How
is the role of NATO evolving? What are the main challenges facing the
organization? The EU
Defence Agency
and
cooperation with
NATO?
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm
Look at the latest news and decisions to keep up to date.
You should also read the Lisbon Declaration of November 2010http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease
the Chicago Declaration of May 2012http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease
the Wales summit Declarations of September 2014http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112517.htm The Warsaw summit Communiqué of July 2016 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Warsaw_summit The Brussels summit of May 2017 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Brussels_summit
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm
Look at the latest news and decisions to keep up to date.
You should also read the Lisbon Declaration of November 2010http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease
the Chicago Declaration of May 2012http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease
the Wales summit Declarations of September 2014http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112517.htm The Warsaw summit Communiqué of July 2016 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Warsaw_summit The Brussels summit of May 2017 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Brussels_summit
The
current NATO Secretary General is Jens Stoltenberg of Norway.
Read this information carefully, as necessary background, take notes on what you think you can use. You won’t need everything.
e.g. North Atlantic Treaty Organization or North Atlantic Alliance – formed April 1949 – at present 29 members (although Montenegro is in the process of joining) – HQ Brussels, Belgium (with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, the central command of NATO military forces). The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, famously stated the organization's goal was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down" (Do not quote this at the Concorso!!).
Read this information carefully, as necessary background, take notes on what you think you can use. You won’t need everything.
e.g. North Atlantic Treaty Organization or North Atlantic Alliance – formed April 1949 – at present 29 members (although Montenegro is in the process of joining) – HQ Brussels, Belgium (with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, the central command of NATO military forces). The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, famously stated the organization's goal was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down" (Do not quote this at the Concorso!!).
Developments
regarding European Defence
https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_49217.htm
https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en https://www.eda.europa.eu/
http://defencesummit.eu/
http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2016/09/gentiloni-eu-needs-schengen-for.html
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36195/most-important-moment-european-defence-decades-mogherini_fr
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/american-withdrawal-presents-opportunity-for-europe-a-1135172.html
http://www.adnkronos.com/aki-en/security/2017/11/10/pinotti-backs-more-integrated-european-defence_ctDIgGhps1J3p37WCRwlmL.html
http://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/future-eu-defence-european-space-data-and-cyber-agency
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/34226/Permanent%20Structured%20Cooperation%20(PESCO)%20-%20Factsheet
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/defence-security-timeline/#
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1516_en.htm
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/22-euco-security-defence/
http://www.newsweek.com/eu-defense-fund-tackle-russia-military-trump-nato-622648
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40217085
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_operations_of_the_European_Union
http://egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/SPB81.pdf
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/07/eu-prepares-a-defense-union-that-could-alleviate-not-aggravate-trumps-concerns-on-nato.html
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari1-2017-keohane-threes-company-france-germany-uk-european-defence-post-brexit
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4385_en.htm
https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en https://www.eda.europa.eu/ http://defencesummit.eu/ http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2016/09/gentiloni-eu-needs-schengen-for.html https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36195/most-important-moment-european-defence-decades-mogherini_fr http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/american-withdrawal-presents-opportunity-for-europe-a-1135172.html http://www.adnkronos.com/aki-en/security/2017/11/10/pinotti-backs-more-integrated-european-defence_ctDIgGhps1J3p37WCRwlmL.html http://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/future-eu-defence-european-space-data-and-cyber-agency https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/34226/Permanent%20Structured%20Cooperation%20(PESCO)%20-%20Factsheet https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/defence-security-timeline/# http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1516_en.htm http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/22-euco-security-defence/ http://www.newsweek.com/eu-defense-fund-tackle-russia-military-trump-nato-622648 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40217085 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_operations_of_the_European_Union http://egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/SPB81.pdf http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/07/eu-prepares-a-defense-union-that-could-alleviate-not-aggravate-trumps-concerns-on-nato.html http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari1-2017-keohane-threes-company-france-germany-uk-european-defence-post-brexit http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4385_en.htm
Background:
NATO
was created at the start of the Cold War as an alliance among states
sharing core democratic values, and was a way to extend the US
commitment to the stability and defense of Western and Southern
Europe (resulting from WWII) indefinitely. Its principal objective
was to discourage a Soviet invasion or interference in the area. This
was based on article 5 of the treaty, under which members are
committed to come to the aid and defense of any member state which is
attacked by a non-member (i.e. Russia). This was achieved by the
deployment of US and allied forces throughout Europe in such a
way that the invasion of a NATO member would automatically involve
the forces of the US and other countries, thus committing them to
action. Conventional Russian forces were always superior to those of
the Alliance, so the ultimate deterrence was provided by US (and
later British and French) nuclear weapons. In the event of a conflict
NATO conventional forces were there to gain time for diplomacy before
using nuclear weapons. In response the Soviet Union created the
Warsaw Pact with its Eastern European allies in May 1955 (after West
Germany joined NATO). NATO never had to go to war, and was thus
successful in fulfilling its main objective of deterring Russia.
With the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (1989-1992), NATO seemed to have lost its historic reason for existing. The US and its NATO allies reduced the size of their forces in Europe and since then there has been an ongoing debate about what, if any, NATO’s role can and should now be in world affairs. The Lisbon declaration (Nov. 2010) seemed to provide some clear indications regarding the direction in which NATO was moving. However, it also raised certain questions and left some unanswered. With the events of 2008 in Georgia and, above all, of 2014 in Ukraine there has been a rise in tensions with Russia, a decline in cooperation between Russia and NATO and fears that we are returning, if not to the Cold War, at least to an adversarial relationship rather than one based on working together. Given this scenario, NATO may now have to return more to its original purpose of guaranteeing its members’ (particularly its Eastern European members’) sovereignty and independence.Main points:
With the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (1989-1992), NATO seemed to have lost its historic reason for existing. The US and its NATO allies reduced the size of their forces in Europe and since then there has been an ongoing debate about what, if any, NATO’s role can and should now be in world affairs. The Lisbon declaration (Nov. 2010) seemed to provide some clear indications regarding the direction in which NATO was moving. However, it also raised certain questions and left some unanswered. With the events of 2008 in Georgia and, above all, of 2014 in Ukraine there has been a rise in tensions with Russia, a decline in cooperation between Russia and NATO and fears that we are returning, if not to the Cold War, at least to an adversarial relationship rather than one based on working together. Given this scenario, NATO may now have to return more to its original purpose of guaranteeing its members’ (particularly its Eastern European members’) sovereignty and independence.Main points:
1)
After
the end of the Cold War the US reduced its forces in Europe and
shifted a significant proportion of what remained southwards. NATO
reduced its heavy conventional forces and European armies based
largely on military service in favor of smaller, more professional
and much more high-tech forces with ‘out of area’ (outside
Europe) capabilities (including logistical support). This process
will continue with more attention paid to cost effectiveness and the
full integration of different national forces and weapons systems.
2)
NATO’s
new Strategic Concept is based on the idea of intervention in crisis
management and security questions beyond NATO’s borders (‘out of
area’ operations beyond Europe, the area NATO was originally
created to defend) and in cooperation with other countries and
regional organizations (ISAF in Afghanistan was NATO-led but included
forces from other countries). This idea has gradually evolved since
the early 1990s with NATO’s intervention in the Balkans (in 1993
against Serbia, and in 1999 in Kosovo).After 9/11 NATO invoked
article 5 for the first time and sent the ISAF to Afghanistan in 2001
under a UN mandate (the first major ‘out of area’ operation) and
later also became involved in training Iraqi forces to take over
responsibility for security. Since August 2009 it has conducted
operation Ocean Shield against piracy off the Horn of (North-East)
Africa. It launched an operation to protect Libyan civilians from the
Gaddafi regime in March-October 2011 which led to the fall of the
regime, and is now involved in operations in the Mediterranean
against illegal immigration. As a result of 9/11 and the threat of
further terrorist attacks there is now also intensified cooperation
between the security services and police forces of NATO members, and
between them and other countries facing the same threat. It also
created a NATO Response Force (NRF) to make it easier for NATO to
provide a rapid response to a crisis before the deployment of heavier
forces.
3)
NATO
began to see its role less in strictly military terms and more and
more in terms of cooperating with the UN, the EU, other international
or regional organizations, and other countries (whether democratic
like Brazil and Australia or less so, like Russia, or not at all but
stable, like China) on a range of issues considered threats to NATO
members’ security, e.g. terrorism, international crime and
trafficking, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear arms, piracy,
cyber attacks, climate change and environmental degradation and
crisis management (intervention to stabilize failed states and
prevent escalating local crises).See the Lisbon Summit Declaration
November 2010
and
the Chicago
Summit Declaration (May 2012)
4) In
the last twenty years since the disintegration of the Soviet bloc,
many former Soviet satellite states have joined NATO and the EU which
have expanded to the East (German unification in 1990, NATO
membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, for
the Baltic states, Rumania, Bulgaria and Slovakia in 2004, for
Albania and Croatia in 2009). The remaining Balkan states will
probably join NATO soon. For Eastern European countries this move was
mainly a guarantee of continued independence from Russia. However,
this has been seen by Russia as aggressive and an attempt to reduce
Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Russia made clear its
opposition to Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia joining NATO or the EU.
Georgia has been promised NATO membership at an unspecified date in
the future but Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008, in support
of the break-away republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, was the
first real sign of the dangers raised by the question of further
NATO/EU expansion to the East. In fact, Russia’s opposition to
Georgia joining NATO seems to have blocked further progress.
However,
it is the evolution of events in Ukraine which have really thrown
into question all certainties about relations with the Russian
Federation. Ukraine also expressed interest in NATO membership in
2008, but later adopted a position of neutrality in 2010 probably
because of Russia’s opposition. A decision in November 2013 by
Ukraine's President Viktor Yanukovych to pull out of an association
deal with the European Union sparked huge street protests that
eventually led to his downfall in February 2014. In March Russia
reacted by annexing the Ukrainian region of Crimea after the Crimean
parliament declared independence from Ukraine, and unrest began
growing in eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russian sentiment is strong.
The US and NATO denounced the Russian move as illegal and its support
for the separatist insurgencies in the Donetsk
and
Luhansk
regions since 2014 as aggressively expansionist. Following Russia’s
support for the separatists in 2014, the Ukrainian government
launched a military counter-offensive against the insurgents, which
resulted in the ongoing War
in Donbass.
After parliamentary
elections
in
October 2014, the new Ukraine government made joining NATO a
priority. In December 2014, the Ukrainian parliament renounced
Ukraine's non-aligned
status
that had “proved to be ineffective in guaranteeing Ukraine's
security and protecting the country from external aggression and
pressure”. Russia obviously opposes this.
Russia has continued to argue that it sees NATO and the EU’s expansion to the East over the last 20 years as far more aggressive than its own response to protect Russian minorities and that this expansion is a violation of a promise made in 1990 that in exchange for Russian agreement to German reunification NATO agreed not to expand towards the East. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation
NATO's growing concern and its strategy to respond to Russia's moves can be seen in
Russia has continued to argue that it sees NATO and the EU’s expansion to the East over the last 20 years as far more aggressive than its own response to protect Russian minorities and that this expansion is a violation of a promise made in 1990 that in exchange for Russian agreement to German reunification NATO agreed not to expand towards the East. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation
NATO's growing concern and its strategy to respond to Russia's moves can be seen in
The
Wales Summit Declaration Sept 2014 (paragraphs 16-31)
the
Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security July 2016
and in detail in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué July 2016 (paragraphs 9-24)
With
the situation in Georgia, the current conflict in Ukraine and the
resulting sanctions, as well as Russia’s growing assertiveness in
international relations (e.g. Syria) new questions have been raised
about the prospects for good future relations between the European
Union, NATO and the West in general and the Russian Federation. With
Russian minorities in other Eastern European and Baltic NATO and EU
members (and also in Moldova) NATO decided in March 2015 to
strengthen its Baltic
Air Policing
mission
and presence in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea area. It has also
conducted joint military exercises with Ukraine but has avoided overt
military involvement in both Ukraine and Georgia, not wanting a
direct confrontation with Russia and the risk of a complete
break-down in relations. Although not NATO members Ukraine
and Georgia
began participating in the NATO
Response Force (NRF),
respectively, in 2014
and
2015.http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315.html
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315-2.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014%E2%80%9315_Russian_military_intervention_in_Ukraine
(See the notes in ‘The EU and the Russian Federation’ for an account of the evolution of events in Ukraine in 2014 and the growth in tension between NATO and the Russian Federation).
At the NATO summit in Wales on 4th and 5th September 2014, the military alliance finalized plans for its new spearhead NATO Response Force (a rapid deployment force of 4,000 soldiers able go into action in 48 hours) as a response to growing concern about the Ukraine crisis and the rise of Islamic State militants. Despite calls from eastern European members (Poland and the Baltic states), NATO did not approve the proposal to create new permanent bases in these member states. Germany in particular wished to avoid further antagonizing Russia by such an action. President Obama, however, assured them of NATO and US commitment to their protection (see below for change of policy at Warsaw Summit) NATO also confirmed the suspension (April 2014) of its partnership for civilian and military cooperation with Russia and offered support for Ukraine’s plans to strengthen its military capacity.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315-2.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014%E2%80%9315_Russian_military_intervention_in_Ukraine
(See the notes in ‘The EU and the Russian Federation’ for an account of the evolution of events in Ukraine in 2014 and the growth in tension between NATO and the Russian Federation).
At the NATO summit in Wales on 4th and 5th September 2014, the military alliance finalized plans for its new spearhead NATO Response Force (a rapid deployment force of 4,000 soldiers able go into action in 48 hours) as a response to growing concern about the Ukraine crisis and the rise of Islamic State militants. Despite calls from eastern European members (Poland and the Baltic states), NATO did not approve the proposal to create new permanent bases in these member states. Germany in particular wished to avoid further antagonizing Russia by such an action. President Obama, however, assured them of NATO and US commitment to their protection (see below for change of policy at Warsaw Summit) NATO also confirmed the suspension (April 2014) of its partnership for civilian and military cooperation with Russia and offered support for Ukraine’s plans to strengthen its military capacity.
President
Putin defended Russia’s annexation of Crimea by saying that
Washington and its European allies were guided by “the rule of the
gun” rather than international law and respect for the principle of
state sovereignty. In March 2014 Washington put military cooperation
with Russia on hold and ended negotiations on the NATO missile
defense program. It also banned the export to Russia of technology
with potential military applications, suspended cooperation on
civilian nuclear energy projects and cut off NASA’s contacts with
its Russian counterparts. Russia, meanwhile, made a resolution of the
impasse over NATO’s missile defense system a precondition to
further strategic arms control talks. It formed the Eurasian Economic
Union with Belarus
and Kazakhstan
in May in 2014 and Armenia
and Kyrgyzstan
became full members in 2015. The Eurasian Economic Union has an
integrated single
market
of 183 million people and a gross
domestic product
of over 4 trillion US dollars (PPP). All EAEU member states
participate in the Collective
Security Treaty Organization,
an intergovernmental mutual defense alliance. Some Russian
commentators even argue that its authoritarian model is a viable
alternative to Western liberal democracy and one which will gain
support in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where some Western ideas
are seen as going against tradition and religion.
At
the 2016 Warsaw summit NATO reverseded its position on deploying
forces to Russia's borders. NATO agreed to deploy military forces to
the Baltic states and eastern Poland from January 2017 to deter
Russia, a response to Moscow's 2014 seizure of Crimea from Ukraine.
The four battalions totaling between 3,000 and 4,000 troops will be
led by Britain in Estonia, the United States in Poland, Canada in
Latvia and Germany in Lithuania.
further
NATO and EU response to Ukraine
and
in NATO's eastern members
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/nato-deploys-troops-poland-russian-border-170413213541667.html
5)
NATO
continues to want and need to stabilize and improve relations with
Russia. There has been extensive practical cooperation in many fields
in the recent past. How far is each side willing to make concessions
to return to this cooperation? And how far have the events and
growing tensions in Eastern Europe put all future cooperation at
risk? See point 4.
a) NATO
is creating a missile defense system in Europe for the protection of
NATO forces and the populations of NATO member states. This is
supposedly intended to deal with a threat from a country like Iran,
accused of wanting to develop nuclear weapons, or against terrorists
(!), but has been consistently opposed by the Russians as potentially
aimed at them. In Lisbon NATO relaunched the idea, offering to work
with Russia on this project. The immediate Russian response at the
Lisbon summit in November 2010 (NATO Russia Council) was positive
providing that the cooperation offered by NATO meant Russia’s real
integration into a system of shared defense against third parties
(e.g. Iran). Russia was not willing to accept a system based in
Eastern European NATO member states from which it would only receive
information and intelligence as a courtesy. The implication from the
Russian point of view is that it could still be used against Russia.
In fact, NATO has now rejected the idea of Russia’s
participation in the control arrangements for the missile defense
system and Russia is threatening to deploy missiles on its Western
borders if NATO goes ahead with its plans. During its 2012
Chicago Summit
NATO leaders declared that the missile defense system had reached
‘interim’ capability. For what this means see the link to the
Wikipedia notes on the Chicago summit. It seems to involve
installations in the Czech Republic, Poland and the Black Sea region
(Turkey and Romania) as well as submarine based missiles. The project
will not be completed till 2020 at the earliest, perhaps, more
realistically, only by 2022.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_missile_defence_system
http://www.rt.com/news/246709-nato-missile-shield-iran/
http://www.rt.com/news/246709-nato-missile-shield-iran/
At
its 2016 Warsaw summit NATO took command of the U.S.-built missile
shield in Europe to defend against ballistic missiles from Iran.
b)
NATO
and the US have frequently reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear
non-proliferation, and continuing large-scale reductions (see
Telegraph article below) in nuclear armaments and missile delivery
systems initiated with the START I treaty (July 1991) and continued
in START II (Jan 1993) and SORT (May 2002). In fact, further
reductions were agreed in the most recent round of negotiations
between the US and Russia that led to the New START treaty which came
into force in February 2011 and replaced the START II and SORT
treaties. Some commentators suggest that it seems slightly
contradictory to launch a project for missile defense (point 5a)
while supporting arms reductions. Others argue that it is simply a
question of realism, and that NATO’s first priority must be its
founding purpose, collective security.
However
points a) and b) are now connected. Russia has now made a resolution
of the impasse over NATO’s missile defense system a precondition to
further strategic arms control talks. There is a danger that with the
gradual evolution of nuclear and missile technology much of the
impressive progress made on nuclear arms reductions could unravel
unless negotiations are relaunched soon. At the same time in the US
there are doubts about whether Russia has respected its New START
commitments to arms reductions.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-17511816http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7674962/US-has-more-than-5000-nuclear-warheads.html
Unresolved
Questions for NATO:
1)
The
decision-making process. The existing system depends on consensus and
agreement at all levels, without formal voting. There is an unwritten
rule that a country (or countries) which is not in agreement with the
other members on an issue remains silent (e.g. Greece and the NATO
intervention in the Balkans) and simply does not participate in the
operation. However, as the organization grows, like the EU, it will
probably need to modify this decision-making process. Can this be
done without damaging NATO’s effectiveness? What seems likely to
happen is that NATO actions may be authorized by all or most members
but not undertaken by all the 28 members. In addition, there may be
space for small groups of NATO allies to undertake operations that
have first been discussed with the other members. In practice this is
want happened in Libya, although the US criticized the lack of
participation by the NATO members which had authorized the mission.
2)
Relations
with Russia – at the start of the 21st
century, despite a clear commitment from both NATO and Russia to
warmer relations and closer cooperation it was not clear what this
meant in practice, or if they were thinking along the same lines.
Russia seemed to believe that without formally joining NATO it should
have the right to share in NATO decisions (and block those it does
not like) and also to take part fully in NATO’s
military/technological programs. NATO seemed to think that
cooperation simply meant keeping Russia informed and providing it
with any information NATO gets regarding possible threats to Russia.
While Russia is a vital partner from the point of view of global
security and within international decision-making bodies (and in
economic terms, e.g. energy supplies to the EU), most NATO members,
particularly those in Eastern Europe are doubtful about whether
Russia really shares NATO’s core democratic beliefs, and how far
Russia can be trusted. Events in Georgia and Ukraine have only
strengthened this point of view. The terrorist attacks in Paris on
November 13th
2015 may lead to a rapprochement between Russia and the West in a
coordinated effort to defeat IS in Syria. However, for the moment
this is in no way certain.
a)
The
proposed NATO missile defense system – this is a good example of
the above. How exactly could Russia be persuaded to cooperate or take
part in or simply accept this project? Since Russia is not being
offered access to the technology and a right to participate fully in
any decisions, it is likely to remain hostile to the project.
b)
NATO
membership for Georgia, Ukraine and the Balkan states – NATO
believes these states have the right to join. Russia sees this as an
aggressive expansion by NATO into Russia’s ‘near abroad’ and is
against more of its neighbors joining NATO. It seems ready to
actively protect what it sees as Russia’s interests and ethnic
Russian minorities (the war with Georgia and support for separatists
in Ukraine). This seems to have frozen progress on expanding NATO
membership to some countries and cooperation between NATO and Russia
for the moment.
c)
Russia
and the US are both aware that further progress on arms reductions
depends not only on the Obama administration but attitudes in the US
Senate and agreement on the missile defense system. Russia argues
that the US must be committed to working with, and not against,
Russia for real progress to be made and progress on an agreement on
NATO’s missile defense system is now a Russian precondition for
nuclear arms reduction talks.
3)
What
happens if in the end NATO loses in Afghanistan? – This is not an
impossibility. Although NATO withdrew most of its forces from the
country by the end of 2014, transferring military and security
responsibilities to the Afghan authorities and forces, about 13,000
NATO troops (including 10.000 US soldiers) remained. At its Warsaw
summit NATO allies agreed to help fund Afghan security forces between
2018 and 2020 with around $1 billion annually. NATO countries will
also keep troops in Afghanistan beyond 2016 to train Afghan forces.
So
the Afghan government could still be defeated by the Taliban and
local warlords (which explains attempt to launch negotiations with
‘moderate’ Taliban groups). This would be a repeat of the US
experience in South Vietnam and in effect a defeat for NATO and the
UN. Would such an outcome, and the enormous cost of the operation,
damage NATO’s reputation and confidence so much that it would be
unable or unwilling to undertake other ‘out of area’ (i.e.
outside Europe) operations? Would this be the end of NATO’s
commitment to proactive crisis management around the world? Would it
mean a return to a much more traditional defensive role limited to
the European area? The NATO operation in Libya, which initially was
seen as a success, led to internal chaos, faction-fighting and the
growing presence of Islamic State and other radical groups in the
area. Again this may have reduced the willingness of NATO members to
take part in similar operations in the future.
4)
Finances
– Both the US and Europe have been hit hard by the recession and
financial crisis. There is reluctance on both sides of the Atlantic
to face the question of paying for NATO forces and operations. The
US contributes between one-fifth and one-quarter of NATO's budget
(22%)
and most of its forces, equipment and technology for actual
operations (in Afghanistan, for example) since
it accounts for a massive 72% of NATO members’ military spending
(while
representing only 41% of the NATO countries’ combined GDP), and the
US wants European members to pay more. For them this has not been a
good time to increase their contributions to NATO. Most of them have
made cuts to their military spending. This could damage NATO’s
operational effectiveness. Recent cuts in European military forces
may be so large as to compromise their ability to launch sustained
independent operations, or even to participate effectively in
large-scale combined operations. ‘Smart
defense’
is an attempt to combine cuts in spending with rationalization of
resources in order to remain fully effective. It is also difficult to
calculate what the blance should be between the US and Europe because
clearly US military spending also covers US operations and forces
outside NATO.
How
realistic is it to talk about a more democratic basis for decision-
making within the organization, with more of a say for European
members, if NATO is essentially an organization in which the US pays
for and does most of the work? # NATO used to be formed by large
armies based on military service. After the end of the Cold War there
was a move to much smaller professional armies based on career
volunteers and greater investment in high-tech equipment to give
these forces a decisive combat advantage. As was mentioned above, in
a period of austerity the key concept seems to be ‘smart
defense’,
* a more intelligent use of limited financial resources, more sharing
of equipment and back-up support and integration between NATO forces
(e.g. Britain and France signed a defense cooperation treaty in
November 2010 which involves plans to share military assets and
technologies). How realistic all this will be in maintaining NATO as
an effective force remains to be seen.
However, at the
Warsaw summit NATO'S European allies agreed a defence spending
increase worth more than £6 billion.Much of this will come from
Eastern European members worried about Russia.
5)
Is
NATO (a defensive military alliance with espionage capabilities)
really the right kind of organization to deal with threats like
cyber-attacks, terrorism, various kinds of illegal trafficking,
illegal immigration, piracy, nuclear proliferation and peace-keeping,
-building and -enforcement operations and environmental concerns?
Perhaps it is and NATO should gradually be re-organized and lose some
of its military character.
6)
Is
there a contradiction between a missile defense system and the
goal of nuclear arms reductions? After all, the missiles used to
eliminate incoming missiles (defense) are often weapons that could
also be rearmed and used as delivery systems (offense).
7)
The
operation in Libya holds several lessons and, as a case study, offers
an interesting comparison with the operation in Afghanistan, the
invasion of Iraq and the situation in Syria, both in terms of
similarities and differences. First, it was, like Afghanistan, an out
of area operation (but only slightly) and had a UN mandate. However,
the Russians claim it exceeded its mandate to protect civilian lives.
It was limited to air raids against specific targets, as requested by
the Arab League and Libyan fighters, and did not involve sending land
forces to Libya. The US played an active role only at the start but
provided logistics, supplies and support. Generally, it had support
from the local population on the ground, and it was successful and of
short duration. However, it also demonstrated that it is difficult to
build consensus to act within NATO even for an operation very close
to NATO’s borders (Germany was initially strongly opposed).
Secondly, the operation was expensive and complex (but obviously
nowhere near as long and costly as the operation in Afghanistan) and
only possible with the political, military, technological and
financial support of the US, despite the attempt to make it a
‘European’ operation. However, what was seen as the operation's
technical success led to the fall of the Gaddafi regime but, as in
Afghanistan, this did not produce a smooth transition to a
functioning democracy but the collapse of law and order. In the
absence of an international mission like the one in Afghanistan
Libya remains a country dominated by armed factions and so far unable
to produce a stable and effective central government with real
control over its territory. As a result it is a base for terrorism
and human-trafficking and is the point of departure for many refugees
trying to enter Europe via Italy. It is hard to see how the new but
fragile unity government will re-establish the rule of law. However
at its Warsaw summit NATO leaders agreed to provide support for the
European Union's military mission off the Libyan coast to crack down
on smugglers. NATO may provide vessels, surveillance aircraft and
radars to help uphold a U.N. arms embargo, although details are still
being worked out.
All of this should
make us think carefuly about what kind of operation NATO is able or
not able to carry out / is willing or unwilling to carry out / should
or should not carry out, and in what circumstances and under what
conditions it is likely to be successful.
8)
In contrast to the fairly rapid response to events in Libya in
2011, there was little desire among NATO members to intervene in
Syria when the civil war began except in terms of sanctions. NATO
began to deploy Patriot missiles to Turkey in 2013 to protect it from
any potential spread of the Syrian conflict.
The
US (since summer 2015) and its allies (notably France and the UK
after the terrorist attacks in Paris in Nov. 2015) have carried out
air raids against IS in coordination with other Middle East allies
but there are no plans for a NATO operation.
However,
there is neither the legal basis for a major NATO ground intervention
in Syria, nor much support for the idea among NATO members. There
have been air raids by the US, Russia Turkey (and France and the UK
after the terrorist attacks in Paris in Nov. 2015) but there is no
agreed and coordinated plan between these three as they have
different objectives. The US continues operations with its allies on
the ground to push Islamic State back. Russia launched its own air
strikes in September 2015 and called for US and NATO cooperation but
the US is still not willing to accept President Assad, Russia’s
ally, as a part of any long term solution to the Syrian crisis and
this limits the degree of possible cooperation. As the fighting goes
on there continue to be very large number of refugees arriving from
Syria at the EU’s borders as a result of the civil war and the
initial success of Islamic State forces. Meanwhile, although Islamic
State has been checked it has not yet been finally defeated.
9)
Events in Turkey, a key NATO ally, are also raising concern. The
attempted military coup in July 2016 and the Turkish government’s
hard-line response to it add to existing questions about the
treatment of the Kurdish minority and human rights in general. Turkey
is also a key partner for the EU in dealing with the migrant crisis.
So
commentators are now asking whether Turkey is still and will remain a
reliable NATO ally, and if not, what this may mean for the alliance's
strategy in the Middle East and Mediterranean.
10)
In
recent years the potential security threats to the EU have grown.
There has been increased instabilty in North Africa and the Middle
East with the collapse of decades-old regimes and areas of civil war
(Syria) or ineffective government and faction-fighting (Libya),
leading to mass migration towards Europe and the spread of terrorism
to Europe itself. Meanwhile Russia has begun to use its military
power to reassert its influence both in the Middle East and in
Eastern Europe. Its intervention first in Georgia and later in the
Ukraine have alarmed the EU and in particular the EU's Eastern
members.The decision of the UK to withdraw from the EU (Brexit) and,
even more, the election of Donald Trump as US President (one whose
statements have sometimes made him sound potentially isolationist, at
least in relation to Europe) have, in the last two years, galvanised
attempts to finally create an integrated European Defence structure
through the EU
Defence Agency
https://www.eda.europa.eu/.
This is not intended or expected to substitute NATO any time soon
(given the scale and strength of the US military and logistical
infrastructure) but to function alogside it. Europe needs to be able
to respond effectively and independently to threats in the event that
the US, for whatever reason, is unwilling or reluctant to assist, or
to carry out operations in areas that the US does not consider of
strategic importance but the EU deems to be vital. Things seem to be
moving fast and the
EU Permanent
Structured Cooperation on security and defence
(PESCO)
should become operational in the very near future. To put things in
perspective, however, one should remember that while the EU's Eastern
European members have welcomedl this process which reassures them of
support from their EU partners they have also welcomed as crucia the
deployment of NATO forces, including US and Canadian units, to their
countries. Similary, Italy which hosts both the US Sixth Fleet and a
growing number of US bases, would surely count at least on US naval,
air and logistical support in any major operation in the
Mediterranean.
(Gentiloni
15/09/2016) In
Italy’s vision, there are three main areas worth exploring in the
pursuit of a common European defense.
The
first concerns a comprehensive approach to regional crises. We should
work to create a more streamlined and integrated civilian-military
structure, in order to ensure a more effective response to complex
emergencies. The establishment of a permanent civilian-military
headquarters — as has also been suggested by France and Germany —
would represent an ambitious step forward in the EU’s capacity for
crisis management.
The
second area regards the development of defense capabilities. Europe
has to acquire the defense capabilities needed to be a prominent
player on the international scene. This will necessitate common EU
efforts to support the Continent’s defense industry and broaden its
industrial and technological base.
The
third area involves multinational forces: the establishment of a
division-level European Multinational Force, able to carry out a set
of pre-determined missions and operations. This initiative would
differ from the multinational forces already in place, such as the
battlegroups, in the size and composition of the military units. It
would also possess a unified strategic command, the endowment of
permanent forces and a common budget for operations.
These
three areas are not entirely new. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge
that in the past we have found it difficult to make significant
progress as 28 member states. Today, at a time when decisive external
action is required, we need to move forward rapidly.
Italy
proposes that a core group of EU countries accelerate their
integration in the area of defense, leaving others the option to join
at a later stage through an inclusive exercise. Rather than advancing
ready-made solutions, this would be the beginning of a political
process.
Many
of the technical aspects of European Defence integration are the same
as those facing NATO (financing, standardization of weapons and
equipment, integration of multilingual military forces) but the fact
that the EU has a large, existing civilian structure maybe a
considerable advantage.
Conclusion:
Despite point 4 NATO still accounts for more than 60% of global military spending: http://www.globalresearch.ca/1-6-trillion-military-mafia-nato-countries-account-for-70-of-world-military-budget/22155
http://www.scribd.com/doc/85583522/AFB-DefenceandSecurity
http://www.stripes.com/news/despite-cuts-nato-still-accounts-for-most-of-world-s-military-spending-1.269882
In 2013 the US spend 3.8% of its nominal GDP on the military, Russia 4.2 % and China 2.1%. but of course the US GDP is much bigger and there are all the other NATO members.http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS
During the early phase of the Cold War the Warsaw Pact’s conventional forces significantly outnumbered NATO forces. A comparison of NATO conventional resources today with those of the Russian Federation gives NATO a clear advantage because of huge, accumulated US assets (and the transfer of the Eastern European bloc countries to NATO), despite increased military spending by Russia in recent years and reductions in Europe by the US and the rest of NATO.
So NATO continues to be the world’s largest and most powerful alliance system, and remains committed to its core values and primary security goals. It is now playing a much wider, much more proactive role than during the Cold War, and intends to continue to do so while seeking new partners within the international community. Time will show whether NATO can be effective in this role and whether it will continue to have the material and financial resources, internal cohesion and international consensus that it will need in order to do so. Events in Ukraine are forcing NATO to re-examine its priorities. It may be compelled to return to its original purpose, the guaranteeing of its members’ sovereignty, freedom and security in a mainly European context. A counter-argument to explore: There are also many critics of NATO who feel that since the end of the Cold War NATO has taken on a more and more proactive role. They fear that even when acting with UN authorization, this too easily leads to an increasingly aggressive militaristic response to local and global problems. They argue that anti-terrorist or humanitarian intervention by military means is a high risk strategy in terms of both collateral damage (civilian deaths, displaced persons, refugees, physical destruction of housing and essential infrastructure, economic collapse and soaring operational costs) and final objectives (creating a functioning democratic state or simply bringing an end to the fighting). They would prefer to see NATO adopt a much more cautious and conservative stance, defensive in the traditional sense, while cooperating with the UN on normal peace-keeping operations and in humanitarian assistance.http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/20/new-thinking-needed-nato
http://peaceandhealthblog.com/2012/05/21/nato-world-security/
Some fairly recent sources:
Despite point 4 NATO still accounts for more than 60% of global military spending: http://www.globalresearch.ca/1-6-trillion-military-mafia-nato-countries-account-for-70-of-world-military-budget/22155
http://www.scribd.com/doc/85583522/AFB-DefenceandSecurity
http://www.stripes.com/news/despite-cuts-nato-still-accounts-for-most-of-world-s-military-spending-1.269882
In 2013 the US spend 3.8% of its nominal GDP on the military, Russia 4.2 % and China 2.1%. but of course the US GDP is much bigger and there are all the other NATO members.http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS
During the early phase of the Cold War the Warsaw Pact’s conventional forces significantly outnumbered NATO forces. A comparison of NATO conventional resources today with those of the Russian Federation gives NATO a clear advantage because of huge, accumulated US assets (and the transfer of the Eastern European bloc countries to NATO), despite increased military spending by Russia in recent years and reductions in Europe by the US and the rest of NATO.
So NATO continues to be the world’s largest and most powerful alliance system, and remains committed to its core values and primary security goals. It is now playing a much wider, much more proactive role than during the Cold War, and intends to continue to do so while seeking new partners within the international community. Time will show whether NATO can be effective in this role and whether it will continue to have the material and financial resources, internal cohesion and international consensus that it will need in order to do so. Events in Ukraine are forcing NATO to re-examine its priorities. It may be compelled to return to its original purpose, the guaranteeing of its members’ sovereignty, freedom and security in a mainly European context. A counter-argument to explore: There are also many critics of NATO who feel that since the end of the Cold War NATO has taken on a more and more proactive role. They fear that even when acting with UN authorization, this too easily leads to an increasingly aggressive militaristic response to local and global problems. They argue that anti-terrorist or humanitarian intervention by military means is a high risk strategy in terms of both collateral damage (civilian deaths, displaced persons, refugees, physical destruction of housing and essential infrastructure, economic collapse and soaring operational costs) and final objectives (creating a functioning democratic state or simply bringing an end to the fighting). They would prefer to see NATO adopt a much more cautious and conservative stance, defensive in the traditional sense, while cooperating with the UN on normal peace-keeping operations and in humanitarian assistance.http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/20/new-thinking-needed-nato
http://peaceandhealthblog.com/2012/05/21/nato-world-security/
Some fairly recent sources:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_75836.htm
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2012/88_2/88_2dorman.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Chicago_Summit
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2012/88_2/88_2dorman.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Chicago_Summit
Outcomes of NATO
Warsaw summit July 2016:
- Allies declared Initial Operational Capability of NATO's Ballistic Missile Defence to counter threats posed by Iran and further afield, North Korea, to the European continent
- Pledge to strengthen individual nations' and collective cyber defences, and recognise cyberspace as a new operational domain.
- NATO Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS surveillance planes to provide information and intelligence to the Global Coalition to counter ISIL from Turkish and international airspace.
- Agreed to an expanded maritime presence in the Mediterranean Sea to cope with the European migrant crisis and human trafficking.
- Continue the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan beyond 2016, confirmed funding commitments for Afghan forces until 2020.
- NATO-Ukraine Commission reviewed the security situation in Ukraine, endorsed government plans for reform, agreed a Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine.
- NATO Secretary General signed a Joint Declaration with the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission to take partnership between NATO and the European Union to a higher level. Declaration sets out areas where NATO and the EU will step up cooperation – including maritime security and countering hybrid threats posed by a more aggressive Russia
More
Background
In
‘NATO’s Next Act – How to Handle Russia and Other Threats’
(Foreign Affairs, July- August 2016)
Philip
M. Breedlove, former NATO Supreme Commander 2013-16, describes how
over the past 3 years NATO has begun shifting its forces from
operations outside Europe (e.g. Afghanistan) to the threats closer to
the heart of the continent – namely Russian aggression and the
challenges associated to the ongoing instability in the Middle East
and North Africa (international displacement of people and
transnational terrorism). Breedlove argues that the US and its NATO
allies need to increase, modernize and rationalize their available
resources in Europe given that the sanctions imposed on Russia after
its seizure of Crimea have not deterred Russia which is continuing
its Cold War- style provocations against NATO ships and planes and
territorial waters and air space and its militarization of the
Arctic. He suggests that a rapid military action by Russia against a
NATO ally (e.g. Poland or one of the Baltic states), presumably in
support of a Russian minority or ‘vital interest’, might meet
little effective resistance from NATO in the short term and the
situation could become a fait
accompli.
He
points out that US and NATO funding for Europe has been insufficient
to deal with this growing threat from Russia, due to US budget cuts,
the US prioritizing of other global threats, the US Asia-Pacific
rebalance, the recession and the economic difficulties faced by many
of America’s European NATO allies, their continuing commitments in
Kosovo and Afghanistan and their growing commitments in dealing with
the refugee crisis due to the Syrian civil war and instability in
Libya. While Poland and the Baltic states see Russia as a real
threat, other NATO allies, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey are more
concerned with the threats coming from the Middle east and North
Africa.
In
2014 in response to events in Ukraine, the US announced the European
Reassurance Initiative and NATO agreed the Readiness Action Plan.
These involve:
More
combined military exercises
The
rotational deployment of US forces in Poland and the Baltic states,
the Black Sea
A
greater NATO presence in the Mediterranean
A
very rapid response brigade (part of the NATO Response Force)
The
prepositioning of NATO military resources and equipment in advanced
positions to facilitate a rapid response to an aggression
Small
headquarters in 6 vulnerable central and eastern European NATO
members
2
new tactical headquarters in Poland and Romania
Breedlove
argues that NATO must continue the fight against Islamic State but
play a supporting role, concentrating on institution building and
education rather than intervention. He argues that the US and NATO
must also continue to work with Russia where possible and where
necessary, to deal with Iran, North Korea and the terrorist threat.
However, he is against the lifting of sanctions on Russia and takes a
hard-line position, claiming that Russia will only respect NATO if it
has the means to respond to any aggressive initiative undertaken by
Russia.
NATO
missile shield in Europe updates
to
July 2016
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8206.htm
https://www.rt.com/news/326398-nato-missile-defense-romania/
https://www.rt.com/news/246709-nato-missile-shield-iran/
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-shield-idUSKCN0Y30JX
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-13/poland-to-break-ground-on-missile-shield-site-as-russia-fumes
https://www.rt.com/news/350281-stoltenberg-nato-buildup-russia/
#
US
defense chief blasts Europe over NATO guardian.co.uk,
Friday 10 June 2011
Robert Gates blames a failure of political will and defense cuts as he warns that younger US politicians could abandon the alliance. He delivered a speech entitled ‘reflections on the status and future of the transatlantic alliance’, warning that NATO risks 'military irrelevance' unless spending is increased by members other than the US.
The US defense secretary, Robert Gates, has warned that a new post-cold war generation of leaders in America could abandon NATO and 60 years of security guarantees to Europe, exasperated by Europe's failures of political will and the gaps in defense funding needed to keep the alliance alive.
In a blistering attack on Europe - which he accused of complacency over international security - Gates predicted a NATO consigned to "military irrelevance" in a "dim if not dismal" future unless allies stepped up to the plate.
"If current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future US political leaders - those for whom the cold war was not the formative experience that it was for me - may not consider the return on America's investment in NATO worth the cost," Gates, a former CIA chief, warned.
Three weeks before standing down as Pentagon head and retiring from decades at the heart of the US security establishment, Gates used a 20-minute valedictory speech in Brussels to read the riot act to a stunned elite audience of European officers, diplomats, and officials.
NATO had degenerated into a "two-tiered" alliance of those willing to wage war and those only interested in "talking" and peacekeeping, he fumed in his bluntest warning to the Europeans in nearly five years as the Pentagon head.
Washington's waning commitment to European security could spell the death of the alliance, he said. The speech was laced with exasperation with and contempt for European defense spending cuts, inefficiencies, and botched planning.
The Libyan mission was a case in point, Gates said, pointing out that the Anglo-French-led campaign was running out of munitions just weeks into operations against an insubstantial foe. The US had again had to come to the rescue of the Europeans in a campaign on Europe's shores and deemed to be of vital interest to the Europeans, he complained.
"The mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country. Yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference."
In March, all 28 NATO members had voted for the Libya mission, he said. "Less than half have participated, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission … Many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can't. The military capabilities simply aren't there." The air campaign had been designed to mount 300 sorties daily but was struggling to deliver 150, Gates added.
Away from the specifics of the current operations in Libya and Afghanistan, Gates charged Europe's leaders with lacking the political will to sustain NATO, complained bitterly about unending defense budget cuts, but conceded that the reduction in spending was probably irreversible.
The US share of NATO military spending had soared to 75%, much more than during the cold war heyday when Washington maintained hundreds of thousands of US troops across Europe, he said. The US public would not stand for this much longer. Congress would rebel against spending "increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets", he said.
Noting he was 20 years older than Barack Obama, Gates said his peers' "emotional and historical attachment" to NATO was "ageing out". "In the past, I've worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance, between members who specialize in 'soft' humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the 'hard' combat missions ... This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable."
From: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/10/nato-dismal-future-pentagon-chief
*In fact, at its summit on the 20th and 21st May 2012 in Chicago NATO concentrated on these issues. Faced with cuts by member states in military spending it adopted a strategy of ‘smart or intelligent’ defense which meant better coordination of the human and technical resources of its members in order to share capabilities and reduce costs. NATO is also trying to prioritize its core tasks and responsibilities while remaining committed to its current security and peace-keeping operations. Members are also trying to reduce the gap in contributions between the US and its European allies. NATO’s withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan was scheduled for 2014 but members agreed to continue to provide training and support for local Afghan security forces beyond that date in order to guarantee the Afghan government’s survival and effectiveness. The Warsaw summit extended this deadline beyond 2016. http://www.rferl.org/content/Funding_Squeeze_Casts_A_Pall_Over_NATOs_Future/2067992.html
http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2011/06/20/natos-biggest-problems-in-the-future-will-be-internal-not-external/
http://www.voanews.com/content/financial-crisis-hits-nato-funding-133906423/148219.html
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-29/world/35437915_1_nato-allies-defense-budgets-european-members
http://www.cfr.org/nato/future-nato/p21044?gclid=CNSLjsiS8q0CFcVN3godkB_6tw
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO%E2%80%93Russia_relations
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/NATO_sees_little_progress_in_missile_talks_with_Russia_999.html
http://www.rferl.org/content/nato_no_russia_summit_without_missile_defense_deal/24464286.html
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/2012-security-predictions/gridlocked-world/EN/index.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_START
http://www.globalresearch.ca/1-6-trillion-military-mafia-nato-countries-account-for-70-of-world-military-budget/22155
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures
Robert Gates blames a failure of political will and defense cuts as he warns that younger US politicians could abandon the alliance. He delivered a speech entitled ‘reflections on the status and future of the transatlantic alliance’, warning that NATO risks 'military irrelevance' unless spending is increased by members other than the US.
The US defense secretary, Robert Gates, has warned that a new post-cold war generation of leaders in America could abandon NATO and 60 years of security guarantees to Europe, exasperated by Europe's failures of political will and the gaps in defense funding needed to keep the alliance alive.
In a blistering attack on Europe - which he accused of complacency over international security - Gates predicted a NATO consigned to "military irrelevance" in a "dim if not dismal" future unless allies stepped up to the plate.
"If current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future US political leaders - those for whom the cold war was not the formative experience that it was for me - may not consider the return on America's investment in NATO worth the cost," Gates, a former CIA chief, warned.
Three weeks before standing down as Pentagon head and retiring from decades at the heart of the US security establishment, Gates used a 20-minute valedictory speech in Brussels to read the riot act to a stunned elite audience of European officers, diplomats, and officials.
NATO had degenerated into a "two-tiered" alliance of those willing to wage war and those only interested in "talking" and peacekeeping, he fumed in his bluntest warning to the Europeans in nearly five years as the Pentagon head.
Washington's waning commitment to European security could spell the death of the alliance, he said. The speech was laced with exasperation with and contempt for European defense spending cuts, inefficiencies, and botched planning.
The Libyan mission was a case in point, Gates said, pointing out that the Anglo-French-led campaign was running out of munitions just weeks into operations against an insubstantial foe. The US had again had to come to the rescue of the Europeans in a campaign on Europe's shores and deemed to be of vital interest to the Europeans, he complained.
"The mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country. Yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference."
In March, all 28 NATO members had voted for the Libya mission, he said. "Less than half have participated, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission … Many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can't. The military capabilities simply aren't there." The air campaign had been designed to mount 300 sorties daily but was struggling to deliver 150, Gates added.
Away from the specifics of the current operations in Libya and Afghanistan, Gates charged Europe's leaders with lacking the political will to sustain NATO, complained bitterly about unending defense budget cuts, but conceded that the reduction in spending was probably irreversible.
The US share of NATO military spending had soared to 75%, much more than during the cold war heyday when Washington maintained hundreds of thousands of US troops across Europe, he said. The US public would not stand for this much longer. Congress would rebel against spending "increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets", he said.
Noting he was 20 years older than Barack Obama, Gates said his peers' "emotional and historical attachment" to NATO was "ageing out". "In the past, I've worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance, between members who specialize in 'soft' humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the 'hard' combat missions ... This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable."
From: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/10/nato-dismal-future-pentagon-chief
*In fact, at its summit on the 20th and 21st May 2012 in Chicago NATO concentrated on these issues. Faced with cuts by member states in military spending it adopted a strategy of ‘smart or intelligent’ defense which meant better coordination of the human and technical resources of its members in order to share capabilities and reduce costs. NATO is also trying to prioritize its core tasks and responsibilities while remaining committed to its current security and peace-keeping operations. Members are also trying to reduce the gap in contributions between the US and its European allies. NATO’s withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan was scheduled for 2014 but members agreed to continue to provide training and support for local Afghan security forces beyond that date in order to guarantee the Afghan government’s survival and effectiveness. The Warsaw summit extended this deadline beyond 2016. http://www.rferl.org/content/Funding_Squeeze_Casts_A_Pall_Over_NATOs_Future/2067992.html
http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2011/06/20/natos-biggest-problems-in-the-future-will-be-internal-not-external/
http://www.voanews.com/content/financial-crisis-hits-nato-funding-133906423/148219.html
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-29/world/35437915_1_nato-allies-defense-budgets-european-members
http://www.cfr.org/nato/future-nato/p21044?gclid=CNSLjsiS8q0CFcVN3godkB_6tw
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO%E2%80%93Russia_relations
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/NATO_sees_little_progress_in_missile_talks_with_Russia_999.html
http://www.rferl.org/content/nato_no_russia_summit_without_missile_defense_deal/24464286.html
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/2012-security-predictions/gridlocked-world/EN/index.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_START
http://www.globalresearch.ca/1-6-trillion-military-mafia-nato-countries-account-for-70-of-world-military-budget/22155
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures
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