sabato 24 gennaio 2026

China’s Belt and Road Initiative

What is it? A brief history, its objectives and a review of its evolution and current state.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative#:~:text=The%20initiative%20was%20launched%20by,21st%20Century%20Maritime%20Silk%20Road.

The Belt and Road Initiative primarily addresses an "infrastructure gap" and thus has the potential to accelerate economic growth across the Asia Pacific, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe. It is a central mechanism of Chinese foreign policy and development finance. The initial focus has been infrastructure investment, education, construction materials, railway and highway, automobile, real estate, power grid, and iron and steel. Already, some estimates list the Belt and Road Initiative as one of the largest infrastructure and investment projects in history, covering more than 68 countries. The BRI outlined six economic corridors for trade and investment connectivity.

The BRI develops new markets for Chinese firms, channels excess industrial capacity overseas, increases China's access to resources, and strengthens its ties with partner countries. The initiative generates its own export demand because Chinese loans enable participating countries to develop infrastructure projects involving Chinese firms, banks and expertise. The infrastructure developed also helps China to address the imbalance between its more developed eastern regions and its less developed western regions.

For developing countries, the BRI is appealing because of the opportunities it offers to alleviate their economic disadvantages relative to Western countries. The BRI offers them infrastructure development, financial assistance, and technical assistance from China. The increase in foreign direct investment and increased trade linkages also increases employment and poverty alleviation for these countries. The link below explains where the BRI stands today.

https://www.sanchez.vc/geocoded-special-reports/the-state-of-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-august-2025 Very good!

By July 2025 roughly 150 countries had signed memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with China under the BRI, although a handful have re-evaluated or withdrawn (Italy in December 2023 and Panama in February 2025). GreenFDC calculates cumulative economic engagement (construction contracts + investment) since 2013 at US $1.308 trillion as of mid-2025. In fact, 2025 saw the highest BRI engagement ever for any year, with USD 128.4 billion in construction contracts and about USD 85.2 billion in investments; China's energy related engagement in 2025 were the highest in any period since the start of the BRI's reaching USD 93 billion.

The BRI’s new strategy:

Smaller – "small and beautiful" projects. After years of megaprojects, Beijing announced in November 2021 that BRI projects should be "small and beautiful"—i.e., better targeted, less wasteful and often co-financed.

Greener – China introduced a green taxonomy in 2020/2021 that put most fossil-fuel projects in a "red" category and committed in September 2021 to stop building new coal-fired power plants abroad. Green investments nonetheless account for a minority of new spending, and fossil-fuel engagements—especially oil and gas in the Middle East—remain significant.

Debt sustainability – China has engaged in debt workouts under the G-20's Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) and Common Framework. For example, China and France co-led a restructuring of US$6.3 billion of Zambia's debt in June 2023. The new emphasis on project finance and syndicated loans (e.g., Peru's Chancay port secured a US$975 million project loan) aims to reduce sovereign exposure

Private-sector participation – Private Chinese firms now lead many BRI investments, whereas state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominated the first decade. This shift reflects domestic overcapacity, the drive to secure critical minerals and technology supply chains in a potential trade-war.

Geoeconomic competition. Alternatives to the BRI include the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), which has mobilised over US$60 billion since 2021 and aims for US$200 billion by 2027; the EU Global Gateway; the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC); Japan's Quality Infrastructure; and GCC sovereign funds. While these initiatives are smaller than the BRI, they shape host-country options and raise standards.

Why Italy withdrew from the BRI and relations today:

https://www.iai.it/en/publications/c05/timing-everything-italy-withdraws-belt-and-road-initiative

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/07/28/italy-and-china-sign-a-3-year-plan-as-italian-leader-meloni-tries-to-reset-relations

https://www.unimpresa.it/disavanzio-italia-cina/70464#:~:text=In%20sei%20anni%20il%20disavanzo,importazioni%20italiane%20dai%20mercati%20cinesi.

https://www.dw.com/en/eu-china-relations-hit-rock-bottom-before-beijing-summit/a-73213412

https://www.economia-italia.com/meloni-asia-contratti-italia-investimenti-2026

https://chinaobservers.eu/italy-china-relations-the-diplomacy-of-conscious-pragmatism/

See the link at the bottom of the page – Italy’s “golden power” rules

Has the BRI helped Africa and Asia to develop?

https://aec.afdb.org/en/papers/does-belt-and-road-initiative-boost-industrialization-empirical-evidence-africa-694

https://caspianpost.com/caucasus-caspian-intelligence/china-s-quiet-expansion-in-central-asia-and-the-caucasus-belt-and-road-strategy

Revently China has reduced lending to Africa

https://www.semafor.com/article/01/23/2026/china-pulls-back-on-funding-african-projects

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2yl88wd3lo

Corruption in Africa remains a challenge to investment and develpment

https://theglobepost.com/2024/08/08/africa-corruption-barrier-investment/

Criticisms of the BRI:

https://vrfbharat.org/why-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-is-failing-with-no-coherent-plan-and-no-end-in-sight/

https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/17/cash-corruption-crumbling-dams-thats-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-10-years-in

https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/chinas-sahel-gamble-falters-as-insurgencies-rage/

However, one should return to the article we looked at before for a more positive view https://www.sanchez.vc/geocoded-special-reports/the-state-of-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-august-2025

While China's leadership promoted a "green, high-quality" BRI at the 2023 forum, 2025 data reveal a return to large fossil-fuel and resource-backed deals.

https://greenfdc.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2025/

Chinese companies are now exporting to the African consumer markets

https://www.cnbc.com/2025/11/24/china-africa-expansion-shifts-infrastructure-resource-mining-consumer-goods-investment.html

A possible line of argument for an essay – Given China’s huge trade surplus (see the link below), it is vital that a significant proportion of these funds is recycled as investment back into the global economy. Countries may have doubts about the planning and effectiveness of particular BRI projects, overall management of the BRI, the environmental effects of the BRI, the risk of a debt-trap for poor countries and the potential export of the Chinese political model or its support for authoritarian regimes, a kind of neocolonialism. However, while all this calls for caution, careful monitoring and oversight and alternative investors and investment initiatives (the US and the EU?) or perhaps partnering China in these investments, blanket oppostion would seem to be unlikely to succeed. The EU is pushing to make sure that trade deals with China are fair while moving to protecting sectors it considers crucial for its economic and geopolitical security. A similar approach will need to be adopted by countries which have joined or are joining the BRI. Cauious cooperation and negotiation after careful assessment of the risks involved.

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-trade-ends-2025-with-record-trillion-dollar-surplus-despite-trump-tariffs-2026-01-14/#:~:text=BEIJING%2C%20Jan%2014%20(Reuters),pressure%20from%20the%20Trump%20administration.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/28/tidal-wave-how-75-nations-face-chinese-debt-crisis-in-2025

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/eu-toughen-trade-stance-china-germany-pivots-2025-11-20/

Italy’s “golden power” rules

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/italys-policy-on-china-the-belt-and-road-gamble-and-its-aftermath/ very clear

Latin America – challenges and opportunities

https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/latin-americas-changing-web-of-risks/

https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/expanding-social-protection-and-addressing-informality-in-latin-america_86c1fd38-en/full-report/introduction_a593b500.html

https://www.iadb.org/en/news/complexities-inequality-latin-america-and-caribbean

https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/nam/en/insights/markets-and-investing/ideas-and-insights/latin-america-in-2026-between-promise-and-pressure-the-answer-is-optionality#:~:text=The%20region's%20underperformance%20is%20rooted,countries%20vulnerable%20to%20external%20shocks.

https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/nam/en/insights/markets-and-investing/ideas-and-insights/latin-america-in-2026-between-promise-and-pressure-the-answer-is-optionality

https://americasmi.com/insights/latin-america-2026-economic-outlook/

https://commission.europa.eu/topics/trade/eu-mercosur-trade-agreement_en#:~:text=The%20EU%20already%20has%20trade,ties%20with%20Latin%20American%20countries.

https://accesspartnership.com/opinion/eu-mercosur-deal-game-changer-europe-latin-america/

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_24_6245

https://earth.org/the-eu-mercosur-deal-comes-with-serious-environmental-and-social-implications/

https://friendsoftheearth.eu/press-release/eu-leaders-approve-toxic-eu-mercosur-deal-amid-uproar-from-communities-small-producers/#:~:text=The%20measures%20do%20too%20little,More%20information%20here.

giovedì 22 gennaio 2026

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney ‘s speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 20 January 2026.

Thank you, Larry. It is both a pleasure, and a duty, to be with you tonight in this pivotal moment that Canada and the world going through.

Today I will talk about a rupture in the world order, the end of a pleasant fiction and the beginning of a harsh reality, where geopolitics, where the large, main power, geopolitics, is submitted to no limits, no constraints.

On the other hand, I would like to tell you that the other countries, especially intermediate powers like Canada, are not powerless. They have the capacity to build a new order that encompasses our values, such as respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the various states.

The power of the less power starts with honesty.

It seems that every day we're reminded that we live in an era of great power rivalry, that the rules based order is fading, that the strong can do what they can, and the weak must suffer what they must.

And this aphorism of Thucydides is presented as inevitable, as the natural logic of international relations reasserting itself.

And faced with this logic, there is a strong tendency for countries to go along to get along, to accommodate, to avoid trouble, to hope that compliance will buy safety.

Well, it won't.

So, what are our options?

In 1978, the Czech dissident Václav Havel, later president, wrote an essay called The Power of the Powerless, and in it, he asked a simple question: how did the communist system sustain itself?

And his answer began with a greengrocer.

Every morning, this shopkeeper places a sign in his window: ‘Workers of the world unite’. He doesn't believe it, no-one does, but he places a sign anyway to avoid trouble, to signal compliance, to get along. And because every shopkeeper on every street does the same, the system persist – not through violence alone, but through the participation of ordinary people in rituals they privately know to be false.

Havel called this “living within a lie”.

The system's power comes not from its truth, but from everyone's willingness to perform as if it were true, and its fragility comes from the same source. When even one person stops performing, when the greengrocer removes his sign, the illusion begins to crack. Friends, it is time for companies and countries to take their signs down.

For decades, countries like Canada prospered under what we called the rules-based international order. We joined its institutions, we praised its principles, we benefited from its predictability. And because of that, we could pursue values-based foreign policies under its protection.

We knew the story of the international rules-based order was partially false that the strongest would exempt themselves when convenient, that trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. And we knew that international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused or the victim.

This fiction was useful, and American hegemony, in particular, helped provide public goods, open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security and support for frameworks for resolving disputes.

So, we placed the sign in the window. We participated in the rituals, and we largely avoided calling out the gaps between rhetoric and reality.

This bargain no longer works. Let me be direct. We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.

Over the past two decades, a series of crises in finance, health, energy and geopolitics have laid bare the risks of extreme global integration. But more recently, great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.

You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration, when integration becomes the source of your subordination.

The multilateral institutions on which the middle powers have relied – the WTO, the UN, the COP – the architecture, the very architecture of collective problem solving are under threat. And as a result, many countries are drawing the same conclusions that they must develop greater strategic autonomy, in energy, food, critical minerals, in finance and supply chains.

And this impulse is understandable. A country that can't feed itself, fuel itself or defend itself, has few options. When the rules no longer protect you, you must protect yourself.

But let's be clear eyed about where this leads.

A world of fortresses will be poorer, more fragile and less sustainable. And there is another truth. If great powers abandon even the pretense of rules and values for the unhindered pursuit of their power and interests, the gains from transactionalism will become harder to replicate.

Hegemons cannot continually monetize their relationships.

Allies will diversify to hedge against uncertainty.

They'll buy insurance, increase options in order to rebuild sovereignty – sovereignty that was once grounded in rules, but will increasingly be anchored in the ability to withstand pressure.

This room knows this is classic risk management. Risk management comes at a price, but that cost of strategic autonomy, of sovereignty can also be shared.

Collective investments in resilience are cheaper than everyone building their own fortresses. Shared standards reduce fragmentations. Complementarities are positive sum. And the question for middle powers like Canada is not whether to adapt to the new reality – we must. The question is whether we adapt by simply building higher walls, or whether we can do something more ambitious.

Now Canada was amongst the first to hear the wake-up call, leading us to fundamentally shift our strategic posture.

Canadians know that our old comfortable assumptions that our geography and alliance memberships automatically conferred prosperity and security – that assumption is no longer valid. And our new approach rests on what Alexander Stubb, the President of Finland, has termed “value-based realism”.

Or, to put another way, we aim to be both principled and pragmatic – principled in our commitment to fundamental values, sovereignty, territorial integrity, the prohibition of the use of force, except when consistent with the UN Charter, and respect for human rights, and pragmatic and recognizing that progress is often incremental, that interests diverge, that not every partner will share all of our values.

So, we're engaging broadly, strategically with open eyes. We actively take on the world as it is, not wait around for a world we wish to be.

We are calibrating our relationships, so their depth reflects our values, and we're prioritizing broad engagement to maximize our influence, given and given the fluidity of the world at the moment, the risks that this poses and the stakes for what comes next.

And we are no longer just relying on the strength of our values, but also the value of our strength.

We are building that strength at home.

Since my government took office, we have cut taxes on incomes, on capital gains and business investment. We have removed all federal barriers to interprovincial trade. We are fast tracking a trillion dollars of investments in energy, AI, critical minerals, new trade corridors and beyond. We're doubling our defence spending by the end of this decade, and we're doing so in ways that build our domestic industries.

And we are rapidly diversifying abroad. We have agreed a comprehensive strategic partnership with the EU, including joining SAFE, the European defence procurement arrangements. We have signed 12 other trade and security deals on four continents in six months. The past few days, we've concluded new strategic partnerships with China and Qatar. We're negotiating free trade pacts with India, ASEAN, Thailand, Philippines and Mercosur.

We're doing something else. To help solve global problems, we're pursuing variable geometry, in other words, different coalitions for different issues based on common values and interests. So, on Ukraine, we're a core member of the Coalition of the Willing and one of the largest per capita contributors to its defence and security.

On Arctic sovereignty, we stand firmly with Greenland and Denmark, and fully support their unique right to determine Greenland's future.

Our commitment to NATO's Article 5 is unwavering, so we're working with our NATO allies, including the Nordic Baltic Gate, to further secure the alliance's northern and western flanks, including through Canada's unprecedented investments in over-the-horizon radar, in submarines, in aircraft and boots on the ground, boots on the ice.

Canada strongly opposes tariffs over Greenland and calls for focused talks to achieve our shared objectives of security and prosperity in the Arctic.

On plurilateral trade, we're championing efforts to build a bridge between the Trans Pacific Partnership and the European Union, which would create a new trading bloc of 1.5 billion people. On critical minerals, we're forming buyers’ clubs anchored in the G7 so the world can diversify away from concentrated supply. And on AI, we're cooperating with like-minded democracies to ensure that we won't ultimately be forced to choose between hegemons and hyper-scalers.

This is not naive multilateralism, nor is it relying on their institutions. It's building coalitions that work – issues by issue, with partners who share enough common ground to act together.

In some cases, this will be the vast majority of nations.

What it's doing is creating a dense web of connections across trade, investment, culture, on which we can draw for future challenges and opportunities.

Middle powers must act together, because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu.

But I'd also say that great powers, great powers can afford for now to go it alone. They have the market size, the military capacity and the leverage to dictate terms. Middle powers do not.

But when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon, we negotiate from weakness. We accept what's offered. We compete with each other to be the most accommodating.

This is not sovereignty. It's the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination. In a world of great power rivalry, the countries in between have a choice – compete with each other for favour, or to combine to create a third path with impact.

We shouldn't allow the rise of hard power to blind us to the fact that the power of legitimacy, integrity and rules will remain strong, if we choose to wield them together – which brings me back to Havel.

What does it mean for middle powers to live the truth?

First, it means naming reality. Stop invoking rules-based international order as though it still functions as advertised. Call it what it is – a system of intensifying great power rivalry, where the most powerful pursue their interests, using economic integration as coercion.

It means acting consistently, applying the same standards to allies and rivals. When middle powers criticize economic intimidation from one direction, but stay silent when it comes from another, we are keeping the sign in the window.

It means building what we claim to believe in, rather than waiting for the old order to be restored. It means creating institutions and agreements that function as described. And it means reducing the leverage that enables coercion – that's building a strong domestic economy. It should be every government's immediate priority.

And diversification internationally is not just economic prudence, it's a material foundation for honest foreign policy, because countries earn the right to principled stands by reducing their vulnerability to retaliation.

Canada has what the world wants. We are an energy superpower. We hold vast reserves of critical minerals. We have the most educated population in the world. Our pension funds are amongst the world's largest and most sophisticated investors. In other words, we have capital, talent… we also have a government with immense fiscal capacity to act decisively. And we have the values to which many others aspire.

Canada is a pluralistic society that works. Our public square is loud, diverse and free. Canadians remain committed to sustainability. We are a stable and reliable partner in a world that is anything but.. A partner that builds and values relationships for the long term.

And we have something else. We have a recognition of what's happening and a determination to act accordingly. We understand that this rupture calls for more than adaptation. It calls for honesty about the world as it is.

We are taking the sign out of the window. We know the old order is not coming back. We shouldn't mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy, but we believe that from the fracture, we can build something bigger, better, stronger, more just. This is the task of the middle powers, the countries that have the most to lose from a world of fortresses and most to gain from genuine cooperation.

The powerful have their power.

But we have something too – the capacity to stop pretending, to name reality, to build our strength at home and to act together.

That is Canada's path. We choose it openly and confidently, and it is a path wide open to any country willing to take it with us. Thank you very much.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btqHDhO4h10

How is the role of NATO evolving? What are the main challenges facing the organization? Developments at the European Defence Agency and cooperation with NATO.

2026 – is NATO in danger of breaking up or becoming unreliable?

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/21/trump-framework-greenland-tariffs-threats

https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/21/politics/military-force-us-greenland-trump

https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/events/transcripts/2026/01/21/nato-secretary-general-at-world-economic-forum-davos

https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/un-anno-di-trump-loccidente-non-e-piu-lo-stesso-227784

https://time.com/7346819/can-trump-pull-united-states-out-of-nato-legal-experts/

https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/the-future-of-nato-is-in-doubt/sa4wgw6j1

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0lx7j1lrwro

https://notesfrompoland.com/2026/01/15/polish-pm-rules-out-sending-troops-to-greenland-says-us-invasion-would-be-end-of-world-as-we-know-it/

https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/groenlandia-meloni-stempera-decisioni-ambito-nato-evitare-divisioni-poi-vede-ceo-17-colossi-giapponesi-AItqAzu

Is there a European alternative to NATO?

https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed

https://united24media.com/latest-news/europe-weighs-new-security-framework-without-nato-amid-trumps-greenland-threats-15139

2025 – should the EU have a nuclear deterrent?

https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2025/09/11/should-europe-develop-its-own-nuclear-deterrent/

https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/04/can-europe-build-its-own-nuclear-umbrella?lang=en&fbclid=PAZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAaaewGQd_NnqW_ztqCmUMGXzl4hAP1tEe3eR0boNq9O85t9Oe9giCwrw5fE_aem_aD2j502ay1yxxYny7YRh4g

https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-tusk-plan-train-poland-men-military-service-russia/

https://www.ifri.org/en/media-external-article/europe-thinks-unthinkable-nuclear-bomb

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Tw1GPjHvF8

https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2025/03/12/the-fact-that-the-debate-on-a-european-nuclear-deterrent-is-open-shows-the-extent-of-the-current-upheaval_6739066_23.html

https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/eu-must-step-nuclear-non-proliferation

https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/france-should-join-natos-nuclear-sharing-arrangements-strengthen-european-deterrence

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_sharing

https://www.visualcapitalist.com/global-nuclear-warhead-stockpiles-1945-2024/

https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2025/04/taking-the-pulse-can-europeans-build-their-independent-extended-nuclear-deterrent?lang=en

How many Italian military personnel are there in missions abroad and where are they?

L’Italia vanta infatti all’attivo più di 40 missioni nel 2024, posizionandosi come primo contributore per le operazioni dell’Ue, secondo contributore della Nato dopo gli Usa – quindi primo tra gli europei – e primo tra i contributori occidentali alle missioni delle Nazioni Unite.

Military personnel: NATO (5.170), ONU (2.764) e UE (742).

From: https://www.affarinternazionali.it/le-missioni-internazionali-2024-quanti-e-dove-sono-i-militari-italiani/

NATO's New Strategic Concept 2022

https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/

https://www.nti.org/atomic-pulse/natos-new-strategic-concept-what-it-is-and-why-it-matters/#:~:text=At%20the%20summit%2C%20NATO%20leaders,alliance's%20new%20and%20enduring%20objectives.

https://www.osorin.it/uploads/model_4/.files/117_item_2.pdf?v=1664283035

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61397478

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/what-next-eu-security-and-defence-0_en

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/110084/%E2%80%9Ceurope-danger-what-next-eu-security-and-defence%E2%80%9D-speech-high-representativevice-president_en the EU’s view

https://www.nato.int/ or https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm NATO-Russia

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50090.htm#:~:text=For%20more%20than%20two%20decades,channels%20of%20communication%20remain%20open.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_191254.htm?selectedLocale=en NATO warning before the Russian invasion

and earlier https://www.nato.int/nato2030/ NATO 2030

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm operations

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_NATO_operations operations

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-the-us-failure-in-afghanistan-wont-break-nato/ withdrawal from Afghanistan

https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/speciale-afghanistan-nato-ritirata-31386

https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/02/01/nato-an-unexpected-driver-of-climate-action/index.html climate action

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm funding

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074 defence spending

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/02/12/nato-countries-defense-spending-gdp-trump/

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074 the US and its partners

NATO and the European Defence Agency

https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/eda-in-short

https://eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue26

https://eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue17/nato-view/enhancing-cooperation-improving-effectiveness-ensuring-coherence

watch?v=3McmcY-3d9I EU-NATO Cooperation Mogherini 9 years ago

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jtrW6ivIuJA EU-NATO Cooperation Borrell 5 years ago

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dfpqdygGV8 Greenland Kallas

However, ‘the European Union (EU) does not have a permanent military command structure along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Allied Command Operations (ACO).’

From: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command_and_control_structure_of_the_European_Union#:~:text=The%20European%20Union%20(EU)%20does,of%20the%20EU's%20CSDP%20missions.

But https://www.eppgroup.eu/newsroom/europe-must-take-command

https://www.euronews.com/business/2026/01/16/can-europes-military-spending-revive-economic-growth#:~:text=Europe%20is%20ramping%20up%20defence,limit%20the%20economic%20pay%2Doff.

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20190612STO54310/defence-how-the-eu-is-boosting-its-security

https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/802-the-four-challenges-facing-european-defence

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1480

This is perhaps the real point – https://www.visionofhumanity.org/europes-military-awakening-and-the-real-challenge-of-defence-integration/

https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/06/11/satellites-space-defense-the-eu-steps-up-efforts-for-a-common-space-strategy-amid-ambitions-and-obstacles/

https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/eu-space-strategy-security-and-defence_en

https://ip-quarterly.com/en/lost-space-europes-role-spatial-defense

https://eda.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/2025/01/22/commissioner-kubilius-calls-for-'big-bang'-in-eu-defence

world military spending by country

https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/military-spending-by-country

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_highest_military_expenditures

https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/unprecedented-rise-global-military-expenditure-european-and-middle-east-spending-surges

https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/sep/14/nato-military-spending-emissions

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/urgently-needed-europeanized-nato-212357 EU military spending compared with Russia

https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2025/06/25/the-hague-summit-declaration last NATO summit

https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/strengthening-natos-eastern-flank NATO’s eastern flank

Enhanced Forward Presence

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhanced_Forward_Presence

https://lc.nato.int/operations/enhanced-forward-presence-efp with map

https://www.max-security.com/resources/global-forecast/nato-future-strategy-2025/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PX4a6d3qNbU Mattarella visiting the troops

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YnDNOMbu0bg

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ACNW-PMYuMY Meloni

https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/operations-and-missions/nato-operations-and-missions NATO Missions

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en#11929 EU Missions

US bases and NATO installations in Italy

https://militarybases.com/overseas/italy/

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/03/us-military-base-expansion-italy

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:NATO_installations_in_Italy

https://rappnato.esteri.it/en/litalia-e-la-nato/ the US and Italy

NATO Funding – How it works. Read all sections

https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/funding-nato

Cybersecurity cooperation

https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/cyber-defence

https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2024/07/10/allies-agree-new-nato-integrated-cyber-defence-centre

https://nextgendefense.com/nato-cyber-defense-center/

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-union-and-nato-hold-first-structured-dialogue-cyber-0_en

Lessons from Afghanistan?

https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/legacy-wcm/media_pdf/2021/12/pdf/2112-factsheet-afgh-lessons-en.pdf

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/i-wrote-natos-lessons-from-afghanistan-now-i-wonder-what-have-we-learned/

https://www.geopolitica.info/la-guerra-in-afghanistan-perche-siamo-andati-e-cosa-abbiamo-imparato-parla-il-gen-cuzzelli/

https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/lessons-wests-long-war-afghanistan-35961

and Libya? https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/lessons-libya-how-not-intervene

NATO has developed a ballistic missile defense system in Europe for the protection of NATO forces and the populations of NATO member states.

https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/ballistic-missile-defence

https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/nato-integrated-air-and-missile-defence

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm#:~:text=NATO%20Ballistic%20Missile%20Defence%20(NATO,task%20of%20deterrence%20and%20defence%20.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-and-nato-officials-inaugurate-missile-defense-shield-in-romania-1463056944

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm

EUBAM Libya supports the Libyan authorities in developing border management and security at the country’s land, sea and air borders. As a civilian crisis management mission with a capacity-building mandate, EUBAM assists Libyan authorities at the strategic and operational levels. The work is carried out through advising, training and mentoring Libyan counterparts in strengthening the border services in accordance with international standards and best practices, and by advising the Libyan authorities on the development of a national Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy.

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eubam-libya_en?s=327

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eubam-libya/empowering-libyan-coast-guard-and-advancing-libyas-maritime-security_en

The European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Irini (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) was launched on 31 March 2020

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Irini

Operation Sea Guardian is NATO’s maritime security operation in the Mediterranean

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136233.htm

EUNAVFOR ASPIDES is an EU military operation contributing to the protection of freedom of navigation, to safeguarding maritime security, especially for merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf under the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eunavfor-aspides_en?s=410381

Operation Atalanta, formally European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia, is an ongoing counter-piracy military operation at sea off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Atalanta#:~:text=Operation%20Atalanta%2C%20formally%20European%20Union,in%20the%20Western%20Indian%20Ocean.

All of this should make us think carefully about what kind of operations NATO and the EU are able or not able to carry out / are willing or unwilling to carry out / should or should not carry out, and in what circumstances and under what conditions they are likely to be successful.

See the Dropbox for the full text.