Italy, the international community and the UN
The Uniting for
Consensus (UfC) proposal
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/italy-and-the-united-nations/uniting-for-consensus-ufc/
but as one of you said during the lesson (Sara?) Massari
talks here about a possible maximum of 27 (instead of 26) SC members so there
is obviously still space for flexibility. Questions like the exact length of
the term of the semi-permanent seats (3-5 years?) still need to be decided, so
the current proposal is a draft that
would need to be further negotiated and finalised.
the challenges
https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/2023_pirozzi_grasping-the-nettle.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council
recent news
https://decode39.com/5919/italy-plan-un-security-council-reform/
https://www.onuitalia.com/2023/01/12/massari-italia-riforma-onu-per-rafforzare-lo-stato-di-diritto/
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/09/1073792
https://www.quirinale.it/elementi/50730
General
position
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/italy-and-the-united-nations/
https://italyun.esteri.it/it/litalia-e-le-ooii/ufc/
https://italyun.esteri.it/it/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2021/01/unscforall/
Reform:
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100059111.pdf
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/security-council-reform/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/onu-riforma-impossibile-36410
Start by reading: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/what-has-the-un-achieved-united-nations
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/sep/23/un-security-council-failing-70-years
What
the UN says about its structural reform plan ‘United to Reform’:
https://reform.un.org/news/united-nations-management-reform-why-reform
https://reform.un.org/news/interview-jens-wandel-special-advisor-sg-reform
https://reform.un.org/content/benefits-management
https://reform.un.org/news/system-changing
https://reform.un.org/news/briefings-held-new-delegation-authority-heads-entity
https://reform.un.org/news/change-makers-enabling-accountability-continuous-learning-and-improvement
https://reform.un.org/news/change-maker-business-transformation-and-accountability
https://reform.un.org/news/enhancing-management-strategy-policy-and-compliance-dmspc-spotlight
https://reform.un.org/content/un-development-system-reform-101
https://reform.un.org/content/development-reform
https://reform.un.org/content/management-reform
https://reform.un.org/content/peace-and-security-reform
https://reform.un.org/news/un-secretary-general-ant%C3%B3nio-guterres-un-reform
The UN Security Council:
https://www.osorin.it/uploads/model_4/.files/130_item_2.pdf?v=1675071056
https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai0926.pdf
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12091.doc.htm
https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/ga12385.doc.htm
https://centerforunreform.org/2019/10/28/the-veto-and-the-un-security-council/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council
https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/ga12385.doc.htm
Why is the
UN important in international relations?
https://www.crisisgroup.org/sb006-ten-challenges-un-2021-2022
1)
The UN is the most important and universal international organization.
At present it has 193 members representing almost the entire world. The most
recent members are Montenegro (2006) and South Sudan (2011). The Vatican City
and Palestine are non-member observer states. Kosovo and Taiwan are not
members.
2) It is the main international
organization responsible for promoting and ensuring peaceful relations between
states and respect for human rights. So if the UN fails, this is of enormous
importance to international relations. The is much debate over UN Security
Council decisions, whether these have authorised interventions, as in
Afghanistan, Libya and Mali or failed to do so, as in Syria. Questions are
raised about the kind of decisions made, how they are made and their
effectiveness or ineffectiveness.
3) It is the main public forum for
international debate, and in many ways its institutions and protocols set
the moral standards for how actors within the international community should
act (even when they do not), and how individuals and minorities should be
treated. Over the years the UN has established the language and terminology in
which political questions are debated. This may result in hypocrisy
when, for example, a clearly non-democratic state is forced to use the language
of democracy and human rights, but it is a very obvious form of hypocrisy which
many experts argue exerts long-term pressure on states to conform to
international norms of behaviour. The language of these norms will form the
future political expectations of the citizens of UN member states, both
democratic and non-democratic ones.
4)
It is the world’s premier aid organization and
provider of emergency, development and educational programs.
Why is there
a need for reform? What are the main criticisms of the UN?
1) UN Security Council reform. The
permanent members of the UN Security Council (each with a veto on the Council’s
decisions) are simply the major powers that won the Second World War. This no
longer represents the economic and political realities of today’s world. From
the Cold War until the present day, the fact that the UN system has failed to
live up to the lofty expectations of its framers can be attributed in
significant part to the threat and exercise of the veto by individual Permanent
Five (P5) members of the Council. This situation can be attributed to an
unequal—but politically necessary—compromise that took place between the great
power Allied victors of the Second World War and the remainder of the UN
membership. The result was a division of powers between the Security Council
and the General Assembly that has never found a satisfactory equilibrium. In the more
than 70 years of its existence there have been several attempts to reform the
SC, and there is an ongoing debate on the right model to adopt, and the ideas
on which to base a model. Should the UN Security Council
a) offer permanent membership to states
that are major economies today (or major powers today), or the emerging
economies of tomorrow, or the most important UN donor states, (and should these
have a veto or not)?
b) have more representation for the poor
countries it seeks to protect?
c) base membership on better geographic
and cultural representation?
d)
base membership on compliance with and participation in UN activities
and operations?
e)
abolish the veto
f) Should
the ‘Uniting for Peace’
GA resolution of 1950 be re-examined as a possible means of mitigating the bad
faith exercise of the veto? It was drafted by a P5 member and revealed the
latent powers of the General Assembly existing within the UN Charter to make
recommendations in the event of a blocked Council, up to and including the use
of force. Or would it go too far in usurping the primary role of the
Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security?
The "Uniting
for Peace" UNGA resolution, states that in any cases where the Security Council,
because of a lack of unanimity among its five permanent members (P5),
fails to act as required to maintain international peace and security,
the General Assembly shall
consider the matter immediately and may issue appropriate recommendations to UN
members for collective measures, including the use of armed force when
necessary, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. It
was adopted 3 November 1950, after fourteen days of Assembly discussions, by a
vote of 52 to 5, with 2 abstentions. The resolution was designed to
provide the UN with an alternative avenue for action when at least one P5
member is using its veto to
obstruct the Security Council from carrying out its functions mandated by
the UN Charter..
While there
is general agreement on the need for reform to make the UNSC more
representative and democratic (though this last word is open to
interpretation), there is little agreement on the correct formula to follow. In
part, this is simply due to the fact that states wish to protect and promote
their own power and interests. However, there are also real questions of
principle. For example, if the UN based voting rights on the Security Council
and in the General Assembly on population (one obvious measure of ‘democratic
representation’ used in the European Parliament)
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130308STO06280/html/How-many-MEPs-will-each-country-get-after-European-Parliament-elections-in-2014
the Council
would be dominated by China, a clearly non-democratic state and the GA by China
and India.
Moreover,
any reform proposal needs to meet at least three basic conditions. Firstly, any reform of the Security Council requires the
agreement of at least two thirds of the UN member states (see below
#)( two thirds of 193 = 129?) and
preferably should have the support of an overwhelming majority in the General
Assembly. Secondly, it must enjoy the support of the current UNSC permanent
members so as not to be vetoed. Thirdly, though this is not an obligation, it
needs to make the UN more effective, not less so (i.e. not more likely to be constantly blocked and unworkable). Given
these limitations, any radical reform of the UNSC seems unlikely, and even
moderate reform seems to be blocked at the moment since no reform plan has
two-thirds support in the UNGA so far.
For some
information on the evolution of Italy’s position see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniting_for_Consensus
https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniting_for_consensus
“On 20 April
2009, Colombia and Italy, acting as representatives of the UfC group, provided
a new model of reform, which was presented as a concrete attempt to reach a
deal. The document proposed creating a new category of seats, still
non-permanent, but elected for an extended duration (3 to 5 years terms)
without the possibility of immediate re-elections. This new kind of seat would
not be allocated to single national countries but rather to regional groups on
a rotational basis. As far as traditional categories of seats are concerned,
the UfC proposal does not imply any change, but only the introduction of small
and medium size states among groups eligible for regular seats. This proposal
includes even the question of veto, giving a narrow range
of options that goes from abolition to limitation of the application of the
veto only to Chapter VII
matters.
During
the last round, Italy firmly rejected the G4 proposal as well as the African Union
one and even denounced the unfair behaviour of G4 countries. According to
Italy, the G4 is attempting to exclude the UfC proposal from the floor, “on the
basis of a presumed level of support”.Moreover, Italy believes that it has
shown flexibility by putting forward a new proposal on April 2009, while the G4
remained tied to its 2005 document. Italy's active role in current discussions
started in February 2009 before the beginning of intergovernmental
negotiations, when Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini
hosted more than 75 countries to develop a shared path towards a reform of the
Security Council. On May 2011, the
members states which participated in the group meeting held in Rome rose to 120.”
For more on this and Italy’s current position, see below *
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council
Stated positions
of the permanent members on Security Council Reform
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/russia-calls-for-reform-in-un-security-council-/1589366#
Then click on: What
is France’s position on UN Security Council Reform?
See also:
Here
are the statements and positions of some of the different countries and groups:
https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform/49905-statements-on-security-council-reform.html
https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform.html
https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/ga11854.doc.htm
https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/ga11970.doc.htm
https://theelders.org/news/united-and-purposeful-security-council-needed-now-more-ever
2) Wider Reforms. In 2005-2006 then UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan made a series of addresses on the subject of UN reform. In
those speeches he spoke about the need for UNSC reform, but he also devoted
much time and space to recommendations on some of the other questions which had
led to widespread criticism of the UN as an organization. He emphasized that
the UN should act swiftly to deal with these problems in order to respond to
international public opinion and win back support and to avoid seeing its image
permanently damaged. Various commentators have indicated the following topics
as issues to be dealt with and the current UN reform project United to
Reform is clearly intended to address points a-c:
a) Waste – Some critics argue that too much
money is spent on personnel and special benefits for personnel instead of on
projects e.g. UN employees staying in first class hotels when on mission
working in the field in a poor developing country (this is also bad taste and
damages the UN’s image) / the duplication of projects by UN agencies, other
international organizations, NGOs and by single countries under bilateral
agreements. As a result funds are wasted.
b) Inefficiency and confusion – duplication
of projects (see above) and/or overlapping of responsibilities creates
confusion. There is a need for much clearer cooperation and coordination
between aid organizations with a clear overall planning and decision-making
structure. Critics argue that there is also a need for an assessment of the
effectiveness of aid programs by an external body. Often projects are limited
in duration due to funding concerns (most donors will not commit funds for more
than 2 years), and some will only be effective with long-term funding.
c) Organizational Deficiencies – There has
also been a lot of criticism of unnecessary and irresponsible bureaucracy. For example, it is difficult to fire anybody
with a permanent contract at the UN, even when someone is not doing or is not
really capable of doing their job. Recruitment is based in part on each
country’s financial contributions to the UN and, at the highest levels, also on
political considerations, (also nepotism and favours) not purely on a person’s
suitability for a post.
d) Corruption, immunity and criminal activity
– there have been serious cases of corruption by UN officials misappropriating
funds for themselves or their supporters. The problem is that as an
international organization the UN does not fall under a national justice system
and its employees enjoy too much immunity since any system of internal
discipline is subject to political pressure. There have been a series of cases
of rape, child abuse and extortion committed by members of UN peace-keeping
forces while on mission. Aid funds are sometimes stolen and supplies resold by
local authorities or criminal organizations and thus never reach the local
community. In a conflict zone the money may then be used to buy arms. A UN
official is not automatically subject to the legal jurisdiction of the host
country for any of these crimes. Thus, many argue that there is a basic lack of accountability and liability
regarding UN officials and UN peace-keepers.
https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/gal3637.doc.htm
https://www.diplomacy.edu/resource/a-diplomatic-analogy-international-functionaries-and-their-privileges/
http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/bbrown/classes/IntlOrgSp09/PEACEKEEPERABUSEIMMUNITYANDIMPUNITY.pdf
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/un-peacekeepers-who-accountable-their-misdeeds
e) UN peace-keeping operations – These have
had a mixed record of many successes and some failures. At present the UN is
dependent on member states to provide soldiers and equipment to form the
peace-keeping forces for a particular operation. This can lead to potentially
fatal delays in organising and mounting the operation (Rwanda). From this
experience many commentators argue that the UN needs to have its own permanent
peace-keeping forces, which would be paid and trained by the UN and directly
responsible to the UN. This should guarantee the professional behaviour of
these forces and allow the UN to respond quickly to a rapidly developing
situation (Rwanda). Other experts argue that previous operations (e.g. in
Somalia) suggest that the UN should only deploy peace-keeping forces on the
ground when it is confident they will be welcomed by the local population, and
that the UN mission commander in the area should have more autonomy to make
decisions which need to be taken rapidly. It should be noted, however, that
other experts are against what they see as a militarization of the UN. The
evolution of the debate on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) commitment, endorsed by all member states of the United
Nations at the 2005 World Summit (and endorsed again in 2021 https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/unga-r2p-debate-2021/)
to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,
focusses on some of the problems posed by UN interventions and in the
assessment criteria it sets for the decision to authorise such an operation:
· Just cause: There must
be "serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently
likely to occur".
· Right
intention: The main intention of the military action must be to prevent human
suffering.
· Last
resort: Every other measure besides military invention has to have already been
taken into account. (This does not mean that every measurement has to have been
applied and been shown to fail, but that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that only military action would work in that situation.)
· Proportional
means: The military means must not exceed what is necessary "to secure the
defined human protection objective".
· Reasonable
prospects: The chance of success must be reasonably high, and it must be
unlikely that the consequences of the military intervention would be worse than
the consequences without the intervention.
· Right
authority: The military action has to have been authorized by the Security
Council.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect
This
raises some excellent questions about R2P. See the section on Military
Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes on this blog.
f) Impartiality – the UN is sometimes not
seen as an unbiased international organization working to protect human rights
and peaceful co-existence e.g. local attitudes to the UN intervention in
Somalia in the 1990s. In Afghanistan and in Iraq (in the latter the UN did not
approve the invasion but did later open a UN office in Baghdad which was then
attacked) the UN may be seen as a Western organization imposing Western values
by force (e.g. female education).
g) Power politics at the level of states and
agencies – a poor country’s vote and support for a policy in the General
Assembly and on the UNSC may be bought, given in exchange for financial aid or
political favours. This leverage of rich countries over poor countries distorts
representation within these bodies.
h) The UN Human Rights Council – (which replaced the UN Human Rights
Commission, a body that was much criticised by human rights NGOs and the media)
has and had various members (elected for 3-year terms) such as China (until
2019), the Russian Federation (until 2016), Cuba (2019), Algeria (until 2016)
Egypt (2010), Pakistan (2011), and Saudi Arabia (until 2019), all with, at
best, a dubious human rights record (Syria and Iran have also been candidates).
They are often more likely to be motivated to hinder or block rather than to
support a serious investigation into human rights violations. Moreover, the
Council has often been accused of politically motivated action (or inaction)
rather than real concern for human rights violations (e.g. concentrating on the
Israeli-Palestinian question to the point of excluding a real investigation of
human rights violations against women and minorities in some Muslim countries
and other countries). Critics argue that, in practice, it is only marginally
better than the UN Human Rights Commission. Some argue that it would be better
not to have a UN body of this kind since the UN inevitably represents the
interests of states (and states are the most frequent violators of humn
rights), and that, instead, funds should go to independent human rights NGOs
(those which have a good reputation with both the media and the public). These
are the NGOs that are often targeted by governments that violate human rights
(e.g. Russia and Amnesty International).
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-24922058
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6919268.stm
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/24/amnesty-un-syria
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2156687/UN-human-rights-report-criticised-containing-condemnations-Britain--Iran-Russia-Cuba.html
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/25/russian-officials-raid-amnesty-moscow-headquarters
i) Aid Dependence – Some
experts argue that the UN itself has made some countries in Africa aid
dependent by offering aid without setting clear conditions, or concentrating
sufficiently on giving countries the know-how to become self-sufficient. This
is now changing and aid is now often tied to progress on democratization and
human rights. There are also longer-term programs now aimed at developing the
local economy. Time will tell whether this is an effective strategy.
General
considerations – There has been progress on at least some of the points listed above,
and the UN is now aware of its image problem and the
need to make real reforms. In terms of the
Functionalist theory of international relations (gradual international
integration, collective governance and the growing material interdependence
between states) the role of the UN is clear (See the UN Charter), but it was
also based on two other conflicting principles. It is in one sense a
product of Idealism/Liberalism, an organization created in response to mass
genocide, war crimes and human rights violations and in order to promote the
universal liberal values (some would say Western values) expressed in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.
This is one of the things that most ordinary people expect it to be and to do.
At the same time it was and is a guarantor of peace between sovereign states
that often see things in terms of Realism (national interests) and Realpolitik
(power politics and pragmatism). It was
created to prevent another World War, to provide a forum for and foster
dialogue between two very powerful states with conflicting interests and
ideologies, the USA and the Soviet Union. (The Council of Europe has similar
goals). To do this it had to give these states (and the other victors of WWII)
special powers, the veto, to allow them to protect their interests.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_veto_power
In fact, it
can be argued that it played this role, maintaining a dialogue between the US
and USSR, extremely well during the Cold War (all Cold War conflicts were local
proxy conflicts, never direct conflicts between the US and the USSR). The UN
was the stage for the Cuban missile crisis but also for its resolution, and the
UN continues to play a crucial role in conflict prevention, peace-keeping and
conflict resolution with varying degrees of success. In Functionalist terms the
UN needs to include all states whatever their political system and values in
order to promote peace, and states often join the UN still prioritising their
own ideology and national interests. This inevitably involves a certain amount
of hypocrisy for some states, given the references to fundamental freedoms and
human rights in the UN Charter (mentioned 7 times, for example see Article 51)
which states must accept in joining, and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and other human rights covenants that states are encouraged to sign and ratify. For
example, in the same year that democratic Italy joined the UN, Franco’s Spain
also joined. Being part of the UN has rarely depended on democracy and human
rights (apartheid South Africa is the exception, on 12
November 1974 the General Assembly suspended South Africa from participating in its
work, due to international opposition to the policy of apartheid.). This
conflict of ideas at the heart of the UN is unavoidable. If the UN was given
powers to enforce its values on its members, some of them, the more powerful
ones one imagines, would probably leave the organization rather than accept a
loss of sovereignty (and in many cases a loss of power by the ruling party or
elite) and investigations into human rights abuses. (We should remember the
fate of the League of Nations # #)In
fact, respect for the sovereignty of each UN member state and non-interference
in a state’s domestic politics is one of the basic principles of the UN and the
current international order (consequently, it does not automatically recognise
a right to secession and this can also be a problem), and this is unlikely to
change in the future, especially as there is no simple mechanism for such a
change. As a result the UN has a mandate to try to prevent (and the International
Criminal Court has a mandate to investigate) human rights abuses within member
states but no real mechanism to do so within powerful states or states that
simply refuse to cooperate. Again the debate about R2P demonstrates the
difficulties involved in launching a UN operation on humanitarian grounds and
about the legal questions and practical dangers involved. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect
The opposition encountered by the ICC from some African states and the
accusations of discrimination also demonstrate these problems.
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jan/31/african-leaders-plan-mass-withdrawal-from-international-criminal-court
Conclusion:
Thus given what we have said above, one could argue that the real role of the
UN and ICC is Constructivist, to create a normative environment and language regarding peaceful relations
between states, democratic values and human rights in the hope that
states and individuals will gradually reform and conform over time. As was
suggested above, the UN is responsible in the same way for creating and
reinforcing the diplomatic language and
behavioural norms for international relations based on peaceful coexistence and
cooperation, collective security and mutual respect. If we compare the
cooperation and dialogue between states today and at any time before or during
the Cold War it would be difficult to deny that the UN and the international
community have made some very real progress.
# The reform
of the Security Council requires the agreement of at least two-thirds of UN
member states and no veto from any of the permanent members of the UNSC.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council
# # The predecessor of the UN, the League of Nations failed to prevent a
second global conflict essentially because it no longer included most of the
world’s major powers. The US never joined it. Of the League's 42 founding
members only 23 were members when it was dissolved in 1946. The Soviet Union
became a member on in September 1934, and was expelled on in December 1939
for aggression against Finland.
Germany joined in September 1926 and withdrew in October 1933,
rejecting the idea of collective security and disarmament negotiations. Italy
was a founding member but withdrew in December 1937 in response to the
sanctions which had been imposed on the country for its 1935 invasion of
Abyssinia during which time poison gas was utilized. Another founding member,
Japan, withdrew in March 1933 in response to a report calling for it to
withdraw its forces from Manchuria. At the start of World War II the only major
powers still in the League of Nations were Britain (and the 5 major separate
members of its empire) and France. Thus,
the question is – if the United Nations abolished the veto on the Security
Council and opened the decision-making process to a majority in the general
Assembly (with the power to impose sanctions on any member, large or small),
would the US, China, Russia and other major countries (Iran, Saudi Arabia)
accept this change or simply withdraw from the organization?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(international_relations)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realism_(international_relations)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism_in_international_relations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberalism_(international_relations)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realpolitik
Background
to the call for reform
After years of
research, Annan presented a progress report, In Larger Freedom, to the UN General Assembly, on 21
March 2005. Annan recommended Security Council expansion and a host of other UN reforms. On 31 January 2006, Kofi Annan outlined his vision for a
comprehensive and extensive reform of the UN in a policy speech to the United Nations Association UK. The speech, delivered at Central Hall, Westminster, also marked the 60th Anniversary of
the first meetings of the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council.
On 7 March
2006, he presented to the General Assembly his proposals for a fundamental
overhaul of the United Nations Secretariat. The reform report is entitled:
"Investing in the United Nations, For a
Stronger Organization Worldwide”.
On 30 March
2006, he presented to the General Assembly his analysis and recommendations for
updating the entire work program of the United Nations Secretariat over the
last 60 years. The report is entitled: "Mandating and Delivering:
Analysis and Recommendations to Facilitate the Review of Mandates".
On the UN Human Rights Council
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/CanadSenateHRC022508.pdf
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/the-un-human-rights-council-does-not-deserve-us-support
General reform of the UN
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations
http://www.canadafreepress.com/2006/rosett040406.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kofi_Annan#Farewell_addresses
Reform of the UN Security Council
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council
http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSS-Analyses-72.pdf
http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/ManagingChange-1.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council#United_Kingdom_and_France
more extreme and I hope it’s not true:
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/243512/u-n-insider-there-no-transparency-brett-d-schaefer
*For the evolution of Italy’s position on UN reform:
Current
position
Statement by H.E.
Ambassador Maurizio Massari on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group Annual
debate on agenda item 125
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Maurizio Massari
on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group
Annual debate on agenda item 125 entitled “Question of
equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security
Council and other matters related to the Security Council”
17 November 2022
Mr. President,
On behalf of the Uniting for Consensus group, I wish
to thank you for convening this debate. We thank you for appointing early
on in the process two skillful Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations
(IGN), Ambassador Tareq Albanai and Michal Mlynár. You are the custodians of
one of the most important processes within the Organization.
The UfC Group continues to stand ready to actively and
constructively support your action and work within the next IGN session and
looks forward to cooperating with them in full transparency and willingness to
make progress. We believe that in their new capacity they shall help
Member States get closer to the common goal of a comprehensively reformed
Security Council.
The UfC also takes this occasion to thank the previous
IGN Co-Chairs for the excellent work they have done in the past year.
Mr. President,
The UfC group feels strongly about the need for
progress in the negotiations, especially after this year’s upheavals in the
international system, including the current crisis in Ukraine.
We will once again approach the next IGN with a
constructive spirit, confident that we can build up on the positive gains
achieved. During the 76th session of work we have advanced on several issues
and it is worthwhile to highlight that the convergences have increased. For
example, on the question of the veto there was a strong support among MS for
voluntarily refraining from the use of veto, or on the need for the increased
representation of developing countries and small- and medium-sized states, including
Small Island Developing States (SIDS), convergences duly reflected in the
“Revised Elements” paper.
In fact, the Co-Chairs’ “Revised Elements” could be a
good base to start our work, notwithstanding the fact that there are important
points on which the negotiating groups still have principled different views
and readings for a starter, on the democratic principle (which for UfC,
together with the principle of accountability, goes hand in hand with regular
elections) or on the principle of regional representation, which should not be
confused with the individual quest for self-representation in the council.
In UfC’s view, a satisfactory reform should increase
the legitimacy of the Security Council in the eyes of the general membership.
To this end, the broadest possible consensus is needed.
As already stated in the past, in our view, a reformed
Security Council that fulfills this aspiration should be more transparent,
representative, accountable, democratic and effective.
·
More transparent means a Council where the decisions are taken not by an
exclusive few who hold an ultimate power, but by all the SC members in a fully
inclusive way and taking into due consideration other voices;
·
More representative means going beyond a simple increase in the number of
SC members; it means giving true consideration to increasing the opportunities
for all Member States to sit periodically on the Council so that all Regions
and all voices are heard, including those of small, insular Countries;
·
More accountable means that every new member of a reformed Security Council
would need to answer to the whole Membership. It also entails a containment of
the number of States with the permanent seats to the current ones, while, at
the same time, restraining the use of the veto;
·
More democratic simply means that every new member of a reformed SC must be
elected;
·
More effective means less avenues for paralysis, and a Council that can act
expeditiously, ultimately making it more legitimate; one that – because it is
transparent, representative, accountable and democratic – enjoys more
credibility in the eyes of all Member States and whose decisions are fully
observed and implemented, thus delivering better on its mandate.
Mr President,
Unlike others, UfC is not asking anything for our
individual members, we are not aspiring to permanent membership equally for us
or for any other State! We want a reform for all, not for few, a reform of the
Security Council that is beneficial for all Member States and for the UN
itself. We are convinced that our idea of reform, which is the only one
that has been adjusted over the years in order to take into consideration the
positions of all negotiating groups, serves the whole membership. Under UfC
proposal, everyone benefits; no one is left behind or left out; and everyone
gains better access to the Council to contribute to a more peaceful world.
Besides, our proposal is the most detailed and pragmatic on the table, as
several Member States from various Regional Groups have repeatedly
acknowledged. It would give all MS, big and small, from all regional
groups, a fair chance to be represented and it wouldn’t discriminate by
introducing new situations of privilege.
The ongoing crises, the increasing number of conflicts
and in particular the war against Ukraine have put a renewed pressure on the
need of a meaningful reform of the SC, need that we share as UfC. However, new
permanent seats and new vetoes would only serve the purpose to further paralyze
it. Let me reiterate that, here, all Member States are equal, thus an approach
to reform that only serves a few cannot be a solution for the entire
membership.
Mr. President,
If a condominium is falling apart, due to the fact
that the members of the condominium board are fighting amongst themselves,
simply adding new members by right to the board is not going to solve the real
problem. Let me reiterate that here all member states are equal, thus an
approach to reform that only serves a few cannot be a solution for the entire
membership.
Mr President,
More in concrete, we propose, on the one hand, to
increase the number of two year-term elected seats in order to ensure a fairer
system of rotation in the Council. Bear in mind that 60 Member States have
never yet served in the Security Council! On the other, we propose the creation
of long-term, non-permanent elected seats, with the possibility of immediate
re-election. This innovation is meant to accommodate those Member States that
legitimately aspire, and have the means to, make a sustained contribution to
the work of the Council.
In our proposal, the Security Council would consist of
twenty-six members: on top of the current 15 seats, there would be nine
long-term, non-permanent elected seats distributed among regional groups as
follows: 3 for Africa, 3 for Asia Pacific, 2 for GRULAC and 1 for WEOG. Plus,
two additional of the current two-year, elected seats assigned: one to the
Eastern European Group and one, as a rotating seat, to Small Island and
Developing States (SIDS) and Small States. This rotating seat would not prevent
them from running within their regional group, but would – instead – be an
additional way for them have fairer chances to gain access to the Security
Council.
Let me underline that this reform model would greatly
enhance regional representation: Africa would constitute the largest group in
the reformed Council; the Asia-Pacific region would have the highest percent
increase; both Latin America and Eastern Europe would double their
representation. Our proposed distribution would also allow an increased and
more stable representation for cross-regional groupings, such as the Arab
group.
Mr. President,
Looking at the next IGN, we confirm once again our
openness to constructive discussion, bearing in mind that there are no
procedural shortcuts to consensus on achieving Security Council reform.
This is one of the main lessons learned over the years: the reform process can
only succeed if the views and positions of every Member of the United Nations
is taken into account.
In order for it to be successful, it is crucial that
the Co-Chairs set a clear agenda of work, so that when the IGN begins, the
whole focus will be on substantive issues and not on procedures. That means
agreeing in advance on a predefined number of sessions, on an IGN calendar and
on the topics to be discussed at each session.
Our ultimate goal during next IGN session should be to
further reduce the main gaps separating negotiating groups and build and grow
more convergences between MS. Let us be clear that the ultimate goal is to
achieve that convergence.
The UfC group stands ready to cooperate to this
precise end with you Mr. President, with the new IGN co-Chairs and the whole
membership.
Thank you.
Uniting for Consensus (UfC) is a movement, nicknamed
the Coffee Club, that developed in the 1990s in opposition to the
possible expansion of the United Nations Security Council. Under the leadership of Italy and
Columbia, it aims to counter the bids for permanent seats proposed by G4
nations (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) and is calling for consensus before any
decision is reached on the form and size of the Security Council.
History
Italy, through its ambassador Francesco Paolo Fulci, along with Pakistan,
Mexico and Egypt, in 1995 founded the "Coffee Club". The four
countries were united by a rejection of the proposal of an increase in the
permanent members of the Security Council and the desire to encourage rather
the expansion of non-permanent seats. The founders of the group were soon
joined by other countries, including Spain, Argentina, Turkey, Canada, and
South Korea, and in a short time the group came to include about 50 countries
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The thesis of the Uniting for Consensus
group is that an increase in permanent seats would further accentuate the
disparity between the member countries and result in the extension of a series
of privileges with a cascade effect. The new permanent members
would in fact benefit from the method of election used on a number of specific
UN organs which would be particularly advantageous to them.
After agreeing with the
need to increase the representativeness of the Security Council, in 2005 during
the 59th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the UfC group — led by
the representatives of Canada, Italy, Colombia and Pakistan — made a proposal that centres on an enlargement
of the number of non-permanent members from ten to twenty. The non-permanent
members would be elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term and would
be eligible for immediate re-election, subject to the decision of their
respective geographical groups. The other members and co-sponsors of the text,
entitled "Reform of the Security Council", were listed as Argentina,
Costa Rica, Malta, Mexico, South Korea, San Marino, Spain and Turkey. Although
the proposal was not accepted, the initiative found broad consensus among
member states, including permanent member China.
On 20 April 2009, Colombia and Italy,
acting as representatives of the UfC group, provided a new model of reform,
which was presented as a concrete attempt to reach a deal. The document
proposed creating a new category of seats, still non-permanent, but elected for
an extended duration (3 to 5 years terms) without the possibility of immediate
re-elections. This new kind of seat would not be allocated to single national
countries but rather to regional groups on a rotational basis. As far as
traditional categories of seats are concerned, the UfC proposal does not
involve any change, but only the introduction of small and medium size states
among groups eligible for regular seats. This proposal includes even the
question of
the veto, giving a narrow range of
options that goes from abolition to limitation of the application of the veto
only to Chapter VII matters.
During the last round of
discussions, Italy firmly rejected the G4 proposal as well as the African Union one and even denounced the
unfair behaviour of G4 countries. According to Italy, the G4 is attempting to exclude the UfC proposal from the
floor, “on the basis of a presumed level of support”. Moreover, Italy believes
that it has shown flexibility by putting forward a new proposal on April 2009,
while the G4 remained tied to its 2005 document. Italy's active role in current
discussions started in February 2009 before the
beginning of intergovernmental negotiations, when Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini hosted more than 75
countries to develop a shared path towards a reform of the Security Council. On
May 2011, the members states which have participated in the group meeting held
in Rome rose to 120.
26/09/19
Ministers of the Countries belonging to the “Uniting for Consensus” Group held
a meeting in New York today to assess the state of the UN Security Council
reform process.
The last rounds of negotiations that took place in 2019, confirmed the
existence of growing areas of convergence as also the persistence of diverging
views on key aspects of the reform.
Eager to achieve results in the process, UfC Countries reaffirm that the
IGN remains the sole legitimate setting for discussion on Security Council
reform, in full transparency and with the participation of all UN Member
States.
In this sense, UfC Ministers reiterate the need and the urgency for the
UN membership to agree on a reform model capable of making the future, expanded
Security Council more democratic, accountable, representative, transparent and
effective, reaffirming that the creation of new permanent seats would hamper
the achievement of these goals.
The UfC Ministers therefore call upon all Member States to continue to
engage constructively in seeking a fair and equitable compromise solution that
meets the collective interest of all 193 Members of the UN, garnering the
widest possible political support from the membership.
UfC Countries invite others to explore the idea of creating longer-term
non-permanent seats, assigned to UN regional groups and with the possibility of
an immediate re-election, coupled with an increase in other non-permanent
seats. UfC Ministers believe that this proposal can be the basis for a possible
solution able to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of those Countries that
wish to contribute regularly to the maintenance of international peace and
security, as well as provide better opportunities for smaller States.
The UfC Countries reaffirm their full commitment to continued
constructive engagement.
During the meeting the UfC Group discussed possible practical ideas for
its action in the future in order to further enhance the Group’s contribution
to achieve an effective UN reform to the benefit to the whole UN membership.
New York, September 26, 2019 from
https://italyun.esteri.it/rappresentanza_onu/en/comunicazione/archivio-news/2019/09/comunicato-stampa-uniting-for-consensus.html
http://www.italyun.esteri.it/rappresentanza_onu
and also
http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/politica_estera/organizzazioni_internazionali/onu/la_riforma.html
where you will find this:
UN
reform: The Security Council
The new
international order, markedly changed as compared with the post-Second World
War situation, and the emerging threats to international security and
stability, require the renewed commitment of all member states to redefine the
essential structure of world security governance.
The Security
Council is the primary body concerned with the maintenance of world peace and
security. It is made up of five permanent members (The United States, Russia,
France, the United Kingdom and China, with veto power), and ten non-permanent
members, distributed geographically, elected for a two-year mandate and not
immediately re-electable (3 for Africa, 2 for Asia, 2 for the Western Group, 1
for Eastern Europe, and 2 for Latin America). The number of these seats was
increased from 6 to 10 in 1963 as a result of decolonization.
In the
nearly twenty years of debate over Security Council reform, two substantially
divergent visions continue to prevail among the 193 United Nations members,
specifically with regard to the creation of new permanent seats.
A portion of
the international community does not consider the creation of new permanent
seats on the Security Council as being in the interests of the international
community and of improving the Council’s overall efficiency. While the position
of the current permanent members can be explained by the historical
circumstances that led to the foundation of the United Nations, a new
hierarchical stratification of the international community, with the assignment
of privileged positions not subject to the electoral process, is not
justifiable. The consequent further and inevitable exclusion of the elected
members would drain the Security Council of credibility.
This is the
position of Italy and the other members of the “Uniting for Consensus”
movement.
Additionally, Italy considers it essential that regional configurations are
given greater importance, and in that sense maintains the assignment of a
Security Council seat to the European Union as one of its fundamental foreign
policy objectives.
On the other
hand, a different portion of the international community adheres, albeit from
diverse perspectives, to the notion of a larger Security Council with
additional permanent members, with the aim of adapting its composition to
reigning geopolitical equilibria.
Common to
both stances is the urgency that any reform be based on the principles of
greater geographic representation, the broader democratic participation of the
membership and increased operational efficiency. Thus a rebalancing of the
Council in favour of the countries of the southern hemisphere – particularly of
the African continent – would certainly be desirable.
The General
Assembly launched intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reforms in
2009 with the aim of arriving at a formula for compromise capable of garnering
the broadest possible consensus. Italy has held three major ministerial events
in Rome on the theme of Security Council reform: one on 5 February 2009, one on
16 May 2011 and the latest on 4 February 2013.
The February
2009 conference, chaired by then Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, revealed its
more than 75 participants’ broad agreement on the need to correct the African
continent’s under-representation on the Security Council, and to strengthen the
role of small and midsized countries as well as relations between the Security
Council and the General Assembly. The May 2011 conference, also chaired by
Minister Frattini and entitled “Global Governance and Security Council Reform”,
and attended by 120 countries, led to the reassertion of several major
principles advanced by President of the 65th General Assembly Deiss: the
adoption of a broadly embraced reform model, respect for the United Nations’
founding values, and the need for simplification, efficiency and flexibility.
In line with
the 2009 and 2011 conferences, the February 2013 ministerial meeting entitled
“New Approaches to the Security Council Reform” and co-chaired by then Minister
for Foreign Affairs Giulio Terzi and Secretary of State of Spain Gonzalo de
Benito Secades, confirmed the existence of points of convergence among the
negotiating groups: the need for flexibility and a spirit of compromise, the
greater representation of Africa, and the quest for a more broadly endorsable
reform model.
Also
interesting, from 2009:
“The Italian proposal is unique in that the plan creates actual regional
seats, not seats for individual states assigned by region. By embedding truly
regional voices on the Council, wider collective interests may triumph over the
more narrow interests of single states. The Italian proposal gives two
additional permanent but veto-less seats to Africa, Asia, Western Europe and
other groups, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe. "Each
regional group would have the 'operational management' of the seats and . . .
would define principles and mechanisms with appropriate checks and balances to
prevent national occupation of the seats and ensure regional
representation."
This is from
a general analysis of the various proposals for UNSC reform on:
See also:
Posts about
the UFC group’s position on UNSC reform on the site of La Rappresentanza Permanente d`Italia presso le Nazioni Unite a New York http://www.italyun.esteri.it/Rappresentanza_ONU/Menu/L_Italia_e_l_ONU/Riforme/
and
Mr. President,
On behalf of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) Group, I wish to thank you for
convening this annual debate on Security Council reform, and warmly welcome the
appointment of Ambassador Sylvie Lucas to her new pivotal capacity. We are
confident that she will be attentive to the needs and concerns of all Member
States to facilitate our collective endeavor in the coming months. Allow me
also to thank Ambassador Courtenay Rattray for his efforts during the past
negotiating session.
We believe that the 69th session of the General Assembly can be seen as a step
forward on our path towards reform in terms of active participation by an
increasing number of Member States. Countries that in the past had been on the
margins of the debate decided to engage and to spell out their positions on the
future of the Security Council. This is a material legacy: our debate needs to
be more inclusive - just as the Council we are striving to reform.
Similarly, we need full transparency. The Inter-Governmental Negotiations are a
membership-driven process, mandated by General Assembly decision 62/557. We
need predictability through a clear agenda, not arbitrary guidance. Member
States should be facilitated in their work, through timely information and
extensive consultation. Each Member State, belonging to any negotiating group,
has the right to be adequately informed about the procedure. The past has
demonstrated that divisive approaches and initiatives complicate our process
even further, distancing us from reaching our commonly shared goal of reform. Thank you, Mr. President.
http://www.italyun.esteri.it/rappresentanza_onu/it/comunicazione/archivio-news/2015/10/2015-10-30-cardi-riforma.html
Mr. President,
The UfC Group has been tirelessly advocating for a deeper discussion of the
principles on which the Council’s reform must be based. It is a crucial
undertaking to clarify how we conceive the reform, which would facilitate
negotiations. Proof of this was given to us by the negotiations on the methods
of selection and appointment of the Secretary-General, under last year’s annual
resolution on the revitalization of the work of the General Assembly. The
collectively shared principle of a more transparent selection process was
spontaneously translated into some concrete measures. We knew, with clarity,
where we were heading so we achieved most of the expected results in only one
year of work.
We all have been talking for years about the common goal of a more
representative, democratic, accountable and effective Security Council, but do
we really agree on the meaning of these principles? Let me give you a concrete
example. Exactly one week ago, most of us attended the launch of a Code of
Conduct, supported by over one hundred countries, aiming to limit the use of
the veto and prevent the Council’s inaction to make it more effective in the
face of heinous international crimes. However, today we will still hear voices
in favor of adding new permanent members, new veto powers, all while pursuing
the same goal of making the Council more effective.
Mr. President,
The Uniting for Consensus Group has been very forthcoming in clarifying how we
interpret the reform principles that I have just mentioned. The UfC has already
tackled the issue – most recently – last year, at the general debate and
throughout the entire work session. Today, as a further contribution to the
debate on the objectives of reform, I would like to touch on an increasingly
recurrent issue: the request for “a Security Council representative of the
realities of the XXI century”. This is certainly an important concept because
it suggests that Security Council reform should be reflective of the changes
that have occurred in the last 70 years. Let me summarize the three main
changes that have taken place.
Firstly, in these 70 years, not only has the number of UN Member States grown,
but the relative weight of the different regional groups of the United Nations
has also changed. This has led the membership to unanimously request an
enlargement of the Council favoring areas that, to date, have been
disadvantaged in the distribution of seats. The response of the UfC to this
first trend is unequivocal: we support an enlargement of the Council up to 26
members, assigning the majority of added seats to Africa, the Asia-Pacific and
Latin America. We also understand and heed the call of the Eastern European
Group, and of cross-cutting groups of States - such as SIDS, Small States and
the Arab countries.
Secondly, some Member States aspire to play a more prominent role in the
Council. The UfC highly values the contribution that these States may offer to
the maintenance of international peace and security. No one has asked them to
forfeit their willingness to play a greater role in the Council. In fact, our
proposal of longer-term seats with the possibility of an immediate re-election
was conceived precisely to meet these expectations. Let me clarify: these seats
would not be reserved to a select group of countries. All UN Member States
willing to make a bigger contribution to the work of the Council would have the
right to run for a longer-term seat. Our proposal is democratic in
nature.
Thirdly, over the past 70 years, we have experienced change at an incessantly
faster pace in the international arena. The emergence of new regional actors
and new global challenges imposes a modern vision for the Security Council,
enhancing its flexibility not only in terms of operations, but also in terms of
its very structure and representation. The reality of the XXI century is in
continuous transformation, and a changing reality requires a Council able to
adapt to it. We believe that regular elections are the best way to guarantee,
not only a truly democratic and accountable Security Council, but also a
Council able to continually adapt to the rapid changes of today and tomorrow.
This is what we mean by inclusive Security Council. Let us offer to all Member
States, especially Small States and Developing countries, which represent the
majority of this membership, the opportunity to contribute more to the
Council’s work. This goal can be achieved solely by ensuring a proper, fair and
democratic system, through regular elections. This is what we mean by a
Security Council in tune with the realities of the XXI century: a new, modern
Council grounded on a profoundly democratic vision that carries within it
inclusiveness and adaptability.
Mr. President,
This is the path toward the early reform that our leaders called for more than
10 years ago. A reform that can be attained with no further delay, building on
the many - already existing - convergences among Members States. A
comprehensive reform of the Security Council that can be concretely achieved by
enlarging the Council with new elected members, and by a more balanced and
equitable representation of regional groups. An enhanced and closer
relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, and
improved working methods of the Council, including the question of the veto,
are also areas that require our due attention.
Mr. President,
This is also the path toward a consensual reform of the Security Council that
due to its paramount importance necessarily needs to be endorsed by all Member
States. The Uniting for Consensus Group stands ready to cooperate with you, the
new IGN Chair and the entire membership for advancing this process, in good
faith and in mutual respect, being guided by our strong conviction that a truly
democratic Security Council reform is possible and within reach.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Uniting for Consensus position 2016 http://www.italyun.esteri.it/rappresentanza_onu/resource/doc/2016/01/ufcdocument25march2015.pdf
Italy's
position 2016-7
http://www.italyun.esteri.it/rappresentanza_onu/en/comunicazione/archivio-news/2017/07/assemblea-generale-riforma-consiglio.html
Position of the permanent SC members
on Security Council reform https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council#Permanent_member_proposals
One proposed change is to admit more permanent members. The candidates
usually mentioned are Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan. They comprise the group of G4 nations, mutually
supporting one another's bids for permanent seats. The United Kingdom, France
and Russia support G4 membership in the U.N. Security Council.[24] This sort of reform has traditionally been opposed by the Uniting for Consensus group, which is composed primarily of nations who are regional rivals and
economic competitors of the G4. The group is led by Italy and Spain (opposing
Germany), Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina (opposing Brazil), Pakistan (opposing
India), and South Korea (opposing Japan), in addition to Turkey, Indonesiaand others.
Since 1992, Italy and other members of the group have instead proposed
semi-permanent seats or the expansion of the number of temporary seats https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council#United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council#United_Kingdom_and_France https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council#Russia http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/zzhgg/t29435.htm http://in.rbth.com/world/2015/08/15/rusia-supports-applications-of-india-brazil-for-permanent-membership-in-un-sc_390367
http://m.deccanherald.com/articles.php?name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.deccanherald.com%2Fcontent%2F441308%2Fuk-france-support-india-permanent.html
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-grenell/japan-deserves-a-un-perma_b_783069.htmlhttp://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-grenell/japan-deserves-a-un-perma_b_783069.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G4_nations
Criticism of the UN
Have a look at the following:
https://www.crisisgroup.org/sb006-ten-challenges-un-2021-2022
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_the_United_Nations
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/what-has-the-un-achieved-united-nations https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/opinion/sunday/i-love-the-un-but-it-is-failing.html?_r=0 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_the_United_Nations
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/mar/03/cholera-haiti-un-experts-chastise-ban-ki-moon
