Introduction
It is usually argued, especially in terms of the Functionalist
theory of international relations, that when there is a conflict, it
is better for the two sides to sit down and negotiate in order to seek a reasonable
compromise, instead of simply continuing the conflict with all the economic and
human costs that this may involve. At the same time a good argument can be made
for saying that there may be some states or groups (terrorists, for example)
with which it is basically wrong or dangerous to negotiate. Thus, the question
of if and when to negotiate with a perceived ‘enemy’ has been and will remain
for the foreseeable future a key question in diplomacy.
After 9/11
the Bush administration decided to wage a ‘war on terror’ against Al Qaeda and
the Taliban. It also named North
Korea, Iraq, Iran and Syria as’ rogue states’ arguing that these states
supported terrorism and were not therefore reliable members of the
international community. It was generally unwilling to negotiate with groups or
states that it considered enemies. It claimed that it would use US power if
necessary to ‘export democracy’ through regime change. This led to military
intervention first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq. However, at the same time the
US seems to have made a deal with Libya – no intervention in Libya in exchange
for no further support for terrorism. And later it opened a partial though
temporary dialogue with Syria, warning Syria of retribution if Syria tried to
destabilize post-Saddam Iraq.
With the arrival of the Obama administration
the US government said it was open to dialogue with old enemies if the
conditions were right. Then, faced with the Arab spring, growing protests
across the Arab world and the fall of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, the
Obama administration decided to back this popular movement for change. This
meant breaking with Gaddafi when he repressed public protests and
supporting military intervention ‘to protect civilians’ and eventually regime
change. The US and its allies also believed that the Assad regime in Syria
should step down or be forced to step down after bloodily repressing public
protest. While many Arab and Muslim countries agreed, the international
community was divided on the question of continuing negotiations with the
regime. The UNSC was also divided on the question of more forceful action, with
Russia and China against US intervention against Assad. All members supported
UN attempts to negotiate a truce as a precondition for negotiations between the
government and the rebels, but Western and Arab countries imposed sanctions on
the Syrian regime to try to discourage it from further acts of violence and in
the hope of bringing it down. The Syrian regime agreed to dismantle its
chemical arsenal under UN supervision. With the rise of Islamic State Russia
(actively backed by China) began intervention in support of the Syrian regime
and Russia even called for an alliance with the US and its NATO allies.
However, the US refused to accept Assad as someone it was prepared to do a deal
with and Russian intervention targeted the rebels as well as IS. Peace talks between the Syrian government and the rebel
leadership went on for several years. Earlier efforts were followed in October
2015 by further
talks in Vienna involving officials from the U.S., the EU, Russia, China and various
regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and, later Iran. Peace talks with the rebel
leadership continued in Astana, Kazakhstan in 2017 Russia-backed Syrian peace
talks in Sochi in January 2018 and the 9th round of the Astana Process on Syrian peace failed to produce a
settlement. The Trump administration decided to withdraw from Syria and accept
the fact of Assad's continued hold on power. This effectively means that in
2022 for the US the Assad regime remains illegitimate, but a reality.
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/us-disappointed-by-attempts-to-legitimize-syria-s-assad/2540146
Meanwhile, after months of
negotiations in July 2015 Iran agreed to
a deal on its nuclear program with the P5+1 (the permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council–the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China plus Germany) plus the European Union, in exchange for the
lifting of sanctions. However, the Trump administration abandoned the deal on
May 12th 2018 because of Iran's refusal to agree to new conditions.
In Afghanistan the Trump
administration tried to open negotiations with the Taliban.
In June 2018 there was a
summit meeting between President Trump and North
Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore. A further
meeting took place in February 2019.
In May 2019 the Trump
administration imposed new sanctions on Iran. In April 2022 the Biden
administration may be close to renewing the deal.
Meanwhile, Russia has
invaded Ukraine and the international community is trying to encourage the two
sides to negotiate.
Given all
the ongoing disputes and negotiations with (and sanctions imposed on, lifted or
threatened against) North Korea, Syria, Iran, Russia, China and Myanmar, identifying if and when it is a good
idea for an actor to negotiate with a state or organization it considers an
enemy is still a vital question for both individual democratic states and the
international community as a whole.
This was also the question facing the EU in dealing with Russia after the
2014 Ukraine conflict (sanctions or no sanction? A question resolved by the
Russian attack in 2022), with the factions in Libya, with a less open Turkey
(is Turkey's application to join the EU now a dead letter?) and in deciding its
attitude to the Arab Spring movements and new authoritarian Arab governments.
It is also the problem for Italy in its relations with Egypt after the Giulio
Regeni case. Should Italy treat Egypt differently?
Here are some of the factors that may influence the decision whether to
negotiate or not, and some examples to think about, although you will no doubt
be able to find for yourself more and better examples from current affairs and
from history:
1) Is there
some kind of believable/ feasible /viable/reasonable compromise that could be
reached?
Cuba – after
the rapprochement in December 2014 it seemed so, but there was still a long way
to go
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/18/us-cuba-relations-one-year-later-progress-report
and the Trump administration imposed new sanctions in November 2017, seeming
once more intent on freezing relations between the 2 countries. Biden seemed
ready for a new initiative but has put things on hold while he deals with other,
more pressing problems.
Al Qaeda and
Islamic State –there seems no basis for a negotiation.
Colombia and the FARC – a successful deal was
negotiated in 2016 and FARC, which then took part in the 2018 legislative and
presidential elections with a promise to fight poverty and corruption but lost
in both to conservative opponents. In 2019 there remained one armed rebel group, the ELN. In
January 2019, polls show that 64% of Colombians wanted President Duque to
resume negotiations with the ELN, but the new government called off talks in
2018, leaving the future of the peace process uncertain. In March 2020, the
National Liberation Army (ELN) declared a unilateral ceasefire during the
outbreak of coronavirus
pandemic.
2) Can a
temporary truce and release of prisoners be arranged to give a positive start to
negotiations?
3) Can
negotiations begin with a moderate political interlocutor who can also act as a
proxy for or channel to a more radical group that we are not yet ready to
negotiate with directly? – Sinn Fein for the IRA in negotiating the 1998 Good Friday
Agreement in Northern Ireland / Fatah for Hamas in negotiations for a
settlement with Israel? This is a way to start things in the hope of broadening
participation if progress is made. See also point 8. Was it and is it possible and desirable to negotiate with
'moderate' Taliban? Or is this dangerous, a betrayal of principle, a bad signal
to give or simply an illusion? The US began high level talks with the Taliban
in February 2019. These ultimately failed in 2021 and led to the US
withdrawal and the collapse of the Afghan government. Should the US have
remained in Afghanistan and relaunched negotiations?
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/afghan-taliban-peace-talks-fail-to-reach-breakthrough/2308518
4) Does the
adversary have some legitimate grievances even though we do not like their
methods? – Hamas for the Palestinians? / Russia in the Ukraine?
5) Do they
have a leadership with whom to negotiate? Will their followers accept the
settlement the leadership negotiates? This was part of Yasser Arafat’s dilemma
at Oslo in 1993.
6) Do they
have widespread local support? (Brigate Rosse – no/ Hamas – in Gaza it seems they
do (but this may be changing. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/21/hamas-violently-suppresses-gaza-economic-israeli-border-protests,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/gaza-strip/freedom-world/2022
). And if they
do, is not negotiating with them a dead end?
The Taliban are
once again the government of Afghanistan. Is it time for the international
community to recognize this fact?
https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/does-the-world-need-to-recognize-the-taliban/
https://www.state.gov/communique-of-the-special-representatives-and-envoys-for-afghanistan/
Should the US have remained in Afghanistan and
relaunched negotiations?
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/afghan-taliban-peace-talks-fail-to-reach-breakthrough/2308518
7) Does 'the
enemy' have international support? – Cuba in the Cold War, and Assad today,
North Korea (from China) today.
8) Time and
timing – is this the right moment to negotiate? Is the population in the area
tired of the struggle? Is the enemy now ready to negotiate? Attitudes in
Northern Ireland, Ireland and Britain in the 1990s / in France during the
Algerian crisis. Has the struggle changed? ETA, no longer faced with Franco but
with democratic Spain, finally gave up armed struggle and announced its
dissolution.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/02/basque-separatist-group-eta-announces-dissolution
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/basque-group-eta-role-spain-180222084410352.html
Does this
mean there can be a new dialogue with peaceful separatists?
Is the
Spanish government correct in its response to the Catalan separatist movement?
Cuba is seen
by many as no longer a Cold War threat, a centre from which Communism can
spread to the Americas. Or is the basic situation the same? The Trump
administration believed the Cuban government is still a brutal regime. Has
there been too much blood? Is there still too much hatred and distrust? Israel
and the Palestinians? In elections and surveys both the Palestinians and
Israelis say they want peace but both sides seem intransigent and very
unwilling to make any concessions. Should the US and EU continue with sanctions
against the Venezuela government?
9) If the adversary
has two wings, one radical and one more moderate, can the moderates be persuaded
to start informal talks, or secret talks and abandon and isolate the extremists
– e.g. factions within the new Taliban government, in Iran, or in Russia? Or is
this an illusion or, even worse, does it risk destabilizing relations even
further and strengthening the position of the more radical group?
10) Are
there outside sponsors for negotiations? – the UN, US, EU and Russia and the
moderate Arab states for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians
11) Are these
sponsors willing to offer money and other aid as an incentive to negotiate? The
UN, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states if the Palestinians and Israelis reached a
full and lasting settlement.
12)
Realpolitik – how desperate are we for a settlement? Munich 1938? The US in Vietnam
in the late 1960s and early 1970s? How much does each side need an agreement?
Can one side win without one? Does the present situation cost too much in terms
of lives or money, or damage us in other ways? Afghanistan? Should the Iraqi
government include Sunni leaders who were ex-Baath party members, Shiites who
are ex-insurgents or anti-US leaders or some of the more radical Kurdish
separatists? Should the US and NATO accept and normalize the dialogue with
Assad in Syria? Should the Western governments do a deal with the Taliban
government in Afghanistan? Will the EU and NATO be forced to accept Russia’s
annexation of Crimea and should Ukraine give up on its hopes to join NATO and
the EU to negotiate a peace treaty with Russia?
13)
Realpolitik – can we buy them out? North Korea and US-South Korean aid to North
Korea in the past in exchange for promises to halt its nuclear program.
14)
Realpolitik – are there domestic reasons for negotiating or not negotiating?
Negotiations with North Vietnam and the Viet Cong (National Liberation Front)
in the late sixties and early seventies and changing US public opinion on the
Vietnam war / Russia’s refusal to negotiate with Chechen rebel separatists
because of the fear that separatist hopes would spread from Chechnya to other
Caucasian republics (and the same for radical Islamist groups in the area)
/Turkey’s fears regarding Kurdish aspirations in Syria and the effect of the
creation of a Kurdish state on the aspirations of Kurds in Turkey itself and
the consequences for its territorial integrity
15)
Realpolitik – is it better to use another approach? An embargo, an invasion,
political isolation, pressure from an intermediary (for example, the US has
often called on China to put pressure on its ally, North Korea to negotiate).
16) How weak
are our allies? How much do they need peace to survive? The government of Pakistan
and negotiations with moderate Taliban? / the government of Iraq and possible
negotiations with Sunni ex-Saddam Hussein supporters and ex- al Qaeda
supporters and other non-government groups?
17) How
expensive for us is what they want (in economic or non-economic terms)? What
would happen if Islamist radicals were successful in the Middle East and managed
to take control of the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia? / Iran and nuclear
weapons? / are the stakes too high to back down and negotiate? September 1939.
18) How
final will the treaty be? In exchange for recognition of a fully independent
Palestinian state, Israel wants a lasting settlement that guarantees security
and means no more attacks and no more claims at a later date. It doesn’t want a
treaty with only 60% of the Palestinians on most but not all of the issues.
19) Is the
situation a kind of civil war? A fight to the death between irreconcilable
enemies? The Algerian government and Islamist rebels in the past? / Syria
today?
20) Are
there any really effective negotiators who can help? In Northern Ireland,
Senator Mitchell and Mo Mowlam
21) Costs -
Is the competition too expensive? The Soviet Union and the US, SALT I and II
and the oil crisis / the US and the Russian Federation and START I and New
START / Or in 2022, what now seems like the potential beginning of a new arms
race?
22) Impasse
– the need for coexistence / Israel and the Palestinians? / the US and the Soviet Union (Nixon and Kissinger)
/ the US and China (Nixon and Kissinger),
India and Pakistan
23) New opportunities,
especially commercial ones – the US and Soviet Union (Nixon and Kissinger) /
the US and China (Nixon and Kissinger)
Conclusion
There may be space for negotiations with some groups or countries which are
currently considered adversaries, but it probably requires a case-by-case
approach, realism so as not to waste time where progress is not really likely
or the counterpart is unreliable, but also real commitment once negotiations
are opened (there were accusations of diplomatic inactivity in many areas
during the Bush administration). Obama’s willingness to listen and offer dialogue
was a first step and a necessary condition as regards both Cuba and Iran, but
the sincerity of the interlocutor as regards commitments remains doubtful in the
eyes of skeptics like the Trump administration. Progress needs to be monitored
in terms of actions in line with the settlement reached or simply in line with
the conditions set for opening negotiations. Finally, the possibility of
meaningful negotiations depends only in part on the decision and determination
of political leaders. It is often largely conditioned by public perception of
the idea. This is true in an area of conflict but also in a democratic country.
ETA originally renounced armed activity back in 2011 but the Spanish government
refused any dialogue with it, at least partly in response to Spanish public
opinion after years of terrorist attacks.
https://www.thelocal.es/20160328/basque-terrorist-group-calls-for-peace-talks-eta
In the case
of ETA such dialogue is now no longer necessary (see above).
However, the same question about popular support for dialogue (and overcoming opposition to dialogue) is perhaps the key to any real hope for serious negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
Some good
background reading:
this link from
page 91 onwards ‘Without Conditions’, but the other articles are interesting too:
http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Prudent_Use_Full_Book.pdf
and on negotiating
in business
http://pon.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/images/posts/N0402Af2.pdf
