For the content but also for translation practice.
English for Diplomacy
This blog is for students of English at the SIOI in Rome. However, the opinions expressed here are my own and should not be taken to represent those of the SIOI or anyone else.
lunedì 4 novembre 2024
domenica 3 novembre 2024
Is the leadership of the US and the West within the international community coming to an end? Can China take over that role?
A comparison of the G7 and the BRICS+ economies (see also the notes on the BRICS on the blog about the BRICS+ in terms of its aims and unity)
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/charted-comparing-the-gdp-of-brics-and-the-g7-countries/
but in GDP PPP terms
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1412425/gdp-ppp-share-world-gdp-g7-brics/
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/economic-growth-forecasts-for-g7-and-brics-countries-in-2024/
https://www.statista.com/statistics/254281/gdp-of-the-bric-countries/
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1412425/gdp-ppp-share-world-gdp-g7-brics/
https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/an-expanding-brics-seeks-to-reform-not-replace-the-global-order/
https://www.bcg.com/publications/2024/brics-enlargement-and-shifting-world-order
A comparison of the US and Chinese
economies
Nominal GDP 2024
The US nominal GDP forecast by the
IMF is $28.78 trillion
China’s nominal GDP forecast by the
IMF is $18.53 trillion
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)
GDP PPP (based
on purchasing power
parity) 2024
The US GDP PPP forecast by the IMF
is $27.97 trillion
China’s GDP PPP forecast by the IMF
is $ 35.04 trillion
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)
The
IMF estimates US GDP growth for 2024 at 2.7%, and for China at
4.6%
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/WEOWORLD/CAN/CHN/USA
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/WEOWORLD/CAN/USA/CHN
Historically, the U.S. public debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) has increased during wars
and recessions and subsequently declined. The ratio of debt to GDP may decrease
as a result of a government surplus or via growth of GDP and inflation. For
example, debt held by the public as a share of GDP peaked just after World War
II (113% of GDP in 1945) but then fell over the following 35 years. In recent
decades, aging demographics and rising healthcare costs have led to concern about the
long-term sustainability of the federal government's fiscal policies. The aggregate, gross amount that
Treasury can borrow is limited by the United States debt ceiling but this was raised in December 2021
to meet the costs of the Covid-19 pandemic.
In March 2024, the public debt of the United States
was around $34.59 trillion
https://www.statista.com/statistics/273294/public-debt-of-the-united-states-by-month/
This is
an estimated at 126.86% of forecast GDP in 2024
Who
holds the US public debt? Most of the debt is held by the US public and US federal agencies (see charts).
https://usafacts.org/articles/which-countries-own-the-most-us-debt/
Foreign
holders of United States treasury debt – according to
the Federal Reserve and U.S. Department of the Treasury, foreign countries held
a total of 7.4 trillion U.S. dollars (24%) in U.S. treasury securities as of
January 2023. Of the total 7.4 trillion held by foreign countries, Japan held
1.1 trillion (3.6%) and China held 0.89 trillion (2.9%).
https://www.statista.com/statistics/246420/major-foreign-holders-of-us-treasury-debt/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_United_States
January 2024 figures (very similar)
https://www.statista.com/statistics/246420/major-foreign-holders-of-us-treasury-debt/
more on the US debt
https://www.pgpf.org/infographic/the-national-debt-is-now-more-than-34-trillion-what-does-that-mean
https://usafacts.org/articles/which-countries-own-the-most-us-debt/
https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2024/04/how-much-is-the-national-debt-what-are-the-different-measures-used
https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/americas-finance-guide/national-debt/
The United
States is on an "unsustainable" path with regard to its national debt
and it is time to address the issue, Federal Reserve chief Jerome Powell (July
2024)
The consensus is that he is
right and the debt will continue to rise without an attempt to balance
government spending
This table on this link shows the
growing US national debt
https://www.investopedia.com/us-national-debt-by-year-7499291
The credit rating for the US ranges
from AAA to AA+ but with a nrgative
outlook.
https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/rating
See also:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_federal_budget
So given its huge public debt, some commentators argue that the US has now
begun an inevitable decline as the dominant economic power, a decline that may
soon erode not only its economic position but also impact its military
dominance. However, according to other experts the relative decline of US power
is at least partially exaggerated and can better be seen as an opportunity for
Washington to redefine its strategic commitments, renegotiate alliances with
its partners and free up resources to relaunch its economy.
China’s
debt is estimated at 88.58% of forecast GDP in 2024
However, the economic outlook is
seen as negative at the moment
https://time.com/6835935/china-debt-housing-bubble/
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/apr/10/ratings-agency-downgrades-china-debt-outlook-over-economic-uncertainty
https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/five-big-uncertainties-facing-chinese-economy-2024
Given all this, the debate
between pessimists about US global leadership and more sanguine observers has
intensified. The former predict a serious and rapid decline in US influence and
the growth of a much more multipolar world strongly influenced and perhaps led
by China, while the latter are confident that for the foreseeable future the US
will be able to maintain its leadership role in international relations.
Moreover, they argue that if we consider the West as a whole, rather
than the US alone, then, despite Europe’s continuing economic difficulties,
China cannot really hope to achieve dominance in terms of economic and military
power. In addition, the world’s principal global institutions are all
expressions of the West’s system of values and China seems basically to be in
the process of joining this system, adapting to it and trying to gain more
influence within it, rather than wanting to overturn it or see it collapse as
the Soviet Union did, and perhaps the Russian Federation today would like.
So, in spite of the economic crisis in 2008 and the alarming economic challenges
of the pandemic and the current war in Ukraine, forecasts of definitive decline
seem premature and the US remains the principal power at the center of the
international stage.
As for military power, the US
military budget still represented 37% of total global military spending, $916
billion in 2023. Global spending was $2.443 trillion. China spent $296 billion
and Russia $109 billion. So the 2023 figures show the US military budget as
roughly 3 times that of China, and even
in PPP terms still more than twice as much.
The US spent almost as much as
China , Russia, India, Saudi Arabia, the UK, Germany, Ukraine, France, Japan and
South Korea combined in 2023.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures
Moreover, NATO, the US-led, now 32-member alliance, accounted for an estimated $1.341 trillion (55%) of a total of $2,443
trillion for global military spending in 2023
However, if the military spending of
other US allies (e.g. Ukraine, Japan,
Australia, South Korea etc.) is added, this figure rises and suggests that the
US remains, at least potentially, the dominant military power in international
relations.
As of October 2023 the US has over
100 major military bases in 46 countries (750 including smaller ones in 80
countries) around the world compared with: Russia which has bases in 14, France in 10, India in 6, Tùrkiye in
10, Britain in 14, India in 5 and China in 3 (only one acknowledged).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Russian_military_bases_abroad
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_overseas_military_bases
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_overseas_military_bases#United_States
Finally, the US was still the world leader
for investment in research and development in 2022 (although China is not far
behind) and in AI research and technology in 2024
https://www.techopedia.com/top-10-countries-leading-in-ai-research-technology
and in the list of the top universities worldwide, 12 out of 15 are American according to one list and 10
out of 20 according to another. Others are European, Australian, one in
Singapore and only one is Chinese.
https://www.topuniversities.com/student-info/choosing-university/worlds-top-100-universities
https://worldtop20.org/global-universities/?gad_source=1&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIt6nV1ID3hQMV0ZCDBx3GAAeLEAAYASAAEgIYu_D_BwE
However, over the last decade, the US share of global GDP (PPP) fell to 15.2 %
(2024) (25.3% in nominal GDP terms)
while China´s share of global GDP
PPP increased to 19% (while the EU accounted for 13.3% of global GDP PPP). As
already mentioned, in nominal terms the US remains ahead, but at this pace of
growth China is likely to overtake US nominal GDP in the 2030. So, although US
strength is evident, its relative decline is real.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)
China has set itself a GDP growth
target of 5% for 2024
https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202403/06/content_WS65e7d31fc6d0868f4e8e4bdd.html
On
the other hand, GDP per capita (both nominal and PPP) clearly
indicates that in 2022 American citizens were still far richer than their
Chinese counterparts (5 times (nominal) and 3.4 (PPP) times richer).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)_per_capita
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita
Per capita income is usually a good
indicator of how much money governments can generate in taxes for government
projects at home and abroad.
Moreover, the Chinese authorities
may face some obstacles as they try to steer their economy away from a model
where growth is based on exports to one where domestic consumption plays a much
greater role. These problems include growing debt within the Chinese economic
system, potential domestic unrest, continuing high levels of savings and
fast-growing but relatively low domestic consumption, an aging population
(which will become a significant factor in the next 20 years), an ongoing struggle
to improve the health care system, the
fight against widespread corruption, and the current housing market downturn.
https://www.theglobaltreasurer.com/2024/04/29/understanding-chinas-real-estate-crisis/
https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/chinas-war-corruption-turns-into-high-wire-act-2024-01-18/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10292030/
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-68595450
https://time.com/6555949/china-silver-economy-aging-population-plan/
As China moves to respond to these
challenges its labor costs are likely to begin to rise and this may make China
less attractive to foreign investors
https://ins-globalconsulting.com/news-post/labor-cost-china/
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-023-02180-1
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268121000329
According
to the World Bank, more than a third of the debt of poor counties is owed to
China
Here
are the top ten counties in debt to China:
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/ranked-the-top-20-countries-in-debt-to-china/
The reputation of the Chinese model and its soft
power has also been damaged by growing domestic repression
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/china
https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china/report-china/
https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/11/china-no-letup-xi-jinpings-repressive-rule
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/11/01/china-tibet-identity-cultural-genocide/
https://www.cfr.org/report/chinas-collapsing-global-image
https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/china-is-making-support-for-democracy-a-crime-in-hong-kong/
https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/carrie-lams-departure-signals-a-further-crackdown-in-hong-kong/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xinjiang_internment_camps
https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/the-underlying-politics-of-poverty-alleviation-in-tibet/
The
EU is now following a de-risking and de-coupling strategy
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2024/754446/EXPO_STU(2024)754446_EN.pdf
https://apcoworldwide.com/blog/the-new-world-of-europe-china-trade-relations/
Are
we facing the start of a new Cold War as Russia and China work more closely
together?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Cold_War
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2024/01/04/world/2024-shape-of-power/
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53104730
China holds very large foreign
exchange reserves
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_foreign-exchange_reserves
https://tradingeconomics.com/china/foreign-exchange-reserves
However, as stated above, of the total 7.4
trillion dollar US debt held by foreign countries, Japan held 1.1 trillion
(3.6%) and China held 0.89 trillion (2.9%).
https://www.statista.com/statistics/246420/major-foreign-holders-of-us-treasury-debt/
The US long accused China of
currency manipulation, keeping the Yuan/Renminbi
at a low exchange rate value in order to boost exports, but it has risen and nw
seems relatively in value and the
U.S. Department of the Treasury does not list China as a currency manipulator
in 2024.
The Yuan/Renminbi
is now increasingly popular for global payments
The difficult US-China trade
relationship
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship
Meanwhile, China is the principal
stake-holder in the BRICS’ New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). China is also a main
key trading partner for Africa and an important investor (with the EU and to a
lesser extent, the US). Trade with Africa fell dramatically in the first
quarter of 2020 but has now rebounded to new heights. Will this strengthen
support for China in Africa, not only as an economic investor but also as a
political ally?
https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2024/04/01/china-africa-economic-bulletin-2024-edition/
https://epthinktank.eu/2024/02/13/russia-in-africa-an-atlas/africa-s-main-trade-partners/
https://disinfo.africa/chinas-authoritarian-export-to-africa-83d3fcc8a991
And with its Belt and Road Initiative China is becoming a major investor and source of investment
capital for many developing countries, which will increase both its economic
and political leverage with these countries.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative
The
US has imposed a series of sanctions on China, for economic, political and
human rights reasons
https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/ai-chips-for-china-face-additional-us-restrictions/
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/2021-u-s-sanctions-year-in-review-1657396/
under
President Trump there was a trade war between the US and China. President Biden
reversed many but not all of those
tariffs
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/26/politics/china-tariffs-biden-policy/index.html
The
EU and China
‘The EU sees China as a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor
and a systemic rival. However, EU-China relations have become increasingly
complex due to a growing number of irritants. China has become less open to the
world and more repressive at home, while taking a more assertive posture
abroad, resorting to economic coercion, boycotts of European goods, and export
controls on critical raw materials.’
From https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-china-relations-factsheet_en
And the EU imposed tariffs on
electrical vehicles made in China in October 2024, claiming unfair competition
High levels of personal savings are
thought to represent one of the most striking characteristics of the Chinese
economy
https://www.ft.com/content/cc40794b-abbb-4677-8a2a-4b10b12b6ff5
In 2022, household consumption
accounted for just 38 percent of China’s GDP.
By comparison, private spending
made up 68 percent of the GDP in the United States that same year.
https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2024/2/19/year-of-the-dragon-china-faces-critical-moment-in-push-to-revive-economy
(good comment on China’s economy)
Investments stood at a very high
level estimated at about 42.1% of GDP for 2024
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1197064/china-total-investment-as-gdp-share/
twice that of the US at 20.7%. in
2023
Along with massive investments in
industrial infrastructure (a good indicator of future competitivity) there has
also been a fall in property prices in urban, industrial areas with significant
social consequences.
https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/08/china-doubles-down-on-manufacturing-leaving-real-estate-behind.html
Moreover, the Chinese government is
now having to try to cope with the rising demand for social services by
shifting resources from other kinds of investments to welfare.
What if the
US chooses not to lead and adopts a more isolationist policy?
This is a more difficult question to
respond to, especially given the role of isolationism in US history.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_non-interventionism#Between_the_World_Wars
The US seemed to have partially retreated
from world affairs under President Trump. President Trump's foreign policy
stance sounded isolationist at times (the Paris climate agreement, the Mexican
border, comments about NATO partners, withdrawal from the Iran deal, the ban on
Muslim visitors to the US from some Islamic countries, US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (the
“TPP”), the reintroduction of tariffs on a wide range of
goods, the withdrawal of more troops from Syria and Afghanistan), but hard line
at others (its position on China, supporting Israel, against terrorism, against
Iran, against Maduro in Venezuela, withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty). Certainly,
Trump’s foreign policy was more unilateral, much more based on narrowly
perceived national interests and involved much less consultation with US
allies. In contrast, President Biden wanted the US to return to cooperation and
consultation and its traditional role, but to just what extent it has become
more cautious is not clear since it faces the constraints of domestic political
opposition and an expanding national debt.
https://eastasiaforum.org/2022/03/11/fractured-domestic-politics-hamstrings-us-foreign-policy/
A re-evaluation and reduction in US
strategic commitments in some areas in order to exercise more influence in
others seems likely. After the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the European continent lost relevance in the eyes of America as
the threat level was reduced. However, events in Ukraine in 2014 and growing
tension with Russia forced a review of this policy and the launching of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence mission.
The
Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022,
however, has clearly brought, the US, NATO and the EU together
https://www.freiheit.org/nato-g7-and-eu-come-together-show-western-unity
The US formally withdrew its last
'combat troops' from Iraq in December 2011 and from Afghanistan in December
2014. It reduced its presence in both countries to 2,500 at the end of 2020.
The Biden administration’s withdrawal
of the remainder of its troops from Afghanistan in 2021 led to the collapse of
the government and the return to power of the Taliban
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/08/15/world/taliban-afghanistan-news
The
future of the US pivot to Asia is unclear but there has been a build-up of US
naval forces in the Western Pacific in response to
North Korean threats and perceived Chinese 'expansionism' and Trump talked of a
'free and open Indo-Pacific ' region with the US not seeking domination but
rather a partnership with strong, independent nations willing to play by the
rules, see the Asia
Reassurance Initiative Act. Biden has continued and strengthened this strategy
https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/biden-asia-turning-indo-pacific-reality-35138
The Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (QSD), colloquially the Quad,
is a strategic security dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States that is maintained by talks
between member countries. The diplomatic and military arrangement was
widely viewed as a response to increased Chinese economic and military power,
and the Chinese government responded to the Quadrilateral dialogue by issuing
formal diplomatic protests to its members, calling it the "Asian NATO". India’s membership of this
group suggests that the BRICS+ countries will not necessarily be aligned on security
issues.
China is aware of the policy being
adopted by the US and clearly sees it as an attempt to undermine its growing
influence in the region. Tensions over developments regarding Taiwan are also
indicative of the frictions which are perhaps inevitable as a rapidly growing
regional power challenges a global power whose resources, while vast, are now
limited. If China continues to grow at current rates but fails to democratize
and develop towards the Western model, then a strengthening of security ties
between China’s neighbors, many of which are democratic states is a likely
response to safeguard their independence and shared values. Other smaller,
non-democratic neighbors of China may be drawn towards cooperation with the US
simply to balance the influence of China (e.g. Vietnam).
https://fulcrum.sg/vietnamese-perceptions-in-a-changing-sino-us-relationship/
More importantly, the combined
economic resources (in terms of GDP) and military resources of the West (NATO
in its narrowest sense, perhaps the OECD in its widest sense) as a whole is and
will remain beyond the capacity of China
to challenge. US military spending alone is three times that of China (2024).
Certainly, China’s power and influence is going to grow both regionally and
globally, perhaps in partnership with Russia at the UN and through the BRICS
group. However, there may be an alternative scenario to confrontation. China is
a major stakeholder in the current international order, as a permanent member
of the UN Security Council, an important WTO and IMF member, and, above all, as
a state holding large foreign currency reserves and one which also has growing
overseas investments , although FDIs in China have fallen significantly
So even though China may continue to
stand on its sovereignty and use nationalist rhetoric that defies international
comment (on issues such as human rights in China, its lack of democracy and the
situation in Tibet and Hong Kong) as interference in its domestic affairs, it
is probable that its stake in the existing global order will continue to grow
and that, although it may try at times to make the liberal order rather less
liberal, it will, nevertheless, have good reason to adopt a policy of
accommodation and cooperation rather than one of confrontation.
In the end perhaps it is the definition of what we mean by the ‘West’ that is
of paramount importance in today’s world. Once that meant Europe and North
America, plus countries like Australia and New Zealand. It would be difficult
today not to include Japan. And then there is the OECD. More importantly, it is
the core liberal democratic values enshrined in the main global institutions
from the UN down which best define the West. These are values which many countries (Brazil, India, but many more in
Latin America and Africa and Southern Asia) and not only the richer, developed ones but developing ones
too, have invested in, or are investing in, and which increasingly represent
the normative political expectations (how things should be) for ordinary people
all over the world, even those who
live in autocracies. The wave of democratization in the 1990s and at least
part of the political hopes expressed in the early days of the Arab Spring
suggest that the West in this sense is very much alive and flourishing, with or
without US leadership. And a ‘West’ which is global and multipolar, rather than
simply a US-led NATO, may be a very positive evolution. Strangely, al-Qaeda and
Islamic State, in describing the UN and other international agencies as agents
of Western cultural imperialism may simply be acknowledging the extent to which
once-Western values are now becoming universal.
It is true that in the last few
years, we have witnessed a rise in nationalism and authoritarianism
https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/understanding-global-rise-authoritarianism
but this is likely to be a response
to and protest against the excesses of globalization, rather than real
disillusion with or disaffection from democracy and civil rights. Those who
doubt the attraction of the West’s cultural model should perhaps pay more
attention to the number of migrants and refugees for most of whom the West
remains the preferred destination in terms of their hopes for prosperity,
security and freedom.
Note – the West in modern English is not normally used as a synonym for
European colonialism (I think this is mainly because European colonialism –
often based on slavery and doctrines of racial superiority – is now seen as
something clearly in contrast with many basic, modern Western values). It is
mainly used in international relations to refer to those countries evolving
towards liberal democracy and a free (today usually mixed) market economy, from
the late 18th century, through the 19th century and up to
1945. Since the end of the Second World War, it has been used to describe first
NATO and other allies outside NATO (like Australia) and then gradually to
include all those countries which generally embrace Western values.
More background material
US economy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_United_States
China
is responding to the US presence in the Pacific and expanded its economic
cooperation in the Pacific, first by signing the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2020
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_Comprehensive_Economic_Partnership
and
by applying to join the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Sept 2021,
although this seems unlikely at the moment
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/china-moves-to-join-the-cptpp-but-dont-expect-a-fast-pass/
It can thus present itself as a
promoter of free trade agreements. Simultaneously, China is carrying out a
massive economic and diplomatic initiative in Central Asia with the goal of
reestablishing the old “Silk Road”.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Belt_One_Road_Initiative
This initiative has led to wider
cooperation with many countries, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, aimed at creating a
safe-area for international trade and at ensuring gas and oil supplies to
China, which are extremely important to China’s industrial production. This
initiative has also led to competition between China and the EU for influence
in the region and for gas and oil supplies. However, this competition may
actually lead to cooperation between China and the EU in Central Asia, in terms
of building new pipelines, which could have both Europe and China as final
delivery points. As China has become more involved in the
international community from an economic point of view, some political
cooperation has followed. In recent years, Chinese
military personnel have taken part in UN missions in Cambodia, the Republic of
the Congo, Liberia, Sudan and Lebanon. In 2015, a combat deployment was sent to
South Sudan, where China has significant oil investments. In addition,
China’s navy has actively participated in the anti-piracy operations in the
Gulf of Aden.
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-gosset/china-us-relations_b_1998484.html
https://chinapower.csis.org/china-un-mission/
Basically, the expansion of China’s
economic interests around the world has led to growing political awareness
among the Chinese leadership of the need to protect those interests and engage
on international issues, especially those closely related to international
security. This has resulted in China playing a more active role within the international
community. This trend culminated with the agreement signed with Djibouti
concerning the creation of China’s first real military base abroad in order to
secure trade between China and Africa. However, in the Middle East region,
China has taken a carefully balanced position in the dispute between Sunni and
Shia Muslims and between their main sponsors, namely Saudi Arabia and Iran. In
fact, the publication of China’s Arab Policy Paper shows that the China wants
to adopt a global approach to the Islamic world without taking sides. Such a
policy will make it possible for China to deal with both Saudi Arabia and Iran
to obtain from both parties an agreement on oil supplies, which is fundamental
for China’s economic growth. It also explains China’s willingness to act as a
mediator between the US and Iran (which resulted in the 5+1 Nuclear Agreement
with Iran and in the lifting of economic sanctions) and in the Syrian civil
war.
Potential
areas of disagreement between China and the West
China’s support for Russia’s war in
Ukraine deepens frictions with the US and EU
As mentioned above China’s neighbors
are worried about its expansionist ambitions in the East Asian area e.g. the
dispute over the Senkaku Islands, located in the South China Sea and claimed by
both China and Japan.
China is the world’s biggest
polluter in terms of CO2 emissions. And the US is its second biggest. However,
China took part in a series of international conferences and welcomed the
agreement at the Climate Conference, COP21, in Paris in December 2015, and made
a joint commitment with the US in 2021.
Meanwhile, although China is the undisputed global green tech leader there are doubts about its commitment to making real changes rapidly,
given that the agreement is not binding in any practical way.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fs6WokEuweU
China’s domestic human rights record
has worsened in recent years, including the use of the death penalty and
repression of political and religious opposition leaders, critics and
dissidents (Hong Kong) and discrimination against minorities (e.g. Tibetans, Uyghurs
and Christians).
https://qz.com/993601/china-uyghur-terrorism/
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/12/chinas-dangerous-ethnic-policies-in-xinjiang/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senkaku_Islands_dispute
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345
http://fortune.com/2016/01/19/taiwan-tsai-ing-wen-china/
http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/china-and-climate-change-three-things-to-watch-after-paris/
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/china
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/29/china-new-hong-kong-law-roadmap-repression
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/31/tibet-china-repression-xinjiang-sinicization/
China and Russia as a combined challenge
to the West
https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/russia-china-challenge-in-us-eu-relations/
https://www.politico.eu/article/china-xi-jinping-has-europe-eu-summit-russia/
https://www.voanews.com/a/china-not-russia-still-tops-list-of-threats-to-us/7534999.html
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/11/us-intelligence-china-russia
https://globaleurope.eu/globalization/china-and-russia-big-brotherly-relations-challenge-europe/