and this is a good summary of the positive aspects of the BRICS+ group, although it needs to be balanced by a more critical analysis https://www.bcg.com/publications/2024/brics-enlargement-and-shifting-world-order

but remember

https://www.binance.com/en/square/post/31533560504257

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)_per_capita

https://www.visualcapitalist.com/charted-how-brics-stacks-up-against-the-g7-economies/

https://www.bcg.com/publications/2024/brics-enlargement-and-shifting-world-order from last year, this is a good summary of the positive aspects of the BRICS+ group, although it needs to be balanced by a more critical analysis.

Some points made at the SIOI conference on’The BRICS+ and multilateralism, or a multicentric order.’

Intra-BRICS trade is growing rapidly but is still relatively low, although they all do a lot of trade with China. The BRICS+ recognize the need to strengthen it and overcome existing trade barriers.

2025: ‘Despite rapid growth in the last two decades, the scale of intra-BRICS trade remains small compared to the economic size and trade capacity of members. Collectively, members account for 27 per cent of global GDP and 68 per cent of the GDP of the global South. In total exports, they have 24 per cent of the global share and 53 per cent of the global South share. But intra-BRICS trade only comprised about 5 per cent of world trade and 20 per cent of South–South trade as of 2024.’ From page 14-5 of https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdr2025ch4_en.pdf

De-dollarization (in favour of a new BRICS reserve currency, or the Chinese currency or trading mainly in the currencies of the group) would make them less open to Western sanctions, fluctuations in the value of the dollar and changes in the interest rate on their public debts. There is growing trade in the BRICS currencies within the group, however, a major shift hasn’t happened yet and still seems hard to achieve. Most trade in a reserve currency is still in dollars with a slight growth in trade in the Euro. https://www.bricsforum.in/media-center/news/brics-virtual-summit-strengthens-push-for-intra-bloc-trade-amid-global-protectionism-26

https://ifsa-network.com/publications/the-dollar-dilemma-how-a-brics-currency-may-affect-the-global-dollar-influence/

https://www.cadtm.org/The-BRICS-and-de-dollarisation#:~:text=Many%20perceive%20the%20BRICS%20countries,dollarisation%20remains%20a%20distant%20prospect.

FDIs towards the BRICS are mainly from the West and China.

There’s a need to change the voting rights quotas at the IMF.

The New Development Bank is not as powerful as the IMF and mainly deals with economic programs between the members rather than with the poor countries of the Global South.

The BRICS still have no real institutional structure as an international organization or founding treaty but regular meetings and cooperation in many fields.

Is there a kind of irreversible competition or a decoupling (or a new Cold War) between the BRICS and the G7 (the West/G7+)? Not really, this division was real in the Cold War, not now. There’s an interdependence in economic terms and in many others.

So do the BRICS represent a new order or disorder or a fragmentation of the existing international order? Can the BRICS+ help to reverse this fragmentation or will they accelerate it?
The main historic change in GDP terms is China’s economic expansion and to some extent India’s, not that of the others. In PPP terms, however, the total GDP of the BRICS+ as a percentage of global GDP PPP is now significantly larger than that of the G7, so the economic institutions need to be reformed to reflect this.

In political terms it is useful to look at Saudi Arabia and the BRICS+ group to understand the nature of the group https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/saudi-arabia-s-multi-alignment-strategy-through-brics-and-opec

‘This shift towards a multipolar world allows middle powers such as Saudi Arabia to exercise greater strategic autonomy in the international system.’

‘Another dimension of BRICS lies in its institutional flexibility and lack of ideological conditionalities, setting it apart from Western-led groupings.The BRICS grouping follows a principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the state, respecting the sovereignty and independence of each member to conduct its domestic affairs. For Riyadh, these common principles are essential to pursue an autonomous foreign policy’.

‘The geopolitics of OPEC+ help the Kingdom assert independence from its traditional Western allies and build new partnerships with major non-Western powers, such as Russia.’

‘To achieve its broader foreign policy objectives, Saudi Arabia maintains a flexible and adaptive approach in its foreign policy. BRICS and OPEC+ platforms enable the Kingdom to deepen its relations with emerging economies, while remaining a vital decision-maker in the global energy market. It helps to prioritise autonomous foreign policy without full alignment to any power bloc. This includes balancing relations with the West while enhancing partnerships with emerging powers, thereby navigating the great power rivalry. The Kingdom continues to rely on the US for its security, intelligence cooperation, and military hardware. Its engagement through BRICS and OPEC+ should not be portrayed as anti-Western; rather viewed as an approach to strengthen its position in a multipolar world.’

Last BRICS summit declarations

https://brics.br/en/news/brics-summit-signs-historic-commitment-in-rio-for-more-inclusive-and-sustainable-governance

link to text to download https://brics.br/en/documents/presidency-documents/250705-brics-leaders-declaration-en.pdf

China and Africa

https://www.theguardian.com/news/2025/sep/17/chinas-emerging-superpower-status-relies-on-africa-and-the-caribbean-but-is-all-as-it-seems

https://theconversation.com/why-china-is-seeking-greater-presence-in-africa-the-strategy-behind-its-financial-deals-238468

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Africa%E2%80%93China_economic_relations#:~:text=China%20commonly%20funds%20the%20construction,or%20hydrocarbons%2C%20such%20as%20oil.

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/06/why-strong-regional-value-chains-will-be-vital-to-the-next-chapter-of-china-and-africas-economic-relationship/

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/05/how-is-chinas-economic-transition-affecting-its-relations-with-africa?lang=en

https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-united-front-africa/

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/6/as-china-africa-woo-each-other-who-gains-more-its-complex-say-experts

India and Africa

https://www.cii.in/International_ResearchPDF/India%20Africa%20Report%202025.pdf

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-africa-should-target-usd-200-bn-trade-in-next-7-years-piyush-goyal/articleshow/112684469.cms?from=mdr

https://africacenter.org/spotlight/africa-india-cooperation-benchmark-partnership/#:~:text=India%2DAfrica%20trade%20has%20grown,the%20European%20Union%20and%20China.

Russia and Africa

https://aecweek.com/russia-expands-energy-partnerships-across-africa-to-meet-rising-demand/

https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/18/africa/russia-expanding-influence-in-africa-intl-cmd

https://www.pressenza.com/2025/08/south-africa-continues-playing-russian-roulette/

The EU and the BRICS

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/760368/EPRS_BRI(2024)760368_EN.pdf

https://infobrics.org/en/post/66517

https://bst-europe.eu/europe-in-the-world/brics-summit-highlights-need-to-improve-strategic-eu-global-south-ties/
The old BRICS economies

https://www.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/economy/asia-pacific/india-economic-outlook.html

https://www.bbvaresearch.com/en/publicaciones/china-economic-outlook-september-2025/

https://www.bbvaresearch.com/en/publicaciones/brazil-economic-outlook-october-2025/

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/10/14/imf-cuts-russias-2025-economic-forecast-again-a90809

https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-outlook-volume-2025-issue-1_83363382-en/full-report/south-africa_6945dfbc.html

BRICS cooperation

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants?lang=en

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/brics-summit-emerging-middle-powers-g7-g20?lang=en good balanced view

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/jul/05/leaders-of-russia-and-china-snub-brics-summit-in-sign-groups-value-may-be-waning

https://carleton.ca/eetn/2025/the-2025-brics-summit-divisions-or-unity/

Voting at the UN

https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/brics-expansion-as-non-west-consolidation/

https://saiia.org.za/research/a-global-rebalance/

https://www.voanews.com/a/south-africa-criticized-for-abstaining-on-un-ukraine-resolution/6468748.html

The New Development Bank

https://www.cadtm.org/Are-the-New-Development-Bank-and-the-BRICS-Monetary-Fund-an-alternative-to-the Look at the graph and pie charts!

Disputes and tensions

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/shifting-balances-in-south-asia-228247

https://trendsresearch.org/insight/rivalry-within-unity-the-impact-of-india-china-competition-on-the-future-of-brics/?srsltid=AfmBOorqRb3znrp5o5mlgRlDuGp_aJheYZu3ba67zW9Hh6aETaATbZoa

https://responsiblestatecraft.org/brics-expansion/

https://warontherocks.com/2025/09/the-limits-of-rapprochement-between-india-and-china/

https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/how-china-india-relations-will-shape-asia-and-global-order/summary click on all sections

https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/04/how-china-india-relations-will-shape-asia-and-global-order/evolution-border-dispute

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4924989-china-still-challenges-india-in-the-himalayas-as-brics-summit-approaches/

An alternative world order?

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/brics-expansion-and-the-future-of-world-order-perspectives-from-member-states-partners-and-aspirants?lang=en

https://www.iris-france.org/186913-brics-towards-a-new-international-order/

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/brics-summit-emerging-middle-powers-g7-g20?lang=en

Human rights

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china/report-china/

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/eastern-europe-and-central-asia/russia/

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/southern-africa/south-africa/

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/india/report-india/

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/americas/south-america/brazil/
BRICS and economic development
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Development_Bank
https://www.ndb.int/
https://mg.co.za/thought-leader/2024-06-27-alternative-payment-systems-in-africa-and-brics-member-states-can-shift-geoeconomic-dynamics/

https://www.bcg.com/publications/2024/brics-enlargement-and-shifting-world-order

The existing world order
The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 created the basis for a cooperative global economic system to stabilize the world economy, a system which soon included the United States, Canada, Western European countries, Japan and Australia and later many other states (see the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which was created later in the early 1990s). It expanded to include Eastern European members of the former Communist bloc after the end of the Cold War and the economic change of direction in China. In parallel, the United Nations, created in 1945, was, and is, a second attempt at the Wilsonian vision of a rule-based international political order able to prevent or rapidly resolve international conflicts of the kind that led to the two world wars. The UN is also committed to the protection and promotion of human rights.

Some questions to consider:
Do the BRICS countries intend to challenge the existing world order?
Do the BRICS intend to undermine, subvert or take control of this economic/political order?
Or do they want to create a parallel alternative to it or simply to play a greater role within it?
Do they see the world order as too dominated by the US, the dollar as the main exchange currency, and its political or military allies?
Do they want a more multipolar system? A less Western-values-based order? Would this legitimize autocracy? Or a system where state sovereignty is paramount?
Do they share objectives as a group or does each of them have its own goals, only cooperating when it is to its advantage?
Will its expansion to include other resource rich countries give them the means to steer the international order?

Does the group represent a threat to human rights? What do the BRICS mean by human rights?
What evidence can you offer in responding to these questions?

Some tentative (provisional) conclusions (2025)

The BRICS seem to be able to vote with a fair degree of quiet unity at the UN (using abstentions on votes on Ukraine, for example) and if they expand to include other resource-rich developing counties will clearly gain in both economic and political influence. The real question for the future is whether this will lend more support to authoritarianism at the expense of democracy and human rights.
However, one should note that the BRICS are not really like the old Communist bloc, which defined itself by its opposition to the West and to capitalism. (Perhaps politically it has so far been more similar to the old Non-Aligned Movement of the Cold War period, of which India was a member – at least until Russia and China’s increasingly proactive foreign policy). Economically, there is no clear division between the ‘West’ and the BRICS. In both groups we find a range of approaches to managing the economy, those that adopt a more free-market approach, those that believe in government supervision and those that believe in a welfare state – and varying proportions of all three. Politically, as with the rest of the world, the BRICS countries have their national interests and will no doubt seek to protect them, but there is no basic ideological division between the West and the BRICS regarding economics. China is hardly recognizable today as a ‘Communist’ state in terms of economic policy. China and Russia are authoritarian states but they are also part of an international community in theory still based on Western liberal free-market and democratic values that they do not wish to challenge publicly (although they may violate them) and which shows no real signs of losing its appeal to the majority of people around the world despite the increase in the number of authoritarian regimes. Brazil, South Africa and India are active supporters of this community’s values. As indicated previously, Bolsonaro was a populist authoritarian figure who aligned with Putin but lost the 2022 election to former president Lula da Silva. So the challenge represented by the BRICS is probably best expressed in economic terms rather than in a situation arising that will necessarily lead to a political clash. Developing economies are becoming less dependent on developed economies and the institutions that they dominate, Here China, Russia and Brazil certainly say that they want the BRICS to represent an alternative model to the West’s (the IMF and World Bank) one that represents the Global South.
https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/28/china/china-brics-expansion-victory-intl-hnk/index.html
In fact, some optimistic commentators hope that both Russia and China will ultimately conform to liberal values in the long term, evolving slowly towards a more democratic and rights-based society, however unlikely this seems in 2025, given their tightening of authoritarian domestic controls and territorial claims in recent years. This at least is the position of most of those who favor relaunching cooperation, where possible, over confrontation. In their opinion, a more multipolar world with a more diffuse leadership does not necessarily mean a weaker West, but perhaps simply a more inclusive and wider definition of that idea. At the same time, we may see the BRICS acting together on crucial economic issues, and also negatively to block, discourage or restrain what they may see as Western adventurism as regards military interventions (perhaps proposed ‘for humanitarian purposes’) in other countries (such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya) or to protect their partners from criticism, but much less able to agree a positive, proactive line in foreign policy due to their different political systems and priorities. Their cooperation could prove valuable in areas where the US is no longer willing to get involved. For instance, during the first Trump administration the BRICS remained supporters of efforts to save the Iran deal.
Other experts point to the reaction of its BRICS partners to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. They have called for restraint by both sides and a peaceful solution to the conflict, in line with the traditional policy of the BRICS, but voted against or abstained from votes criticizing Russia for invading an independent sovereign state. Such open or tacit support for Russia may be ideological on China’s part, in favor of authoritarian government, but simply economic on the part of India and South Africa, both wanting to secure their energy supplies. Brazil’s position may have partly reflected Bolsonaro’s sympathy for authoritarianism but with president Lula just the continued desire to cooperate with Russia as an energy supplier.

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/05/09/brazils-lula-pitches-strategic-partnership-with-russia-a89034

https://feps-europe.eu/brics-2025-brazils-balancing-act/

China also seems to be quietly helping Russia by offering an alternative to the SWIFT payment system

https://caliber.az/en/post/china-launches-quiet-alternative-to-swift-says-russian-official

and by continuing its energy imports

https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3329705/chinas-crude-oil-imports-russia-rise-september-despite-us-pressure

but problems with infrastructure make it unlikely that China will be able to increase imports of gas in the short term.

https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-pipeline-deal-with-china-seen-taking-decade-boost-exports-2025-10-07/

So cooperation among the BRICS may be less a question of principle and more one of a general opposition to political interference or sanctions from a Western-led or dominated international community and a determination to have greater influence and freedom in the economic field within the international community and its institutions. Beyond that, however, each member of the BRICS may simply want the freedom to focus on its own priorities in foreign policy with or without its BRICS partners. India, for example, is also part of the Quad group, aimed at containing China’s increasing military presence in the Indo-Pacific area.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quadrilateral_Security_Dialogue
https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialogo_quadrilaterale_di_sicurezza
https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/2025-quad-foreign-ministers-meeting

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-quad-critical-minerals-initiative

https://www.vifindia.org/article/2025/october/31/Minerals-at-the-Frontline-India%20and-Quad-s-Critical-Minerals-Initiative

Australia and EU agree sweeping trade deal in face of global uncertainty

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly6g6l6lq7o

lunedì 23 marzo 2026

The risk of a financial crisis and a new recession

Deregulation

Financial markets are experiencing a renewed wave of deregulation in 2025-2026, particularly in the US and EU, aiming to boost competitiveness and corporate growth. Critics argue this loosening threatens financial stability, weakens oversight, and poses risks similar to pre-2008 levels. Key areas include easing leverage rules, reducing capital requirements for banks, and relaxing oversight on non-bank financial institutions.

Current Deregulatory Trends:

US Banking Easing: FDIC and federal regulators have eased key leverage rules for banks, allowing reduced capital requirements.
EU Competitiveness Focus: The European Commission launched "simplification omnibus packages" in 2025 to reduce reporting burdens on banks, driven by calls for enhanced competitiveness.
Private Credit Growth: Alternative lenders and private credit markets are operating with reduced oversight, growing rapidly

Concerns About Current Policies:

· Stability Risks: Reduced capital requirements may limit the ability of banks to withstand crises.

· Return of Risks: The resurgence of deregulatory agendas is often viewed as a trade-off, where near-term profitability for banks comes at the cost of future financial instability.

· Weakened Oversight: Critics argue that the dismantling of protections established after the 2008 financial crisis (like Dodd-Frank) could lead to increased fraud and reduced market integrity.

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2025/html/ecb.sp251003_1~edb1443d00.en.html

https://www.columbiathreadneedle.com/fr/fr/institutional/insights/the-resurgence-of-financial-deregulation-implications-for-markets-and-investors/#:~:text=The%20resurgence%20of%20financial%20deregulation%20is%20reshaping%20the%20competitive%20landscape,vigilance%20and%20adaptability%20remain%20essential.

https://blog.siebert.com/banks-are-back-and-that-should-worry-you#:~:text=It%20is%20clear%20that%20traditional,twirling%20mustaches%20in%20corner%20offices.

The Dodd-Frank Act

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) is a sweeping U.S. federal law enacted in response to the 2008 financial crisis to decrease risk in the financial system. It established stricter regulations on banks, non-bank financial institutions, and derivatives markets, while creating the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to prevent predatory lending.

Key Components and Impact:

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB): Created an independent agency to protect consumers in the financial marketplace, overseeing mortgages, credit cards, and loans.
Volcker Rule: Limits the ability of U.S. banks to make certain kinds of speculative investments that do not benefit their customers, effectively restricting proprietary trading.
"Too Big to Fail" Mitigation: Aims to mitigate risks from large financial institutions whose failure could trigger a systemic crisis, establishing mechanisms for their orderly liquidation.
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC): Established to monitor risks to the entire U.S. financial system.
Derivatives Regulation: Increased transparency and oversight in the swaps market, regulating swap dealers and requiring margin requirements.
Whistleblower Program: Enhanced the SEC’s authority to reward whistleblowers who provide information leading to successful enforcement actions.

Origin: Signed into law by President Barack Obama in July 2010 following the "Great Recession".
Criticisms & Changes: Critics, including financial institutions, often argue the law imposes excessive compliance costs, particularly on smaller banks. In 2018, Congress passed legislation that rolled back parts of the act, easing regulations on many small-to-medium-sized banks.

The Dodd-Frank Act represents the most significant overhaul of financial regulation in the U.S. since the Great Depression.

The Growing Shadow Banking Problem

Financial markets are facing renewed concerns regarding excessive deregulation, with shadow banking (also known as non-bank financial intermediation, or NBFI) acting as a primary source of systemic risk, according to reports from late 2025 and early 2026. While traditional banks have become more regulated since the 2008 financial crisis, risk has shifted to less regulated non-bank entities—such as hedge funds, private credit providers, and investment funds—which now account for approximately 51% of global financial assets, or roughly $256.8 trillion.

Rapid Expansion: Shadow banking (non-bank financial intermediation) is growing at nearly double the rate of traditional lenders.
Systemic Risk: The sector is characterized by high leverage, maturity mismatches, and opacity, which can create systemic risks to the broader financial system.
Data Gaps: Global regulators, including the Financial Stability Board (FSB), have warned they are "blind" to many dangers in this sector due to severe data limitations, particularly regarding private credit.
Failed Oversight: Despite the 2008 crisis being triggered by shadow banking, reforms like Dodd-Frank primarily targeted traditional banks, leaving the "shadow" sector largely intact.

While the global financial system is generally considered better capitalized than in 2008, analysts argue that a new "casino" of unregulated credit has emerged. The resurgence of financial deregulation, often aimed at promoting growth, has "sown the seeds of future instability," as some analysts fear another crisis could stem from the opaque shadow banking sector.

Key Public Debt & Risk Factors for 2026

Entering 2026, the global financial market is characterized by a "resilient but risky" environment, where high public debt levels (exceeding 235% of world GDP) are putting pressure on sovereign issuers amid high, albeit potentially peaking, interest rates. While a widespread sovereign default crisis is not the base case, the risk of "bond vigilantes" driving up yields is increasing, particularly for countries with high deficits.

US Debt Ceiling and Deficits: The US faces renewed risks around its debt ceiling, with potential for instability in November 2026. The US federal deficit is projected to reach $1.9 trillion in FY 2026, with debt held by the public expected to reach 101% of GDP, rising toward 120% by 2036.
European Sovereign Pressure: Europe is experiencing structural headwinds, with France facing high debt and a "relentlessly up" probability of default for its corporates, alongside high 10-year real yields. Italy is also seen as having volatile debt, with persistent risks from stagnant GDP growth.
Market Vulnerability: Potential for turmoil in government debt markets is considered the biggest risk, with the capacity to trigger sharp increases in interest rates and market volatility.

https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/press-releases/2026/03/with-pressures-rising-in-global-debt-markets-maintaining-resilience-will-require-sound-public-finances-strong-institutions-and-policies-that-support-growth-and-innovation.html#:~:text=The%20OECD%20Global%20Debt%20Report,medium%2Dterm%20growth%20prospects.%E2%80%9D

https://realeconomy.rsmus.com/the-growth-of-government-debt-and-its-consequences-for-financial-markets/#:~:text=After%20that%2C%20the%20primary%20deficit,deterrent%20to%20investment%20and%20growth.

Italy

As of early 2026, Italy's public debt remains a significant area of focus for financial markets, characterized by high debt-to-GDP levels, but with a generally stable outlook from rating agencies. While the risk of default is deemed low in the short term, the sustainability of the debt depends on future economic growth, deficit reduction, and ECB interest rate policies

· Default Risk: Fitch Ratings affirmed Italy’s Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating at 'BBB+' with a Stable Outlook in March 2026, citing a large, diversified economy and benefits of eurozone membership.

· Debt Trajectory: Public debt is expected to continue increasing until 2027, with predictions of it reaching 137.9% of GDP in early 2026 before potentially starting to decline in 2027-2028.

· Deficit Targets: S&P projects the budget deficit to marginally decline to around 2.9% of GDP in 2026, dipping below the 3% threshold, aided by measures such as taxes on banks and insurance companies.

· Financing Needs: In 2026, Italy faces around EUR 256 billion in maturing securities (net of BOTs)

https://www.eunews.it/en/2026/01/29/low-growth-new-debt-interest-rates-in-italy-ingredients-for-budgetary-unsustainability/#:~:text=Brussels%20%E2%80%93%20Italy%20has%20everything%20it,to%20the%20European%20Commission's%20estimates.

The Great Depression

As regards tariffs, don’t forget:

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 (or Hawley-Smoot Act): was a U.S. law signed by President Herbert Hoover on June 17, 1930, that raised import duties on over 20,000 goods by roughly 20% to 60%, aiming to protect American farmers and businesses during the Great Depression. It was sponsored by Senator Reed Smoot of Utah and Representative Willis C. Hawley of Oregon. Over 1,000 economists warned President Hoover to veto the legislation, warning of increased consumer prices and international retaliation.
Aftermath: It is largely considered to have failed, causing a global trade war, a 66% decline in international trade from 1929–1934, and worsened economic conditions, contributing to the severity of the Great Depression. In 1934 under FDR, the legislation was largely rolled back by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

mercoledì 11 marzo 2026

Italy and the Middle East

As of 11 March 2026, Italy has maintained much of its diplomatic presence across the Middle East, though several embassies have operated with reduced staff, specialized "Gulf Task Force" support, or temporary, security-related closures due to heightened regional tensions.

Based on information from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Farnesina) and active notices, the following key embassies remain operational, with a focus on facilitating the departure of Italian nationals:

Israel (Tel Aviv): Remained active, though it experienced temporary closures for emergency security reasons in early March 2026.
Lebanon (Beirut): The embassy remains fully operational to assist nationals, despite staff reductions.
Iraq (Baghdad): Operational, but staff numbers have been reduced for security reasons.
Syria (Damascus): Italy has reopened its embassy, with a focus on long-term regional stability.
UAE (Abu Dhabi & Dubai): Active; additional staff were deployed to these offices to assist with evacuations.
Saudi Arabia (Riyadh & Jeddah): Operational, but a rare "avoid travel" warning was issued for the capital and Eastern Province in March 2026.
Other locations: Embassies in Amman (Jordan), Muscat (Oman), Kuwait City (Kuwait), and Doha (Qatar) are also listed as part of the operational network.

However. on 6 March, The Italian government decided, "for security reasons," to "temporarily close" its embassy in Tehran and transfer all diplomatic personnel to Baku, Azerbaijan,

Key Operational Statuses

"Gulf Task Force": Established to assist Italians in the region.
Consular Services: While physical offices have experienced temporary closures (e.g., Tel Aviv on March 2-3), assistance is being provided via mobile teams and the digital FAST-IT platform.
Evacuations: A significant repatriation operation (approx. 25,000 citizens) has been carried out primarily facilitated through UAE, Oman, and Qatar.

Note: The situation is highly fluid and, as indicated in early March 2026, specific offices may temporarily close or restrict access based on immediate security condition

As of 11 March 2026, Italy is actively deploying and reinforcing its military presence in the Middle East, primarily focused on defensive air defense assistance to Gulf states and naval protection for Cyprus, while explicitly ruling out direct involvement in offensive operations against Iran.

Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni stated that Italy is coordinating with European allies to provide defensive assets, motivated by the need to protect approximately 2,000 Italian troops already in the region and tens of thousands of Italian citizens, following a sharp rise in regional tensions.

Key Deployments and Operations (as of 11 March 2026):

Air Defense in the Gulf: Italy is deploying advanced air defense systems (including potential SAMP/T batteries) to Gulf nations to counter drone and missile threats.
Naval Presence in Cyprus: A naval unit is being dispatched to the vicinity of Cyprus to bolster security and protect the European partner from regional strikes.
UNIFIL (Lebanon): Over 1,000 Italian soldiers remain in southern Lebanon as part of the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission.
Maritime Security: Italian naval units, such as the frigate Virginio Fasan, are active in the Red Sea/Horn of Africa area, operating under national mandates (Mediterraneo Sicuro) rather than direct US command. The guided-missile frigate Federico Martinengo was deployed from Taranto to the Cyprus area to bolster security alongside European allies in response to heightened tensions and Iranian-backed threats. It is participating in a coordinated mission with France, Spain, and the Netherlands. It has joined the naval group escorting the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, which is currently operating in the area.

· Operation Aspides: European leaders are assessing whether the EU naval operation Aspides, currently deployed in the Red Sea, could be used to support naval escorts

Non-belligerent: Meloni emphasized, "Italy is not at war with anyone and will not be at war with anyone," aiming to avoid a third front in the ongoing regional conflict.
Resource Constraints: Defense Minister Guido Crosetto noted that Italian defense capabilities are heavily strained due to ongoing support for Ukraine and existing commitments, making new deployments "delicate".
Evacuation Readiness: The Italian government has prepared contingency to evacuate personnel if necessary.

English for Diplomacy

martedì 24 marzo 2026

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