'Total vessel transits in the Red Sea fell 56% year-on-year as of September, according to data from the ship tracking and maritime analytics provider MarineTraffic.

Container traffic took the biggest hit with a decline of 73% over the same period, while the vessel traffic for liquefied natural gas (LNG) fell 87%, dry breakbulk 54%, and mixed dry cargo 37%.

Meanwhile, vessel traffic of liquefied petrol gas (LPG) dropped 74%, roll-on/roll-off vessels 78%, and wet bulk cargo 41%.'

from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/red-sea-trade-sees-historic-decline-amid-rising-tensions-in-middle-east/3354345

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pPt_8tn8aw

https://www.google.com/search?q=Italy+and+the+red+sea&oq=Italy+and+the+red+sea&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUyBggAEEUYOTIICAEQABgWGB4yCAgCEAAYFhgeMggIAxAAGBYYHjIICAQQABgWGB4yCggFEAAYgAQYogQyCggGEAAYgAQYogQyCggHEAAYgAQYogTSAQg3OTI0ajBqN6gCCLACAQ&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#fpstate=ive&vld=cid:e248a30a,vid:oBYKPjaGXTw,st:0

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136233.htm

lunedì 4 novembre 2024

President Meloni’s address to the 79th United Nations General Assembly

For the content but also for translation practice.

https://www.governo.it/it/articolo/intervento-del-presidente-meloni-alla-79-assemblea-generale-delle-nazioni-unite/26654

https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-address-79th-united-nations-general-assembly/26659

domenica 3 novembre 2024

Is the leadership of the US and the West within the international community coming to an end? Can China take over that role?

A comparison of the G7 and the BRICS+ economies (see also the notes on the BRICS on the blog about the BRICS+ in terms of its aims and unity)

https://www.visualcapitalist.com/charted-comparing-the-gdp-of-brics-and-the-g7-countries/

but in GDP PPP terms

https://www.theglobalist.com/brics-brics-g7-economy-population-just-the-facts/#:~:text=The%20BRICS%20countries%20account%20for,the%20G7%20only%20represents%2030%25.&text=BRICS%20member%20states%20are%20responsible,21%25%20produced%20by%20the%20G7

https://www.statista.com/statistics/1412425/gdp-ppp-share-world-gdp-g7-brics/

https://www.visualcapitalist.com/economic-growth-forecasts-for-g7-and-brics-countries-in-2024/

https://www.statista.com/statistics/254281/gdp-of-the-bric-countries/

https://www.statista.com/statistics/1412425/gdp-ppp-share-world-gdp-g7-brics/

https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/an-expanding-brics-seeks-to-reform-not-replace-the-global-order/

https://www.bcg.com/publications/2024/brics-enlargement-and-shifting-world-order

A comparison of the US and Chinese economies

Nominal GDP 2024

The US nominal GDP forecast by the IMF is $28.78 trillion

China’s nominal GDP forecast by the IMF is $18.53 trillion

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)

GDP PPP (based on purchasing power parity) 2024

The US GDP PPP forecast by the IMF is $27.97 trillion

China’s GDP PPP forecast by the IMF is $ 35.04 trillion

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)

The IMF estimates US GDP growth for 2024 at 2.7%, and for China at 4.6%

https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/WEOWORLD/CAN/CHN/USA

https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/WEOWORLD/CAN/USA/CHN

Historically, the U.S. public debt as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) has increased during wars and recessions and subsequently declined. The ratio of debt to GDP may decrease as a result of a government surplus or via growth of GDP and inflation. For example, debt held by the public as a share of GDP peaked just after World War II (113% of GDP in 1945) but then fell over the following 35 years. In recent decades, aging demographics and rising healthcare costs have led to concern about the long-term sustainability of the federal government's fiscal policies. The aggregate, gross amount that Treasury can borrow is limited by the United States debt ceiling but this was raised in December 2021 to meet the costs of the Covid-19 pandemic.

In March 2024, the public debt of the United States was around $34.59 trillion

https://www.statista.com/statistics/273294/public-debt-of-the-united-states-by-month/

This is an estimated at 126.86% of forecast GDP in 2024

https://www.statista.com/statistics/269960/national-debt-in-the-us-in-relation-to-gross-domestic-product-gdp/

Who holds the US public debt? Most of the debt is held by the US public and US federal agencies (see charts).

https://usafacts.org/articles/which-countries-own-the-most-us-debt/

https://www.thebalance.com/who-owns-the-u-s-national-debt-3306124#:~:text=federal%20government%20operations.-,Public%20Debt,and%20holders%20of%20savings%20bonds.

Foreign holders of United States treasury debt – according to the Federal Reserve and U.S. Department of the Treasury, foreign countries held a total of 7.4 trillion U.S. dollars (24%) in U.S. treasury securities as of January 2023. Of the total 7.4 trillion held by foreign countries, Japan held 1.1 trillion (3.6%) and China held 0.89 trillion (2.9%).

https://www.statista.com/statistics/246420/major-foreign-holders-of-us-treasury-debt/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_United_States

January 2024 figures (very similar)

https://www.statista.com/statistics/246420/major-foreign-holders-of-us-treasury-debt/

Finally, the US was still the world leader for investment in research and development in 2022 (although China is not far behind) and in AI research and technology in 2024

https://www.statista.com/statistics/732247/worldwide-research-and-development-gross-expenditure-top-countries/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20is%20the,parity%20(PPP)%20U.S.%20dollars.

https://www.techopedia.com/top-10-countries-leading-in-ai-research-technology

and in the list of the top universities worldwide, 12 out of 15 are American according to one list and 10 out of 20 according to another. Others are European, Australian, one in Singapore and only one is Chinese.

https://www.topuniversities.com/student-info/choosing-university/worlds-top-100-universities

https://worldtop20.org/global-universities/?gad_source=1&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIt6nV1ID3hQMV0ZCDBx3GAAeLEAAYASAAEgIYu_D_BwE
However, over the last decade, the US share of global GDP (PPP) fell to 15.2 % (2024) (25.3% in nominal GDP terms)

https://www.statista.com/statistics/270267/united-states-share-of-global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/#:~:text=United%20States%20share%20of%20global%20gross%20domestic%20product%20(GDP)%202028&text=In%202022%2C%20the%20United%20States,purchasing%20power%20parity%20(PPP).

while China´s share of global GDP PPP increased to 19% (while the EU accounted for 13.3% of global GDP PPP). As already mentioned, in nominal terms the US remains ahead, but at this pace of growth China is likely to overtake US nominal GDP in the 2030. So, although US strength is evident, its relative decline is real.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)

China has set itself a GDP growth target of 5% for 2024

https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202403/06/content_WS65e7d31fc6d0868f4e8e4bdd.html

On the other hand, GDP per capita (both nominal and PPP) clearly indicates that in 2022 American citizens were still far richer than their Chinese counterparts (5 times (nominal) and 3.4 (PPP) times richer).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)_per_capita

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita

Per capita income is usually a good indicator of how much money governments can generate in taxes for government projects at home and abroad.

Moreover, the Chinese authorities may face some obstacles as they try to steer their economy away from a model where growth is based on exports to one where domestic consumption plays a much greater role. These problems include growing debt within the Chinese economic system, potential domestic unrest, continuing high levels of savings and fast-growing but relatively low domestic consumption, an aging population (which will become a significant factor in the next 20 years), an ongoing struggle to improve the health care system, the fight against widespread corruption, and the current housing market downturn.

https://www.theglobaltreasurer.com/2024/04/29/understanding-chinas-real-estate-crisis/

https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/chinas-war-corruption-turns-into-high-wire-act-2024-01-18/

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10292030/

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-68595450

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-ageing-population-threatens-switch-new-economic-growth-model-2024-01-18/

https://time.com/6555949/china-silver-economy-aging-population-plan/

As China moves to respond to these challenges its labor costs are likely to begin to rise and this may make China less attractive to foreign investors

https://ins-globalconsulting.com/news-post/labor-cost-china/

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268121000329#:~:text=Labor%20costs%20in%20China%20have,as%20the%20%E2%80%9CWorld's%20Factory%E2%80%9D.

https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-023-02180-1

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268121000329

According to the World Bank, more than a third of the debt of poor counties is owed to China

https://www.devex.com/news/china-is-owed-37-of-poor-countries-debt-payments-in-2022-world-bank-102463#:~:text=Economic%20development-,China%20is%20owed%2037%25%20of%20poor%20countries'%20debt%20payments%20in,supposed%20to%20pay%20this%20year.

https://edition.cnn.com/2023/11/07/business/china-bri-developing-countries-overdue-debt-intl-hnk/index.html

Here are the top ten counties in debt to China:

https://www.visualcapitalist.com/ranked-the-top-20-countries-in-debt-to-china/

The reputation of the Chinese model and its soft power has also been damaged by growing domestic repression

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/2/china-trying-to-develop-world-built-on-censorship-and-surveillance

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/china

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china/report-china/

https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/11/china-no-letup-xi-jinpings-repressive-rule

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/11/01/china-tibet-identity-cultural-genocide/

https://www.cfr.org/report/chinas-collapsing-global-image

https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/china-is-making-support-for-democracy-a-crime-in-hong-kong/

https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/carrie-lams-departure-signals-a-further-crackdown-in-hong-kong/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xinjiang_internment_camps

https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/the-underlying-politics-of-poverty-alleviation-in-tibet/

https://www.economist.com/china/2024/02/15/how-china-stifles-dissent-without-a-kgb-or-stasi-of-its-own

The EU is now following a de-risking and de-coupling strategy

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2024/754446/EXPO_STU(2024)754446_EN.pdf

https://apcoworldwide.com/blog/the-new-world-of-europe-china-trade-relations/

Are we facing the start of a new Cold War as Russia and China work more closely together?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Cold_War

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2024/01/04/world/2024-shape-of-power/

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53104730

China holds very large foreign exchange reserves

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_foreign-exchange_reserves

https://tradingeconomics.com/china/foreign-exchange-reserves

However, as stated above, of the total 7.4 trillion dollar US debt held by foreign countries, Japan held 1.1 trillion (3.6%) and China held 0.89 trillion (2.9%).

https://www.statista.com/statistics/246420/major-foreign-holders-of-us-treasury-debt/

The US long accused China of currency manipulation, keeping the Yuan/Renminbi at a low exchange rate value in order to boost exports, but it has risen and nw seems relatively in value and the U.S. Department of the Treasury does not list China as a currency manipulator in 2024.

https://www.msci.org/u-s-treasury-department-once-again-refuses-to-cite-china-for-currency-manipulation/#:~:text=The%20report%20concluded%20%E2%80%9Cno%20major,four%20quarters%20through%20June%202023.%E2%80%9D

https://news.cgtn.com/news/2023-12-04/Why-the-Chinese-yuan-is-likely-to-strengthen-in-the-coming-years-1pgerxlsHSM/index.html#:~:text=In%202022%2C%20it%20rose%20by,significant%20amount%20of%2012.25%20percent.

The Yuan/Renminbi is now increasingly popular for global payments

https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Currencies/China-s-yuan-rises-to-4th-most-used-currency-in-global-settlements

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-20/yuan-s-popularity-for-global-payments-hits-highest-in-six-years

The difficult US-China trade relationship

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship

Meanwhile, China is the principal stake-holder in the BRICS’ New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). China is also a main key trading partner for Africa and an important investor (with the EU and to a lesser extent, the US). Trade with Africa fell dramatically in the first quarter of 2020 but has now rebounded to new heights. Will this strengthen support for China in Africa, not only as an economic investor but also as a political ally?

https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2024/04/01/china-africa-economic-bulletin-2024-edition/

https://epthinktank.eu/2024/02/13/russia-in-africa-an-atlas/africa-s-main-trade-partners/

https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2024/04/02/10-charts-to-explain-22-years-of-china-africa-trade-overseas-development-finance-and-foreign-direct-investment/

https://disinfo.africa/chinas-authoritarian-export-to-africa-83d3fcc8a991

And with its Belt and Road Initiative China is becoming a major investor and source of investment capital for many developing countries, which will increase both its economic and political leverage with these countries.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative

The US has imposed a series of sanctions on China, for economic, political and human rights reasons

https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/ai-chips-for-china-face-additional-us-restrictions/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_sanctions_against_China#:~:text=The%20executive%20order%20prohibits%20all,44%20Chinese%20companies%20were%20identified

https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/2021-u-s-sanctions-year-in-review-1657396/

under President Trump there was a trade war between the US and China. President Biden reversed many but not all of those tariffs

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/26/politics/china-tariffs-biden-policy/index.html

The EU and China

‘The EU sees China as a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival. However, EU-China relations have become increasingly complex due to a growing number of irritants. China has become less open to the world and more repressive at home, while taking a more assertive posture abroad, resorting to economic coercion, boycotts of European goods, and export controls on critical raw materials.’

From https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-china-relations-factsheet_en

And the EU imposed tariffs on electrical vehicles made in China in October 2024, claiming unfair competition

https://www.dw.com/en/china-decries-new-eu-tariffs-on-its-electric-vehicles/a-70637630#:~:text=The%20European%20Union%20(EU)%20increased,standard%2010%25%20car%20import%20duty.

https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/china_en

High levels of personal savings are thought to represent one of the most striking characteristics of the Chinese economy

https://www.ft.com/content/cc40794b-abbb-4677-8a2a-4b10b12b6ff5

In 2022, household consumption accounted for just 38 percent of China’s GDP.

By comparison, private spending made up 68 percent of the GDP in the United States that same year.

https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2024/2/19/year-of-the-dragon-china-faces-critical-moment-in-push-to-revive-economy (good comment on China’s economy)

Investments stood at a very high level estimated at about 42.1% of GDP for 2024

https://www.statista.com/statistics/1197064/china-total-investment-as-gdp-share/

twice that of the US at 20.7%. in 2023

https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/united-states/investment--nominal-gdp#:~:text=in%20Mar%202023%3F-,United%20States%20Investment%20accounted%20for%2020.7%20%25%20of%20its%20Nominal%20GDP,21.3%20%25%20in%20the%20previous%20quarter.

Along with massive investments in industrial infrastructure (a good indicator of future competitivity) there has also been a fall in property prices in urban, industrial areas with significant social consequences.

https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/08/china-doubles-down-on-manufacturing-leaving-real-estate-behind.html

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinas-jan-feb-property-investment-falls-90-yy-2024-03-18/#:~:text=Property%20investment%20in%20China%20fell,fall%20in%20December%20last%20year.

Moreover, the Chinese government is now having to try to cope with the rising demand for social services by shifting resources from other kinds of investments to welfare.

What if the US chooses not to lead and adopts a more isolationist policy?

This is a more difficult question to respond to, especially given the role of isolationism in US history.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_non-interventionism#Between_the_World_Wars

The US seemed to have partially retreated from world affairs under President Trump. President Trump's foreign policy stance sounded isolationist at times (the Paris climate agreement, the Mexican border, comments about NATO partners, withdrawal from the Iran deal, the ban on Muslim visitors to the US from some Islamic countries, US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (the “TPP”), the reintroduction of tariffs on a wide range of goods, the withdrawal of more troops from Syria and Afghanistan), but hard line at others (its position on China, supporting Israel, against terrorism, against Iran, against Maduro in Venezuela, withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty). Certainly, Trump’s foreign policy was more unilateral, much more based on narrowly perceived national interests and involved much less consultation with US allies. In contrast, President Biden wanted the US to return to cooperation and consultation and its traditional role, but to just what extent it has become more cautious is not clear since it faces the constraints of domestic political opposition and an expanding national debt.

https://eastasiaforum.org/2022/03/11/fractured-domestic-politics-hamstrings-us-foreign-policy/

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-05-17/bloomberg-evening-briefing-biden-s-foreign-policy-bends-to-default-threat

A re-evaluation and reduction in US strategic commitments in some areas in order to exercise more influence in others seems likely. After the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the European continent lost relevance in the eyes of America as the threat level was reduced. However, events in Ukraine in 2014 and growing tension with Russia forced a review of this policy and the launching of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence mission.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, has clearly brought, the US, NATO and the EU together

https://www.freiheit.org/nato-g7-and-eu-come-together-show-western-unity

The US formally withdrew its last 'combat troops' from Iraq in December 2011 and from Afghanistan in December 2014. It reduced its presence in both countries to 2,500 at the end of 2020.

https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2473884/us-completes-troop-level-drawdown-in-afghanistan-iraq/

The Biden administration’s withdrawal of the remainder of its troops from Afghanistan in 2021 led to the collapse of the government and the return to power of the Taliban

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/08/15/world/taliban-afghanistan-news

The future of the US pivot to Asia is unclear but there has been a build-up of US naval forces in the Western Pacific in response to North Korean threats and perceived Chinese 'expansionism' and Trump talked of a 'free and open Indo-Pacific ' region with the US not seeking domination but rather a partnership with strong, independent nations willing to play by the rules, see the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act. Biden has continued and strengthened this strategy

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/biden-asia-turning-indo-pacific-reality-35138

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), colloquially the Quad, is a strategic security dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States that is maintained by talks between member countries. The diplomatic and military arrangement was widely viewed as a response to increased Chinese economic and military power, and the Chinese government responded to the Quadrilateral dialogue by issuing formal diplomatic protests to its members, calling it the "Asian NATO". India’s membership of this group suggests that the BRICS+ countries will not necessarily be aligned on security issues.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quadrilateral_Security_Dialogue#:~:text=The%20Quadrilateral%20Security%20Dialogue%20(QSD,by%20talks%20between%20member%20countries.

China is aware of the policy being adopted by the US and clearly sees it as an attempt to undermine its growing influence in the region. Tensions over developments regarding Taiwan are also indicative of the frictions which are perhaps inevitable as a rapidly growing regional power challenges a global power whose resources, while vast, are now limited. If China continues to grow at current rates but fails to democratize and develop towards the Western model, then a strengthening of security ties between China’s neighbors, many of which are democratic states is a likely response to safeguard their independence and shared values. Other smaller, non-democratic neighbors of China may be drawn towards cooperation with the US simply to balance the influence of China (e.g. Vietnam).

https://fulcrum.sg/vietnamese-perceptions-in-a-changing-sino-us-relationship/

More importantly, the combined economic resources (in terms of GDP) and military resources of the West (NATO in its narrowest sense, perhaps the OECD in its widest sense) as a whole is and will remain beyond the capacity of China to challenge. US military spending alone is three times that of China (2024). Certainly, China’s power and influence is going to grow both regionally and globally, perhaps in partnership with Russia at the UN and through the BRICS group. However, there may be an alternative scenario to confrontation. China is a major stakeholder in the current international order, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, an important WTO and IMF member, and, above all, as a state holding large foreign currency reserves and one which also has growing overseas investments , although FDIs in China have fallen significantly

https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/international/global/foreign-direct-investment-china-plummets-23-year-low

So even though China may continue to stand on its sovereignty and use nationalist rhetoric that defies international comment (on issues such as human rights in China, its lack of democracy and the situation in Tibet and Hong Kong) as interference in its domestic affairs, it is probable that its stake in the existing global order will continue to grow and that, although it may try at times to make the liberal order rather less liberal, it will, nevertheless, have good reason to adopt a policy of accommodation and cooperation rather than one of confrontation.
In the end perhaps it is the definition of what we mean by the ‘West’ that is of paramount importance in today’s world. Once that meant Europe and North America, plus countries like Australia and New Zealand. It would be difficult today not to include Japan. And then there is the OECD. More importantly, it is the core liberal democratic values enshrined in the main global institutions from the UN down which best define the West. These are values which many countries (Brazil, India, but many more in Latin America and Africa and Southern Asia) and not only the richer, developed ones but developing ones too, have invested in, or are investing in, and which increasingly represent the normative political expectations (how things should be) for ordinary people all over the world, even those who live in autocracies. The wave of democratization in the 1990s and at least part of the political hopes expressed in the early days of the Arab Spring suggest that the West in this sense is very much alive and flourishing, with or without US leadership. And a ‘West’ which is global and multipolar, rather than simply a US-led NATO, may be a very positive evolution. Strangely, al-Qaeda and Islamic State, in describing the UN and other international agencies as agents of Western cultural imperialism may simply be acknowledging the extent to which once-Western values are now becoming universal.

It is true that in the last few years, we have witnessed a rise in nationalism and authoritarianism

https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/understanding-global-rise-authoritarianism

but this is likely to be a response to and protest against the excesses of globalization, rather than real disillusion with or disaffection from democracy and civil rights. Those who doubt the attraction of the West’s cultural model should perhaps pay more attention to the number of migrants and refugees for most of whom the West remains the preferred destination in terms of their hopes for prosperity, security and freedom.
Note – the West in modern English is not normally used as a synonym for European colonialism (I think this is mainly because European colonialism – often based on slavery and doctrines of racial superiority – is now seen as something clearly in contrast with many basic, modern Western values). It is mainly used in international relations to refer to those countries evolving towards liberal democracy and a free (today usually mixed) market economy, from the late 18^thcentury, through the 19^th century and up to 1945. Since the end of the Second World War, it has been used to describe first NATO and other allies outside NATO (like Australia) and then gradually to include all those countries which generally embrace Western values.

More background material
US economy

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_United_States

China is responding to the US presence in the Pacific and expanded its economic cooperation in the Pacific, first by signing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2020

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_Comprehensive_Economic_Partnership

and by applying to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Sept 2021, although this seems unlikely at the moment

https://www.thaipbsworld.com/china-applies-to-join-pacific-trade-pact-to-boost-economic-clout/#:~:text=BEIJING%2C%20Sept%2016%20(Reuters),bolster%20its%20clout%20in%20trade.

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/china-moves-to-join-the-cptpp-but-dont-expect-a-fast-pass/

https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/jul/15/no-chance-china-will-join-pacific-trade-pact-in-near-term-australia-warns

It can thus present itself as a promoter of free trade agreements. Simultaneously, China is carrying out a massive economic and diplomatic initiative in Central Asia with the goal of reestablishing the old “Silk Road”.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Belt_One_Road_Initiative

This initiative has led to wider cooperation with many countries, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, aimed at creating a safe-area for international trade and at ensuring gas and oil supplies to China, which are extremely important to China’s industrial production. This initiative has also led to competition between China and the EU for influence in the region and for gas and oil supplies. However, this competition may actually lead to cooperation between China and the EU in Central Asia, in terms of building new pipelines, which could have both Europe and China as final delivery points. As China has become more involved in the international community from an economic point of view, some political cooperation has followed. In recent years, Chinese military personnel have taken part in UN missions in Cambodia, the Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sudan and Lebanon. In 2015, a combat deployment was sent to South Sudan, where China has significant oil investments. In addition, China’s navy has actively participated in the anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2113436/china-completes-registration-8000-strong-un

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-gosset/china-us-relations_b_1998484.html

https://chinapower.csis.org/china-un-mission/

https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/asie-visions/chinas-military-deployments-gulf-aden-anti-piracy-and

Basically, the expansion of China’s economic interests around the world has led to growing political awareness among the Chinese leadership of the need to protect those interests and engage on international issues, especially those closely related to international security. This has resulted in China playing a more active role within the international community. This trend culminated with the agreement signed with Djibouti concerning the creation of China’s first real military base abroad in order to secure trade between China and Africa. However, in the Middle East region, China has taken a carefully balanced position in the dispute between Sunni and Shia Muslims and between their main sponsors, namely Saudi Arabia and Iran. In fact, the publication of China’s Arab Policy Paper shows that the China wants to adopt a global approach to the Islamic world without taking sides. Such a policy will make it possible for China to deal with both Saudi Arabia and Iran to obtain from both parties an agreement on oil supplies, which is fundamental for China’s economic growth. It also explains China’s willingness to act as a mediator between the US and Iran (which resulted in the 5+1 Nuclear Agreement with Iran and in the lifting of economic sanctions) and in the Syrian civil war.

Potential areas of disagreement between China and the West

China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine deepens frictions with the US and EU

https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/05/chinese-support-for-russias-war-in-ukraine-deepens-friction-with-u-s-e-u/

As mentioned above China’s neighbors are worried about its expansionist ambitions in the East Asian area e.g. the dispute over the Senkaku Islands, located in the South China Sea and claimed by both China and Japan.

China is the world’s biggest polluter in terms of CO2 emissions. And the US is its second biggest. However, China took part in a series of international conferences and welcomed the agreement at the Climate Conference, COP21, in Paris in December 2015, and made a joint commitment with the US in 2021.

https://www.state.gov/u-s-china-joint-glasgow-declaration-on-enhancing-climate-action-in-the-2020s/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20and%20China,the%20value%20of%20continued%20discussion.

Meanwhile, although China is the undisputed global green tech leader there are doubts about its commitment to making real changes rapidly, given that the agreement is not binding in any practical way.

https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Four-contradictions-in-Chinas-energy-and-environmental-policies-in-2023.pdf

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fs6WokEuweU

China’s domestic human rights record has worsened in recent years, including the use of the death penalty and repression of political and religious opposition leaders, critics and dissidents (Hong Kong) and discrimination against minorities (e.g. Tibetans, Uyghurs and Christians).

https://qz.com/993601/china-uyghur-terrorism/

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/12/chinas-dangerous-ethnic-policies-in-xinjiang/

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/25/at-least-120000-muslim-uighurs-held-in-chinese-re-education-camps-report

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senkaku_Islands_dispute

http://www.ibtimes.com/china-rejects-neighbors-claims-south-china-sea-asian-ministers-warn-escalating-2043337

http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345

http://fortune.com/2016/01/19/taiwan-tsai-ing-wen-china/

http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Tensions-Renew-Between-Vietnam-and-China-Over-South-China-Sea-20150518-0003.html

http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/china-and-climate-change-three-things-to-watch-after-paris/

http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/china

https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/29/china-new-hong-kong-law-roadmap-repression

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang