mercoledì 28 ottobre 2026

The EU’s Global Gateway, the Africa-EU Partnership and Italy’s Mattei Plan

The Initiative: The European Commission's Global Gateway is the European Union’s global infrastructure and investment strategy. It serves as a democratic, values-driven alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative.

The Funding Milestone: While the initiative originally launched with a target to mobilize €300 billion in investments between 2021 and 2027, the European Union successfully surpassed its goal ahead of schedule, mobilizing over €306 billion

Core Focus Areas: The program channels public and private sector investments via the "Team Europe" framework into five major global pillars:

  • Digital connectivity (e.g., secure internet corridors, satellite links).
  • Climate and clean energy (e.g., green transitions, renewable power networks).
  • Transport networks (e.g., strategic corridors and transit infrastructure).
  • Health capacities (e.g., local pharmaceutical production and supply chains).
  • Quality education and research

https://commission.europa.eu/topics/international-partnerships/global-gateway_en

https://commission.europa.eu/topics/international-partnerships/global-gateway_en?prefLang=it&etrans=it

https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway_it

https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway_en

The European Union’s Global Gateway initiative has surpassed its initial €300 billion investment goal and operates 256 consolidated flagship projects worldwide, showing the most tangible progress and active delivery in specific corridors and regions

The Global Gateway strategy has made its most concrete and effective progress in large-scale transport corridors, green energy, and digital links.

The Lobito Corridor (Angola, Zambia, DRC)

  • What it is: A major railway and logistics overhaul connecting the copper and cobalt mines and critical raw-material belt of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia to the Atlantic coast at the Port of Lobito in Angola. It operates as a private concession/joint venture consortium.
  • Why it works: It drastically cuts transit times for critical raw materials and agricultural goods from weeks down to days, boosting regional trade and building joint European, African, and American financial backing.
  • Impact: Rail and supply-chain operations have dramatically cut transit times (reducing transport windows significantly down from traditional overland bottlenecks) to move low-carbon metals and agricultural logistics toward international markets.
  • Key projects: It also involves major logistics investments like the Caála Logistics Platform, designed to aggregate, store, cool, and process local products, and co-financing with international development banks

Coastal Protection and Trade Corridors (West Africa)

  • What it is: Infrastructure investments along the Lagos-Abidjan trade corridor.
  • Why it works: Partnering with groups like the World Bank and specialized engineering firms, it addresses severe coastal erosion while safeguarding vital West African trade and transport routes.

Green Energy and Critical Minerals (Kazakhstan and Central Asia)

  • What it is: Large-scale renewable energy, solar, wind, and green hydrogen frameworks.
  • Why it works: It pairs European demand for diversified clean energy and raw materials with Central Asian infrastructure development, though it faces ongoing civil society calls for better local community consultation.

Digital Connectivity (Pacific and Africa-EU Partnerships)

  • What it is: Subsea cables, satellite data sharing, and regional digital infrastructure.
  • Why it works: It bridges digital divides by integrating partner countries more closely into global data and telecommunication networks.

In sub-Saharan Africa https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/initiatives-sub-saharan-africa_en

However, https://counter-balance.org/publications/joint-letter-publications/key-concerns-about-the-global-gateway-remain-unaddressed-by-the-european-commission/

https://europeandemocracyhub.epd.eu/the-eus-global-gateway-needs-democracy-to-work/

 https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/mta-joint-futures-31-eu-global-gateway-and-north-africa

The Africa-EU Partnership

https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/africa-eu-partnership_en

https://www.napforum.org/policy-briefs/the-failure-of-the-eu-s-strategic-partnerships-in-africa-what-s-behind-the-lost-ground-to-china-and-russia

https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/beyond-summits-africa-eu-partnership-priority

The EU Global Gateway includes a Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package - with EUR 150 billion worth of grants and investment supported by the EU budget.

https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/initiatives-sub-saharan-africa/eu-africa-global-gateway-investment-package_en

The Africa-EU Partnership faces structural, economic, and geopolitical difficulties that strain relations between the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU).

The Main Difficulties and Challenges from the African Point of View

  • Power Asymmetries and Paternalism: Despite European claims to the contrary, the relationship often retains an unequal dynamic where Africa is treated as an aid recipient or security problem rather than an autonomous, equal political actor.
  • Economic and Extractive Logic: Trade patterns continue to focus on exporting raw materials from Africa to Europe rather than supporting local industrialization, value addition, and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
  • Sovereign Debt Crises: Many African nations face severe debt burdens—such as Kenya allocating a large portion of its revenue to debt service—limiting their fiscal space for climate and infrastructure investments.
  • Climate and Adaptation Finance Gaps: Sub-Saharan Africa faces massive annual adaptation funding shortfalls (estimated at $46 billion per year by 2030), compounded by differing accounting methods and slow disbursement of promised European funds.
  • Geopolitical Competition and Fading Moral Authority: European responses to global crises—such as vaccine nationalism during COVID-19, shifting budget priorities toward domestic defense and the war in Ukraine, and perceived double standards regarding international law—have eroded trust.
  • Migration and Security Friction: Migration policies often reflect unilateral European containment goals rather than shared, long-term mobility and talent partnerships, while security cooperation struggles against regional fragmentation and shifting alliances.
  • Ritualistic Declarations vs. Implementation: High-level summits frequently produce symbolic declarations  and pledges that fail to translate into transparent, fast-tracked, and accountable execution on the ground.

Objections from human rights NGOs

The Africa-EU Partnership faces significant structural, legal, and political difficulties when balancing economic cooperation with human rights compliance.

Key Difficulties and Challenges

  • Non-Binding Clauses in Trade Agreements: Human rights principles are frequently mentioned in the preambles of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and African regions, but they are often not legally enforceable or backed by dedicated human rights chapters.
  • Tension Between Geopolitics and Accountability: The EU often prioritizes strategic, migration, or resource-security interests (such as deals involving migration management or tech surveillance) over strict human rights conditionality. For instance, transparency concerns have been raised regarding EU-funded security cooperation or tech exports to rights-violating governments.
  • Asymmetric Regulatory Frameworks: Critics argue that European due diligence laws—such as the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD)—can risk reinforcing top-down or Eurocentric compliance norms rather than empowering local African legal frameworks and remedies.
  • Cross-Border Accountability Gaps: Victims of corporate human rights abuses (such as land grabbing or labor exploitation in resource extraction) face major procedural hurdles, including high litigation costs, complex cross-border jurisdictions, and heavy burdens of proof in European courts.
  • Suspension Mechanisms vs. Realpolitik: While partnership agreements (such as the EU-OACPS agreement) contain clauses allowing for the suspension of aid or cooperation in cases of severe human rights breaches ("cases of special urgency"), these mechanisms are politically sensitive and rarely invoked

Other considerations

Doing business with dictatorial regimes and human rights violators presents a complex dilemma for the Africa-EU Partnership, as it forces the European Union to constantly balance its core democratic values against urgent geopolitical and economic interests.

The structural and ethical difficulties of navigating these relationships manifest in several critical ways:

1. The Value-Interest Paradox (Principled vs. Pragmatic Foreign Policy)

  • The Normative Dilemma: The EU’s foundational framework mandates that external partnerships promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. However, strict adherence to these conditions often alienates African regimes that face democratic backsliding or are under military rule (such as in parts of the Sahel).
  • Transactional Realities: To curb irregular migration and secure energy resources (such as oil, gas, and green hydrogen), the EU frequently enters into strategic agreements with authoritarian leaders. Critics argue that this pragmatic approach directly undermines Europe's normative credibility.

2. High Geopolitical Competition (The "No-Strings" Alternative)

  • Loss of Strategic Leverage: When the EU enforces human rights conditionalities, dictatorial regimes easily pivot to alternative global powers like China and Russia.
  • Competitive Asymmetry: China’s Belt and Road Initiative offers infrastructure funding under a policy of "non-interference," while Russia provides security and military assistance without demanding governance reforms. Consequently, the EU often loses strategic ground and economic influence by upholding strict ethical standards.

3. Regulatory and Compliance Burdens

  • Supply Chain Due Diligence: European businesses operating in or sourcing from authoritarian states must navigate rigorous accountability legislation, such as strict supply chain due diligence and carbon adjustment mechanisms. Proving that materials (like critical minerals) were extracted without forced labor or human rights abuses is incredibly complex in states lacking transparent legal systems.
  • Dual-Use Technology Dilemmas: Civil society groups frequently criticize European entities for exposing the partnership to abuse by exporting advanced surveillance or dual-use software to repressive governments, which use these technologies to crack down on domestic dissent.

4. Political Instrumentalization and Weaponization

  • Civil Society Suppression: Dictatorial regimes frequently weaponize European support for local civil society organizations (CSOs). Authoritarian governments often paint local human rights defenders as "foreign agents" working for Western interests, isolating local communities and restricting safe avenues for foreign investment.
  • Sanction Backfire: When the EU implements economic sanctions against unconstitutional governments, the measures often inadvertently harm the civilian population and deepen poverty rather than modifying the behavior of the ruling elite.

Direct Comparison: EU Values vs. Commercial/Geopolitical Imperatives

The EU Value Objective

The Practical Business/Geopolitical Reality

Human Rights Conditionality: Demanding democratic governance and civil freedoms.

Partner Diversification: Authoritarian regimes bypass the EU for unconditional financing from China/Russia.

Migration Management: Partnering to secure borders and stabilize transit zones.

Authoritarian Empowerment: Funding inadvertently legitimizes or finances repressive state security apparatuses.

Resource & Green Energy Security: Investing in raw minerals and green hydrogen.

Local Governance Gaps: Extracting resources within corrupt jurisdictions invites severe legal and reputational risks.

Italy’s Mattei Plan

https://www.governo.it/it/piano-mattei

The Mattei Plan (Piano Mattei) is Italy's strategic initiative for Africa, launched in January 2024 by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to build equal partnerships and boost economic cooperation. The plan starts with an initial allocation of €5.5 billion.

The third annual progress report for Italy's Mattei Plan for Africa (updated as of June 30, 2026) was adopted at the sixth Steering Committee meeting at Palazzo Chigi and submitted to Parliament on July 3, 2026.

Key Updates and Progress

  • Partnership Scope: The initiative has expanded its geographical reach to include 18 partner countries in Africa, following earlier expansions at summits in Rome and Addis Ababa.
  • Funding & Investment: Launched in January 2024 with an initial allocation of €5.5 billion (combining climate funds and development cooperation funds), over €1 billion in Italian resources is already actively committed to projects on the continent.
  • Global Gateway Synergy: The plan coordinates closely with the EU's Global Gateway initiative, securing synergies valued at over €1.2 billion.
  • Core Strategic Initiatives:
    • Advancing the Lobito Corridor infrastructure project (linking Central and Southern Africa via companies like Webuild).
    • Developing African coffee production value chains.
    • Expanding the Blue Raman undersea cable toward East Africa.
    • Operating the Play Hub for Sustainable Development in Rome to support African startups using artificial intelligence. [1, 2, 3]
  • Key Sectors: Projects focus on six core pillars: education and training, health, water, agriculture and fisheries, energy (including renewables and biofuels), and physical/digital infrastructure

https://www.governo.it/en/artcolo/mattei-plan-africa/31297

https://www.esteri.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/ISPI_FPC-Piano-Mattei.pdf

https://temi.camera.it/leg19/temi/iniziative-italiane-per-l-africa-piano-mattei.html#:~:text=Iniziative%20italiane%20per%20l'Africa%20(piano%20Mattei)&text=Il%20Piano%20strategico%20Italia%2DAfrica,si%20veda%20il%20relativo%20dossier).

https://www.mur.gov.it/it/piano-mattei-ricerca-e-alta-formazione/i-principali-paesi-target-il-piano-mattei

https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/mattei-plan-recasting-cooperation-through-strategy-and-branding

The Mattei Plan develops new projects and actively implements initiatives and investments already under-way, sharing with African nations the design, definition and implementation phases of each project, in order to ensure economic and social returns that remain within the country and serve as a stable source of resources for further interventions.

Alongside strategic transnational projects for the development of Africa as a whole, and following an incremental approach, the Plan initially involved nine Nations directly (Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the Republic of the Congo and Côte d’Ivoire). This number rose to fourteen in 2025, with the addition of Angola, Ghana, Mauritania, Senegal and Tanzania, and subsequently to eighteen in 2026, with the inclusion of Gabon, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia.

The Mattei Plan for Africa is structured around six pillars:

1.     WATER: projects aim to improve water management and access, addressing climate change mitigation and adaptation and specifically tackling desertification. Infrastructure interventions cover the entire water cycle: supply, treatment, distribution and reuse, in particular through the design, construction, management and maintenance of complex water infrastructure and of treatment and water-quality monitoring facilities;

2.     AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES: interventions aim to help strengthen the African continent’s food sovereignty and reduce rates of undernourishment and malnutrition. In particular, initiatives focus on promoting: cooperation with Italian centres of excellence; the transition from subsistence farming to more efficient and profitable techniques for farmers; the sustainable management of marine resources and support for coastal communities; the development of local supply chains; the training of young people in agriculture; and innovation to increase crop yields and resilience to climate change;

3.     ENERGY: initiatives aim to expand local populations’ access to energy, promote the use of renewable energy, support the spread of new technologies and the development of sustainable energy supply chains, such as biofuels, and address climate change mitigation through more efficient electrification and forest conservation. These projects and investments form part of the framework of energy complementarity between Europe and Africa, in which Italy serves as the natural entry hub for energy supplies to the whole of Europe;

4.     PHYSICAL AND DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE: in addition to the infrastructure initiatives under the previous three pillars, the initiatives in the frame of this pillar support the strengthening of satellite connectivity, digital transformation and the modernisation of postal services, and the development of energy transmission and distribution infrastructure, especially from renewable sources. The aim is to overcome physical barriers and contribute to the digital transition, for instance through support for digital backbones and the establishment of innovation hubs;

5.     EDUCATION, TRAINING AND CULTURE: the aim is to strengthen human capital across all six pillars, by promoting the acquisition of technical, professional and managerial skills, in order to support employment, entrepreneurship and local economic growth through partnerships between educational institutions, the private sector and public administrations, as well as support for fair and inclusive training pathways at all levels. Particular attention is given to lifelong learning, the development of technical and digital skills, educational innovation and strengthening the capacity of partner nations’ public sectors; this pillar also includes initiatives in the cultural field, in particular cooperation programmes for the protection, conservation and enhancement of cultural heritage, as well as for the development of cultural and creative industries;

6.     HEALTH: projects aim to protect the right to health, strengthen local health systems, improve access to care, enhance training for medical and healthcare staff, and develop digital telemedicine platforms, with particular attention to rural areas in order to promote inclusion and protect the most vulnerable sections of the population. Interventions also focus on combating undernutrition, protecting maternal and child health, and strengthening disease-prevention programmes.

On the basis of specific needs and requests from partners, in addition to the six main pillars, the Mattei Plan includes further training programmes and joint initiatives in areas such as sport and youth policy, natural-disaster risk management, and cooperation in the space sector.

Every project and intervention under the Mattei Plan reflects a genuine partnership approach, involving institutions, businesses, universities, research centres, civil society and local communities, in order to ensure effective, sustainable and long-term development.

Projects, which aim to achieve concrete and measurable results, are designed with a cross-cutting approach to strengthen sustainability and allow for replicability, as part of an ongoing expansion and diversification of cooperation initiatives between Italy and Africa.

From https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/mattei-plan-africa-objectives-and-focus-areas/31298

As Italy’s Piano Mattei (Mattei Plan) moves from launch to full-scale implementation in 2026, expanding its operational reach from 9 to 18 African nations, positive opinions and assessments of Italy's Mattei Plan in 2026 highlight its evolution into a fully operational, multilateral strategy that marks a significant shift in Euro-African relations. Supporters praise the initiative for moving away from traditional, paternalistic aid models toward an "equal partnership" focused on shared economic growth, infrastructure development, and co-creation.

However, it faces several critical structural, political, and geopolitical challenges.

While Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s administration frames the initiative as a "non-predatory, equal partnership", some policy analysts and international observers highlight the following core difficulties the plan must navigate in 2026:

1. Scaling the Financial Architecture

  • The "From Projects to Delivery" Gap: While Italy has unrolled dozens of initiatives and committed over €1 billion, critics argue the budget remains modest compared to the vast developmental needs of 18 countries.
  • Multilateral Integration: Italy is attempting to alleviate financial constraints by tying the Mattei Plan to larger European frameworks like the EU Global Gateway and international institutions (the World Bank and the African Development Bank). However, merging Italy's centralized national command with complex, multi-layered international funding structures introduces significant bureaucratic friction.

2. Accusations of "Extractivism" and Energy Contradictions

  • The Energy Asymmetry: The plan is heavily rooted in securing energy corridors (such as natural gas and biofuels) to turn Italy into a Mediterranean energy hub.
  • Local vs. European Benefit: Experts from institutions like the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) point out a growing tension: while Italy preaches "local value retention," major projects—like Kenyan biofuels or critical minerals from the Lobito Corridor—are primarily geared toward supplying European markets and driving Europe's green transition, raising local concerns of neo-colonial resource extraction.

3. Geopolitical Security and Regional Instability

  • The Saharan and Sahelian Crisis: Implementation areas directly border or encompass regions facing severe political volatility, coup d'états, and terrorism. For example, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani highlighted that security threats, such as terrorist acts in partner countries like Nigeria, present immediate physical and operational risks to Italian personnel and infrastructure deployment. Civil conflict and regional insecurity represent severe operational, financial, and strategic threats to Italy's Mattei Plan for Africa. Because the initiative operates heavily through infrastructure, energy, and development projects in highly volatile regions, active civil strife, radical islamism, and political fragmentation directly jeopardize its long-term viability. (# See the notes below)
  • Crowded Geopolitical Space: Italy must execute this plan while competing for influence against deeply entrenched global actors in Africa, including China, Russia, Turkey, and even fellow EU member states like France and Spain.

4. The Unspoken Migration Agenda

  • Conditionality Apprehensions: Officially, the pillars focus on development (water, agriculture, health, education, energy, and infrastructure). Unofficially, the Italian government directly links the success of the plan to the reduction of irregular maritime migration.
  • Partner Trust: African civil society groups and leadership remain wary that development aid might be weaponized or conditioned upon African nations acting as external border guards for Europe.

5. Transparency and Accountability Deficits

  • Lack of Independent Evaluation: The governance structure is highly centralized within a dedicated steering committee under the Italian Prime Minister's office. Independent reviews indicate the plan still lacks clear, publicly available, and measurable key performance indicators (KPIs). Without third-party oversight, assessing whether the plan is genuinely improving local livelihoods or simply functioning as a domestic political branding tool remains a major challenge

https://www.iai.it/en/publications/c05/projects-delivery-mattei-plan-2026-and-beyond

Supporters of the Mattei Plan respond by pointing to:

Shift from Projects to Delivery

  • Tangible results: According to the third annual progress report sent to Parliament in July 2026, the plan has transitioned from initial pilot phases into a fully functional operational mechanism.
  • Expanding footprint: Evaluators point out that the framework has scaled rapidly, growing from 9 initial pilot countries to 18 partner nations with over 70 active projects across Africa.
  • Substantial funding mobilization: A strong financial framework combining Climate Fund approvals, credit financing, and private resources has successfully committed over €1 billion in Italian resources alone, acting as a force multiplier for larger investments.

 Integration with European and Global Strategies

  • The EU Global Gateway alignment: Analysts emphasize that folding the Mattei Plan into the European Union's broader Global Gateway initiative expands its reach and coordinates efforts rather than duplicating them.
  • Strategic positioning: International observers note the plan represents an important formalization and acceleration of European engagement at a time when other Western nations are struggling to maintain geopolitical influence on the continent.
  • G7 synergy: Prominent infrastructure milestones, such as Italian industrial group Webuild's advances on Africa's strategic Lobito Corridor, align directly with G7-backed corridor investments, demonstrating the plan's integration into global supply chain strategies.

The "Cooperation Between Equals" Philosophy

  • African ownership: Positive feedback from North African perspectives (including Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt) highlights that the plan aligns with Africa's local development priorities rather than imposing external mandates.
  • Focus on self-sufficiency: Proponents praise the framework's core principle of assisting African economies to grow through their own resources by building skills development hubs, digital infrastructure (like the Blue Raman fiber optic cable extension), and local supply chains (such as coffee production).

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/64886c13f1db0739b64a77d2/t/6aa81f5026f5bd574d883e2e/1789402960438/Alice+Hopkin+Report+ONLINE.pdf

 

# The primary conflict-driven vulnerabilities impacting Mattei Plan pilot projects and broader strategic goals include:

Geographic Vulnerabilities in Key Pilot Countries

  • Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa: As one of the core pilot nations for the plan, Ethiopia poses a severe risk due to unresolved internal insecurity, persistent regional tensions, and the ongoing threat of a broader conflict escalation. Instability here directly threatens investments in local agriculture, water management, and institutional training.
  • The Sahel: Italy's attempts to expand infrastructure and migration management projects in the Sahel are severely restricted by military coups, state fragility, and a surge in jihadist groups operating across borders.
  • Nigeria: The Italian government has explicitly cited terrorist acts in Nigeria as direct threats to its strategic partnership priorities, highlighting how non-state armed actors directly undermine energy and development stability.

Strategic and Operational Risks

  • Threats to Asset Security: The Mattei Plan relies heavily on physical infrastructure, energy diversification (e.g., gas from Algeria, energy transit networks), and localized agricultural initiatives. Civil conflicts expose these high-value physical assets to sabotage, extortion, or destruction by rebel factions or terrorist organizations.
  • Aggravation of the Migration Root Causes: A core objective of the Mattei Plan is to stem irregular migration by addressing its root economic causes. However, active civil conflicts drive severe displacement crises. Political violence effectively neutralizes local development aid, making it impossible to establish the stable, long-term employment needed to mitigate migratory flows.
  • Financial Dilution: Critics note that €5.5 billion spread over four years across 14 countries is already a modest budget. When conflict breaks out, a significant portion of these limited resources must inevitably be diverted away from core development into expensive security protocols, asset protection, and emergency risk mitigation.

Geopolitical Friction

The vacuum created by civil conflict and Western withdrawal in unstable target countries has increasingly been filled by rival actors like Russia (via paramilitary presence) and China. This shifting security dynamic severely compromises Italy's strategic autonomy and its ambition to act as the primary, trusted mediator between the EU and Africa

What are the main characteristics, benefits and drawbacks of globalization and the current trends in the global economy?

What is globalization? (See the notes for an essay at the end of this post).

The World Bank describes globalization as the ongoing process of economic integration driven by cross-border trade, capital flows, technology, and migration, which requires stronger international cooperation, social safety nets, and regulatory standards to deliver inclusive growth.

Core views on globalization

·        Economic Integration: The World Bank emphasizes that lower trade barriers, falling transport costs, and rapid communication link national economies more closely together than ever before.

·        Opportunities and Risks: Globalization accelerates growth, technology diffusion, and poverty reduction, but it also creates domestic adjustment challenges, wage pressures, and economic inequality.

·        Role of Standards: Recent assessments highlight that adopting and shaping global standards is a prerequisite for export growth and public service delivery in developing

What Globalization looks like in 2026? Cureent trends and challenges

·        Trade Fractures and Rewiring: Cross-border trade patterns are shifting due to geopolitical tensions, trade barriers, and policy uncertainty rather than total deglobalization. "Rewiring" refers to a fundamental structural reorganization, reshaping or reconfiguration of systems, supply chains, and institutions, shifted away from pure cost efficiency toward security, resilience, and technological adaptation.

·        Regional Clustering ("friend-shoring, reshoring and near-shoring"): Production and trade are increasingly organized through regional blocs and connector economies (like Mexico or Vietnam) rather than long, fragile global supply chains.

·        Uneven Technology and AI Integration: While artificial intelligence and digital services provide upside potential, adoption remains broad, shallow, and unevenly distributed—widening the gap between high-income and low-income economies.

·        Subdued Capital Flows: Foreign direct investment (FDI) and job-creation capacity in emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) face headwinds from high debt, conflict, and rising protectionism

Key Policy Recommendations for Policy and Growth

To navigate this reshaped global landscape, the World Bank emphasizes several core policy priorities in its 2026 outlook:

Global & Regional Cooperation

·        Managing Openness and strengthen cooperayion: Countries must adopt and adapt to international rules to manage economic interdependency, rather than trying to seal themselves off, and keep trade channels open where possible to prevent destructive fragmentation.

·        Supporting Developing Nations: By strengthening international cooperation to support vulnerable and low-income countries, providing them with International financial assistance, low-interest loans, and technical guidance and thus help developing countries integrate safely into global markets.

Macroeconomic & Fiscal Resilience:

·        Rebuilding fiscal space and manage rising public debt.

·        Implementing strict domestic inflation control and enhance debt transparency

Structural Reforms:

·        Improving institutional quality, governance, and regulatory predictability.

·        Mobilizing private investment to offset subdued public spending.

Human Capital and Technology:

Governments also need to

·        Invest heavily in education, digital infrastructure, and skills-training for the workforce to bridge the AI and technology divide.

·        Strengthen Safety Nets to ensure social protection to support workers affected by global shifts.

https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/world-trade-report-2026_execsum_e.htm

https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/68364e3b-c999-43d2-9d29-1739bd613bd3/content

https://www.piie.com/microsites/globalization/what-is-globalization

Is the world deglobalizing?

Not according to UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, but global economic growth is projected to slow to 2.6% in 2026 (down from 2.9% in 2025).

Key Projections & Findings

  • Global Growth & Developing Economies:
    • World output is expected to drop to 2.6% in 2026.
    • Growth in developing economies is projected to slow to 4% (down from 4.7% in 2025).
  • Regional Disparities:
    • Asia is projected to account for 59% of global economic growth in 2026.
    • Country-level growth highlights include India at 7.3%, Indonesia at 5.2%, and China at 4.5%.
    • Income convergence has stalled across most other developing regions, leaving a $4.3 trillion Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) financing gap in the Global South.
  • Trade and Technology:
    • Global trade in goods and services is projected to expand by 4% in constant prices, following a record $35 trillion in global trade volume in 2025.
    • Artificial intelligence (AI) hardware and semiconductors are major drivers of merchandise trade, though gains and financial profits remain heavily concentrated.
  • Risks and Shocks:
    • The Middle East conflict and energy disruptions pushed Brent crude oil prices past $110 per barrel, fueling inflation and import cost pressures in developing nations.
    • Official Development Assistance (ODA) is projected to drop by 7%, marking the third consecutive annual decline.

https://unctad.org/publication/trade-and-development-report-2026

https://unctad.org/news/global-growth-slows-26-and-gaps-widen-between-developing-regions

According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in its October 2026 Global Trade Outlook and Statistics update, the state of globalization is curently experiencing a "narrow upswing" driven by an artificial intelligence infrastructure boom, even as geopolitical fragmentation and conflicts heavily strain parts of the global economy. (Reglobalization?)

While supply chains have shown remarkable resilience in adapting to ongoing disruptions in the Middle East, the benefits are unevenly distributed across sectors and geographies.

Key Trade Projections for 2026

The WTO’s updated outlook outlines a stark contrast between a surging goods sector and a downgraded services market:

·        Merchandise Trade Forecast Raised to 3.9%: The WTO sharply revised its 2026 global goods trade volume growth forecast upward to 3.9% (from its 1.9% baseline projected in March). It expects growth to reach 4.1% in 2027.

·        Commercial Services Downgraded to 3.3%: In contrast, services growth was downgraded to 3.3% from a previous baseline of 4.8%. This slump is primarily due to higher aviation fuel costs, dragging down global transport and travel growth to just 0.9% and 0.2% respectively.

The Two Factors Shaping Globalization in late 2026

1. The AI Hardware Boom and Supercycle

The primary driver of the upward revision in merchandise trade is an unprecedented investment surge in AI-enabling infrastructure.

·        Massive Trade Jump: Global spending on semiconductors and AI data centers surged 67% year-on-year.

·        Growth Share: In the first half of 2026, AI-enabling goods alone accounted for 47% of all global merchandise trade growth.

·        Regional Divide: This boom heavily favors tech-exporting hubs. Asia is projected to lead global merchandise trade, with imports rising 9.5% and exports up 9.9% in 2026. Meanwhile, North American import growth remains subdued at 1.4%.

2. Geopolitical Strain & Systemic Risk

Despite these strong tradefigures, underlying structural threats to globalization are mounting, a sentiment heavily echoed in the flagship World Trade Report 2026 released in September 2026

·        Erosion of MFN Terms: The WTO warns that the percentage of global merchandise trade occurring under core Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariff terms has dropped to 72%, down from 80% just two years ago, signaling an intensifying shift toward bilateralism and protectionist blocs.

·        The Cost of Fragmentation: WTO macroeconomic modeling indicates that splitting the global economy along geopolitical lines could reduce global GDP by 5.1% and slash international trade. A complete breakdown of multilateral cooperation into isolated free trade agreements could cost up to 6.9% of global GDP.

https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gtos1026_e.pdf

https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/world-trade-report-2026_e.htm

https://atlasinstitute.org/a-narrow-upswing-the-wtos-october-2026-update/

The effects of the conflict in the Middle East between the US,Israel and Iran

The 2026 conflict in the Middle East has triggered one of the most severe energy and economic shocks in modern history, driven by major disruptions in critical transit chokepoints and energy facilities.

Impact on Energy Supply

  • Strait of Hormuz Disruption: De facto blockages and attacks on shipping lanes have restricted movement through a vital corridor carrying roughly 20% to 30% of global oil and 20% of liquefied natural gas (LNG).
  • Oil and Gas Output Loss: Global oil production dropped significantly during peak hostilities (with losses exceeding 9 to 10 million barrels per day), sending Brent crude prices surging past $110–$118 per barrel.
  • Infrastructure Damage: Strikes targeted key regional energy sites, including oil storage depots in the United Arab Emirates, refineries in Saudi Arabia, and major natural gas facilities in Qatar (severely impacting global helium, urea, and LNG supplies). [1, 2, 3]
  • Emergency Releases: The International Energy Agency (IEA) coordinated a historic release of 400 million barrels of strategic oil reserves to help calm markets.

Effects on the Global Economy

  • Inflation and Cost Pressures: Surging energy, shipping, and fertilizer costs (with fertilizer and urea prices jumping sharply) have re-ignited global inflation and inflated food and manufacturing prices.
  • Burden on Developing Nations: Emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) in Asia, Africa, and parts of Latin America—which rely heavily on imported fuel and agricultural inputs—suffer the steepest hits to growth and currency reserves. Growth forecasts for developing economies have faced downward revisions by international institutions like the World Bank.
  • Food Security: Because a major portion of global fertilizer production and transit routes pass through the Gulf, rising energy costs and logistics bottlenecks have driven up food staples and strained humanitarian aid programs.
  • Uneven Beneficiaries: Net energy exporters, including the U.S. and Russia (capitalizing on alternative demand), experienced temporary fiscal windfalls, contrasting sharply with heavy importers in Europe and Asia.

 

Some terminology, issues and recent background:

‘Slowbalization’ after the global financial crisis of 2008 https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2023/02/08/charting-globalizations-turn-to-slowbalization-after-global-financial-crisis

Deglobalization, which so far hasn’t happened in terms of a real decline in global trade, may also be interpreted as a kind of partial decoupling from the global system in favour of greater regionalization.

https://yalebooks.yale.edu/2023/10/26/its-not-deglobalization-its-regionalization/#:~:text=Still%2C%20collectively%20this%20host%20of,moving%20between%20its%20fifteen%20members

https://yalebooks.yale.edu/2023/10/26/its-not-deglobalization-its-regionalization/

 ‘Reglobalization’ today? https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/reglobalization-world-economy-growth/

Economic security https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/economic-security-in-a-changing-world_4eac89c7-en/full-report/economic-security-and-vulnerabilities-in-international-supply-chains_dc88aefa.html

Nearshoring, friendshoring and reshoring after earlier outsourcing or offshoring

(See also the definitions further down)

https://www.allianz-trade.com/it_IT/news-e-approfondimenti/community/business-tips/la-nuova-forma-delle-attivita-commerciali.html

https://leap.luiss.it/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/WP5.25-Reshaping-global-value-chains.pdf

https://www.prialto.com/blog/offshoring-vs-outsourcing

The Chinese economy

https://www.fitchratings.com/research/sovereigns/fitch-affirms-china-at-a-outlook-stable-15-06-2026

 https://www.fitchratings.com/research/sovereigns/chinas-domestic-demand-weakness-to-limit-growth-to-4-1-in-2026-22-01-2026

Huge trade surplus https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinas-exports-surge-363-yy-september-imports-up-31-2026-10-14/

https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/12/chinas-record-1-trillion-plus-trade-surplus-shows-renminbi-should-be-allowed-appreciate

https://tradingeconomics.com/china/balance-of-trade

US trade restrictions

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/21/trump-tariffs-15-percent#:~:text=President%20announced%20increase%20from%2010,levies%2C%20under%20a%20separate%20law.

challenges and trends in 2026

https://unctad.org/publication/global-trade-update-january-2026-top-trends-redefining-global-trade-2026#:~:text=Global%20trade%20enters%202026%20under,opportunities%20concentrated%20in%20developing%20economies.

some definitions

outsourcing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outsourcing

offshoring https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offshoring

reshoring https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offshoring#:~:text=Reshoring%2C%20also%20known%20as%20onshoring,back%20to%20the%20original%20country.

nearshoring https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nearshoring

friendshoring https://www.csis.org/analysis/friendshoring-vs-onshoring#:~:text=Friendshoring%20means%20integrating%20production%20in,reshoring%20if%20they%20are%20returning.

supply chain security https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supply_chain_security

supply chain  diversification https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supply_chain_diversification#:~:text=Supply%20chain%20diversification%2C%20within%20the,of%20products%20into%20the%20market.

file:///C:/Users/Pc/Downloads/the-state-of-european-supply-chains-survey-2024.pdf

https://www.aberdeeninvestments.com/en-ae/institutional/insights-and-research/what-is-the-future-of-european-supply-chains

The US and EU – reshoring, friendshoring, nearshoring and securing supply chains

https://blog.qima.com/europe/nearshoring-trends-europe-vs-us

https://www.interregeurope.eu/find-policy-solutions/stories/reshoring-and-nearshoring-for-stronger-european-value-chains

https://luxembourg.representation.ec.europa.eu/actualites-et-evenements/actualites/eu-secures-access-diversified-affordable-and-sustainable-supply-critical-raw-materials-2024-05-23_en?prefLang=pt

Protectionism and responding to it https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/features/protectionism-likely-to-continue-rising-in-2025/#:~:text=Protectionism%20is%20expected%20to%20increase%20in%202025.,on%20edible%20oils%20from%205.5%25%20to%2027.5%25

https://www.eiu.com/n/global-outlook-rising-geopolitical-risks-in-2025-amid-tariff-shocks-and-policy-shifts/#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20EIU's%20Global%20outlook%20report%2C,be%20vulnerable%20to%20shocks%20and%20political%20pressure**

https://www.banque-france.fr/en/publications-and-statistics/publications/historic-rise-protectionism-united-states-january-2025#:~:text=Post%20No.,United%20States%20are%20fully%20implemented.

https://www.imk-boeckler.de/data/downloads/OEA/Veranstaltungen/2025/v_2025_10_24_blecker.pdf#:~:text=By%20early%20September%202025%2C%20Trump's%20new%20tariff,to%20negotiate%20trade%20%E2%80%9Cdeals%E2%80%9D%20on%20his%20terms.

https://www.theguardian.com/business/article/2024/jun/11/protectionism-growth-poverty-world-bank

Can we have global economic growth and tackle climate change at the same time?

https://globalcarbonbudget.org/fossil-fuel-co2-emissions-hit-record-high-in-2025/

https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/cop/climate-crossroads-decade-after-paris-agreement-2026-02-16/

https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2026/feb/11/point-of-no-return-hothouse-earth-global-heating-climate-tipping-points

Investment

https://unctad.org/publication/world-investment-report-2025

https://www.amundi.com/institutional/article/global-investment-views-january-2026

and productivity

https://www.laufg.com/blog/the-productivity-advantage-powering-economic-growth-in-2026 using automation, data‑driven decision tools, and other technologies that raise output per hour. Many industries have further to go to increase artificial intelligence (AI) adoption rates.

The EU economy https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/eu-economy-projected-moderately-grow-amid-global-economic-uncertainty-2025-05-19_en

It needs to be more competitive and achieve higher productivity

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2026/774677/EPRS_BRI(2026)774677_EN.pdf

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/can-europe-finally-deliver-on-competitiveness/

EU trade agreements

https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/negotiations-and-agreements_en negotiations or ratification ongoing or an agreement in place

Mercosur and Mexico agreements https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1644

important examples https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-japan-economic-partnership-agreement/

https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/

http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm 

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20161014STO47381/trade-agreements-what-the-eu-is-working-on

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ehxv-Zkkig4

https://www.euronews.com/business/2026/02/13/eurozone-trade-ends-2025-with-a-126bn-surprise-surplus

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5742

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2569

https://www.epc.eu/publication/why-geopolitics-not-just-trade-finally-sealed-the-euindia-deal/#:~:text=On%2027%20January%202026%2C%20the,exports%20to%20India%20by%202032.

EU restrictions on trade with Russia and the costs involved

https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-sanctions-against-russia-following-invasion-ukraine/import-and-export-bans_en#:~:text=International%20trade%20sanctions,all%20electric%20and%20hybrid%20vehicles October 2025

G7 support for Ukraine

https://g7.canada.ca/en/news-and-media/news/g7-finance-ministers-statement

US trade restrictions and tariffs

As of early 2026, U.S.-EU trade was in flux following a July 2025 deal that established a 15% tariff ceiling on most European goods. However, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled these tariffs illegal in February 2026, leading to ongoing "tariff chaos" and potential suspension of the deal. Key issues include US restrictions on European steel, aluminum, and potential tech sanctions. 

The 2025 Deal and 2026 Legal Challenge: The 2025 agreement aimed to set a 15% tariff on most EU goods, including cars, to address trade imbalances. Following the Feb 2026 Supreme Court ruling against these tariffs, the future of this agreement is uncertain.

Sector-Specific Restrictions:

Steel/Aluminum: The U.S. implemented tariff rate quotas for EU steel and aluminum, maintaining50% duties on some products to protect domestic industry.

Automobiles: While part of the 15% ceiling negotiations, autos and parts faced significant restrictions and potential retaliatory tariffs.

Tech & Digital Services: The U.S. has threatened tariffs on European companies in response to EU digital regulations, which the U.S. considers discriminatory against its tech firms.

"Buy American" Policy: Existing restrictions under the Buy American Act threaten to further limit European access to U.S. government procurement, specifically in the defense sector. 

Impact on Trade

Reduced Exports: EU exports to the U.S. dropped by 15% by value in late 2025, largely driven by the tariff changes.

Investment Demands: The U.S. pressured the EU to invest $600 billion in the American economy. 

The situation remains volatile, with potential for further retaliatory measures from the EU if the U.S. pursues further protectionist policies

https://www.reuters.com/business/eu-lawmaker-urges-delay-us-trade-deal-vote-after-tariff-upheaval-2026-02-22/

Impact of the Ukraine war on markets

The immediate impact of the invasion was a sharp rise in commodity prices and severe equity price declines that mainly affected Russian markets.

https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/05/impacts-of-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-on-financial-market-conditions-and-resilience_a29d11b1/879c9322-en.pdf

Other trade agreements

US-China https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/11/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-strikes-deal-on-economic-and-trade-relations-with-china/#:~:text=China%20will%20purchase%20at%20least,and%20hardwood%20and%20softwood%20logs.

The RCEP:  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_Comprehensive_Economic_Partnership                                                     

The CPTPP:

https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comprehensive_and_Progressive_Agreement_for_Trans-Pacific_Partnership

The EU and China

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/02/20/european-commission-targets-wtos-key-rule-in-push-to-rebalance-china-trade

‘The EU sees China as a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival. However, EU-China relations have become increasingly complex due to a growing number of irritants. China has become less open to the world and more repressive at home, while taking a more assertive posture abroad, resorting to economic coercion, boycotts of European goods, and export controls on critical raw materials.’

from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-china-relations-factsheet_en

https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en

https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en

These notes go with the longer older articles on globalization (Chained to Globalization/Why Globalization Stalled/Globalization’s Wrong Turn) that will be in the Dropbox.

And here is some more background and events 2019-23 if you need it:

The global economy was hit by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and although some of the recent trade barriers were later removed by the Biden administration Covid-19 trade restrictions had to be put in place. This exposed global supply chains to delays, disruptions and interruptions.

https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/services-trade-restrictions-increased-in-2020-compounding-covid-19-economic-shock.htm

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres19_e/pr840_e.htm

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/business/wto-global-trade.html

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2019/html/ecb.ebart201903_01~e589a502e5.en.html#toc1

However, many countries tried to reach new free trade agreements to boost exports while being forced to adopt a series of Covid-19 trade restrictions, e.g. on transport and travel.

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/trdev_21nov19_e.htm

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/trdev_11dec20_e.htm

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres21_e/pr889_e.htm#:~:text=The%20WTO%20is%20now%20predicting,%2Dpandemic%20long%2Drun%20trend.

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/trdev_28oct21_e.htm

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 led to trade sanctions on Russia and retaliation by Russia in the form of gas and oil price rises. Western countries responded by seeking diversification of suppliers and resources (more investment in the development of green energies and a greater reliance, at least in the short term on coal and nuclear power).

And some more notes towards an essay!

Globalization refers to the increasingly global interconnectedness of cultures, people and economic activity.

https://www.piie.com/microsites/globalization/what-is-globalization

Most often, it refers to economics: the increasingly global distribution of the production of goods and services, through reduction in barriers to international trade such as tariffs, export fees, and import quotas (as well as invisible barriers such as complex and slow bureaucracy), and the transfer of such goods and services to consumers. It also involves the freer movement and circulation of workers around the world, delocalization or outsourcing (relocation of factory and service providers from one country to another – see ‘Outsourcing’ and’ Offshoring’) and glocalization of products and services. Globalization contributes to economic growth in developed and developing countries through increased specialization and the principle of comparative advantage. All this helps to lower the price of goods and thus benefits the consumer and raises the standard of living. Globalization of financial markets makes money available at low interest rates for investment across the world (the

circulation of capital to where, in theory, it can best be invested).

 

The rapid increase in the process of globalization was the result of a number of factors: the end of the Cold War and the end of the relative isolation of countries like Russia, the old Warsaw Pact states and China, and their integration into the global trading system; the work of the World Trade Organization to eliminate or reduce trade barriers; the work of the World Bank, which is a lending institution whose aim is to help integrate countries into the wider world economy and promote long-term economic development; the work of the International Monetary Fund which aims to promote global monetary cooperation and financial stability and thus support trade; developments in transport technologies, infrastructure and procedures and thus reductions in transport costs, e.g. container ships and ports, low-cost airlines; developments in Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) that facilitate trade, e.g. the internet, cell phones and satellite technologies. In many ways, this is all in line with the old Functionalist theory of international relations.

Many supporters of globalization argue(d?) that it also promotes peace and cooperation. In the 1960s and’70s there was very little trade between the West and the Communist bloc. In the 1990s the level of trade between, for example, the US and China or the EU and the Russian Federation was expanding rapidly, and it was difficult to imagine how such trading partners could become involved in a general conflict without seriously damaging their own economies. However, the start of the war in Ukraine, the sanctions that followed and the increased tensions with China have made the claim that globalization fosters peace seem much less convincing.

The countries that gain least from globalization will be those least integrated within the global trading system, either by choice (by political decision and the maintenance of strong trade barriers) or through a lack of the necessary infrastructure (e.g. ports, airports and roads), or know-how and expertise, or technology, or an adequate industrial base or a secure business environment (e.g. failed or partially failed states or states with high levels of corruption, bureaucracy, red-tape and insecurity of ownership or the absence of the rule of law due to weak governance or civil war).

 

The term globalization can also refer to the transnational circulation of ideas, languages, and popular culture, particularly via the internet and social media or on satellite TV across political borders. Many Western political commentators identify its most positive effects in the spread of democratic and human rights values at a grass roots level, a phenomenon which authoritarian regimes may find difficult to control. Paradoxically, cultural globalization in this sense may actually lead to tension and political instability, at least in the short term, as the rapid changes which have taken place in the Arab world (the Arab Spring) and around the globe demonstrate (e.g. the street protests in Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Hong Kong, Venezuela and Chile and government repression). Moreover, globalization may lead to a mixing of cultures and an enriched, more vibrant multicultural society. This is an important factor both for the EU and for a city like New York.

Globalization also means the growing role of international organizations, both global and regional, like the UN, the WTO, the IMF or the EU and AU, given the diminishing ability of nation states to confront their problems alone – problems which are now often global challenges requiring international cooperation at an ever-increasing level e.g. climate change, a financial crisis, a pandemic and migration.

 

However, critics of globalization make a series of points:

Globalization encourages competition to lower prices. This can damage developed economies with strong social welfare systems which find themselves in competition with countries like China where social welfare costs for companies are relatively small (or non-existent in some very poor countries), and overheads may also be relatively low. Many Europeans commentators would now argue that this aspect of globalization outweighs the benefits to Western consumers of low-cost goods because European companies may be unable to compete and close, or move their factories and other production facilities abroad where costs are lower (offshore), or outsource part, or all, of the production process to foreig companies located in low-cost areas. This will lead to more unemployment in the developed economies. They call for trade sanctions and limits on countries like China until those countries provide their own workers with adequate health care, education and pensions. The freer movement and circulation of workers around the world has also been criticized as leading to a decline in salaries as workers from the host state compete with migrants (often willing, or forced, to work at lower pay rates and usually less organized in terms of unions), and a rise in social tensions between these two groups. There may also be rising friction due to cultural and linguistic differences.

Further criticisms in this field concern the risk of increased threats to security, and from terrorism and epi- or pandemics. The greater volume of trade makes it difficult for the customs authorities to effectively check the goods being transported and this has, it is argued, made illegal trafficking in drugs, arms, organs and human beings easier. The same argument is made for the increased number of people moving across borders.

The Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine led to delays and interruption in global supply chains and to a rethinking of the whole question of globalization. Many companies, countries and groups, including the EU, NATO, their democratic allies and other groups have adopted a two-fold strategy: continuing to seek free-trade agreements with reliable partners while at the same time prioritizing security, diversification of supplies (e.g. new green energy sources) and suppliers (gas and oil via Tunisia from Algeria for Italy) and regionalization (a shortening of supply chains) instead of always prioritizing short-term efficiency in terms of comparative advantage and the lowest price available globally. They want to prioritize economic security and avoid over-dependence on supplies that may be interrupted by an event like the Covid-19 pandemic, and on suppliers who may use supplies as an economic or political weapon by imposing price hikes or reducing or cutting of supplies. All of this was stated very clearly by Christine Lagarde, as President of the ECB in April 2022

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2022/html/ecb.sp220422~c43af3db20.en.html (this is also good for note-taking on language items!)

This has led to trends like ‘reshoring’, ‘nearshoring’ and ‘friendshoring’ moving some production back to the home country or to a country nearer geographically or politically allied to, or more reliable for, the home country.

Globalization is also criticized as producing a tendency towards a global monoculture (Coca Cola, hamburgers and bland pop music and the destruction of local cultures) and towards an agricultural monoculture of crops, which threatens small-scale farmers reduces agricultural biodiversity and could put the world at risk of sudden reductions in food production due to crop diseases.

Since the economic recession in 2008 many experts have argued that globalization makes the spread of a financial or economic crisis more likely because of the interconnectedness of the world economy, and thus renders the global trading system less stable, rather than more stable as supporters claim. However, other economists point out that this interconnectedness is not a new phenomenon as the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the Depression of the 1930s demonstrates. In fact, they argue that today’s global institutions and our awareness of global economic realities made it possible for countries to react more effectively this time by adopting common policies rather than pursuing protectionist policies as happened in the 1930s. However, the globalization of financial markets and the removal of or reduction in the rules controlling financial and banking transactions (financial deregulation) in the 1990s, together with the availability of credit on easy terms to those who were not really credit-worthy led, in the opinion of many critics, to a financial culture of irresponsibility based on short-term gains from the stock market and property markets, and lending to high-risk borrowers rather than sound, long term investment of this money in industrial and technological projects and research. This, they say, led directly to the financial bubble and crisis in the US real estate market (starting in 2007), in particular the sub-prime mortgage market (but also in the Spanish and Irish real estate markets). It also allowed too much lending to some states and then too much speculation against these states and their currencies (e.g. Greece, Greek Treasury bonds and the Euro) on financial markets. Critics argue that a distinction should be made between the real economy (the production of goods and services) where the bankruptcy of even the biggest company will not create an economic crisis for a government, and the financial sector where financial institutions may lend on such an enormous scale that should they face bankruptcy they put the country’s entire economic system at risk. This argument leads to the conclusion that financial institutions require much stricter regulation and oversight than other types of companies and that this is still lacking. Many of the world's largest and most valuable companies, such as Amazon, Alphabet, and Meta, are part of the virtual economy as they operate with a virtual-first or digital-heavy model. This sector now also seems to require some form of oversight to prevent a speculative bubble that bursts and leads to a global recession.

Critics argue that poor countries, particularly small, poor countries with little or no industrial base, and thus dependent on the export of agricultural produce or raw materials are under pressure from developed economies and emerging economies to open up their economies to foreign companies. They may thus be exploited or face very great fluctuations in the global price of the commodities that they export.

https://unctad.org/news/commodity-dependence-5-things-you-need-know

This may prevent them from accumulating enough capital to develop and grow their economies. It is argued that they may need to protect strategic industries, with trade barriers and national institutions and management, in the early stages of the development of these industries, as most developed countries themselves did (e.g. Italy and Japan) and China still does with technology.

Globalization has also been criticized for prioritizing global economic growth (in which it has been very successful) over global issues such as sustainable development, climate change, deforestation, the reduction in biodiversity and global warming. A series of conferences (including the UN Climate Change Conference, COP 21, in Paris in November-December 2015 and COP30 in Belém, Brazil in November 2025 have attempted to address these issues, but there is great disagreement among commentators as to the effectiveness of these conferences and the extent of the real progress made. Some praise the conferences as a ‘breakthrough’ (the UN) in terms of commitment, while others see them as too little and too late (many NGOs) and mainly an exercise in empty rhetoric or hypocrisy.

Cultural globalization has also been criticized as leading to a dehumanized monoculture based on materialist and essentially Western consumer values. In this context we should note the rising criticism, on the more traditional fringes of some cultures, of international institutions like the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF and even the UN itself as Western (i.e. ‘foreign’) and imperialist.

Globalization is criticized as making it more likely that an epidemic will become a pandemic. The response of most countries to the Covid-19 pandemic was to try to isolate themselves. However, there has been growing awareness of the need for global cooperation now and in the future

https://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/Declaration-AfM-COVID-final.pdf

Finally, it is said that globalization has also given international criminal and terrorist organizations more space to operate and these threats to security will require an ongoing, collective response given the spread of new AI tools.

For more on the EU’s position, see:

https://eccoclimate.org/what-are-the-challenges-facing-europe-and-the-world-in-2026/#:~:text=30%20January%202026,on%20decarbonisation%20and%20climate%20policies.

Strategic globalization https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/01/the-eu-needs-a-plan-for-the-age-of-strategic-globalization.html#:~:text=The%20shift%20has%20not%20been,efficiency%20than%20by%20strategic%20preference. Very good

https://www.eunews.it/en/2024/02/14/eu-competitiveness-goes-through-free-trade-agreements/

Conclusion – The Covid-19 pandemic and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have shown how globalization exposes countries to potentially fragile global supply chains and overdependence on a limited range of suppliers and supplies. The EU and many of its allies and partners are now moving to promote trade deals to achieve diversification in both areas and a review of their mechanisms and approach to dealing with globalization. Meanwhile, the EU continues to negotiate trade deals aimed at liberalization with partners it considers reliable. A re-examination of the terms of trade between developed, emerging, and developing countries is also clearly necessary and the goal of ongoing global negotiations. At the same time, as many of the problems of the 21st century are now on a global scale, only shared global strategies and cooperation will ultimately succeed in dealing with them (e.g. climate change and the COP conferences. As Sustainable Development Goal 17 makes clear, in order to deal with the current economic challenges faced by developing countries and made worse by climate change, debt levels, disruptions to trade and population trends, a global partnership will be necessary. However, critics argue that so far negotiations on global challenges have produced only modest consensus and even less in terms of practical results. The Covid-19 pandemic and the war in the Ukraine and the Middle East have damaged, distorted or simply changed global trading patterns and the duration and extent of the effects on the system are still difficult to forecast. All in all, it seems likely that countries will become more dependent on local or regional production or production by friendly states. However, since globalization is driven by technological progress, which is unlikely to halt, countries, their partners and allies and the international community as a whole will need to learn to manage more effectively this largely irreversible process.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Globalization

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Bank

http://www.worldbank.org/

http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_are_the_objectives_of_the_International_Monetary_Fund

https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/05/06/the-pros-and-cons-of-globalization/#2025f589ccce old but good

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Globalization_and_Its_Discontents

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-globalization_movement

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trade_justice

Some historical and more recent background to globalization

Prior to World War II – The Wall Street Crash, the Great Depression

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wall_Street_Crash_of_1929

http://fortune.com/2018/03/04/did-tariffs-cause-the-great-depression/

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-27/lessons-learned-and-forgotten-from-last-trade-war-quicktake

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Depression

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1933_Banking_Act

After World War II

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system

https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2005/08/art-320747/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gramm%E2%80%93Leach%E2%80%93Bliley_Act#Criticisms

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subprime_mortgage_crisis

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%932008

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_debt_crisis

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dodd%E2%80%93Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_and_Consumer_Protection_Acthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dodd%E2%80%93Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_and_Consumer_Protection_Act

https://www.thebalance.com/financial-regulations-3306234

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-57_en.htm

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170313.en.html

https://news.stanford.edu/news/2014/november/banking-regulation-admati-110314.html

Clinton and deregulation

https://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1877351_1877350_1877322,00.html

Trump, banking deregulation and tariffs

https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/24/trump-signs-bank-bill-rolling-back-some-dodd-frank-regulations.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trump_tariffs

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43512098

Under Biden

https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/2021/biden-and-europe-remove-trumps-steel-and-aluminum

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-67758395

https://www.npr.org/2023/06/27/1184027892/china-tariffs-biden-trump