Issued on 05 Sep. 2014 Last
updated: 29 Sep. 2014
Issued by the Heads of State
and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Wales
1.
We, the Heads of State and
Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have
gathered in Wales at a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security. Russia's
aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of
a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Growing instability in our southern
neighbourhood, from the Middle East to North Africa, as well as transnational
and multi-dimensional threats, are also challenging our security. These can all
have long-term consequences for peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region
and stability across the globe.
2.
Our Alliance remains an
essential source of stability in this unpredictable world. Together as strong
democracies, we are united in our commitment to the Washington Treaty and the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Based on
solidarity, Alliance cohesion, and the indivisibility of our security, NATO
remains the transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the
essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. The
greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our
territories and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty. As stated in the Transatlantic Declaration that we issued
today, we are committed to further strengthening the transatlantic bond and to
providing the resources, capabilities, and political will required to ensure
our Alliance remains ready to meet any challenge. We stand ready to act
together and decisively to defend freedom and our shared values of individual
liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.
3.
Today we reaffirm our
commitment to fulfil all three core tasks set out in our Strategic Concept:
collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. Here in Wales,
we have taken decisions to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. We are
reaffirming our strong commitment to collective defence and to ensuring
security and assurance for all Allies; we are adapting our operations,
including in Afghanistan, in light of progress made and remaining challenges;
and we are strengthening our partnerships with countries and organisations
around the globe to better build security together.
4.
Every day, our troops deliver
the security that is the foundation of our prosperity and our way of life. We
pay tribute to all the brave men and women from Allied and partner nations who
have served, and continue to serve, in NATO-led operations and missions. We owe
an eternal debt of gratitude to all those who have lost their lives or been
injured, and we extend our profound sympathy to their families and loved ones.
5.
In order to ensure that our
Alliance is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new security challenges,
today we have approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan. It provides a coherent
and comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to the changes in
the security environment on NATO's borders and further afield that are of
concern to Allies. It responds to the challenges posed by Russia and their
strategic implications. It also responds to the risks and threats emanating
from our southern neighbourhood, the Middle East and North Africa. The Plan
strengthens NATO's collective defence. It also strengthens our crisis
management capability. The Plan will contribute to ensuring that NATO remains a
strong, ready, robust, and responsive Alliance capable of meeting current and
future challenges from wherever they may arise.
6.
The elements of the Plan
include measures that address both the continuing need for assurance of Allies
and the adaptation of the Alliance's military strategic posture.
7.
The assurance measures include
continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in
the eastern part of the Alliance, both on a rotational basis. They will provide
the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence, and are
flexible and scalable in response to the evolving security situation.
8.
Adaptation measures include
the components required to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the
security challenges it might face. We will significantly enhance the
responsiveness of our NATO Response Force (NRF) by developing force packages
that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges and threats.
As part of it, we will establish a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF),
a new Allied joint force that will be able to deploy within a few days to
respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO's
territory. This force should consist of a land component with appropriate air,
maritime, and special operations forces available. Readiness of elements of the
VJTF will be tested through short-notice exercises. We will also establish an
appropriate command and control presence and some in-place force enablers on
the territories of eastern Allies at all times, with contributions from Allies
on a rotational basis, focusing on planning and exercising collective defence
scenarios. If required, they will also facilitate reinforcement of Allies
located at NATO's periphery for deterrence and collective defence. We will
further enhance NATO's ability to quickly and effectively reinforce those
Allies, including through preparation of infrastructure, prepositioning of
equipment and supplies, and designation of specific bases. Adequate host nation
support will be critical in this respect. We will also ensure that our Allied
forces maintain the adequate readiness and coherence needed to conduct NATO's
full range of missions, including deterring aggression against NATO Allies and
demonstrating preparedness to defend NATO territory. We will enhance our
Standing Naval Forces to support maritime situational awareness and to conduct
the full spectrum of conventional maritime operations.
9.
We will ensure that the
current NATO Command Structure remains robust, agile, and able to undertake all
elements of effective command and control for simultaneous challenges; this
includes a regional focus to exploit regional expertise and enhance situational
awareness. Contributing Allies will raise the readiness and capabilities of the
Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast and will also enhance its role as a
hub for regional cooperation. We will enhance our intelligence and strategic
awareness and we will place renewed emphasis on advance planning.
10. We will establish an enhanced exercise programme with an increased focus on
exercising collective defence including practising comprehensive responses to
complex civil-military scenarios. The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) we
agreed in Chicago will be instrumental in ensuring full coherence of the
training and exercise elements of the Readiness Action Plan.
11. Development and implementation of the adaptation measures will be done on
the basis of the evolving strategic environment in the regions of concern,
including in the eastern and southern peripheries of the Alliance, which will
be closely monitored, assessed, and prepared for.
12. We have tasked our Defence Ministers to oversee the expeditious
implementation of the Readiness Action Plan, which will begin immediately.
13. We will ensure that NATO is able to effectively address the specific
challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and
covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly
integrated design. It is essential that the Alliance possesses the necessary
tools and procedures required to deter and respond effectively to hybrid
warfare threats, and the capabilities to reinforce national forces. This will
also include enhancing strategic communications, developing exercise scenarios
in light of hybrid threats, and strengthening coordination between NATO and
other organisations, in line with relevant decisions taken, with a view to
improving information sharing, political consultations, and staff-to-staff
coordination. We welcome the establishment of the NATO-accredited Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia as a meaningful contribution to
NATO's efforts in this area. We have tasked the work on hybrid warfare to be
reviewed alongside the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan.
14. We agree to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets, to make the
most effective use of our funds and to further a more balanced sharing of costs
and responsibilities. Our overall security and defence depend both on how much
we spend and how we spend it. Increased investments should be directed towards
meeting our capability priorities, and Allies also need to display the
political will to provide required capabilities and deploy forces when they are
needed. A strong defence industry across the Alliance, including a stronger
defence industry in Europe and greater defence industrial cooperation within
Europe and across the Atlantic, remains essential for delivering the required
capabilities. NATO and EU efforts to strengthen defence capabilities are
complementary. Taking current commitments into account, we are guided by the
following considerations:
o
Allies currently meeting the
NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
on defence will aim to continue to do so. Likewise, Allies spending more than
20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research
& Development, will continue to do so.
o
Allies whose current
proportion of GDP spent on defence is below this level will:
§
halt any decline in defence
expenditure;
§
aim to increase defence
expenditure in real terms as GDP grows;
§
aim to move towards the 2%
guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets
and filling NATO's capability shortfalls.
o
Allies who currently spend
less than 20% of their annual defence spending on major new equipment,
including related Research & Development, will aim, within a decade, to increase
their annual investments to 20% or more of total defence expenditures.
o All Allies will:
§
ensure that their land, air
and maritime forces meet NATO agreed guidelines for deployability and
sustainability and other agreed output metrics;
§
ensure that their armed forces
can operate together effectively, including through the implementation of
agreed NATO standards and doctrines.
15. Allies will review national progress annually. This will be discussed at
future Defence Ministerial meetings and reviewed by Heads of State and
Government at future Summits.
16. We condemn in the strongest terms Russia's escalating and illegal military
intervention in Ukraine and demand that Russia stop and withdraw its forces
from inside Ukraine and along the Ukrainian border. This violation of Ukraine's
sovereignty and territorial integrity is a serious breach of international law
and a major challenge to Euro-Atlantic security. We do not and will not
recognise Russia's illegal and illegitimate 'annexation' of Crimea. We demand
that Russia comply with international law and its international obligations and
responsibilities; end its illegitimate occupation of Crimea; refrain from
aggressive actions against Ukraine; withdraw its troops; halt the flow of
weapons, equipment, people and money across the border to the separatists; and
stop fomenting tension along and across the Ukrainian border. Russia must use
its influence with the separatists to de-escalate the situation and take
concrete steps to allow for a political and a diplomatic solution which
respects Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internationally
recognised borders.
17. We are deeply concerned that the violence and insecurity in the region
caused by Russia and the Russian-backed separatists are resulting in a deteriorating
humanitarian situation and material destruction in eastern Ukraine. We are
concerned about discrimination against the native Crimean Tatars and other
members of local communities in the Crimean peninsula. We demand that Russia
take the necessary measures to ensure the safety, rights and freedoms of
everyone living on the peninsula. This violence and insecurity also led to the
tragic downing of Malaysia Airlines passenger flight MH17 on 17 July 2014.
Recalling United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2166, Allies call
upon all states and actors in the region to ensure immediate, safe, and
unrestricted access to the crash site of MH17 to allow resumption of the
investigation and the repatriation of the remains and belongings of the victims
still present at the site. Those directly and indirectly responsible for the
downing of MH17 should be held accountable and brought to justice as soon as
possible.
18. We are also concerned by Russia's pattern of disregard for international
law, including the UN Charter; its behaviour towards Georgia and the Republic
of Moldova; its violation of fundamental European security arrangements and
commitments, including those in the Helsinki Final Act; its long-standing
non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE); and
its use of military and other instruments to coerce neighbours. This threatens
the rules-based international order and challenges Euro-Atlantic security. In
addition, these developments may potentially have long-term effects on
stability in the Black Sea region, which remains an important component of
Euro-Atlantic security. Russia's current actions are contrary to the principles
on which the established confidence building mechanisms in the Black Sea were
built. We will continue to support, as appropriate, regional efforts by Black
Sea littoral states aimed at ensuring security and stability.
19. While Russia continues to intervene militarily, arm separatists, and foment
instability in Ukraine, we support the sanctions imposed by the European Union
(EU), the G7, and others, which are an essential part of the overall
international effort to address the destabilizing behaviour of Russia, bring it
to deescalate, and arrive at a political solution to the crisis created by its
actions. Amongst these are measures taken by Allies including Canada, Norway
and the United States, as well as the EU decisions to limit access to capital
markets for Russian state-owned financial institutions, restrict trade in arms,
establish restrictions for export of dual use goods for military end uses,
curtail Russian access to sensitive defence and energy sector technologies, and
other measures.
20. Allies have had, and will continue in the course of our ongoing work, a
strategic discussion regarding Euro-Atlantic security and Russia. This
discussion provides the basis for NATO's vision regarding our approach to, and
the mechanisms of the Alliance's relations with, Russia in the future.
21. For more than two decades, NATO has strived to build a partnership with
Russia, including through the mechanism of the NATO-Russia Council, based upon
the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. Russia has breached its
commitments, as well as violated international law, thus breaking the trust at
the core of our cooperation. The decisions we have taken at the Summit
demonstrate our respect for the rules-based European security architecture.
22. We continue to believe that a partnership between NATO and Russia based on
respect for international law would be of strategic value. We continue to
aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship with Russia, including
reciprocal confidence building and transparency measures and increased mutual
understanding of NATO's and Russia's non-strategic nuclear force postures in
Europe, based on our common security concerns and interests, in a Europe where
each country freely chooses its future. We regret that the conditions for that
relationship do not currently exist. As a result, NATO's decision to suspend
all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia remains
in place. Political
channels of communication, however, remain open.
23. The Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. But
we cannot and will not compromise on the principles on which our Alliance and
security in Europe and North America rest. NATO is both transparent and
predictable, and we are resolved to display endurance and resilience, as we
have done since the founding of our Alliance. The nature of the Alliance's
relations with Russia and our aspiration for partnership will be contingent on
our seeing a clear, constructive change in Russia's actions which demonstrates
compliance with international law and its international obligations and
responsibilities.
24. An independent, sovereign, and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to
democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security. At a time when
Ukraine's security is being undermined, the Alliance continues its full support
for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its
internationally recognised borders. The broad support for United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,
demonstrates the international rejection of Russia's illegal and illegitimate
'annexation' of Crimea. We are extremely concerned by the further escalation of
aggressive actions in eastern Ukraine. We see a concerted campaign of violence
by Russia and Russian-backed separatists aimed at destabilising Ukraine as a
sovereign state.
25. We commend the people of Ukraine for their commitment to freedom and
democracy and their determination to decide their own future and foreign policy
course free from outside interference. We welcome the holding of free and fair
Presidential elections on 25 May 2014 under difficult conditions and the
signature of the Association Agreement with the European Union on 27 June 2014,
which testify to the consolidation of Ukraine's democracy and its European
aspiration. In this context, we look forward to the elections to the Verkhovna
Rada in October 2014.
26. We encourage Ukraine to further promote an inclusive political process,
based on democratic values and respect for human rights, minorities, and the
rule of law. We welcome President Poroshenko's Peace Plan and call on all
parties to meet their commitments, including those made in Geneva and Berlin.
We call on Russia to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Ukrainian
government. We actively support ongoing diplomatic efforts towards a
sustainable political solution to the conflict which respects Ukraine's
sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within its internationally
recognised borders.
27. We commend and fully support the actions of other international
organisations that are contributing to de-escalation and pursuing a peaceful
solution to the crisis, in particular the Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU. We welcome the swift deployment of
the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, which must be able to operate unhindered and
have access to all regions of Ukraine in order to fulfil its mandate. We also
welcome the decision by the EU to launch a Common Security and Defence Policy
mission to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform,
including police and the rule of law.
28. Recognising the right of Ukraine to restore peace and order and to defend
its people and territory, we encourage the Ukrainian armed forces and security
services to continue to exercise the utmost restraint in their ongoing
operation so as to avoid casualties among the local civilian population.
29. Ukraine is a long-standing and distinctive partner of the Alliance. At our
meeting here in Wales, we met with President Poroshenko and issued a joint
statement. We highly value Ukraine's past and present contributions to all
current Allied operations as well as to the NATO Response Force. We encourage
and will continue to support Ukraine's implementation of wide-ranging reforms
through the Annual National Programme, in the framework of our Distinctive
Partnership. We have launched additional efforts to support the reform and
transformation of the security and defence sectors and promote greater
interoperability between Ukraine's and NATO forces. These efforts are designed
to enhance Ukraine's ability to provide for its own security. We welcome
Ukraine's participation in the Partnership Interoperability Initiative and
Ukraine's interest in the enhanced opportunities within the Initiative, and
look forward to its future participation.
30. Russia's illegitimate occupation of Crimea and military intervention in
eastern Ukraine have raised legitimate concerns among several of NATO's other
partners in Eastern Europe. Allies will continue to support the right of
partners to make independent and sovereign choices on foreign and security
policy, free from external pressure and coercion. Allies also remain committed
in their support to the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova.
31. In this context, we will continue to support efforts towards a peaceful
settlement of the conflicts in the south Caucasus, as well as in the Republic
of Moldova, based upon these principles and the norms of international law, the
UN Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act. The persistence of these protracted
conflicts continues to be a matter of particular concern, undermining the
opportunities for citizens in the region to reach their full potential as
members of the Euro-Atlantic community. We urge all parties to engage constructively
and with reinforced political will in peaceful conflict resolution, within the
established negotiation frameworks.
32. We are deeply concerned by the growing instability and mounting transnational
and multi-dimensional threats across the Middle East and North Africa region.
These threats directly affect the security of the people living there, as well
as our own security. Peace and stability in this region are essential for the
Alliance. Therefore, we emphasise the need for lasting calm and an end to
violence. We continue to support the legitimate aspirations of the peoples in
this region for peace, security, democracy, justice, prosperity, and the
preservation of their identity. We will continue to closely monitor the
situation and explore options for possible NATO assistance to bilateral and
international efforts to promote stability and contribute to the response to
the growing crisis in, and threats from, the Middle East region.
33. The so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) poses a grave
threat to the Iraqi people, to the Syrian people, to the wider region, and to
our nations. We are outraged by ISIL's recent barbaric attacks against all
civilian populations, in particular the systematic and deliberate targeting of
entire religious and ethnic communities. We condemn in the strongest terms
ISIL's violent and cowardly acts. If the security of any Ally is threatened, we
will not hesitate to take all necessary steps to ensure our collective defence.
The rapid deterioration of the security situation in Iraq and ISIL's expanding
threat underline the necessity for a political solution based upon an inclusive
Iraqi government with cross-sectarian representation. Additionally, in light of
the dramatic humanitarian consequences of this crisis and its repercussions on
regional stability and security, many Allies have already provided, and are
offering, security and humanitarian assistance to Iraq on a bilateral basis.
34. We re-affirm NATO's continued commitment to the NATO-Iraq partnership,
through which we will revitalise our effort to help Iraq build more effective
security forces. That partnership encompasses, within the existing Individual
Partnership and Cooperation Programme, cooperation in the areas of: political
dialogue; education and training; response to terrorism; defence institution
building; border security; and communications strategy. Allies and partners
should continue to help coordinate humanitarian assistance to Iraq through the
appropriate channels. We welcome the role that the Euro-Atlantic Disaster
Response Coordination Centre is playing. We have also agreed that NATO will
help coordinate among Allies and partners security assistance support to Iraq;
this could also include helping coordinate the provision of lift to deliver
assistance. Should the Iraqi government request it, NATO will stand ready to
consider measures in the framework of NATO's Defence and Related Security
Capacity Building Initiative with an eye to launching such an effort in the
near term. NATO will support ongoing bilateral efforts of Allies and partners
by soliciting and coordinating, on a voluntary basis, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets. Additionally, Allies will seek to
enhance their cooperation in exchanging information on returning foreign
fighters.
35. We continue to follow the ongoing crisis in Syria with grave concern. We
condemn in the strongest terms the campaign of violence against the Syrian
people by the Assad regime, which caused the current chaos and devastation in
this country. We call on the Syrian government to fully comply with the
provisions of all relevant UNSCRs and to immediately commit to a genuine
political transition in accordance with the 30 June 2012 Geneva Communiqué. We
believe a negotiated political transition is essential to bring an end to the
bloodshed. We highlight the important role of the moderate opposition to
protect communities against the dual threats of the Syrian regime's tyranny and
ISIL's extremism. More than three years of fighting have had dramatic
humanitarian consequences and a growing impact on the security of regional
countries. Despite possible destabilising effects on their economies and
societies, NATO member Turkey, our regional partner Jordan, as well as
neighbouring Lebanon, are generously hosting millions of refugees and displaced
Syrians. The deployment of Patriot missiles to defend the population and
territory of Turkey is a strong demonstration of NATO's resolve and ability to defend
and deter any potential threat against any Ally.
36. We welcome the successful completion by the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Mission and Allies
of the removal and elimination of Syria's declared chemical weapons, as called
for in UNSCR 2118 and OPCW Executive Council decisions. NATO Allies played a
key role in ensuring this success as well as in the destruction of the chemical
materials themselves. We remain highly concerned by continuing reports of the use
of chemicals as weapons in Syria. Twelve chemical weapon production facilities
are still awaiting destruction and questions remain concerning the completeness
and accuracy of Syria's chemical weapons declaration. We urge the Assad
government to answer all outstanding questions regarding its declaration to the
OPCW, to address all remaining issues, and to take action to ensure full
compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, UNSCR
2118, and OPCW Executive Council decisions.
37. ISIL has, with its recent advance into Iraq, become a transnational threat.
The Assad regime has contributed to the emergence of ISIL in Syria and its
expansion beyond. ISIL's presence in both Syria and Iraq is a threat to
regional stability. It has become a key obstacle to political settlement in
Syria and a serious risk to the stability and territorial integrity of Iraq.
The people of Syria and Iraq and elsewhere in the region need the support of
the international community to counter this threat. A coordinated international approach
is required.
38. We are deeply concerned by the ongoing violence and the deteriorating
security situation in Libya, which threaten to undermine the goals for which
the Libyan people have suffered so much and which pose a threat to the wider
region. We urge all parties to cease all violence and engage without delay in
constructive efforts aimed at fostering an inclusive political dialogue in the
interest of the entire Libyan people, as part of the democratic process.
Recognising the central role of the UN in coordinating international efforts in
Libya, we strongly support the ongoing efforts of the United Nations Support
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to achieve an immediate ceasefire, scale down
tensions, and contribute to national reconciliation. Our Operation Unified
Protector demonstrated NATO's determination, together with regional Arab
partners, to protect the Libyan people. On the basis of NATO's decision in
October 2013, following a request by the Libyan authorities, we continue to stand
ready to support Libya with advice on defence and security institution building
and to develop a long-term partnership, possibly leading to Libya's membership
in the Mediterranean Dialogue, which would be a natural framework for our
cooperation.
39. While Mali has re-established a constitutional order, we recognise that
terrorist acts and the trafficking of arms, drugs, and people across the
Sahel-Sahara region threaten regional and our own security. We welcome the
efforts of the UN and underscore the importance of a strong commitment by the
international community to address the complex security and political
challenges in this region. In this respect, we welcome the comprehensive Sahel
strategies of the African Union and the EU. We also welcome the robust and
credible military commitment of Allies in the Sahel-Sahara region, which
contributes to the reaffirmation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the African countries concerned, and to the security of the Alliance. NATO
is prepared to explore, upon request by the countries concerned, where it can
contribute to address these challenges, in full coordination with UN, EU,
regional and bilateral efforts.
40. In the strategically important Western Balkans region, democratic values,
the rule of law, and good neighbourly relations continue to play a pivotal role
in maintaining lasting peace and stability. The Alliance remains fully
committed to the stability and security of the region, and we will continue to
actively support the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of countries in this region.
Allies and their Western Balkans partners actively contribute to the
maintenance of regional and international peace, including through regional
cooperation formats.
We welcome Serbia's progress in building a stronger partnership with NATO and encourage Belgrade to continue on this path. We also welcome the progress achieved in Kosovo and encourage further efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law throughout a multi-ethnic Kosovo. The 8 June 2014 parliamentary elections were largely in line with international standards and an important milestone. We look forward to the expeditious formation of a representative and inclusive government, committed to the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. We welcome the improvement of the security situation and the progress achieved through the dialogue. We commend both parties for their commitment to the Belgrade-Pristina agreement of 19 April 2013 and encourage continued work on its full implementation.
We welcome Serbia's progress in building a stronger partnership with NATO and encourage Belgrade to continue on this path. We also welcome the progress achieved in Kosovo and encourage further efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law throughout a multi-ethnic Kosovo. The 8 June 2014 parliamentary elections were largely in line with international standards and an important milestone. We look forward to the expeditious formation of a representative and inclusive government, committed to the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. We welcome the improvement of the security situation and the progress achieved through the dialogue. We commend both parties for their commitment to the Belgrade-Pristina agreement of 19 April 2013 and encourage continued work on its full implementation.
41. We met yesterday in an expanded meeting on Afghanistan and, together with
our International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) partners, we issued a
Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan.
42. For over a decade, NATO Allies and partner nations from across the world
have stood shoulder to shoulder with Afghanistan in the largest operation in
the history of the Alliance. This unprecedented effort has enhanced global
security and contributed to a better future for Afghan men, women, and
children. We honour the Afghan and international personnel who have lost their
lives or been injured in this endeavour.
43. With the end of ISAF in December 2014, the nature and scope of our
engagement with Afghanistan will change. We envisage three parallel, mutually
reinforcing strands of activity: in the short term, NATO Allies and partner
nations stand ready to continue to train, advise, and assist the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) after 2014 through the non-combat Resolute
Support Mission; in the medium term, we reaffirm our commitment to contribute
to the financial sustainment of the ANSF; in the long term, we remain committed
to strengthening NATO's partnership with Afghanistan. We count on Afghanistan's commitment
and cooperation.
44. We recognise the particular importance of advancing regional cooperation
and good neighbourly relations for the security and stability of Afghanistan.
We remain determined to support the Afghan people in their efforts to build a
stable, sovereign, democratic, and united country, where rule of law and good
governance prevail, and in which human rights for all, especially the rights of
women, including their full participation in decision making, and those of
children, are fully protected. Working with the Government of Afghanistan and
the wider international community, our goal remains to never again be
threatened by terrorists from within Afghanistan. Our commitment to Afghanistan will
endure.
45. We commend the Kosovo Force (KFOR) for the successful conduct of its
mission over the past 15 years, in accordance with UNSCR 1244. KFOR will
continue to contribute to a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement
in Kosovo in close cooperation with the Kosovo authorities and the EU, as
agreed. KFOR will also continue to support the development of a peaceful,
stable and multi-ethnic Kosovo. The Alliance will continue to assist the Kosovo
Security Force with advice on the ground and will keep the nature of further
support under review.
46. We will continue to maintain KFOR's robust and credible capability to carry
out its mission. Sustained improvement in the security situation and the
successful implementation of agreements reached in the EU-facilitated dialogue
between Belgrade and Pristina will allow NATO to consider a possible change in
its force posture. Any reduction of our troop presence will be measured against
clear benchmarks and indicators, and will remain conditions-based and not
calendar-driven.
47. Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean will continue to adapt to
meet evolving security risks in an area of essential strategic interest to the
Alliance. Somalia-based piracy has not been eradicated. NATO has contributed to
a steady reduction in pirate activity off the coast of Somalia through
Operation Ocean Shield, working in coordination with the relevant international
actors, including the EU and other nations, in line with the relevant decisions
taken. We have agreed to continue NATO's counter piracy involvement off the
coast of Somalia until the end of 2016, utilising a focused presence to optimise
the use of NATO assets. Both of these operations contribute to enhancing the
Alliance's maritime situational awareness, interoperability, and engagement
with partners.
48. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our
territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty. No one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of
its members were to be threatened. NATO will maintain the full range of
capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and
security of our populations, wherever it should arise.
49. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and
missile defence capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy.
50. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The
strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United
States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies. The
independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a
deterrent role of their own and contribute to the overall deterrence and
security of the Alliance. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons
might have to be contemplated are extremely remote.
51. The Allies' conventional forces make essential contributions to the
deterrence of a broad range of threats. They contribute to providing visible
assurance of NATO's cohesion as well as the Alliance's ability and commitment
to respond to the security concerns of each and every Ally.
52. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence;
it cannot substitute for them. The capability is purely defensive.
53. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation continue to play an
important role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. Both
the success and failure of these efforts can have a direct impact on the threat
environment of NATO. In this context, it is of paramount importance that
disarmament and non-proliferation commitments under existing treaties are
honoured, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which
is a crucial element of Euro-Atlantic security. In that regard, Allies call on
Russia to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and
verifiable compliance.
54. The threat to NATO populations, territory, and forces posed by the
proliferation of ballistic missiles continues to increase and missile defence
forms part of a broader response to counter it. At our Summit in Lisbon in 2010
we decided to develop a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability to
pursue our core task of collective defence. Missile defence will become an
integral part of the Alliance's overall defence posture and contribute to the
indivisible security of the Alliance.
55. The aim of this capability is to provide full coverage and protection for
all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against the increasing
threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the
principles of indivisibility of Allies' security and NATO solidarity, equitable
sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into
account the level of threat, affordability, and technical feasibility, and in
accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance.
Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile
proliferation, NATO missile defence can and will adapt accordingly.
56. At our Summit in Chicago in 2012, we declared the achievement of an Interim
NATO BMD Capability as an operationally significant first step, offering
maximum coverage, within available means, to defend our populations, territory,
and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack. NATO Interim BMD is operationally
capable.
57. Today we are pleased to note that the deployment of Aegis Ashore in
Deveselu, Romania is on track to be completed in the 2015 timeframe. Aegis
Ashore will be offered to NATO and will provide a significant increase in NATO
BMD capability. We are also pleased to note the forward deployment of
BMD-capable Aegis ships to Rota, Spain. Building on the Interim Capability, the
additional Aegis BMD-capable ships could be made available to NATO.
58. Today we are also pleased to note that additional voluntary national
contributions have been offered, and that several Allies are developing,
including through multinational cooperation, or are acquiring further BMD
capabilities that could become available to the Alliance. Our aim remains to
provide the Alliance with a NATO operational BMD that can provide full coverage
and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces, based
on voluntary national contributions, including nationally funded interceptors
and sensors, hosting arrangements, and on the expansion of the Active Layered
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) capability. Only the command and
control systems of ALTBMD and their expansion to territorial defence are
eligible for common funding.
59. We note the potential opportunities for cooperation on missile defence, and
encourage Allies to explore possible additional voluntary national
contributions, including through multinational cooperation, to provide relevant
capabilities, as well as to use potential synergies in planning, development,
procurement, and deployment. We also note that BMD features in two Smart
Defence projects.
60. As with all of NATO's operations, full political control by Allies over
military actions undertaken pursuant to this capability will be ensured. To
this end, we will continue to deepen political oversight of NATO BMD as the
capability develops. We welcome the completion of the Alliance's review of the
arrangements for NATO Interim BMD Capability and note that the Alliance will be
ready to make use of additional Allied contributions as they are made available
to the Alliance. We also task the Council to regularly review the
implementation of the NATO BMD capability, including before the Foreign and
Defence Ministers' meetings, and prepare a comprehensive report on progress and
issues to be addressed for its future development by our next Summit.
61. We remain prepared to engage with third states, on a case-by-case basis, to
enhance transparency and confidence and to increase ballistic missile defence
effectiveness. Initial steps have been made and could lead to various forms of
engagement with third states on missile defence. As we did in Chicago in 2012,
we reaffirm that NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will
not undermine Russia's strategic deterrence capabilities. NATO missile defence
is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the
Euro-Atlantic area.
62. The Alliance reaffirms its long-standing commitment to conventional arms
control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security and emphasises the
importance of full implementation and compliance to rebuild trust and
confidence. Russia's unilateral military activity in and around Ukraine has
undermined peace, security, and stability across the region, and its selective
implementation of the Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty and long-standing
non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) have
eroded the positive contributions of these arms control instruments. Allies call
on Russia to fully adhere to its commitments. Allies are determined to
preserve, strengthen, and modernise conventional arms control in Europe, based
on key principles and commitments, including reciprocity, transparency, and
host nation consent.
63. At our last Summit in Chicago we set ourselves the ambitious goal of NATO
Forces 2020: modern, tightly connected forces equipped, trained, exercised, and
commanded so as to be able to meet NATO's Level of Ambition and so that they
can operate together and with partners in any environment. We judge that the
goal remains valid and reaffirm our commitment to delivering it. The Readiness
Action Plan complements and reinforces NATO Forces 2020 by improving our
overall readiness and responsiveness.
64. NATO needs, now more than ever, modern, robust, and capable forces at high
readiness, in the air, on land and at sea, in order to meet current and future
challenges. We are committed to further enhancing our capabilities. To this
end, today we have agreed a Defence Planning Package with a number of
priorities, such as enhancing and reinforcing training and exercises; command
and control, including for demanding air operations; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; NATO's ballistic missile defence capability,
in accordance with the decisions taken at the 2010 Lisbon and 2012 Chicago
Summits, including the voluntary nature of national contributions; cyber
defence; as well as improving the robustness and readiness of our land forces
for both collective defence and crisis response. Fulfilment of these priorities
will increase the Alliance's collective capabilities and better prepare NATO to
address current and future threats and challenges. We have agreed this Package
in order to inform our defence investments and to improve the capabilities that
Allies have in national inventories. In this context, NATO joint air power
capabilities require longer-term consideration.
65. We continue to emphasise multinational cooperation. Following the Joint
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) initiative launched at our
Chicago Summit, work is on track to deliver an initial operational capability
to support NATO operations and NATO Response Force rotations from 2016 onwards.
In this context, we note the progress in the development of the Alliance Ground
Surveillance capability that will become available for operational deployment
in 2017. Furthermore, NATO's Airborne Early Warning and Control Force will
continue to be modernised to maintain its full operational capability. JISR exemplifies
the advantages of multinational cooperation in capability development and
employment among Allies, which allow for significant operational and cost
benefits. In this spirit, several Allies are establishing a multinational MQ-9
remotely-piloted air system users group, in particular to enhance
interoperability and reduce overall costs.
66. In a similar vein, we highlight the fact that, since we launched the Smart
Defence initiative at our Chicago Summit, an ever growing number of
multinational projects have been set up to help Allies harmonise requirements,
pool resources, and achieve tangible benefits in terms of operational
effectiveness as well as cost efficiency. We are building on this positive
momentum, in particular to address Alliance priority capability requirements.
Specifically, two groups of Allies have agreed to work on, respectively,
increasing the availability of air-to-ground Precision Guided Munitions, and on
the provision of a deployable airbase capability, and have signed Letters of Intent
to this effect. A further two groups of Allies have decided to establish
concrete projects for improving JISR information exchange in operations and
ballistic missile defence, including naval training.
67. Today we have also endorsed the NATO Framework Nations Concept. It focuses
on groups of Allies coming together to work multinationally for the joint
development of forces and capabilities required by the Alliance, facilitated by
a framework nation. Its implementation will contribute to providing the Alliance
with coherent sets of forces and capabilities, particularly in Europe. It will
help demonstrate European Allies' willingness to do more for our common
security and also improve the balance of the provision of capabilities between
the United States and European Allies as well as among European Allies
themselves. To implement this concept, today, a group of ten Allies,
facilitated by Germany as a framework nation and focusing on capability
development, have, through a joint letter, committed to working systematically
together, deepening and intensifying their cooperation in the long term, to
create, in various configurations, a number of multinational projects to
address Alliance priority areas across a broad spectrum of capabilities. They
will initially concentrate on creating coherent sets of capabilities in the
areas of logistics support; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
protection; delivering fire-power from land, air, and sea; and deployable
headquarters. Another group of seven Allies, facilitated by the United Kingdom
as a framework nation, have also agreed today to establish the Joint
Expeditionary Force (JEF), a rapidly deployable force capable of conducting the
full spectrum of operations, including high intensity operations. The JEF will
facilitate the efficient deployment of existing and emerging military
capabilities and units. Additionally, a group of six Allies, facilitated by
Italy as a framework nation and based on regional ties, will focus on improving
a number of Alliance capability areas, such as stabilisation and
reconstruction, provision of enablers, usability of land formations, and
command and control. Other groupings are being developed in line with the
Framework Nations Concept.
68. Two Allies have announced their intention to establish a Combined Joint
Expeditionary Force, to be delivered from 2016 and to be available for the full
spectrum of operations, including at high intensity.
69. We continue to build on the experience gained in recent operations and
improve our interoperability through the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI).
Today we have endorsed a substantial CFI Package consisting of six key
deliverables, including the high-visibility exercise Trident Juncture 2015,
with 25,000 personnel to be hosted by Spain, Portugal, and Italy; a broader and
more demanding exercise programme from 2016 onwards; and a deployable Special
Operations Component Command headquarters. As a key component in delivering
NATO Forces 2020, the CFI addresses the full range of missions, including the
most demanding, thereby demonstrating the continued cohesion and resolve of the
Alliance. It provides the structure for Allies to train and exercise
coherently; reinforces full-spectrum joint and combined training; promotes
interoperability, including with partners; and leverages advances in
technology, such as the Federated Mission Networking framework, which will
enhance information sharing in the Alliance and with partners in support of
training, exercises and operations.
70. In this context, NATO will continue to work closely with the EU, as agreed,
to ensure that our Smart Defence and the EU's Pooling and Sharing initiatives
are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and to support capability
development and interoperability with a view to avoiding unnecessary
duplication and maximising cost- effectiveness. We welcome the efforts of NATO
nations and EU member states, in particular in the areas of strategic airlift
and air-to-air refuelling, medical support, maritime surveillance, satellite
communication, and training, as well as efforts of several nations in the area
of remotely piloted aircraft systems. We also welcome the national efforts in
these and other areas by European Allies and partners, which will benefit both
organisations. The success of our efforts will continue to depend on mutual
transparency and openness between the two organisations. We encourage making
the fullest use of existing NATO-EU mechanisms to this effect.
71. The geopolitical and economic importance of the maritime domain in the 21st
century continues to grow. NATO needs to adapt to a complex, more crowded,
rapidly evolving, and increasingly unpredictable maritime security environment.
This necessitates a strengthening of the Alliance's maritime capabilities,
which should not be seen in isolation but as an integral part of NATO's larger
toolbox to safeguard the Alliance's interests. We will therefore continue to
intensify and expand our implementation of the Alliance Maritime Strategy,
further enhancing the Alliance's effectiveness in the maritime domain and its
contributions to deterrence and collective defence, crisis management,
cooperative security, and maritime security. We will reinvigorate NATO's
Standing Naval Forces by making their composition and the duration of national
contributions more flexible and, in principle, no longer using them for
protracted operations or for operations with low-end tasks. In addition, we
will enhance their education, training, and exercise value, especially at the
high end of the spectrum. We will also investigate ways to enhance further the
effectiveness of the full range of Alliance maritime capabilities. Greater
co-ordination, cooperation, and complementarity with relevant international
organisations, including the EU, in line with the relevant decisions taken, as
well as work with partner and non-partner nations, will be an important element
of the implementation of the Alliance Maritime Strategy. We welcome the
adoption of the EU's Maritime Security Strategy in June 2014, which will
potentially contribute to the security of all Allies.
72.
As the Alliance looks to the
future, cyber threats and attacks will continue to become more common,
sophisticated, and potentially damaging. To face this evolving challenge, we
have endorsed an Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy, contributing to the fulfillment
of the Alliance's core tasks. The policy reaffirms the principles of the
indivisibility of Allied security and of prevention, detection, resilience,
recovery, and defence. It recalls that the fundamental cyber defence
responsibility of NATO is to defend its own networks, and that assistance to
Allies should be addressed in accordance with the spirit of solidarity,
emphasizing the responsibility of Allies to develop the relevant capabilities
for the protection of national networks. Our policy also recognises that
international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN Charter,
applies in cyberspace. Cyber attacks can reach a threshold that threatens
national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability. Their impact
could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. We affirm
therefore that cyber defence is part of NATO's core task of collective defence.
A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5
would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.
73. We are committed to developing further our national cyber defence
capabilities, and we will enhance the cyber security of national networks upon
which NATO depends for its core tasks, in order to help make the Alliance
resilient and fully protected. Close bilateral and multinational cooperation
plays a key role in enhancing the cyber defence capabilities of the Alliance.
We will continue to integrate cyber defence into NATO operations and
operational and contingency planning, and enhance information sharing and
situational awareness among Allies. Strong partnerships play a key role in
addressing cyber threats and risks. We will therefore continue to engage
actively on cyber issues with relevant partner nations on a case-by-case basis
and with other international organisations, including the EU, as agreed, and
will intensify our cooperation with industry through a NATO Industry Cyber
Partnership. Technological innovations and expertise from the private sector
are crucial to enable NATO and Allies to achieve the Enhanced Cyber Defence
Policy's objectives. We will improve the level of NATO's cyber defence
education, training, and exercise activities. We will develop the NATO cyber
range capability, building, as a first step, on the Estonian cyber range
capability, while taking into consideration the capabilities and requirements
of the NATO CIS School and other NATO training and education bodies.
74. NATO recognises the importance of inclusive, sustainable, innovative, and
globally competitive defence industries, which include small and medium-sized
enterprises, to develop and sustain national defence capabilities and the
defence technological and industrial base in the whole of Europe and in North
America.
75. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), as well as their means of delivery, by states and non-state actors
continues to present a threat to our populations, territory, and forces. The
Alliance is resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions
for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in a way that promotes
international stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security
for all. Addressing
serious proliferation challenges remains an urgent international priority.
76. We call on Iran to seize the opportunity of the extension of the Joint Plan
of Action until 24 November 2014 to make the strategic choices that will
restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear
programme. We continue to call on Iran to comply fully with all its
international obligations, including all relevant Resolutions of the United
Nations Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Board of Governors. We also underscore the importance of Iran's cooperation
with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues, in particular those related to
possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme.
77. We are deeply concerned by the nuclear and ballistic missiles programmes
and proliferation activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) and call on it to comply fully with all relevant UNSCRs and the 2005
Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. We call on the DPRK to abandon all its
existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable,
and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities. We
strongly condemn the DPRK's December 2012 launch, which used ballistic missile
technology, the nuclear test carried out by the DPRK in February 2013, and the
various launches of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles since February
2014. We call on the DPRK to refrain from any further nuclear tests, launches
using ballistic missile technology, or other provocations.
78. The upcoming 2015 NPT Review Conference is an opportunity for parties to
reaffirm support for this Treaty and for its non-proliferation, disarmament and
peaceful uses pillars. Allies support efforts towards the success of this
conference. We call for universal adherence to, and compliance with, the NPT
and the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and call for full
implementation of UNSCR 1540 and welcome further work under UNSCR 1977. We call
on all states to commit to combating effectively the proliferation of WMD
through the universalisation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and through
the Proliferation Security Initiative. We also call on all States to continue
strengthening the security of nuclear materials and of radioactive sources
within their borders, as they were called on to do by the Nuclear Security
Summits of 2010 (Washington), 2012 (Seoul), and 2014 (The Hague). We will also
ensure that NATO is postured to counter Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear (CBRN) threats, including through the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task
Force.
79. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO
countries and to international stability and prosperity more broadly, and will
remain a threat for the foreseeable future. It is a global threat that knows no
border, nationality, or religion – a challenge that the international community
must fight and tackle together. We reaffirm our commitment to fight terrorism
with unwavering resolve in accordance with international law and the principles
of the UN Charter. NATO Allies are exposed to a wide range of terrorist threats.
NATO has a role to play, including through our military cooperation with
partners to build their capacity to face such threats, and through enhanced
information sharing. Without prejudice to national legislation or
responsibilities, the Alliance strives at all times to remain aware of the
evolving threat from terrorism; to ensure that it has adequate capabilities to
prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorist threats; and to engage with
partners and other international organisations, as appropriate, promoting
common understanding and practical cooperation in support of the UN Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, including in areas such as Explosive Risk
Management. Building on our Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work, we
will continue to improve our capabilities and technologies, including to defend
against Improvised Explosive Devices and CBRN threats. We will keep terrorism
and related threats high on NATO's security agenda.
80. NATO Allies form a unique community of values, committed to the principles
of individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The
Alliance is convinced that these shared values and our security are
strengthened when we work with our wide network of partners around the globe.
We will continue to engage actively to enhance international security through
partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations, in
accordance with our Berlin Partnership Policy.
81. Partnerships are, and will continue to be, essential to the way NATO works.
Partners have served with us in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and other operations,
sacrificing alongside Alliance troops, and work with us in combating terrorism
and piracy. Partners make significant contributions to our practical
cooperation activities in a number of different areas, including Trust Funds.
Together with our partners, we have built a broad cooperative security network.
Allies are resolved to maintain and build on this legacy, as our partnerships
play a crucial role in the promotion of international peace and security. At
this Summit, we therefore collectively pledge to strengthen the political
dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners who share our vision for
cooperative security in an international order based on the rule of law. We
will continue to build defence capacity and interoperability through such
initiatives as the Defence Education Enhancement Programme and the Professional
Development Programme. We will also continue to promote transparency,
accountability, and integrity in the defence sectors of interested nations
through the Building Integrity programme.
82. This year we celebrate twenty years of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). PfP
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council are, and will continue to be, a part
of our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. They have forged political
ties across Europe, through the Caucasus and into Central Asia; they have also
been the foundation for practical cooperation to address common threats to our
shared security, including in the field of human security. This cooperation was
driven, at heart, by the common values and principles to which Allies and
partners have all committed in the PfP founding documents. They include the
promise to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, to respect internationally
recognised borders, and to settle disputes by peaceful means. These principles
are as important as ever today and must be upheld unequivocally across the
Euro-Atlantic community.
83. We reaffirm our commitment to the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and the principles that underpin them; MD and ICI
remain two complementary yet distinct partnership frameworks. We look forward
to deepening our political dialogue and practical cooperation in both fora,
building on many years of steady progress. We remain open to welcoming new
members from the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East region to these
frameworks.
84. This year we also celebrate twenty years of the Mediterranean Dialogue.
Today, as the Mediterranean region faces huge security challenges with
wide-ranging implications for Euro-Atlantic security, the importance of this
forum, which brings together key countries from NATO's southern border, is
clearer than ever. Enhancing the political dimension of MD will help to address
the challenges of the region. We stand ready to continue working with our MD
partners to make the most of the opportunities offered by their partnership
with NATO, including individual partnership and cooperation programmes.
85. We also celebrate ten years of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which
has helped to promote understanding and security cooperation with our partners
in the Gulf region. We encourage our ICI partner countries to be proactive in
taking full advantage of the opportunities offered by their partnership with
NATO, including individual partnership and cooperation programmes.
86. We will also intensify efforts to engage with and reach out to those
partners across the globe that can contribute significantly to addressing
shared security concerns. The Berlin Partnership Policy has created increased
opportunities for these countries to work individually with NATO at the
political and practical level. We welcome that some of our partners across the
globe have seized these opportunities by providing support to operations and
engaging in security cooperation and dialogue to enhance common understanding
of our shared security interests.
87. We will likewise look to further develop relations with relevant regional
international organisations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab
League, and be open to engaging with others, including in the context of
regional crisis situations.
88. As combat operations end in Afghanistan, we will ensure that the bonds
forged between Allied and partner nations' armed forces remain as strong as
ever. We have fought together. Now we will focus on preparing and training
together. We have therefore adopted a comprehensive Partnership
Interoperability Initiative to enhance our ability to tackle security
challenges together with our partners. Here in Wales, our Defence Ministers
launched the Interoperability Platform, meeting with 24 partners 1
that have demonstrated their commitment to reinforce their interoperability
with NATO. These partners have been invited to work with us to take forward
dialogue and practical cooperation on interoperability issues. Defence
Ministers also met with five partners 2 that make particularly
significant contributions to NATO operations to discuss further deepening
dialogue and practical cooperation as part of the enhanced opportunities within
the Partnership Interoperability Initiative. We stand ready to consider the
addition of other partners as their contributions and interests warrant.
89. Today we have decided to launch a Defence and Related Security Capacity
Building Initiative to reinforce our commitment to partner nations and to help
the Alliance to project stability without deploying large combat forces, as
part of the Alliance's overall contribution to international security and
stability and conflict prevention. The Initiative builds upon NATO's extensive
expertise in supporting, advising and assisting nations with defence and
related security capacity building. Building on our close cooperation and
following their requests, we have agreed to extend this initiative to Georgia,
Jordan, and the Republic of Moldova. We are also ready to consider requests
from interested partners and non-partners, as well as to engage with
international and regional organisations, with an interest in building their
defence and related security capacity through this demand-driven initiative. We
reaffirm NATO's readiness to provide defence and related security capacity
advisory support for Libya when conditions permit. We will pursue these efforts
in complementarity and close cooperation with other international
organisations, in particular the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, as appropriate. Some
partner nations themselves can bring unique partner insight and contributions
to NATO capacity building efforts. We welcome the appointment of NATO's Deputy
Secretary General as Special Coordinator for Defence Capacity Building, as well
as the establishment of a military hub in the NATO Command Structure, to help
ensure a timely, coherent and effective NATO response, taking into account
efforts by partners and individual Allies, on a voluntary basis.
90. We attach great importance to ensuring women's full and active participation
in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, as well as in
post-conflict efforts and cooperation. We remain committed to preventing
conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence. Since our last Summit in
Chicago, we have made significant progress in implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women,
Peace and Security and related resolutions. We are now implementing the results
of the Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of
Operations. A revised Policy and Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security have
been developed with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and
with other partners 3. The establishment of a permanent position of
NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security underscores the
Alliance's active engagement and commitment to this agenda. NATO's cooperation
with partner nations, international organisations, and civil society has been
strengthened and should be further enhanced. Our ongoing efforts to integrate
gender perspectives into Alliance activities throughout NATO's three core tasks
will contribute to a more modern, ready, and responsive NATO. We have directed
the Council to submit a progress report on NATO's implementation of UNSCR 1325
and related resolutions for our next Summit.
91. We recall NATO's firm commitment to the implementation of UNSCR 1612 and
related resolutions on the protection of children affected by armed conflict
and remain deeply concerned about the damaging effects of armed conflicts on
children. NATO will continue to carry out its responsibilities as part of the
wider international effort and to build on initiatives already taken to
properly integrate this issue into the planning and conduct of its operations
and missions, as well as its training, monitoring, and reporting. Therefore, in
close cooperation with the UN, NATO will assess how to ensure it is
sufficiently prepared whenever and wherever the issue of Children and Armed
Conflict is likely to be encountered.
92. The Open Door Policy under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty is one of
the Alliance's great successes. Successive rounds of NATO enlargement have
enhanced the security and stability of all our nations. The steady progress of
Euro-Atlantic integration fosters reform, strengthens collective security, and
ensures the stability necessary for prosperity. NATO's door will remain open to
all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are
willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership,
which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose
inclusion will contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We
reaffirm our strong commitment to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the partners
that aspire to join the Alliance, judging each on its own merits. Decisions on
enlargement are for NATO itself. We encourage partners to continue to implement
the necessary reforms and decisions to advance their aspirations and prepare
for membership, and we will continue to offer political and practical support
to their efforts. Today we have endorsed decisions that take forward our Open
Door Policy based on progress by individual partners that aspire to join the
Alliance.
93. NATO recognises Georgia's significant efforts to strengthen its democracy and
to modernise its military forces and defence institutions. We welcome the
democratic development of Georgia, including through the peaceful transfer of
power following parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012 and 2013,
respectively. We encourage Georgia to continue implementation of reforms,
including consolidating democratic institutions, taking forward judicial
reforms, and ensuring full respect for the rule of law. NATO highly appreciates
Georgia's sizeable contribution to the ISAF operation and recognises the
sacrifices Georgian troops have made in Afghanistan. Together with Georgia's
offer to participate in the NATO Response Force, these contributions
demonstrate Georgia's role as a contributor to our shared security. At the 2008
Bucharest Summit we agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO and we
reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions. Since
then, Georgia has made significant progress and has come closer to NATO by
implementing ambitious reforms and making good use of the NATO-Georgia
Commission and Annual National Programme. We note that Georgia's relationship
with the Alliance contains the tools necessary to continue moving Georgia
forward towards eventual membership. Today we have endorsed a substantial
package for Georgia that includes defence capacity building, training,
exercises, strengthened liaison, and enhanced interoperability opportunities.
These measures aim to strengthen Georgia's defence and interoperability
capabilities with the Alliance, which will help Georgia advance in its
preparations towards membership in the Alliance.
94. We reiterate our continued support to the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders. We
welcome Georgia's full compliance with the EU-mediated cease-fire agreement and
other multilateral measures to build confidence. We welcome Georgia's
commitment not to use force and call on Russia to reciprocate. We continue to
call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia
regions of Georgia as independent states and to withdraw its forces from
Georgia. We encourage all participants in the Geneva talks to play a
constructive role as well as to continue working closely with the OSCE, the UN,
and the EU to pursue peaceful conflict resolution in the internationally
recognised territory of Georgia.
95. We welcome the significant progress made by Montenegro in its reforms, its
constructive role in the Western Balkans region and the contribution that it
makes to international security, including its contribution to our engagement
in Afghanistan. In recognition of Montenegro's progress towards NATO
membership, the Alliance has agreed to open intensified and focused talks with
Montenegro, and agreed that Foreign Ministers will assess Montenegro's progress
no later than by the end of 2015 with a view to deciding on whether to invite
Montenegro to join the Alliance. These talks will be conducted in conjunction
with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) process. In the meantime, we look to
Montenegro to continue its efforts to address the remaining challenges,
particularly with respect to rule of law and completing security sector reform.
We also welcome the increase in public support in Montenegro for NATO
membership and encourage continued efforts in this area.
96. We reiterate the agreement at our 2008 Bucharest Summit, as we did at
subsequent Summits, to extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia 4 to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution
to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN, and strongly
urge intensified efforts towards that end. An early solution, and subsequent
membership, will contribute to security and stability in the region. We
encourage and support the continuation of reform efforts within the country,
particularly with a view to ensuring effective democratic dialogue, media
freedom, judicial independence, and a fully-functioning multi-ethnic society
based on full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. We also
encourage further efforts to develop good neighbourly relations. We appreciate
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's long-standing contribution to our
operations and its active role in regional cooperation. We value the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's long-standing commitment to the NATO accession
process.
97. We continue to fully support the membership aspirations of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. We look forward to free and fair general elections in October,
which we hope will lead to an efficient and effective government coalition,
ready to address the issues related to the country's Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
We acknowledge the efforts undertaken since 2012 to come to a political
agreement on registering the immovable defence property to the state. We remain
concerned that little progress has been achieved to comply with the condition
set by NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in April 2010. As Allied Foreign
Ministers will keep developments under active review, we encourage the leadership
of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the necessary steps in that regard so that
its first MAP cycle can be activated as soon as possible. We appreciate Bosnia
and Herzegovina's contributions to NATO-led operations, and we commend its
constructive role in regional dialogue and security.
98. Here in Wales, our Foreign Ministers have met their counterparts from
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, and the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia. Ministers discussed the progress made by these countries, the
Euro-Atlantic integration process, and other key Summit issues, including the
international security situation. NATO is grateful to these partners for the
significant contributions that they continue to make to NATO's objectives and
to international security and stability.
99. In light of NATO's operational experiences and the evolving complex
security environment, a comprehensive political, civilian, and military
approach is essential in crisis management and cooperative security.
Furthermore, it contributes to the effectiveness of our common security and
defence, without prejudice to Alliance collective defence commitments. Today we
reaffirm our decisions taken at the Lisbon and Chicago Summits. The
comprehensive approach is conducive to more coherence within NATO's own
structures and activities. Furthermore, NATO has developed a modest but
appropriate civilian capability in line with Lisbon Summit decisions. As part
of NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach by the international
community, we will enhance cooperation with partner nations and other actors,
including other international organisations, such as the UN, the EU and the
OSCE, as well as non-governmental organisations, in line with decisions taken.
We will ensure that comprehensive approach-related lessons learned, including
from ISAF, will be carried forward and applied in various strands of work and
new initiatives, including, as appropriate, the Readiness Action Plan, the
Connected Forces Initiative, the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building
Initiative, and the Partnership Interoperability Initiative.
100. In the spirit of the comprehensive approach and in light of a changing
security environment in Europe, our Foreign Ministers met with the EU High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the OSCE
Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to
discuss closer cooperation. At a time when the values and principles that
underpin the major institutions in the Euro-Atlantic area are being challenged,
Allies emphasised the need to work together to ensure our shared goal of a
Europe whole, free and at peace. We look forward to continuing the dialogue to
advance this further.
101. NATO's cooperation with the United Nations (UN) strengthens international
security. We welcome our regular political dialogue on areas of common
interest. We are encouraged by the growing practical cooperation between the
staffs of our organisations, including exchanges of best practices and lessons
learned in operations, training and exercises, and sharing of expertise. We are
committed to exploring ways to reinforce our practical support to UN peace
operations, including by enhancing cooperation between NATO and the UN in
building defence and related security capacity.
102. The European Union (EU) remains a unique and essential partner for NATO.
The two organisations share common values and strategic interests. In a spirit
of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity, and respect for the
autonomy and institutional integrity of both NATO and the EU, and as agreed by
the two organisations, we will continue to work side-by-side in crisis
management operations, broaden political consultations, and promote
complementarity of the two organisations to enhance common security and stability.
The current strategic environment has highlighted the need for further
strengthening our strategic partnership and reinforcing our joint efforts and
our common message.
103. NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European
defence, which will lead to a stronger NATO, help enhance the security of all
Allies and foster an equitable sharing of the burden, benefits and
responsibilities of Alliance membership. In this context, we welcome the EU
member states' decisions to strengthen European defence and crisis management,
including at the European Council in December 2013.
104. We look forward to continued dialogue and cooperation between NATO and the
EU. Our consultations have broadened to address issues of common concern,
including security challenges like cyber defence, the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, counter-terrorism, and energy security. We will also seek
to work more closely together in several other areas, including maritime
security, defence and related security capacity building, and addressing hybrid
threats, in line with decisions taken.
105. Non-EU Allies continue to make significant contributions to the EU's
efforts to strengthen its capacities to address common security challenges. For
the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies' fullest
involvement in these efforts is essential. We encourage further mutual steps in
this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership.
106. We welcome the Secretary General's report on NATO-EU relations. We
encourage him to continue to work closely with the EU High Representative and
the leaders of other EU institutions across the broad spectrum of the NATO-EU
strategic partnership and provide a report to the Council in time for the next
Summit.
107. As demonstrated most recently by its activities in the framework of the
Russia-Ukraine crisis, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) plays an important role in addressing the security challenges in the
Euro-Atlantic area. We fully support efforts undertaken by the OSCE and
continue to work closely with the OSCE in areas such as conflict prevention and
resolution, post conflict rehabilitation and in addressing new security
threats. We are committed to further enhancing our cooperation, both at the
political and operational level, in all areas of common interest.
108. We welcome the increasing emphasis by the African Union (AU) on addressing
transnational security threats, and its growing efforts to build the African
capacity to rapidly respond to emerging conflicts. We encourage deeper
political and practical cooperation between NATO and the AU to support the
African Union in establishing a more robust African peace and security
capacity. Based on the AU's request, NATO will continue to provide technical
support and stands ready to explore, in consultation with the AU, opportunities
to expand our logistical, training, and planning assistance in support of
African peacekeepers. We welcome the recent progress in establishing a sound
legal framework for NATO-AU cooperation.
109. A stable and reliable energy supply, the diversification of routes,
suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks
remain of critical importance. While these issues are primarily the
responsibility of national governments and other international organisations,
NATO closely follows relevant developments in energy security, including in
relation to the Russia-Ukraine crisis and the growing instability in the Middle
East and North Africa region. We will continue to consult on and further
develop our capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas
where NATO can add value. In particular, we will enhance our awareness of
energy developments with security implications for Allies and the Alliance;
further develop NATO's competence in supporting the protection of critical
energy infrastructure; and continue to work towards significantly improving the
energy efficiency of our military forces, and in this regard we note the Green
Defence Framework. We will also enhance training and education efforts,
continue to engage with partner countries, on a case-by-case basis, and consult
with relevant international organisations, including the EU, as appropriate.
Today we have noted a progress report on NATO's role in energy security and we
task the Council to continue to refine NATO's role in energy security in
accordance with the principles and guidelines agreed at the Bucharest Summit
and the direction provided by subsequent Summits and the Strategic Concept. We
task the Council to produce a further progress report for our next Summit.
110. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate
change, water scarcity, and increasing energy needs will further shape the
future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential
to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.
111. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, Allies agreed on an ambitious reform programme,
encompassing reviews of the Agencies and NATO Command Structure; resource
reform; Headquarters reform; and an end-to-end review of all structures engaged
in NATO capability development. Heads of State and Government took stock of
progress at the 2012 Chicago Summit. Since then, NATO has continued to reform
by instituting new policies, overhauling its structures, and streamlining
procedures to improve efficiency and to ensure our Alliance is responsive and
agile against the diverse challenges and threats it faces.
112. NATO has adapted to drive further financial reform, harnessed the best efforts
of our International Staff and International Military Staff, developed its NATO
Command Structure, and achieved a greater level of coherence between its
Agencies. While significant progress has been made in the reform of the
Alliance, ongoing initiatives still need to be fully delivered and further
efforts will be required. We have tasked further work in the areas of delivery
of common funded capabilities, reform governance and transparency and
accountability, especially in the management of NATO's financial resources. We
look forward to a further report on progress on these reforms by the time of
our next Summit.
113. We express our appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to us by
the Government of the United Kingdom and the people of Wales. The decisions we
have taken at our Summit will help to keep our nations and populations safe,
the bond between Europe and North America strong, and our region and the world
stable. We will meet
again in Poland in 2016.
1.
Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Japan,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia,
Montenegro, Morocco, New Zealand, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 4, Ukraine, and the United Arab
Emirates.
2.
Australia, Finland, Georgia,
Jordan, and Sweden.
3.
Afghanistan, Australia, Japan,
Jordan, New Zealand and the United Arab Emirates.
4.
Turkey recognises the Republic
of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
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