Italy’s Permanent
Representative Ambassador Giorgio Marrapodi June 2026
Current context
UNSC operational paralysis
The United Nations Security Council suffers from deep
operational paralysis driven by the P5 members’ (Permanent Five) geopolitical
rivalries, frequent veto use by Russia, the US and China (but not by France and
the UK since Dec. 1989), and other major powers or regional powers ignoring and
violating international law. Tensions involving such powers over conflicts in
Ukraine, the Middle East (Gaza, Iran), Sudan, and Myanmar block consensus.
Permanent members of the UNSC use or threaten to use their veto to defend their
interests, shield allies or block resolutions, rendering the body ineffective
during critical crises. Where the UNSC does manage to issue a resolution, it
often lacks the means to enforce its decision.
https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/10/1168505
US funding cuts to UN and the closure of
UN programs and offices
The United States has formally withdrawn from 31
United Nations entities and dozens of other international bodies. The U.S.
ceased participation in and funding for 31 UN agencies, including the World
Health Organization (WHO), UN Women, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN
Human Rights Council (UNHRC), UNESCO, and the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), alongside ongoing defunding of UNRWA (United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East).
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/18/united-nations-un-2026-budget-job-losses-us-funding-cuts
https://www.reuters.com/world/un-slash-quarter-peacekeepers-globally-over-lack-cash-2025-10-08/
Nationalism
The United Nations (UN) is facing an existential
crisis driven by a worldwide rise in nationalism and a severe lack of
international cooperation. Over the past decade, the foundational principle of
multilateralism—the idea that countries should work together to solve global
problems—has been increasingly rejected in favor of "native-first"
politics.
https://asiatimes.com/2026/02/economic-nationalism-giving-rise-to-a-zero-sum-world/
The mismatch in UN Peacekeeping
"Rich nations pay, poor nations fight." This
stark phrase summarizes the geopolitical mismatch in United Nations Peacekeeping. The core dynamic is driven by
a profound divide between who authorizes and finances the missions (or perhaps underfund
the missions), and who
actually risks lives on the ground. Rich Nations Decide and Fund: The
permanent members of the UN Security Council hold the political power to
mandate missions. They and other rich nations also provide a large portion of
the financial budget. Poor Nations Provide the Troops:
Developing nations - predominantly from South Asia and Africa (such as Nepal,
India, Rwanda, and Bangladesh) - supply the bulk of the "Blue
Helmets" deployed to high-risk zones.
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2026/06/statement-by-italys-permanent-representative-amb-giorgio-marrapodi-on-behalf-of-the-uniting-for-consensus-group-the-intergovernmental-negotiations-on-the-question-of-equitable-representation-on-a/
Deputy Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani’s address to the 8ist United
Nations General Assembly Sept. 2026
https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2026/09/il-ministro-antonio-tajani-interviene-allassemblea-generale-delle-nazioni-unite/
UN Secretary-General António Guterres Sept. 2026
https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/81/unsg_en.pdf
https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/secretary-general-united-nations
https://press.un.org/en/2026/ga12785.doc.htm
https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/09/1168323
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statements/2026-01-15/secretary-generals-remarks-the-general-assembly-priorities-for-2026
Statement by Italy at the UN Security Council’s Open Debate
Nov. 2025
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2025/11/statement-by-italy-at-the-un-security-councils-open-debate-on-working-methods-of-the-security-council/
Statement of Italy at the Open Debate on The United Nations
Oct. 2025
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2025/10/statement-of-italy-at-the-open-debate-on-the-united-nations-organization-looking-into-the-future/
President Meloni’s address to the 80th United Nations
General Assembly
Sept. 2025
https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-address-80th-united-nations-general-assembly/29851
then
https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/what-security-council#:~:text=ORGANIZATION,Headquarters%20in%20New%20York%20City
Also interesting https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2023/09/a-un-expert-on-the-institutions-successes-failures-and-continued-relevance?lang=en
UN efforts, led by
the Secretary-General, aimed at internal reform and re-engaging member states
and the global public, particularly youth, in the UN’s work and goals:
United to Reform
(2019)
https://reform.un.org/
https://reform.un.org/news/news
(for more detail and
outcomes see the Back to the wider reform of the UN section below).
the UN Pact for the
Future (2024) https://www.un.org/pact-for-the-future/en
https://unfoundation.org/blog/post/pact-decoded-imagine-a-future-if-world-leaders-get-it-right/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=19554869486&gbraid=0AAAAAD9kiAdXg90wzpPL1lJ0uDxG-vD4K&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIm9GC2IWAkQMVWI6DBx1yLSumEAAYASAAEgLIGPD_BwE
and the UN80 Initiative
(2025) https://www.un.org/un80-initiative/en
Italy’s Stance
Italy advocates for a pragmatic reform, aiming
to make the United Nations – particularly the UN Security Council – more inclusive,
accountable, transparent, effective, efficient and responsive to today’s global
challenges. and much more representative, giving more voice to poorer,
developing members and rejecting the creation of new permanent seats or
privileges. It does this while leading the Uniting for Consensus (UfC)
group.
How Italy Wants the UN to Be Reformed
- It
opposes New Permanent Seats:
Italy argues that adding new permanent members (with or without a veto)
creates new hierarchies and fails to fix decision-making paralysis. India,
Brazil, Japan and Germany argue that they should have permanent seats.
- The
"Intermediate Approach":
As part of the UfC model, Italy proposes creating a category of
longer-term non-permanent seats with the possibility of immediate
re-election, allowing for better regional rotation and representation for
all 193 member states.
- Curbing
the Veto: Italy views the veto power of
the P5 (China, France, UK, Russia, US) as anachronistic and contrary to
the sovereign equality of states, advocating for self-restraint and
greater accountability.
- Operational
Efficiency: Italy pushes for a leaner
"glass house" that cuts bureaucracy, eliminates waste, and
addresses modern cross-cutting threats like climate change, food security,
and human trafficking as core peace and security issues.
Key points from Italian speeches at the UN
- Prime
Minister Giorgia Meloni (80th UN General Assembly, September 2025):
- Stated
that multilateralism is empty without functional institutions and called
for a realistic, sovereignty-respecting reform.
- Noted
that the "Glass Palace" must become a "Glass House"
that minimizes waste and avoids creating a "better-represented
few".
- Ambassador
Giorgio Marrapodi / Permanent Mission (June and August 2026):
- Reaffirmed
that the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) remain the only legitimate
platform for reform and stressed that the process must be
member-state-driven.
- Emphasized
building an inclusive, transparent, and democratic Security Council
capable of preventing conflicts from disrupting global food supplies and
regional stability
Background: Reform of the UN Security
Council
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council
https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16201.doc.htm
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-10/the-united-nations-looking-into-the-future.php
Italy and reform of the
UN Security Council
https://www.esteri.it/en/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/organizzazioni_internazionali/onu/la_riforma/
https://lavocedinewyork.com/onu/2025/05/21/riforma-onu-anti-paralisi-visioni-divergenti-si-sfidano-al-panel-del-gei-a-new-york/
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2025/05/statement-by-h-e-ambassador-maurizio-massari-on-behalf-of-the-uniting-for-consensus-group-the-intergovernmental-negotiations-on-the-question-of-equitable-representation-on-and-increase-in-the-member-2/
The Uniting for Consensus
(UfC) group
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniting_for_Consensus#:~:text=Uniting%20for%20Consensus%20(UfC)%2C,the%20United%20Nations%20Security%20Council.
The UfC proposal for UN Security Council Reform
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/italy-and-the-united-nations/uniting-for-consensus-ufc/
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2025/09/uniting-for-consensus-joint-statement-on-the-reform-of-the-un-security-council/
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2025/01/statement-by-h-e-ambassador-maurizio-massari-on-behalf-of-the-uniting-for-consensus-group-at-the-the-intergovernmental-negotiations-on-the-question-of-equitable-representation-on-and-increase-in-the/
The following text with
updates could be the basis for an essay on UNSC reform: https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/2023_pirozzi_grasping-the-nettle.pdf
a range in the number of
seats for each area seems to be left open to be agreed, see page 9
https://onuitalia.com/2023/01/29/unsc-reform-massari-ufcs-proposal-would-enhance-regional-representation/
https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2023/03/joint-press-release-of-the-uniting-for-consensus-group/
In March 2024, Ambassador Massari talked about a maximum of 27 (instead of 25 or 26 in earlier
proposals) Security Council members, so there is obviously still space
for flexibility. Questions like the exact length of the term of the
semi-permanent seats (3-5 years?) still need to be decided, so the current
proposal is a draft that would need to be further negotiated and finalised. See
this link:
https://italyun.esteri.it/it/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2024/03/statement-by-h-e-ambassador-maurizio-massari-on-behalf-of-the-uniting-for-consensus-group-the-intergovernmental-negotiations-on-the-question-of-equitable-representation-on-and-increase-in-the-membe-2/
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/italy-and-the-united-nations/uniting-for-consensus-ufc/
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2024/09/uniting-for-consensus-joint-press-statement-on-the-reform-of-the-un-security-council/#:~:text=The%20members%20of%20UfC%20recalled,a%20more%20equitable%20geographic%20distribution.
Sept 2024
and more generally for
the wider context and the crisis in global governance
https://www.ispionline.it/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ISPI-Report-2025-The-Time-of-Reckoning-web-1.pdf
recent background
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/onu-riforma-impossibile-36410
2022
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100059111.pdf
2022
History of veto power https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/history-of-veto-power-how-unsc-member-states-utilised-it-17877022
France https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/france-and-the-united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations-security-council/why-france-wishes-to-regulate-use-of-the-veto-in-the-united-nations-security-65315/
UK https://una.org.uk/sites/default/files/Briefing%20-%20Veto%20code%20of%20conduct.pdf
recent news and more background
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2024/02/statement-by-h-e-ambassador-maurizio-massari-on-behalf-of-the-uniting-for-consensus-group-the-intergovernmental-negotiations-on-the-question-of-equitable-representation-on-and-increase-in-the-membe/
https://italyun.esteri.it/it/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2023/05/statement-by-h-e-ambassador-maurizio-massari-on-behalf-of-the-uniting-for-consensus-group/
https://www.onuitalia.com/2023/01/29/unsc-reform-massari-ufcs-proposal-would-enhance-regional-representation/
https://www.onuitalia.com/2022/12/14/consiglio-di-sicurezza-massari-riforma-a-portata-di-mano-ma-sia-fatta-in-modo-inclusivo/
https://www.passblue.com/2023/02/14/italy-is-hopeful-about-un-reform-as-long-as-its-proposal-leads-the-way/
https://www.onuitalia.com/2023/01/29/unsc-reform-massari-ufcs-proposal-would-enhance-regional-representation/
https://www.onuitalia.com/2022/12/14/consiglio-di-sicurezza-massari-riforma-a-portata-di-mano-ma-sia-fatta-in-modo-inclusivo/
https://www.osorin.it/uploads/model_4/.files/130_item_2.pdf?v=1675071056
https://decode39.com/5919/italy-plan-un-security-council-reform/
https://italyun.esteri.it/it/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2022/11/statement-by-h-e-ambassador-maurizio-massari-on-behalf-of-the-uniting-for-consensus-group-annual-debate-on-agenda-item-125/
https://www.onuitalia.com/2023/01/12/massari-italia-riforma-onu-per-rafforzare-lo-stato-di-diritto/
https://www.onuitalia.com/2022/12/14/consiglio-di-sicurezza-massari-riforma-a-portata-di-mano-ma-sia-fatta-in-modo-inclusivo/
https://lavocedinewyork.com/onu/2022/11/17/riforma-consiglio-di-sicurezza-onu-duello-tra-usa-e-italia-allassemblea-generale/
https://www.onuitalia.com/2022/12/29/massari-nel-2023-per-litalia-allonu-sforzi-contro-diseguaglianze-conferenza-su-corno-dafrica/
https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/23150/what-will-the-world-make-of-the-un-summit-of-the-future-in-2023/
https://www.lavocedinewyork.com/en/new-york/2021/09/24/mario-draghis-speech-at-the-unga76-inequality-cancels-out-the-advancements/
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/09/1073792
https://www.quirinale.it/elementi/50730
General features of Italy’s work and priorities at
the UN
https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-address-80th-united-nations-general-assembly/29851
https://italyun.esteri.it/it/
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/italy-and-the-united-nations/
https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2025/10/italia-rieletta-in-consiglio-dei-diritti-umani-onu-per-il-mandato-2026-28/
https://www.esteri.it/en/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/organizzazioni_internazionali/onu/la_riforma/
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2025/03/csw69-statement-of-italy-at-ministerial-round-table-on-national-mechanisms-for-gender-equality-and-the-empowerment-of-women-and-girls-recommitting-resourcing-and-accelerating-implementation-of-the/
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2025/03/csw69-statement-of-italy-at-ministerial-round-table-on-national-mechanisms-for-gender-equality-and-the-empowerment-of-women-and-girls-recommitting-resourcing-and-accelerating-implementation-of-the/
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2023/01/nota-stampa-italia-eletta-per-la-prima-volta-alla-vice-presidenza-un-women-il-mandato-allambasciatore-massari-per-il-2023/
https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2025/10/giornata-mondiale-ed-europea-contro-la-pena-di-morte-tajani-nessun-uomo-puo-dare-la-morte-a-un-altro-uomo/
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2024/11/statement-of-italys-permanent-representative-amb-maurizio-massari-at-the-un-general-assemblys-third-committees-plenary-meetin/
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/italy-and-the-united-nations/uniting-for-consensus-ufc/
https://www.esteri.it/en/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/organizzazioni_internazionali/onu/60-anniversario-dell-adesione-dell/
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2025/10/statement-of-italy-at-the-general-debate-of-the-un-general-assemblys-second-committee/
Back to the wider reform of the UN
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations
Start
by reading: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/what-has-the-un-achieved-united-nations
What
the UN says about its recent structural reform plan ‘United to Reform’
https://reform.un.org/
https://reform.un.org/news/united-nations-management-reform-why-reform
https://reform.un.org/news/un-secretary-general-ant%C3%B3nio-guterres-marks-%E2%80%9Cgo-live%E2%80%9D-sweeping-un-reforms-1-january-2019
and some of its elements:
https://reform.un.org/news/interview-jens-wandel-special-advisor-sg-reform
https://reform.un.org/content/benefits-management
https://reform.un.org/news/system-changing
https://reform.un.org/news/briefings-held-new-delegation-authority-heads-entity
https://reform.un.org/news/change-makers-enabling-accountability-continuous-learning-and-improvement
https://reform.un.org/news/change-maker-business-transformation-and-accountability
https://reform.un.org/news/enhancing-management-strategy-policy-and-compliance-dmspc-spotlight
https://reform.un.org/content/un-development-system-reform-101
https://reform.un.org/content/development-reform
https://reform.un.org/content/management-reform
https://reform.un.org/content/peace-and-security-reform
https://reform.un.org/news/un-secretary-general-ant%C3%B3nio-guterres-un-reform
https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/it/dfae/politica-estera/organizzazioni-internazionali/nu/impegno-svizzero/onu-riforma.html
Notes
towards an essay:
Why is the
UN important in international relations?
https://ask.un.org/faq/176175
https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/sb13-ten-challenges-un-2025-2026
https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/sb12-ten-challenges-un-2024-2025
https://unric.org/en/un-the-main-challenges-and-key-dates-in-2024/
1)
The UN is the most important and universal international organization.
At present it has 193 members representing almost the entire world. The most
recent members are Montenegro (2006) and South Sudan (2011). The Vatican City
and Palestine are non-member observer states. Kosovo and Taiwan are not
members.
2) It is the main international
organization responsible for promoting and ensuring peaceful relations between
states and respect for human rights. So if the UN fails, this is of enormous
importance to international relations. The is much debate over UN Security
Council decisions, whether these have authorised interventions, as in
Afghanistan, Libya and Mali or failed to do so, as in Syria. Questions are
raised about the kind of decisions made, how they are made and their
effectiveness or ineffectiveness.
3) It is the main public forum for
international debate, and in many ways its institutions and protocols set
the moral standards for how actors within the international community should
act (even when they do not), and how individuals and minorities should be
treated. Over the years the UN has established the language and terminology in
which political questions are debated. This may result in hypocrisy
when, for example, a clearly non-democratic state is forced to use the language
of democracy and human rights, but it is a very obvious form of hypocrisy which
many experts argue exerts long-term pressure on states to conform to
international norms of behaviour. The language of these norms will form the
future political expectations of the citizens of UN member states, both
democratic and non-democratic ones.
4) The
UN has a vast network of agencies, programs, and specialized
bodies, including prominent ones like the World Health Organization (WHO),
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR). Other major agencies include the World Food Programme (WFP),
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and International Labour
Organization (ILO), and is thus an essential provider of
emergency, development and educational programs.
Why is there
a need for reform? What are the main criticisms of the UN?
1) UN Security Council reform. The
permanent members of the UN Security Council (each with a veto on the Council’s
decisions) are simply the major powers that won the Second World War. This no
longer represents the economic and political realities of today’s world. From
the Cold War until the present day, the fact that the UN system has failed to
live up to the lofty expectations of its framers can be attributed in
significant part to the threat and exercise of the veto by individual Permanent
Five (P5) members of the Council. This situation can be attributed to an
unequal—but politically necessary—compromise that took place between the great
power Allied victors of the Second World War and the remainder of the UN
membership. The result was a division of powers between the Security Council
and the General Assembly that has never found a satisfactory equilibrium. In the more
than 70 years of its existence there have been several attempts to reform the
SC, and there is an ongoing debate on the right model to adopt, and the ideas
on which to base a model. Should the UN Security Council –
a) offer permanent membership to states
that are major economies today (or major powers today), or the emerging
economies of tomorrow, or the most important UN donor states, (and should these
have a veto or not)?
b) have more representation for the poor
countries it seeks to protect?
c) base membership on better geographic and
cultural representation?
d) base membership on compliance with and
participation in UN activities and operations?
e) abolish the veto or at least limit its
use?
f) Should
the ‘Uniting for Peace’
GA resolution of 1950 be re-examined as a possible means of mitigating the bad
faith exercise of the veto? It was drafted by a P5 member and revealed the
latent powers of the General Assembly existing within the UN Charter to make
recommendations in the event of a blocked Council, up to and including the use
of force. Or would it go too far in usurping the primary role of the
Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security?
The "Uniting
for Peace" UNGA resolution, states that in any cases where the Security Council,
because of a lack of unanimity among its five permanent members (P5),
fails to act as required to maintain international peace and security,
the General Assembly ‘shall
consider the matter immediately and may issue appropriate recommendations to UN
members for collective measures, including the use of armed force when
necessary, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security’.
It was adopted 3 November 1950, after fourteen days of Assembly discussions, by
a vote of 52 to 5, with 2 abstentions. The resolution was designed to
provide the UN with an alternative avenue for action when at least one P5
member is using its veto to
obstruct the Security Council from carrying out its functions mandated by
the UN Charter..
While there
is general agreement on the need for reform to make the UNSC more
representative and democratic (though this last word is open to
interpretation), there is little agreement on the correct formula to follow. In
part, this is simply due to the fact that states wish to protect and promote
their own power and interests. However, there are also real questions of
principle. For example, if the UN based voting rights on the Security Council
and in the General Assembly on population (one obvious measure of ‘democratic
representation’ used in the European Parliament)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apportionment_in_the_European_Parliament#:~:text=Under%20the%20Lisbon%20Treaty%2C%20which,of%20the%20EU's%20member%20states.
the Council
would be dominated by China, a clearly non-democratic state and the GA by China
and India.
Moreover,
any reform proposal needs to meet at least three basic conditions. Firstly, any reform of the Security Council requires the
agreement of at least two thirds of the UN member states (see below
#) (two thirds of 193 = 129?) and
preferably should have the support of an overwhelming majority in the General
Assembly. Secondly, it must enjoy the support of the current UNSC permanent
members so as not to be vetoed. Thirdly, though this is not an obligation, it
needs to make the UN more effective, not less so (i.e. not more likely to be constantly blocked and unworkable). Given
these limitations, any radical reform of the UNSC seems unlikely, and even
moderate reform seems to be blocked at the moment since no reform plan has
two-thirds support in the UNGA so far.
Lots more
background on UNSC reform
For some information on the evolution of Italy’s position see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniting_for_Consensus
“On 20 April
2009, Colombia and Italy, acting as representatives of the UfC group, provided
a new model of reform, which was presented as a concrete attempt to reach a
deal. The document proposed creating a new category of seats, still
non-permanent, but elected for an extended duration (3 to 5 years terms)
without the possibility of immediate re-elections. This new kind of seat would
not be allocated to single national countries but rather to regional groups on
a rotational basis. As far as traditional categories of seats are concerned,
the UfC proposal does not imply any change, but only the introduction of small
and medium size states among groups eligible for regular seats. This proposal
includes even the question of veto,
giving a narrow range of options that goes from abolition to limitation of the
application of the veto only to Chapter VII matters.
During the last round, Italy firmly rejected the G4 proposal as well as the African Union one and even denounced the unfair
behaviour of G4 countries. According to Italy, the G4 is attempting to exclude
the UfC proposal from the floor, “on the basis of a presumed level of
support”.Moreover, Italy believes that it has shown flexibility by putting
forward a new proposal on April 2009, while the G4 remained tied to its 2005
document. Italy's active role in current discussions started in February 2009
before the beginning of intergovernmental negotiations, when Minister of
Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini hosted more than 75 countries to develop
a shared path towards a reform of the Security Council. On May 2011, the members states which participated in the group meeting
held in Rome
rose to 120.”
Stated positions of the permanent members on the Security
Council Reform and other groups
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/biden-throws-weight-behind-un-security-council-reform-expansion/3340205#
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/26/c_138583219.htm#:~:text=China%20supports%20reasonable%20reform%20of%20UN%20Security%20Council%3A%20envoy,-Source%3A%20Xinhua%7C%202019&text=UNITED%20NATIONS%2C%20Nov.,the%20needs%20of%20the%20times.
https://www.state.gov/briefings-foreign-press-centers/unga79/reforming-the-un-security-council
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-supports-two-permanent-un-security-council-seats-africa-2024-09-12/
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/kremlin-says-it-supports-reform-of-un-security-council/2994742
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/france-and-the-united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations-security-council/#:~:text=France%20has%20long%20been%20in,%3A%20permanent%20and%20non%2Dpermanent.
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations/france-and-the-united-nations-security-council/article/why-france-wishes-to-regulate-use
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-calls-for-security-council-expansion-uk-statement-at-the-un-general-assembly#:~:text=The%20United%20Kingdom%20continues%20to,%2C%20Germany%2C%20Japan%20and%20Brazil.
African Union https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africa-and-us-non-proposal-un-security-council-reform#:~:text=Almost%2020%20years%20ago%2C%20the,members%2C%E2%80%9D%20including%20veto%20power.
Arab Group https://www.bna.bh/en/news?cms=q8FmFJgiscL2fwIzON1%2BDr7u%2FucHbOmRykMV4DgnsAg%3D
G4 https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38344/G4+Ministerial+Joint+Press+Statement+on+the+reform+of+the+UN+Security+Council#:~:text=The%20G4%20Ministers%20reiterated%20their,Council's%20legitimacy%20and%20ensure%20its
The BRICS https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/positions-of-brics-nations-on-un-security-council-reform/
2) Wider reforms. In 2005-2006 then UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan made a series of addresses on the subject of UN reform. In
those speeches he spoke about the need for UNSC reform, but he also devoted
much time and space to recommendations on some of the other questions which had
led to widespread criticism of the UN as an organization. He emphasized that
the UN should act swiftly to deal with these problems in order to respond to
international public opinion and win back support and to avoid seeing its image
permanently damaged. Various commentators have indicated the following topics
as issues to be dealt with and the current UN reform project United to
Reform is clearly intended to address points a-c:
a) Waste – Some critics argue that too much
money is spent on personnel and special benefits for personnel instead of on
projects e.g. UN employees staying in first class hotels when on mission
working in the field in a poor developing country (this is also bad taste and
damages the UN’s image) / the duplication of projects by UN agencies, other
international organizations, NGOs and by single countries under bilateral
agreements. As a result, funds are wasted.
b) Inefficiency and confusion – duplication
of projects (see above) and/or overlapping of responsibilities creates
confusion. There is a need for much clearer cooperation and coordination
between aid organizations with a clear overall planning and decision-making
structure. Critics argue that there is also a need for an assessment of the
effectiveness of aid programs by an external body. Often projects are limited
in duration due to funding concerns (most donors will not commit funds for more
than 2 years), and some will only be effective with long-term funding.
c) Organizational Deficiencies – There has
also been a lot of criticism of unnecessary and irresponsible bureaucracy. For example, it is difficult to fire anybody
with a permanent contract at the UN, even when someone is not doing or is not
really capable of doing their job. Recruitment is based in part on each
country’s financial contributions to the UN and, at the highest levels, also on
political considerations, (also nepotism and favours) not purely on a person’s
suitability for a post.
d) Corruption, immunity and criminal activity
– there have been serious cases of corruption by UN officials misappropriating
funds for themselves or their supporters. The problem is that as an
international organization the UN does not fall under a national justice system
and its employees enjoy too much immunity since any system of internal
discipline is subject to political pressure. There have been a series of cases
of rape, child abuse and extortion committed by members of UN peace-keeping
forces while on mission. Aid funds are sometimes stolen and supplies resold by
local authorities or criminal organizations and thus never reach the local
community. In a conflict zone the money may then be used to buy arms. A UN
official is not automatically subject to the legal jurisdiction of the host
country for any of these crimes. Thus, many argue that there is a basic lack of accountability and liability
regarding UN officials and UN peace-keepers.
https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/gal3637.doc.htm
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/03/07/does-immunity-mean-impunity-understanding-obstacles-in-the-prosecution-of-u-n-corruption-2/
https://www.diplomacy.edu/resource/a-diplomatic-analogy-international-functionaries-and-their-privileges/
http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/bbrown/classes/IntlOrgSp09/PEACEKEEPERABUSEIMMUNITYANDIMPUNITY.pdf
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/un-peacekeepers-who-accountable-their-misdeeds
e) UN peace-keeping operations – These have
had a mixed record of many successes and some failures. At present the UN is
dependent on member states to provide soldiers and equipment to form the
peace-keeping forces for a particular operation. This can lead to potentially
fatal delays in organising and mounting the operation (Rwanda). From this
experience many commentators argue that the UN needs to have its own permanent
peace-keeping forces, which would be paid and trained by the UN and directly
responsible to the UN. This should guarantee the professional behaviour of
these forces and allow the UN to respond quickly to a rapidly developing
situation (Rwanda). Other experts argue that previous operations (e.g. in
Somalia) suggest that the UN should only deploy peace-keeping forces on the
ground when it is confident they will be welcomed by the local population, and
that the UN mission commander in the area should have more autonomy to make
decisions which need to be taken rapidly. It should be noted, however, that
other experts are against what they see as a militarization of the UN.
Look at the
evolution of the debate on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) commitment, endorsed by all member states of the United
Nations at the 2005 World Summit (and endorsed again in 2021 https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/unga-r2p-debate-2021/)
to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,
focusses on some of the problems posed by UN interventions and in the
assessment criteria it sets for the decision to authorise such an operation:
·
Just cause: There must be "serious
and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to
occur".
·
Right
intention: The main intention of the military action must be to prevent human
suffering.
·
Last
resort: Every other measure besides military invention has to have already been
taken into account. (This does not mean that every measurement has to have been
applied and been shown to fail, but that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that only military action would work in that situation.)
·
Proportional
means: The military means must not exceed what is necessary "to secure the
defined human protection objective".
· Reasonable prospects: The chance of success must be
reasonably high, and it must be unlikely that the consequences of the military
intervention would be worse than the consequences without the intervention.
·
Right
authority: The military action has to have been authorized by the Security
Council.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect
This
raises some excellent questions about R2P.
Italy stated at the General Assembly Plenary Debate on the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in June 2025 that in line with the EU it fully
supports R2P and laments the failure to apply it.
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2025/06/italys-statement-at-general-assembly-plenary-debate-on-the-responsibility-to-protect-r2p/
f) Impartiality
– the UN is sometimes not seen as an unbiased international organization
working to protect human rights and peaceful co-existence e.g. local attitudes
to the UN intervention in Somalia in the 1990s. In Afghanistan and in Iraq (in
the latter the UN did not approve the invasion but did later open a UN office
in Baghdad which was then attacked) the UN may be seen as a Western
organization imposing Western values by force (e.g. female education).
g) Power politics at the level of states and
agencies – a poor country’s vote and support for a policy in the General
Assembly and on the UNSC may be bought, given in exchange for financial aid or
political favours. This leverage of rich countries over poor countries distorts
representation within these bodies.
h) The UN Human Rights Council – (to which Italy has just been re-elected)
replaced the UN Human Rights Commission, a body that was much criticised by
human rights NGOs and the media) and has and had various members (elected for
3-year terms) such as China, the Russian Federation, Cuba, Algeria, Egypt,
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, all with, at best, a dubious human rights record
(Syria and Iran have also been candidates). Human rights NGOs argue that they
are often more likely to be motivated to hinder or block rather than to support
a serious investigation into human rights violations. Moreover, the Council has
often been accused of politically motivated action (or inaction) rather than
real concern for human rights violations (e.g. concentrating on the
Israeli-Palestinian question to the point of excluding a real investigation of
human rights violations against women and minorities in some Muslim countries
and in other countries). Critics argue that, in practice, it is only marginally
better than the UN Human Rights Commission. Some argue that it would be better
not to have a UN body of this kind since the UN inevitably represents the
interests of states (and states are the most frequent violators of human
rights), and that, instead, funds should go to independent human rights NGOs
(those which have a good reputation with both the media and the public). These
are the NGOs that are often targeted by governments that violate human rights
(e.g. Russia and Amnesty International).
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-24922058
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6919268.stm
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/24/amnesty-un-syria
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2156687/UN-human-rights-report-criticised-containing-condemnations-Britain--Iran-Russia-Cuba.html
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/25/russian-officials-raid-amnesty-moscow-headquarters
i) Aid Dependence – Some
experts argue that the UN itself has made some countries in Africa aid
dependent by offering aid without setting clear conditions, or concentrating
sufficiently on giving countries the know-how to become self-sufficient. This
is now changing and aid is now often tied to progress on democratization and
human rights. There are also longer-term programs now aimed at developing the
local economy. Time will tell whether this is an effective strategy.
General
considerations – There has been progress on at least some of the points listed above,
and the UN is now aware of its image problem and the
need to make real reforms. The United to
Reform program was introduced to address some of these challenges. https://www.un.org/en/ga/second/62/bschneider.pdf
https://cdn.openaid.se/app/uploads/2020/09/29115924/1999-01-01_Aid_Dependence_%E2%80%93_Issues_and_Indicators.pdf
j) The
UN’s role in the past and today – In terms of the Functionalist theory of
international relations (gradual international integration, collective
governance and the growing material interdependence between states) the role of
the UN is clear (See the UN Charter), but it was also based on two other
conflicting principles. It is in one sense a product of Idealism/Liberalism, an
organization created in response to mass genocide, war crimes and human rights
violations and in order to promote the universal liberal values (some would say
Western values) expressed in the UN Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. This is one of the things that most
ordinary people expect it to be and to do. At the same time, it was and is a
guarantor of peace between sovereign states that often see things in terms of
Realism (national interests) and Realpolitik (power politics and pragmatism). It was created to prevent another
World War, to provide a forum for and foster dialogue between two very powerful
states with conflicting interests and ideologies, the USA and the Soviet Union.
(The Council of Europe has similar goals). To do this it had to give these
states (and the other victors of WWII) special powers, the veto, to allow them
to protect their interests.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_veto_power
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_veto_power#:~:text=At%20the%20San%20Francisco%20conference,Security%20Council%20from%20making%20a
In fact, it
can be argued that it played this role, maintaining a dialogue between the US
and USSR, extremely well during the Cold War (all Cold War conflicts were local
proxy conflicts, never direct conflicts between the US and the USSR). The UN
was the stage for the Cuban missile crisis but also for its resolution, and the
UN continues to play a crucial role in conflict prevention, peace-keeping and
conflict resolution with varying degrees of success. In Functionalist terms
(###) the UN needs to
include all states whatever their political system and values in order
to promote peace, and states often join the UN still prioritising their own
ideology and national interests. This inevitably involves a certain amount of
hypocrisy for some states, given the references to fundamental freedoms and
human rights in the UN Charter (mentioned 7 times, for example see Article 51)
which states must accept in joining, and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and other human rights covenants that states are encouraged to
sign and ratify. For example, in the same year that democratic Italy joined the UN,
Franco’s Spain also joined. Being part of the UN has rarely depended on
democracy and human rights (apartheid South Africa was the exception, on 12 November 1974 the General Assembly suspended South Africa from
participating in its work, due to international opposition to the policy of
apartheid.). This
conflict of ideas at the heart of the UN is unavoidable. If the UN was given
powers to enforce its values on its members, some of them, the more powerful
ones one imagines, would probably leave the organization rather than accept a
loss of sovereignty (and in many cases a loss of power by the ruling party or
elite) and investigations into human rights abuses. (We should remember the
fate of the League of Nations # #)In
fact, respect for the sovereignty of each UN member state and non-interference
in a state’s domestic politics is one of the basic principles of the UN and the
current international order (consequently, it does not automatically recognise
a right to secession and this can also be a problem), and this is unlikely to
change in the future, especially as there is no simple mechanism for such a
change. As a result, the UN has a mandate to try to prevent (and the
International Criminal Court has a mandate to investigate) human rights abuses
within member states but no real mechanism to do so within powerful states or
states that simply refuse to cooperate. Again, the debate about R2P
demonstrates the difficulties involved in launching a UN operation on
humanitarian grounds and about the legal questions and practical dangers
involved. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect
The opposition encountered by the ICC from some African states and the
accusations of discrimination also demonstrate these problems.
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court https://journaldudroittransnational.it/burkina-faso-mali-and-niger-withdrawing-from-the-icc-sovereignty-claims-and-impunity-risks/
In 2025, some African states, particularly Burkina Faso,
Mali, and Niger, have heavily criticized the International Criminal Court
(ICC), accusing it of selective
justice and neocolonial
repression. These countries announced their withdrawal, citing the ICC's
perceived inability to prosecute crimes by powerful nations while
disproportionately targeting African states, and a desire to create their own
regional justice mechanisms. This sentiment is shared by some other African
nations who feel the ICC has not met its promise to hold powerful states
accountable, a feeling intensified by recent events, such as the ICC's arrest
warrants for Israeli officials, which have drawn criticism and calls for
sanctions from some powerful nations.
Criticisms from African states
Selective justice and neocolonialism: The primary criticism is that the ICC is a tool of
neocolonial repression that selectively targets less privileged countries,
particularly African nations.
Disproportionate focus on Africa: Many African nations feel that while many crimes occur on
the continent, the ICC has disproportionately prosecuted Africans, a sentiment
that has strained relationships with the court.
Failure to hold powerful states accountable: Critics argue that the ICC has not held powerful nations
accountable for crimes, and that powerful individuals, especially those aligned
with the West, are never prosecuted.
Inability to prosecute serious crimes: Some states argue the ICC has proven incapable of
effectively prosecuting crimes like war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Desire for regional sovereignty: The withdrawal is presented as an assertion of sovereignty
and a desire to establish "indigenous mechanisms for the consolidation of
peace and justice" within their own regions.
Withdrawals:
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger announced their joint withdrawal from the Rome
Statute in September 2025, a move that some view as a setback for international
justice. The withdrawals may be linked to the new governments' political
alignment with Russia, especially considering the ICC's arrest warrant for
Russian President Putin.
Conclusion: Thus, given what we have said above, one
could argue that the real role of the UN and ICC is to create a normative environment regarding peaceful relations
between states, democratic values and human rights in the hope that
states and individuals will gradually reform and conform over time. The UN is
therefore responsible for creating and reinforcing the diplomatic language and
behavioural norms for international relations, norms based on peaceful
coexistence and cooperation, collective security, international law and mutual
respect. If we compare the cooperation and dialogue between states today and at
any time before or during the Cold War it would be difficult to deny that the
UN and the international community have made some very real progress. However,
in 2025 many commentators argue that there are rising tensions within the
international community, particularly between great powers, and a growing
disregard for the norms established and represented by the UN. This lack of
global governance and respect for international law threatens to undermine the
UN’s role as provider of these norms.
# A reform of
the Security Council requires the agreement of at least two-thirds of UN member
states and no veto from any of the permanent members of the UNSC.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council
# # The predecessor of the UN, the League of Nations failed to prevent a
second global conflict essentially because it no longer included most of the
world’s major powers. The US never joined it. Of the League's 42 founding
members only 23 were members when it was dissolved in 1946. The Soviet Union
became a member on in September 1934, and was expelled on in December 1939
for aggression against Finland. Germany
joined in
September 1926 and withdrew in October 1933, rejecting the idea of collective
security and disarmament negotiations. Italy was a founding member but withdrew
in December 1937 in response to the sanctions which had been imposed on the
country for its 1935 invasion of Abyssinia during which time poison gas was
utilized. Another founding member, Japan, withdrew in March 1933 in response to
a report calling for it to withdraw its forces from Manchuria. At the start of
World War II, the only major powers still in the League of Nations were Britain
(and the 5 major separate members of its empire) and France.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/League_of_Nations
https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zbg4t39/revision/9
Thus, the
question is – if the United Nations abolished the veto on the Security Council
and opened the decision-making process to a majority in the General Assembly
(with the power to impose sanctions on any member, large or small), would the
US, China, Russia and other countries (Iran, Saudi Arabia) accept this change
or simply withdraw from the organization?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(international_relations)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realism_(international_relations)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism_in_international_relations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberalism_(international_relations)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realpolitik
### Functionalism
is a theory of international relations that advocates the
formation of international organizations imbued with sufficient authority to
manage, mediate, or prevent conflicts among nation-states in order to preserve
peace, while also providing frameworks within which those nations can work
together toward their common goals in scientific, social, economic, and other
areas
Background
to the call for reform
After years of
research, Annan presented a progress report, In Larger Freedom, to the UN General Assembly, on 21
March 2005. Annan recommended Security Council expansion and a host of other UN reforms. On 31 January 2006, Kofi Annan outlined his vision for a
comprehensive and extensive reform of the UN in a policy speech to the United Nations Association UK. The speech, delivered at Central Hall, Westminster, also marked the 60th Anniversary of
the first meetings of the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council.
On 7 March
2006, he presented to the General Assembly his proposals for a fundamental
overhaul of the United Nations Secretariat. The reform report is entitled:
"Investing in the United Nations, For a
Stronger Organization Worldwide”.
On 30 March
2006, he presented to the General Assembly his analysis and recommendations for
updating the entire work program of the United Nations Secretariat over the
last 60 years. The report is entitled: "Mandating and Delivering:
Analysis and Recommendations to Facilitate the Review of Mandates".
On the UN Human Rights Council
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/CanadSenateHRC022508.pdf
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/the-un-human-rights-council-does-not-deserve-us-support
General reform of the UN
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations
http://www.canadafreepress.com/2006/rosett040406.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kofi_Annan#Farewell_addresses
Reform of the UN Security Council
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council
http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSS-Analyses-72.pdf
http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/ManagingChange-1.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council#United_Kingdom_and_France
*For the evolution of Italy’s position on UN reform:
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Maurizio Massarion behalf
of the Uniting for Consensus Group 2025
https://estatements.unmeetings.org/estatements/10.0010/20250415100000000/AGSyRGmsl_/byyRUtekJ_nyc_en.pdf
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Maurizio Massarion behalf
of the Uniting for Consensus Group 2022, text:
Annual debate on agenda item 125 entitled “Question of
equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security
Council and other matters related to the Security Council”
17 November 2022
Mr. President,
On behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, I wish
to thank you for convening this debate. We thank you for appointing early
on in the process two skillful Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations
(IGN), Ambassador Tareq Albanai and Michal Mlynár. You are the custodians of
one of the most important processes within the Organization.
The UfC Group continues to stand ready to actively and
constructively support your action and work within the next IGN session and
looks forward to cooperating with them in full transparency and willingness to
make progress. We believe that in their new capacity they shall help
Member States get closer to the common goal of a comprehensively reformed
Security Council.
The UfC also takes this occasion to thank the previous
IGN Co-Chairs for the excellent work they have done in the past year.
Mr. President,
The UfC group feels strongly about the need for
progress in the negotiations, especially after this year’s upheavals in the
international system, including the current crisis in Ukraine.
We will once again approach the next IGN with a
constructive spirit, confident that we can build up on the positive gains
achieved. During the 76th session of work we have advanced on several issues
and it is worthwhile to highlight that the convergences have increased. For
example, on the question of the veto there was a strong support among MS for
voluntarily refraining from the use of veto, or on the need for the increased
representation of developing countries and small- and medium-sized states, including
Small Island Developing States (SIDS), convergences duly reflected in the
“Revised Elements” paper.
In fact, the Co-Chairs’ “Revised Elements” could be a
good base to start our work, notwithstanding the fact that there are important
points on which the negotiating groups still have principled different views
and readings for a starter, on the democratic principle (which for UfC,
together with the principle of accountability, goes hand in hand with regular
elections) or on the principle of regional representation, which should not be
confused with the individual quest for self-representation in the council.
In UfC’s view, a satisfactory reform should increase
the legitimacy of the Security Council in the eyes of the general membership.
To this end, the broadest possible consensus is needed.
As already stated in the past, in our view, a reformed
Security Council that fulfills this aspiration should be more transparent,
representative, accountable, democratic and effective.
·
More transparent means a Council where the decisions are taken not by an
exclusive few who hold an ultimate power, but by all the SC members in a fully
inclusive way and taking into due consideration other voices;
·
More representative means going beyond a simple increase in the number of
SC members; it means giving true consideration to increasing the opportunities
for all Member States to sit periodically on the Council so that all Regions
and all voices are heard, including those of small, insular Countries;
·
More accountable means that every new member of a reformed Security Council
would need to answer to the whole Membership. It also entails a containment of
the number of States with the permanent seats to the current ones, while, at
the same time, restraining the use of the veto;
·
More democratic simply means that every new member of a reformed SC must be
elected;
·
More effective means less avenues for paralysis, and a Council that can act
expeditiously, ultimately making it more legitimate; one that – because it is
transparent, representative, accountable and democratic – enjoys more
credibility in the eyes of all Member States and whose decisions are fully
observed and implemented, thus delivering better on its mandate.
Mr President,
Unlike others, UfC is not asking anything for our
individual members, we are not aspiring to permanent membership equally for us
or for any other State! We want a reform for all, not for few, a reform of the
Security Council that is beneficial for all Member States and for the UN
itself. We are convinced that our idea of reform, which is the only one
that has been adjusted over the years in order to take into consideration the
positions of all negotiating groups, serves the whole membership. Under UfC
proposal, everyone benefits; no one is left behind or left out; and everyone
gains better access to the Council to contribute to a more peaceful world.
Besides, our proposal is the most detailed and pragmatic on the table, as
several Member States from various Regional Groups have repeatedly
acknowledged. It would give all MS, big and small, from all regional
groups, a fair chance to be represented and it wouldn’t discriminate by
introducing new situations of privilege.
The ongoing crises, the increasing number of conflicts
and in particular the war against Ukraine have put a renewed pressure on the
need of a meaningful reform of the SC, need that we share as UfC. However, new
permanent seats and new vetoes would only serve the purpose to further paralyze
it. Let me reiterate that, here, all Member States are equal, thus an approach
to reform that only serves a few cannot be a solution for the entire
membership.
Mr. President,
If a condominium is falling apart, due to the fact
that the members of the condominium board are fighting amongst themselves,
simply adding new members by right to the board is not going to solve the real
problem. Let me reiterate that here all member states are equal, thus an
approach to reform that only serves a few cannot be a solution for the entire
membership.
Mr President,
More in concrete, we propose, on the one hand, to
increase the number of two year-term elected seats in order to ensure a fairer
system of rotation in the Council. Bear in mind that 60 Member States have
never yet served in the Security Council! On the other, we propose the creation
of long-term, non-permanent elected seats, with the possibility of immediate
re-election. This innovation is meant to accommodate those Member States that
legitimately aspire, and have the means to, make a sustained contribution to
the work of the Council.
In our proposal, the Security Council would consist of
twenty-six members: on top of the current 15 seats, there would be nine
long-term, non-permanent elected seats distributed among regional groups as
follows: 3 for Africa, 3 for Asia Pacific, 2 for GRULAC and 1 for WEOG. Plus,
two additional of the current two-year, elected seats assigned: one to the
Eastern European Group and one, as a rotating seat, to Small Island and
Developing States (SIDS) and Small States. This rotating seat would not prevent
them from running within their regional group, but would – instead – be an
additional way for them have fairer chances to gain access to the Security
Council.
Let me underline that this reform model would greatly
enhance regional representation: Africa would constitute the largest group in
the reformed Council; the Asia-Pacific region would have the highest percent
increase; both Latin America and Eastern Europe would double their
representation. Our proposed distribution would also allow an increased and
more stable representation for cross-regional groupings, such as the Arab
group.
Mr. President,
Looking at the next IGN, we confirm once again our
openness to constructive discussion, bearing in mind that there are no
procedural shortcuts to consensus on achieving Security Council reform.
This is one of the main lessons learned over the years: the reform process can
only succeed if the views and positions of every Member of the United Nations
is taken into account.
In order for it to be successful, it is crucial that
the Co-Chairs set a clear agenda of work, so that when the IGN begins, the
whole focus will be on substantive issues and not on procedures. That means
agreeing in advance on a predefined number of sessions, on an IGN calendar and
on the topics to be discussed at each session.
Our ultimate goal during next IGN session should be to
further reduce the main gaps separating negotiating groups and build and grow
more convergences between MS. Let us be clear that the ultimate goal is to
achieve that convergence.
The UfC group stands ready to cooperate to this
precise end with you Mr. President, with the new IGN co-Chairs and the whole
membership.
Thank you.
from https://italyun.esteri.it/it/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2022/11/statement-by-h-e-ambassador-maurizio-massari-on-behalf-of-the-uniting-for-consensus-group-annual-debate-on-agenda-item-125/
Some older comment on and criticism of the
UN
https://www.crisisgroup.org/sb006-ten-challenges-un-2021-2022
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_the_United_Nations
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/what-has-the-un-achieved-united-nations https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/opinion/sunday/i-love-the-un-but-it-is-failing.html?_r=0 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_the_United_Nations
http://www.e-ir.info/2012/11/13/addressing-misconduct-by-un-personnel-how-to-hold-offenders-accountable/
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/mar/03/cholera-haiti-un-experts-chastise-ban-ki-moon
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/01/18/broken-system-the-failure-to-punish-high-level-corruption-at-the-un/
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/11/un-peacekeepers-accused-killing-rape-central-african-republic
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/08/u-n-sex-abuse-scandal-in-central-african-republic-hits-rock-bottom/
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1976
