English for Diplomacy: maggio 2019

Negotiating with the ‘enemy'. When is this the right choice? Under what circumstances might a government consider negotiating with another state or a group that it sees as an enemy or an adversary or choose to break off such negotiations?

Introduction
It is usually argued, especially in terms of the Functionalist theory of international relations, that when there is a conflict it is better for the two sides to sit down and negotiate in order to seek a reasonable compromise, instead of simply continuing the conflict with all the economic and human costs that this may involve. At the same time a good argument can be made for saying that there may be some states or groups (terrorists, for example) with which it is basically wrong or dangerous to negotiate. Thus the question of if and when to negotiate with a perceived ‘enemy’ has been and will remain for the foreseeable future a key question in diplomacy.

After 9/11 the Bush administration decided to wage a ‘war on terror’ against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It also named North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Syria as’ rogue states’ arguing that these states supported terrorism and were not therefore reliable members of the international community. It was generally unwilling to negotiate with groups or states that it considered enemies. It claimed that it would use US power if necessary to ‘export democracy’ through regime change. This led to military intervention first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq. However, at the same time the US seems to have made a deal with Libya – no intervention in Libya in exchange for no further support for terrorism. And later it opened a partial though temporary dialogue with Syria, warning Syria of retribution if Syria tried to destabilize post-Saddam Iraq.

With the arrival of the Obama administration the US government said it was open to dialogue with old enemies if the conditions were right. Then, faced with the Arab spring, growing protests across the Arab world and the fall of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, the Obama administration decided to back this popular movement for change. This meant breaking with Gaddafi when he repressed public protests and supporting military intervention ‘to protect civilians’ and eventually regime change. The US and its allies also believed that the Assad regime in Syria should step down or be forced to step down after bloodily repressing public protest. While many Arab and Muslim countries agreed, the international community was divided on the question of continuing negotiations with the regime. The UNSC was also divided on the question of more forceful action, with Russia and China against US intervention against Assad. All members supported UN attempts to negotiate a truce as a precondition for negotiations between the government and the rebels, but Western and Arab countries imposed sanctions on the Syrian regime to try to discourage it from further acts of violence and in the hope of bringing it down. The Syrian regime agreed to dismantle its chemical arsenal under UN supervision. With the rise of Islamic State Russia (actively backed by China) began intervention in support of the Syrian regime and Russia even called for an alliance with the US and its NATO allies. However, the US refused to accept Assad as someone it was prepared to do a deal with and Russian intervention has targeted the rebels as well as IS. Peace talks between the Syrian government and the rebel leadership went on for several years. Earlier efforts were followed in October 2015 by further talks in Vienna involving officials from the U.S., the EU, Russia, China and various regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and, for the first time Iran. Peace talks with the rebel leadership continued in Astana, Kazakhstan in 2017 Russia-backed Syrian peace talks in Sochi in January 2018 and the 9^th round of the Astana Process on Syrian peace have so far failed to produce a settlement. The Trump administration now intends to withdraw from Syria and accepts the reality of Assad's hold on power. This effectively means that for the US Assad is now an acceptable negotiating partner in the fight against radical Islamic military and terrorist groups.

Meanwhile, after months of negotiations in July 2015 Iran agreed to a deal on its nuclear program with the P5+1 (the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council–the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China plus Germany) plus the European Union, in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. However, the Trump administration abandoned the deal on May 12^th 2018 because of Iran's refusal to agree to new conditions.

In Afghanistan the Trump administration is trying to open negotiations with the Taliban.

In June 2018 there was a summit meeting between President Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore. A further meeting took place in February 2019.

In May 2019 the Trump administration imposed new sanctions on Iran.

Given all the ongoing disputes and negotiations (and sanctions imposed on, lifted or threatened against) with North Korea, Syria, Iran, Russia and Myanmar, identifying if and when it is a good idea for an actor to negotiate with a state or organization it considers an enemy is still a vital question for both individual democratic states and the international community as a whole.

This is also the question facing the EU in dealing with Russia and the Ukraine conflict (sanctions or no sanction?), with the factions in Libya, with a less open Turkey (is Turkey's application to join the EU now a dead letter?) and in deciding its attitude to the Arab Spring movements and authoritarian Arab governments. It is also the problem for Italy in its relations with Egypt after the Regeni case (Should Italy treat Egypt differently?).

Here are some of the factors that may influence the decision whether to negotiate or not, and some examples to think about, although you will no doubt be able to find for yourself more and better examples from current affairs and from history:

1) Is there some kind of believable/ feasible /viable/reasonable compromise that could be reached?

Cuba – after the rapprochement in December 2014 it seemed so, but there was still a long way to gohttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/18/us-cuba-relations-one-year-later-progress-report
and the Trump administration imposed new sanctions in November 2017, seeming once more intent on freezing relations between the 2 countries.

Al Qaeda and Islamic State –there seems no basis for a negotiationColombia and the FARC – a successful deal was negotiated in 2016 and FARC which took part in the 2018 legislative and presidential elections with a promise to fight poverty and corruption but lost in both to conservative opponents. In 2019 there remained one armed rebel group the ELN. In January 2019, polls show that 64% of Colombians wanted President Duque to resume negotiations with the ELN, but the new government called off talks in 2018, leaving the future of the peace process uncertain.

2) Can a temporary truce and release of prisoners be arranged to give a positive start to negotiations? Can negotiations begin with a moderate political interlocutor who can also act as a proxy for or channel to a more radical group that we are not yet ready to negotiate with directly? – Sinn Fein for the IRA in negotiating the 1998 Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland / Fatah for Hamas in negotiations for a settlement with Israel? This is a way to start things in the hope of broadening participation if progress is made

3) Does the adversary have some legitimate grievances even though we do not like their methods? – Hamas for the Palestinians / Russia in the Ukraine?

4) Do they have a leadership with whom to negotiate? Will their followers accept the settlement the leadership negotiates? This was part of Yasser Arafat’s problem at Oslo.

5) Do they have widespread local support? (Brigate Rosse – no/ Hamas – in Gaza it seems so (but this may be changing. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/21/hamas-violently-suppresses-gaza-economic-israeli-border-protests ) And if they do, is not negotiating with them a dead end? – the Taliban in some areas, is gaining support again

http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2018/01/31/550771/Afghanistan-Taliban-militants

http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/heres-the-most-disturbing-thing-about-the-taliban-takeover-of-kunduz/

Is it possible and desirable to negotiate with 'moderate' Taliban? Or is this dangerous, a betrayal of principle or simply an illusion?The US began high level talks with the Taliban in February 2019.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/world/asia/us-taliban-talks-afghanistan-qatar-baradar.html

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/23/tillerson-open-to-peace-talks-with-taliban-afghanistan-pakistan-south-asia-diplomacy/

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/14/taliban-publish-letter-calling-us-start-afghan-peace-talks

https://asiafoundation.org/2018/02/14/afghan-women-pessimistic-peace-talks-taliban/

6) Does 'the enemy' have international support – Cuba in the past, and Assad today, North Korea (from China) today?

7) Time and timing – is this the right moment to negotiate? Is the population in the area tired of the struggle? Is the enemy now ready to negotiate? Attitudes in Northern Ireland, Ireland and Britain in the 1990s / in France during the Algerian crisis. Has the struggle changed? ETA is no longer faced with Franco but with democratic Spain, has given up armed struggle and announced its dissolution.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/02/basque-separatist-group-eta-announces-dissolution

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/basque-group-eta-role-spain-180222084410352.html

Does this mean there can be a new dialogue with peaceful separatists? Is the Spanish government correct in its response to the Catalan separatist movement?

Cuba is seen by many as no longer a Cold War threat, a centre from which Communism can spread to the Americas. Or is the situation the same? The Trump administration believes the Cuban government is still a brutal regime. Has there been too much blood? Is there still too much hatred and distrust? Israel and the Palestinians? In elections and surveys both the Palestinians and Israelis say they want peace but both sides seem intransigent and very unwilling to make any concessions. Should the US and EU continue with sanctions against the Venezuela government?

8) Does the group have two wings, one radical and one more moderate? Can the moderates be persuaded to start negotiations and abandon and isolate the extremists – e.g. the Taliban?

9) Are there outside sponsors for negotiations? – the UN, US, EU and Russia and the moderate Arab states for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians

10) Are these sponsors willing to offer money and other aid as an incentive to negotiate? The UN, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states if the Palestinians and Israelis reached a full and lasting settlement.

11) Realpolitik – how desperate are we? Afghanistan? How much does each side need an agreement? Can one side win without one? Does the present situation cost too much in terms of lives or money, or damage us in other ways? Should the Iraqi government include Sunni leaders who were ex-Baath party members, Shiites who are ex-insurgents or anti-US or some of the more radical Kurdish separatists? Should the US and NATO accept and normalize the dialogue with Assad in Syria? Should the Afghan government do a deal with some of the Taliban? Will the EU and NATO be forced to accept Russia’s annexation of Crimea?

12) Realpolitik – can we buy them out? North Korea and US-South Korean aid to North Korea in the past in exchange for promises to halt its nuclear program.

13) Realpolitik – Are there domestic reasons for negotiating or not negotiating? Negotiations with North Vietnam and the Viet Cong (National Liberation Front) in the late sixties and early seventies and changing US public opinion on the Vietnam war / Russia’s refusal to negotiate with Chechen rebel separatists because of the fear that separatist hopes would spread from Chechnya to other Caucasian republics (and the same for radical Islamist groups in the area) /Turkey’s fears regarding Kurdish aspirations in Syria and the effect of the creation of a Kurdish state on the aspirations of Kurds in Turkey itself and the consequences for its territorial integrity

14) Realpolitik – Is it better to use another approach? An embargo, an invasion, political isolation, pressure from an intermediary (for example, the US has often called on China to put pressure on its ally, North Korea to negotiate).

15) How weak are our allies? How much do they need peace to survive? The government of Pakistan and negotiations with moderate Taliban?/ the government of Iraq and possible negotiations with Sunni ex-Saddam Hussein supporters and ex- al Qaeda supporters and other non-government groups?

16) How expensive for us is what they want (in economic or non-economic terms)? What would happen if Islamist radicals were successful in the Middle East and threatened to take control of the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia? / Iran and nuclear weapons? / are the stakes too high to back down and negotiate? September 1939.

17) How final will the treaty be? In exchange for recognition of a fully independent Palestinian state, Israel wants a lasting settlement that guarantees security and means no more attacks and no more claims at a later date. It doesn’t want a treaty with only 60% of the Palestinians on most but not all of the issues.

18) Is the situation a kind of civil war? A fight to the death between irreconcilable enemies? The Algerian government and Islamist rebels in the past? / Syria today?

19) Are there any really effective negotiators who can help? In Northern Ireland, Senator Mitchell and Mo Mowlam

20) Costs - Is the competition too expensive? The Soviet Union and the US, SALT I and II and the oil crisis / the US and the Russian Federation and START and New START / What now seems like the beginning of a new arms race?

21) Impasse – the need for coexistence / Israel and the Palestinians?/ the US and Soviet Union (Nixon and Kissinger) / the US and China (Nixon and Kissinger)

22) New opportunities, especially commercial ones – the US and Soviet Union (Nixon and Kissinger) / the US and China (Nixon and Kissinger)

Conclusion
There may be space for negotiations with some groups or countries which are currently considered adversaries, but it requires a case by case approach, realism so as not to waste time where progress is not really likely or the counterpart is unreliable, but also real commitment once negotiations are opened (there were accusations of diplomatic inactivity in many areas during the Bush administration). Obama’s willingness to listen and offer dialogue was a first step and a necessary condition as regards both Cuba and Iran, but the sincerity of the interlocutor as regards commitments remains doubtful in the eyes of skeptics like the Trump administration. Progress needs to be monitored in terms of actions in line with the settlement reached or simply in line with the conditions set for opening negotiations. Finally, the possibility of meaningful negotiations depends only in part on the decision and determination of political leaders. It is often largely conditioned by public perception of the idea. This is true in an area of conflict but also in a democratic country. ETA originally renounced armed activity back in 2011 but the Spanish government refused any dialogue with it, at least partly in response to Spanish public opinion after years of terrorist attacks..

https://www.thelocal.es/20160328/basque-terrorist-group-calls-for-peace-talks-eta

In the case of ETA such dialogue is now no longer necessary (see above).

However, the same question about popular support for dialogue (and overcoming opposition to dialogue) is perhaps the key to any real hope for serious negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Good background:

Below, from page 91 onwards ‘Without Conditions’, but the other articles too:http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Prudent_Use_Full_Book.pdf

http://pon.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/images/posts/N0402Af2.pdf