US nominal GDP was $ Q4 2020
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP
The IMF forecasts U.S. growth for 2021 at 5.1% (after
a fall of 2.3% in 2020 and an increase of 4% in 2019) and for China at 8.1% (after
a rise of 2.3% in 2020 and in 6.1% 2019).
Historically,
the U.S. public debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP)
has increased during wars and recessions and subsequently declined. The ratio
of debt to GDP may decrease as a result of a government surplus or via growth
of GDP and inflation. For example, debt held by the public as a share of GDP
peaked just after World War II (113% of GDP in 1945) but then fell over the
following 35 years. In recent decades, aging demographics and rising healthcare
costs have led to concern about the long-term
sustainability of the federal government's fiscal policies.[3] The
aggregate, gross amount that Treasury can borrow is limited by the United States debt ceiling.
As of August 31, 2020,
federal debt held by the public was $20.83 trillion and intragovernmental holdings were $5.88 trillion, for a total national debt of
$26.70 trillion. At the end of 2020, debt held by the public was
approximately 99.3% of GDP, and approximately 37% of the debt held by the
public was owned by foreigners. The United States has the largest external debt in the world. As of June 2020, the total of U.S. Treasury securities held by foreign
countries was $7.04 trillion, up from $6.63 trillion in June 2019. In
2017, the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio was ranked 43rd highest out of 207 countries. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecast in April 2018 that debt held by the public will rise
to nearly 100% of GDP by 2028, perhaps higher if current policies are extended
beyond their scheduled expiration date.[12]
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the federal government spent trillions in virus aid and economic relief. The CBO
estimated that the budget deficit for fiscal year 2020 would increase to
$3.3 trillion or 16% GDP, more than triple that of 2019 and the largest
as % GDP since 1945.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States
$17.26
trillion and intragovernmental holdings were$5.9 trillion, for a total or US
"National Debt"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_United_States
Gross
Federal Debt to GDP ratio was 127.27%
in the third quarter of 2020 (as of December) an increase of more than 20%
compared with 2019 and more than the 113% of GDP
in 1945.
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEGDQ188S
https://www.thebalance.com/debt-to-gdp-ratio-how-to-calculate-and-use-it-3305832
In
the longer-term, the United States Gross Federal Debt to GDP is projected to
trend to over 134% in 2022.
So given its huge and growing public debt, some
commentators argue that the US has now begun an inevitable decline as the
dominant superpower, a decline that may soon erode not only its economic
position but also impact its military dominance. However, according to other
experts the relative decline of US power is at least partially exaggerated and
can better be seen as an opportunity for Washington to redefine its strategic
commitments, renegotiate alliances with its partners and free up resources to
relaunch its economy.
The Covid-19 pandemic obviously makes
all forecasts dubious, so the optimistic predictions for the global economy in
2021 will depend greatly on the effectiveness and rapid distribution of
vaccines. Clearly, however, China has weathered the storm in economic terms
more successfully so far than its competitors. It is now expected to overtake
the US as the world’s largest economy in nominal terms in 2028, 5 years earlier
than previously forecast.
https://www.reuters.com/article/global-economy-poll-int-idUSKBN29W04C
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55454146
In GDP PPP
terms the Chinese economy is already bigger than the US economy $24.16 trillion
against $20.86 in 2020)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)
The outlook
for the US credit rating (AAA) varies from negative to stable.
The debate
between pessimists and more sanguine observers has grown. The former predict a
serious and rapid decline in US influence and the growth of a much more
multipolar world strongly influenced by China, while the latter are confident
that for the foreseeable future the US will be able to maintain its leadership
role in international relations. Moreover, they argue that if we consider the
West as a whole, rather than the US alone, then, despite Europe’s continuing
economic difficulties, China cannot really hope to achieve dominance in terms
of economic and military power. In addition, the world’s principal global
institutions are all expressions of the West’s value system and China seems
basically to be in the process of joining this system, adapting to it and
trying to gain more influence within it, rather than wanting to overturn it or
see it collapse as the Soviet Union did.
In spite of the economic crisis
in 2008 and the alarming economic challenge of the current pandemic, forecasts
of definitive decline seem premature and the US remains the principal power at
the center of the international stage.
As for military power, the US military budget still represented 38% of total
global military spending, $732 billion in 2019 (before the pandemic). Global
spending was $1.917 trillion. The US still spent more than China, India,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, the UK., Japan, South Korea and Brazil combined in 2019. Moreover, NATO, the
US-led 29-member alliance, accounted for more than
$1035 billion in 2019,
billion (54%) of global military spending in 2019 (down from 60% in
2013). However, if the military spending of other US allies (e.g. Japan,
Australia, South Korea etc.) is added, this figure rises and suggests that the
US remains, at least potentially, the dominant power in international
relations. The US has major military bases in 38 countries (800 including
smaller ones in 70 countries) around the world compared with: Russia in 9,
France in 11, Britain in 16, India in 9 and China in 3.
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/fs_2020_04_milex_0_0.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_overseas_military_bases
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_overseas_military_bases#United_States
https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2018/05/02/us-remains-top-military-spender-sipri-reports/
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-worldwide-network-of-us-military-bases/5564
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/06/us-military-bases-around-the-world-119321/
So the 2019
figures show the US military budget still over 2.5 times bigger than that of
China.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures
Finally, the
US was still the world leader for investment in research in 2019 (although
China is not far behind), and in the list of the top 20 universities worldwide,
between 10 and 14 are American, according to which list you choose to believe. Many
others are European and only one or two Asian.
https://chinapower.csis.org/china-research-and-development-rnd/
http://uis.unesco.org/apps/visualisations/research-and-development-spending/
https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2020
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2020/world-ranking#!/page/0/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats
However, over the last decade, the US share of global GDP (PPP) fell to 15.1 %
(2019), while China´s share of global GDP PPP increased to 19.2% (however the
EU also accounted for 16.0% of global GDP PPP). In nominal terms the US remains
ahead but at this pace of growth China may overtake US nominal GDP by as early
as this year (2028). So, although US strength is evident, its relative decline
is real.
In fact, 2021,
the country´s reliance on imports, combined with its growing debt and its huge military
expenditure since 9⁄11 as it has expanded its military and counter-terrorism
operations around the world, inflated its annual budget deficit which stood at
8.6% of GDP for the 2011 fiscal year. After significant spending cuts it returned
to its historical average relative to the size of the economy (around 3% of
GDP) registering 2.4% in 2015. After that the annual budget deficit began to
rise again, 3.1% in 2016,3.4% in 2017, 3.8% in 2018 and 4.6% in 2019 and
17.9% with the pandemic in 2020 (twice that during the recession in 2009).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)
https://www.statista.com/statistics/270267/united-states-share-of-global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/
https://www.statista.com/statistics/270439/chinas-share-of-global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/
https://www.thebalance.com/us-deficit-by-year-3306306
On the other hand, GDP PPP per capita (both nominal and PPP) clearly
indicates that American citizens are still far richer than their Chinese
counterparts (5 times (nominal) and 3.5 (PPP) times richer).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)_per_capita
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita
Per capita
income is usually a good indicator of how much money governments can generate
in taxes for government projects at home and abroad.
Moreover,
the Chinese authorities may face some obstacles as they try to steer their
economy away from a model where growth is based on exports to one where
domestic consumption plays a much greater role. These problems include growing
debt within the Chinese economic system, potential domestic unrest, continuing
high levels of savings and fast-growing but relatively low domestic
consumption, an aging population (which will become a significant factor in the
next 20 years), a still relatively weak health care system and widespread corruption.
As China moves to respond to these challenges its labor costs are likely to
begin to rise.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-debt-idUSKCN1UD0KD
The
reputation of the Chinese model and its soft power has also been damaged by
growing domestic repression
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/china-and-tibet
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/02/09/can-china-turn-the-tides-and-mend-its-reputation/
https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/china-is-making-support-for-democracy-a-crime-in-hong-kong/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xinjiang_internment_camps
https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/the-underlying-politics-of-poverty-alleviation-in-tibet/
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/global
Are
we facing the start of a new Cold War?
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53104730
China
holds very large foreign exchange reserves, particularly in dollars. In November
2020, China held about $1.063 trillion, and Japan slightly more, $1.260
trillion, each less than 5% of the total US national debt of $26.700 trillion.
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets-economy/090616/5-countries-own-most-us-debt.asp
The US has
long accused China of currency manipulation, keeping the Yuan/Renminbi at a low exchange rate value in order to
boost exports, but it has now reached its strongest level in 2 years.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/business/china-renminbi-yuan-strong.html
Meanwhile,
China is the principal stake-holder in the BRICS’ New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). China is also the main trading
partner for Africa and an important investor in Africa (but behind the EU and
US), Trade with Africa fell dramatically in the first quarter of 2020 but is
expected to rebound in line with the renewed growth of China’s economy.
https://www.theafricareport.com/57044/china-africa-top-10-issues-going-into-2021/
And with its Belt and Road Initiative China is set to become a major investor and source of investment capital for
many developing countries, which will increase both its economic and political
leverage with these countries.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative
The
section that follows describes he situation before the trade war and pandemic
and will need to be revised when the global economy stabilizes:
The pace of
domestic consumption accelerated until the trade war and Covid-19 pandemic as
China shifts to an economic model involving more domestic demand
http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201809/20/WS5ba30475a310c4cc775e7413.html
but it moderated
with the effects of the trade war
High levels
of personal savings are thought to represent one of the most striking
characteristics of the Chinese economy but this may not be accurate.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-08/chinese-savers-won-t-save-the-chinese-economy
While
consumer spending still only amounted to 39.1% of GDP in Dec 2017, compared
with more than 68% in the US (June 2018) and 57.8% in India (June 2018)
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/china/private-consumption--of-nominal-gdp
investments
stood at a level estimated at about 43.45% of GDP (IMF for 2018). The US stood
at 20.59%.
https://www.quandl.com/data/ODA/CHN_NID_NGDP-China-Total-Investment-of-GDP
https://www.quandl.com/data/ODA/USA_NID_NGDP-United-States-Total-Investment-of-GDP
Along with
massive investments in industrial infrastructure (a good indicator of future
competitivity) there has also been a continual rise in property prices in
urban, industrial areas with significant social consequences. Moreover, the
Chinese government is now having to to try to cope with the rising demand for
social services by shifting resources from other kinds of investments to
welfare.
China is rapidly increasing
investment in technology, particularly in IT, and education. US companies
operating in China have registered very high productivity levels while
benefiting so far from much lower labor costs. However, there are now signs
that as labor flows from rural areas begin to slow and demand for skilled
workers rises, labor costs in China are now beginning to rise though they
obviously remain below levels in the US and Europe.
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/27/chinese-wages-rise-made-in-china-isnt-so-cheap-anymore.html
And if the US
chooses not to lead?
This is a
more difficult question to respond to, especially given the role of
isolationism in US history.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_non-interventionism#Between_the_World_Wars
The US seemed
to have partially retreated from world affairs under President Trump. President Trump's foreign policy stance sounded
isolationist at times (the Paris climate agreement, the Mexican border,
comments about NATO partners, withdrawal from the Iran deal, the ban on Muslim
visitors to the US from some Islamic countries, US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, the“TPP”, the reintroduction
of tariffs on a wide range of goods, plans to withdraw more troops from Syria
and Afghanistan), but hard line at others (position on China, supporting
Israel, against terrorism, against Iran, against Maduro in Venezuela,
withdrawal from the Intermediate
Nuclear Forces Treaty). Certainly, Trump’s foreign policy was more
unilateral, much more based on narrowly perceived national interests and
involved much less consultation with US allies. In contrast, President Biden
wants the US to return to cooperation and consultation and its traditional
role, but to just what extent is not clear yet since it faces the constraints
of the domestic pandemic crisis and an expanding national debt.
https://www.cato.org/commentary/biden-foreign-policy-restraint-circumstance-not-design
A re-evaluation
and reduction in US strategic commitments in some areas in order to exercise
more influence in others seems likely. After the fall of the Berlin wall and
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the European continent lost relevance in the
eyes of America as the threat level was reduced. However, recent events in
Ukraine and growing tension with Russia have forced a review of this policy and
the launching of NATO's Enhanced
Forward Presence mission.
The US
formally withdrew its last 'combat troops' from Iraq in December 2011 and from
Afghanistan in December 2014. It reduced its presence in both countries to
2,500 at the end of 2020.
The Biden
administration has begun the withdrawal of the remainder of the troops from Afghanistan,
a process which is scheduled to be completed by 11 September 2021.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-56955702
The future of Obama's pivot to Asia is unclear but
there has been a build-up of US naval forces in the
Western Pacific in response to earlier North Korean threats and perceived
Chinese 'expansionism' and Trump talked of a 'free and open Indo-Pacific '
region with the US not seeking domination but rather a partnership with strong,
independent nations willing to play by the rules, see the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act. Will President Biden pursue a
new pivot to Asia?
https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/trumps-post-pivot-strategy/
https://www.csis.org/analysis/asia-reassurance-initiative-act-reassuring-australia
https://www.dw.com/en/can-president-joe-biden-return-the-us-pivot-to-asia/a-56337037
China is
aware of the policy being adopted by the US and clearly sees it as an attempt
to undermine its growing influence in the region. Tensions over developments
regarding Taiwan are also indicative of the frictions which are perhaps
inevitable as a rapidly growing regional power challenges a global power whose
resources, while vast, are now limited. If China continues to grow at current
rates but fails to democratize and develop towards the Western model then a
strengthening of security ties between China’s neighbors, many of which are
democratic states is a likely response to safeguard independence and shared
values.
More importantly, the combined economic
resources (in terms of GDP) and military resources of the West (NATO in its
narrowest sense, perhaps the OECD in its widest sense) as a whole is and will
remain far beyond the capacity of China to challenge. US military spending
alone is two and a half times that of China (2020). Certainly, China’s power
and influence is going to grow both regionally and globally, perhaps in
partnership with Russia at the UN and through the BRICS group. However, there may
be an alternative scenario to confrontation. China is a major stakeholder in
the current international order, as a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, an important WTO and IMF member, and, above all, as a state holding
vast foreign currency reserves (e.g. US Treasury bonds) estimated at around 1.063
trillion dollars, and one which also has growing overseas investments
(estimated to have reached $1.23 trillion by 2019).
https://chinapower.csis.org/china-foreign-direct-investment/
So even though China may continue to stand on
its sovereignty and use nationalist rhetoric that defies international comment
(on issues such as human rights in China, its lack of democracy and the
situation in Tibet) as interference in its domestic affairs, it is probable
that its stake in the existing global order will continue to grow and that,
although it may try at times to make the liberal order rather less liberal, it
will, nevertheless, have good reason to adopt a policy of accommodation and
cooperation rather than one of confrontation.
In the end perhaps it is the definition of what we mean by the ‘West’ that is
of paramount importance in today’s world. Once that meant Europe and North
America, plus countries like Australia and New Zealand. It would be difficult
today not to include Japan. And then there is the OECD. More importantly, it is
the core liberal democratic values enshrined in the main global institutions
from the UN down which best define the West. These are values which many
countries (Brazil, India, but many more in Latin America and Africa and
Southern Asia) and not only the richer, developed ones but developing ones too,
have invested in, or are investing in, and which increasingly represent the
normative political expectations (how things should be) for ordinary people all
over the world. The wave of democratization in the 1990s and at least part of
the political hopes expressed in the early days of the Arab Spring suggest that
the West in this sense is very much alive and flourishing, with or without US
leadership. And a ‘West’ which is global and multipolar, rather than simply a
US-led NATO, may be a very positive evolution. Strangely, al-Qaeda and Islamic
State, in describing the UN and other international agencies as agents of
Western cultural imperialism may simply be acknowledging the extent to which
once-Western values are now becoming universal.
Those who doubt the attraction of the West’s cultural model should perhaps pay
more attention to the vast number of migrants and refugees for most of whom the
West remains the preferred destination in terms of their hopes for prosperity,
security and freedom.
Note – the West in modern English is not normally used as a synonym for
European colonialism (I think this is mainly because European colonialism –
often based on slavery and doctrines of racial superiority – is now seen as
something clearly in contrast with many basic, modern Western values). It is
mainly used in international relations to refer to those countries evolving
towards liberal democracy and a free (today usually mixed) market economy, from
the late 18th century, through the 19th century and up to
1945. Since the end of the Second World War, it has been used to describe first
NATO and other allies outside NATO (like Australia) and then gradually to
include all those countries which generally embrace Western values.
Longer term
background material
On January 26, 2016, the debt held by the public was
$13.62 trillion or about 75% of the previous 12 months of GDP. Intragovernmental holdings
stood at $5.34 trillion, giving a combined total gross national debt of $18.96
trillion or about 104% of the previous 12 months of GDP. $6.2
trillion or approximately 47% of the debt held by the public was owned by
foreign investors, the largest of which were the People's Republic of China
and Japan at about $1.3 trillion each for the two
countries as of November 2015 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/current
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/government-debt-to-gdp
Washington’s fiscal position is even more alarming if viewed as an ongoing
trend. Over the last few years, the US public debt as a percentage of GDP rose
rapidly, from 56.4% in 2001 to 100.8% in 2012, 100.9% in 2013 and 103.2% in
2014. As indicated before, it stood at 103.8%
in the third quarter of 2017.
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GFDEGDQ188S
For China’s spending on household consumption see:
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/household-final-consumption-expenditure-etc-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PETC.ZS
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/consumer-spending
For an alternative estimate of global military spending and by country
see: http://www.janes.com/article/76463/global-defence-spending-to-hit-post-cold-war-high-in-2018-jane-s-by-ihs-markit-says
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151216006109/en/Growing-Security-Fears-Boost-Defence-Budgets-IHS
https://www.nationalpriorities.org/campaigns/military-spending-united-states/
https://www.nationalpriorities.org/campaigns/us-military-spending-vs-world/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_budget_of_China
http://journal-neo.org/2015/09/16/the-us-and-china-s-military-budget/
US economy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_United_States
How is the relationship between China and the West developing?
A few
aspects of China’s changing role in international relations
Signs of a trend towards stronger cooperation
That China
is starting to get more involved in international relations is demonstrated by
various diplomatic initiatives launched by the Chinese government in the
economic field. First of all, China joined the project aimed at establishing a
free trade zone with various Asian-Pacific countries, namely the Free Trade
Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). The goal is to increase its exports in the
Asia-Pacific area in order to boost its economic growth and forecasts suggest
that this initiative could lead to an increase in China’s GDP of one percentage
point. This initiative was seen by some as an attempt to counter the
Trans-Pacific Partnership initiative, backed by the US and Japan and signed on
4th Feb 2016 (from which the Trump administration has now
withdrawn), but China publicly backed the Trans-Pacific Partnership showing
itself to be a promoter of free trade agreements. Simultaneously, China is
carrying out a diplomatic initiative in Central Asia with the goal of
reestablishing the old “Silk Road”.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Belt_One_Road_Initiative
This
initiative has led to wider cooperation with many countries, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and
Kyrgyzstan, aimed at
creating a safe-area for international trade and at ensuring gas and oil
supplies to China, which are extremely important to China’s industrial
production. This initiative has also led to competition between China and the
EU for influence in the region and for gas and oil supplies. However, this
competition may actually lead to cooperation between China and the EU in Central
Asia, in terms of building new pipelines, which could have both Europe and
China as final delivery points.
As China has become more involved in the international community from an
economic point of view, political cooperation has followed. In recent years, Chinese military personnel have taken part
in UN missions in Cambodia, the Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sudan and
Lebanon. In 2015, a combat deployment was sent to South Sudan, where China has
significant oil investments. In addition, China’s navy is actively
participating in the anti-piracy mission of the UN in the Gulf of Aden.
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-gosset/china-us-relations_b_1998484.html
https://chinapower.csis.org/china-un-mission/
Basically, the expansion of
China’s economic interests around the world has led to growing political
awareness among the Chinese leadership of the need to protect those interests
and engage on international issues, especially those closely related to
international security. This has resulted in China playing a more active role
within the international community. This trend culminated with the agreement
signed with Djibouti concerning the creation of China’s first real military
base abroad in order to secure trade between China and Africa. China’s concerns
about international security, aggravated by the participation of Uyghurs in the
campaign waged by the self-proclaimed Islamic State, could be an opportunity
for Western countries to persuade China to take on an increasingly active role
in sharing some of the international community’s responsibilities, especially
in the security domain. However, in the Middle East region, China has taken a
carefully balanced position in the dispute between Sunni and Shia Muslims and
between their main sponsors, namely Saudi Arabia and Iran. In fact, the recent
publication of China’s Arab Policy Paper shows that the China wants to adopt a
global approach to the Islamic world without taking sides. Such a policy will
make it possible for China to deal with both Saudi Arabia and Iran to obtain
from both parties an agreement on oil supplies agreement, which is fundamental
for China’s economic growth. It also explains China’s willingness to act as a
mediator between the US and Iran (which resulted in the 5+1 Nuclear Agreement
with Iran and in the lifting of economic sanctions) and in the Syrian civil war.
https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asia-Pacific_Economic_Cooperation
http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/political-science/17-408-chinese-foreign-policy-fall-
http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/chinas-stake-in-the-saudi-arabia-iran-clash/
http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/what-did-china-bring-to-the-iran-talks/
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-01/07/content_22985419.htm
Potential areas of disagreement
between China and the West
As mentioned
above China’s neighbors are worried about its expansionist ambitions in the
East Asian area e.g. the dispute over the Senkaku Islands, located in the South
China Sea and claimed by both China and Japan.
China is the
world’s biggest polluter in terms of CO2 emissions. And the US its second
biggest. Although China took part in a series of international conferences and
welcomed the agreement at the Climate Conference, CoP21 in Paris in December
2015, many countries remain doubtful about China’s commitment to making real
changes, given that the agreement is not binding in any practical way.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-contradictions-climate-leadership
China’s
domestic human rights record, including the use of the death penalty and
repression of political and religious opposition leaders, critics and
dissidents and discrimination against minorities (e.g. Tibetans and Uyghurs).
https://qz.com/993601/china-uyghur-terrorism/
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/12/chinas-dangerous-ethnic-policies-in-xinjiang/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senkaku_Islands_dispute
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345
http://fortune.com/2016/01/19/taiwan-tsai-ing-wen-china/
http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/china-and-climate-change-three-things-to-watch-after-paris/
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/china
Global Defense Spending and by country
https://www.globalfirepower.com/defense-spending-budget.asp
https://www.statista.com/chart/9100/the-top-15-countries-for-military-expenditure-in-2016/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures
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