Preliminary
background reading on Russia
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25800386.pdf?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Introduction:
This relationship is important to the EU because Russia is the EU’s
largest neighbor, the EU’s third biggest trading partner (see notes
below) and a major (re-)emerging economy (one of the BRICS), an
important market for European exports, a major military power, and
one of the world’s two biggest nuclear powers, a permanent member
of the UN Security Council, and so a major player in international
relations, and for Europe a vital supplier of energy (e.g. the
opening of Nord Stream pipeline in 2011).
After
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the disintegration of the Warsaw
Pact, the decline and collapse of Communism, the reunification
of Germany and the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991,
there was, in the early 1990s, real hope and expectation that Russia
would, with some unavoidable difficulties due to the transition,
gradually turn into a Western-style democracy, allowing the EU to
develop the same kind of relationship with Russia that it has with
the US, Canada, Australia or Japan.
This
did not happen and there was a period of economic chaos, corruption
and decline which led first to the emergence of a small number of
extremely rich ‘oligarchs’ and a general impoverishment of the
mass of the population, and then to a return to an authoritarian
model under Putin and Medvedev. Relations today are dominated by 2
factors which are in contradiction. The EU in particular, and the
West in general, needs a close relationship with Russia as a partner
both politically and economically. At the same time Russia is not
perceived as a real democracy based on respect for human and civil
rights, so this partnership is one of convenience rather than of
conviction (in clear contrast to the EU's relations with Canada,
Japan, Brazil and South Africa, for example). There is a fundamental
element of trust missing, which is what characterizes relations among
EU members, and between them and many other democratic states or
states committed to implementing democratic development. With the
conflict in Georgia, the current conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s
growing assertiveness in international relations new questions have
been raised about the prospects for good future relations between the
European
Union and the Russian Federation.
The
main factors:
1)
In Soviet times there was very little trade between The Communist
bloc and Western Europe. Today there is very significant trade
between the two. Russia is Europe’s main gas supplier and an
important oil supplier and a market for European luxury goods,
capital equipment, technology, transport equipment, chemicals,
medicines and agricultural products, and this has created real
economic interdependence. There are concerns about whether Russia
might try to use energy supplies as a weapon to put short term
pressure on the EU regarding political questions, as it did regarding
economic questions with its non-EU neighbor, Ukraine, in 2009, with
follow-on effects also on EU members. As a result, the EU is involved
in various projects to build new pipelines and gain access to
resources outside Russia’s control and thus to diversify suppliers.
At the same time it is committed to developing new, greener energy
sources and after the Fukushima Daiichi disaster several EU countries
are trying to cut back on their dependence on energy production from
nuclear power. This may, at least in the short term, make it
difficult to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russia. It remains true
that the EU is surprisingly quiet about violations of civil and human
rights within
Russia (certainly in terms of action but often also in terms of
words) and until recent events in Ukraine, the EU clearly gave
priority to economic security. On the other hand, some experts argue
that building a strong and reliable relationship with Russia will act
as a demonstration of Europe’s good will towards Russia and
encourage Russia to reform and overcome its democratic deficit. The
rapid development and exploitation of US and Canadian shale oil and
gas resources (as well as potential European resources, e.g. in
Poland) could one day provide real alternatives to Russian energy
supplies and a welcome diversification of suppliers but this remains
only a long-term and ecologically dubious prospect. Meanwhile, trade
between the EU and Russia fell for the first time in 2014 with the
introduction of sanctions in response to Russia’s intervention in
Ukraine.
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/european-business-summit-2014/eu-russia-trade-drops-sharply-bilateral-relations-sour-302144
Russia too is trying to diversify
by finding new customers. In May 2014 it signed deals with China to
supply crude oil and build a new pipeline to supply gas.
http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/yuzhno-sakhalinsk/china-russia-pipeline-deal-to-shape-global-lng-27663702
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-25/russian-oil-seen-heading-east-not-west-in-crimea-spat.html
2)
In the last twenty years many former Soviet satellite states have
joined NATO and the EU, at least partly as a guarantee of their
continuing independence from Russia. This has been seen by Russia as
an aggressive act and an attempt to reduce Russia’s sphere of
influence. Russia made clear its opposition to Ukraine, Belarus and
Georgia joining NATO or the EU. Russia’s intervention in Georgia in
2008, in support of the break-away republics of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, is a good example of the dangers raised by the question of
further NATO/EU expansion to the east. Further real progress towards
EU and NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia seems unlikely at
present given Russia’s opposition and the situation in the
separatist regions seems to be frozen.
Above
all, it is the evolution of events in Ukraine which have really
thrown into question all certainties about relations with the Russian
Federation. A decision in November 2013 by Ukraine's President Viktor
Yanukovych to pull out of an association deal with the European Union
and opt for closer ties with Russia sparked huge street protests and
then police violence that eventually led to his downfall and flight
in February 2014. In March Russia reacted by annexing the largely
Russian-speaking Ukrainian region of Crimea after the Crimean
parliament held a referendum and declared independence from Ukraine.
At the same time unrest began growing in eastern Ukraine, where
pro-Russian sentiment is strong. The US and NATO denounced the
Russian move as illegal and aggressively expansionist. Russia
responded by repeatedly asserting that it saw NATO and the EU’s
expansion to the East over the last 20 years as far more aggressive
and a violation of a promise made in 1990 that in exchange for
Russian agreement to German reunification NATO agreed not to expand
towards the East.
A
Brief Summary of Events in Ukraine -
Relations between the West and Moscow worsened dramatically as the
risk of civil conflict grew and the status of Crimea remained
unresolved. In March 2014 the EU and US imposed travel bans and asset
freezes on several officials from Russia and Ukraine over the Crimea
referendum. A ban on financial transactions was introduced the
following month. Washington put military cooperation with Russia on
hold and ended negotiations on the NATO missile defense program. Also
in April NATO suspended all cooperation with Russia, and in June the
G7 met without Russia (G8). A UN General Assembly resolution
described the Crimea referendum as illegal but Russia blocked a
similar resolution on the Security Council (some countries such as
Cuba, Afghanistan, Syria, Venezuela, Bolivia recognized the validity
of the referendum in Ukraine). Meanwhile Russia, Ukraine,
the US and the EU held talks in Geneva on steps
to "de-escalate" the crisis in eastern Ukraine,
but were later unable to halt the violence between pro-Russian
separatists and Ukrainian government forces.
Protests
in Donetsk
and Luhansk
escalated into an armed
separatist insurgency.
In May pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk declared
independence after referendums which were not recognized by Kiev or
the West. In the same month elections were held in Ukraine and in
June Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President-elect
Petro Poroshenko called
for a quick end to the bloodshed in eastern Ukraine.
On June 16th
Russia cut
off all gas supplies to Ukraine,
with Gazprom saying Ukraine had failed to settle its debts. On 25th
June
Russia's
parliament canceled
a parliamentary resolution authorizing the use of Russian forces in
Ukraine.
EU leaders welcomed the move but warned of more sanctions if Russia
did not do more to de-escalate tensions in Ukraine. On 27th
June the
EU signed an association
agreement
with Ukraine, along with Georgia and Moldova, in what President Petro
Poroshenko described as the
most important day in the country's history since independence in
1991. On
July 1st
Poroshenko
ended a tentative ceasefire and launched military operations against
pro-Russia rebels, saying "we will attack and liberate our
land."
On
July 17th
Malaysian
Airlines flight MH17 was shot down in eastern Ukraine, killing all
298 people on board. An adviser to Ukraine's interior ministry stated
the plane was hit by a missile from a Buk surface-to-air launcher.
Kiev later accused rebel forces of tampering with evidence at the
crash site, saying the armed groups were moving bodies and destroying
evidence. Other reports indicated the OSCE monitoring group sent to
the site was only granted limited access. Several EU leaders
threatened to impose further sanctions on Russia if the Kremlin did
not pressure rebels thought to have shot down the MH17 passenger
plane to grant more access to the crash site. On
July 21st
fighting
broke out in Donetsk as Ukrainian forces tried to regain control of
the city. On the 23rd
US intelligence officials said they believed the plane was shot down
by pro-Russian separatists "by mistake." On 5 August Russia
began a build-up of forces on the Ukrainian border, and continued a
series
of training exercises that had been held on and off since the start
of the conflict. On 22 August A
Russian aid convoy of more than 100 lorries
entered eastern Ukraine and made a drop in rebel-controlled Luhansk
without government permission, sparking allegations of a “direct
violation of international law”. On 29
August
NATO
released satellite images appearing to show Russian soldiers,
artillery and armoured vehicles engaged in military operations in
eastern Ukraine. Russia’s alleged military involvement to back the
rebels was seen as a major escalation in the crisis, which was
described as a full-blown civil war. Vladimir Putin was also accused
of hostility towards Kiev, telling the outgoing president of the
European Commission that he could take the city “in two weeks” if
he wanted. However, by the start of September most of the Donetsk
region, apart from the city itself and a small area around it, was
under the control of the Ukrainian armed forces.
On 5 September 2014 Ukraine's government and separatist leaders signed a ceasefire deal, the Minsk Protocol, after talks in Belarus, raising hopes of an end to the nearly five-month conflict in eastern Ukraine. It included provisions for a release of prisoners, withdrawal of forces and the establishment of a buffer zone and the decentralization of power from Kiev to the eastern region. The cease-fire seemed fragile and in danger of collapse. However, on 16 Sept. Ukraine, as agreed, voted to give the east of the country limited self-rule as part of proposals aimed at ending the separatist fighting. President Poroshenko said these measures would pave the way for decentralisation while guaranteeing the 'territorial integrity and independence' of Ukraine.
The United Nations' refugee agency, UNHCR, said that the number of people displaced in Ukraine by the fighting, particularly around Donetsk and Luhansk, as of 1 September 2014, was 260,000. A UN report published on 29 August 29, said 2,220 people died and about 6,000 were injured in the Ukrainian crisis between mid-April and August 17 2014.
On 5 September 2014 Ukraine's government and separatist leaders signed a ceasefire deal, the Minsk Protocol, after talks in Belarus, raising hopes of an end to the nearly five-month conflict in eastern Ukraine. It included provisions for a release of prisoners, withdrawal of forces and the establishment of a buffer zone and the decentralization of power from Kiev to the eastern region. The cease-fire seemed fragile and in danger of collapse. However, on 16 Sept. Ukraine, as agreed, voted to give the east of the country limited self-rule as part of proposals aimed at ending the separatist fighting. President Poroshenko said these measures would pave the way for decentralisation while guaranteeing the 'territorial integrity and independence' of Ukraine.
The United Nations' refugee agency, UNHCR, said that the number of people displaced in Ukraine by the fighting, particularly around Donetsk and Luhansk, as of 1 September 2014, was 260,000. A UN report published on 29 August 29, said 2,220 people died and about 6,000 were injured in the Ukrainian crisis between mid-April and August 17 2014.
As
the conflict continued a new round of sanctions was imposed, by the
US, the EU, and others like Canada, Japan Australia, Switzerland
during the summer and autumn of 2014 to deter Russia from supporting
the insurrectionist movement in the Donbass area. These sanctions
involve banking and financial facilities and transactions, trade
restrictions on military and technological exports (particularly to
the Russian energy sector) and investment in and exports to the
Crimea. The US also banned the export to Russia of technology with
potential
military applications, suspended cooperation on civilian nuclear
energy projects and cut off NASA’s contacts with its Russian
counterparts. President Putin defended Russia’s annexation of
Crimea by saying that Washington and its European allies were guided
by “the rule of the gun” rather than international law and
respect for the principle of state sovereignty.
Russia,
meanwhile, made a resolution of the impasse over NATO’s missile
defense system a precondition to further strategic arms control
talks. It moved forward with plans for a Eurasian Economic Union and
a stronger Collective Security Treaty Organization with partners such
as Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Some
Russian commentators have even argued that its authoritarian model is
a viable alternative to Western liberal democracy and one which will
gain support in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where some Western
ideas are seen as going against tradition and religion. In August
2014 Russia responded to Western sanctions with counter-measures, its
own sanctions on the import of agricultural products from the US, the
EU and the other countries which imposed sanctions on Russia.
The
economic sanctions are generally believed to have helped weaken the
Russian economy and to have intensified the challenges that Russia
was already facing after the fall in global oil prices, a decline in
the value of the ruble and the flight of international capital. An
analysis of recent data confirms Russia’s entry into a recession,
with negative GDP growth of -3.7% in 2015 and -0.9% in the first half
of 2016. So the sanctions have had the economic effect intended
(although the fall in oil prices has been more important for Russia's
economy). However, they have not yet forced Russia into a change of
policy in Ukraine. In fact, Greek Prime Minister
Alexis
Tsipras,
Paolo
Gentiloni,
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and a British think tank, the Bow
group, all argue that sanctions are not the right approach as the
costs to the EU of the sanctions and countersanctions have also been
significant. EU exports to Russia fell by something between 12.1% and
14.5% in 2014. However, the European Commission estimated the effects
of the sanctions and countersanctions on the EU as ‘contained’ at
-0.3% of the EU's GDP in 2014 and -0.4% in 2015 (€40 and €50
billion respectively, and perhaps €90 billion in the long term).
The sanctions may have lowered growth in the EU by 0.25% in 2015 and
will have consequences in terms of unemployment. An estimated 0.9
million jobs in the short term and perhaps up to 2.2 million (around
1% of total employment in the long term) could be lost.
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/effects-sanctions-and-counter-sanctions-eu-russian-trade-flows
At
the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014, the military alliance
approved plans for a new "spearhead" force (a rapid
deployment force of 4,000 soldiers able go into action in 48 hours)
as a response to growing concern about the Ukraine crisis and the
advance of Islamic State militants in the Middle East. Despite calls
from eastern European members (Poland and the Baltic states), NATO
did not approve at that time the proposal to create new permanent
bases in these member states. Germany in particular wished to avoid
further antagonizing Russia by such an action. President Obama,
however, assured them of NATO and US commitment to their protection.
In February 2015, as a result of the failure of the original Minsk Protocol, a new agreement was reached, Minsk II, which involved an immediate ceasefire on Feb. 15th, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the restoration of social and economic links. Despite violations and a fear of a break-down the ceasefire seems to be holding. Total casualties in the eastern Ukraine amounted to 9,640 between April 2014 and September 2015.
In February 2015, as a result of the failure of the original Minsk Protocol, a new agreement was reached, Minsk II, which involved an immediate ceasefire on Feb. 15th, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the restoration of social and economic links. Despite violations and a fear of a break-down the ceasefire seems to be holding. Total casualties in the eastern Ukraine amounted to 9,640 between April 2014 and September 2015.
At
the NATO Warsaw summit in July 2016 NATO repeated its determination
to maintain and repair the dialogue with Russia while continuing to
support Ukraine's independence. It agreed to deploy multi-lateral
forces to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
So any moves towards the accession of the Ukraine into the EU and NATO seem unlikely given the situation there today and the West's desire not to further antagonize Russia. The situation in Ukraine is likely to remain frozen, like that in Georgia and the Moldova/Transnistria situation which dates back to 1990-1992. Moreover, the rapid evolution of the situation in Ukraine has intensified calls for the EU to move more rapidly towards a diversification of energy suppliers to escape overdependence on Russia. It has also led to a reassessment of the whole relationship with Russia and the terms of political cooperation between Russia and the West (the EU, the US and NATO), and a debate about what kind of measures should be taken against Russia and how effective or desirable the current sanctions are. After all, although Russia is also criticized for its actions in Ukraine and for its support of the Assad regime in Syria, it remains a fundamental ally in the fight against terrorism and for the moment an essential trading partner. However, the election of Donald Trump as US President could lead to significant changes.
So any moves towards the accession of the Ukraine into the EU and NATO seem unlikely given the situation there today and the West's desire not to further antagonize Russia. The situation in Ukraine is likely to remain frozen, like that in Georgia and the Moldova/Transnistria situation which dates back to 1990-1992. Moreover, the rapid evolution of the situation in Ukraine has intensified calls for the EU to move more rapidly towards a diversification of energy suppliers to escape overdependence on Russia. It has also led to a reassessment of the whole relationship with Russia and the terms of political cooperation between Russia and the West (the EU, the US and NATO), and a debate about what kind of measures should be taken against Russia and how effective or desirable the current sanctions are. After all, although Russia is also criticized for its actions in Ukraine and for its support of the Assad regime in Syria, it remains a fundamental ally in the fight against terrorism and for the moment an essential trading partner. However, the election of Donald Trump as US President could lead to significant changes.
3)
EU members need to show more unity in dealing with Russia through EU
institutions. In the past EU members tended to negotiate bilateral
agreements with Russia and this could allow Russia to exploit
divisions between EU members.
4)
Russia’s domestic political situation is characterized by a lack of
freedom of the press and a concentration of media power, economic
power and political power in the hands of the government, or friends
of the government (opponents call this ‘cronyism and corruption’),
repression of opposition leaders and strong critics of the government
(e.g. Aleksei A. Navalny, Garry Kasparov, Pussy Riot), restrictions
on freedom of expression and the right to demonstrate (freedom of
assembly and association), opposition to the activities of NGOs in
Russia involved in human rights issues, accusations of
state-sponsored murder regarding the death or disappearance of some
critics, (e.g. investigative journalist Anna
Politkovskaya),
accusations from many sources of massive human rights violations and
atrocities during and after the military campaigns in Chechnya, the
repression of or discrimination against other ethnic or social
groups (e.g. immigrants and gays) by the police, secret services,
military or paramilitary supporters and allies of the government. The
government, first under Putin, then under Medvedev, and now under
Putin again seems authoritarian and nationalist, determined to
maintain control over society. In fact, since his re-election Putin
has moved to undo some of Medvedev’s more liberal legislation.
Those in positions of power are often from the FSB secret service
(many like Putin originally from the KGB) or from among those who
have made money and given their support to the government. Rich
opponents have been charged with corruption and imprisoned, silenced
or driven abroad. However, the government so far seems genuinely
popular and although its control of the media raises some doubts
about how far elections in Russia can be considered free and
fair, it seems likely that the government still has widespread
support (including, despite some demonstrations against intervention
in Ukraine, general support for the intervention in Crimea) and
popular legitimacy. This may be due to the fear of terrorism or of a
return to the economic chaos of the early 1990s and a resurgence of
national pride after the embarrassment of a weak and economically
helpless Russia in the early 1990s. Russia has a stable government
but the uneven distribution of wealth makes Russia much less stable
socially. It still lacks the large, independent-minded middle class
on which a functioning democracy is often said to rest. The protests
and demonstrations in 2014 on social and economic questions suggest,
however, that the middle class is growing and starting to find its
voice. With Russia now in recession social tensions may grow.
5)
Russia’s economy is too narrowly based on the export of energy
resources and other raw materials. As mentioned above, the Russian
economy in 2015 contracted (-3.7% GDP growth) largely as a result of
the fall in oil prices, from well over $100 a barrel between 2011 and
2013 to around $60 a barrel in June 2015, to a low of $30 in January
2016, to $45 in September 2016.
http://www.infomine.com/investment/metal-prices/crude-oil/5-year/https://ycharts.com/indicators/average_crude_oil_spot_price
Successful
diversification would strengthen the economy and spread the wealth.
This would help stabilize the country socially. Many experts argue
that given Russia’s interest in buying shares in western European
energy companies it must now open its economy much more to EU
investment in its own energy companies and loosen government control.
However, any move in this direction is now blocked by the Ukraine
conflict and resulting sanctions, and Russia is turning to China as a
new export market for its oil. There is also a need for a better
business environment in Russia, less bureaucracy and red-tape etc..
to attract investment. Organized crime is still powerful. In August
2012 Russia finally joined the WTO and this should have led to a
real liberalization of the economy, increased foreign investment and
significant economic expansion. All of this is now threatened by the
Ukraine sanctions and counter-sanctions, and by the business
environment (corruption and security of ownership, legal transparency
etc...) which remains poor.
Moreover, in ‘The Dying Bear’ in 2011 (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136511/nicholas-eberstadt/the-dying-bear) Nicholas Eberstadt argued that Russia is facing a demographic disaster with a population that fell from 148.8 million in 1993 to 141.9 million in 2010, an aging population, a falling rate of family formation, more deaths than births each year and an average life expectancy of 67 years (lower than in 1961). The low life expectancy is the result of high rates of alcoholism, fatal accidents and violence (violence at the level of some post-conflict African countries), a decline in the quality of the health service and a decline in education levels. Thus Eberstadt predicted a decline in the quality and quantity of human resources available to the Russian economy in the future. All this could undermine Russia’s economic prospects as one of the BRICS. The state is currently trying to raise the birth rate by rewarding families financially for having more children but it is not clear how successful this policy is. Russia also benefits from the growing presence of millions of immigrants from ex-Soviet republics, who provide cheap labor but are not well-integrated into Russian society and are often resented, and from remittances worth billions of dollars from Russians working abroad. However, there is also a general internal migration from East to West that may soon leave the Asian areas of Russia critically underpopulated. Eberstadt also argues that Russia is an economy based on the export of raw materials and that, although this can strengthen a developed economy like Norway or Canada, without a strong industrial-technological base the Russian economy remains weak. In fact, without such a developed economic base Russia’s export earnings are less than those of Belgium. According to Eberstadt all the factors listed above will tend to weaken the Russian Federation economically, politically and, in the end, also militarily. Russia’s future position and role within the international community may thus be threatened with decline and Russia may become a more difficult partner to work with due to domestic tensions. .
However, recent trends suggest at least a partial demographic recovery. Following the 2014 annexation of Crimea, over 98% of Crimea residents acquired Russian citizenship. Russia's population thus expanded by 2,294,110 people. Moreover, as of 2014, the Russian fertility rate of 1.750 children per woman was the highest in Eastern, Southern and Central Europe. In 2013, Russia experienced the first natural population growth since 1990 at 22,700 people. Taking into account immigration, the population grew by 294,500 people. According to official Russian sources Russia's population was 143.4 million in January 2016 (excluding Crimea). We will need to see if this trend continues.
Moreover, in ‘The Dying Bear’ in 2011 (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136511/nicholas-eberstadt/the-dying-bear) Nicholas Eberstadt argued that Russia is facing a demographic disaster with a population that fell from 148.8 million in 1993 to 141.9 million in 2010, an aging population, a falling rate of family formation, more deaths than births each year and an average life expectancy of 67 years (lower than in 1961). The low life expectancy is the result of high rates of alcoholism, fatal accidents and violence (violence at the level of some post-conflict African countries), a decline in the quality of the health service and a decline in education levels. Thus Eberstadt predicted a decline in the quality and quantity of human resources available to the Russian economy in the future. All this could undermine Russia’s economic prospects as one of the BRICS. The state is currently trying to raise the birth rate by rewarding families financially for having more children but it is not clear how successful this policy is. Russia also benefits from the growing presence of millions of immigrants from ex-Soviet republics, who provide cheap labor but are not well-integrated into Russian society and are often resented, and from remittances worth billions of dollars from Russians working abroad. However, there is also a general internal migration from East to West that may soon leave the Asian areas of Russia critically underpopulated. Eberstadt also argues that Russia is an economy based on the export of raw materials and that, although this can strengthen a developed economy like Norway or Canada, without a strong industrial-technological base the Russian economy remains weak. In fact, without such a developed economic base Russia’s export earnings are less than those of Belgium. According to Eberstadt all the factors listed above will tend to weaken the Russian Federation economically, politically and, in the end, also militarily. Russia’s future position and role within the international community may thus be threatened with decline and Russia may become a more difficult partner to work with due to domestic tensions. .
However, recent trends suggest at least a partial demographic recovery. Following the 2014 annexation of Crimea, over 98% of Crimea residents acquired Russian citizenship. Russia's population thus expanded by 2,294,110 people. Moreover, as of 2014, the Russian fertility rate of 1.750 children per woman was the highest in Eastern, Southern and Central Europe. In 2013, Russia experienced the first natural population growth since 1990 at 22,700 people. Taking into account immigration, the population grew by 294,500 people. According to official Russian sources Russia's population was 143.4 million in January 2016 (excluding Crimea). We will need to see if this trend continues.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Russia
6)
Terrorism – Russia is faced with separatism and Islamic
fundamentalism in some of its federated republics (Chechnya and
Dagestan are republics in the Russian Federation) and independent
allied republics (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are in the Commonwealth
of Independent States) in the Caucasus. The war in Chechnya was only
the most obvious example. The Russian response has been fairly
drastic in some places, milder in others, but it is not clear if
Russia is winning the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign in the area.
This was both a reason for Russia to support NATO logistically in
Afghanistan, but also a reason for Russia to avoid bad publicity with
its Moslem citizens by getting too heavily involved (also the Soviet
Union fought and lost a war there in the 1970s, so it evokes bad
memories). However, Russia and the West cooperate closely on major
security issues, through the exchange of information and intelligence
between secret services on terrorist threats and illegal trafficking.
This also means that in order to have Russian cooperation against al
Qaeda the West said little in criticism of Russia’s handling of
the Chechen question.
7)
Syria – On Syria, initially, a clear division emerged on the UN
Security Council in 2011-12 between Russia, and to a lesser extent
China, which were against sanctions and international intervention
and argued their case in terms of the UN principle of
non-interference in the domestic affairs of an independent state, and
the West which viewed and views the Assad regime as delegitimized by
its involvement in massacres and massive human rights abuses. The
West attempted to support ‘moderate’ opponents of the regime with
money and arms and called for Assad to step down. Russia’s position
may have been in part a response to what happened in Libya where the
West convinced Russia to allow the UNSC to authorize an intervention
to protect civilians. The Russians argue that NATO exceeded its
mandate by helping the rebels to overthrow the Gaddafi
regime.
With
the rise of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, Russia at first argued
that US interventionism in the Middle East since 2003 had only led to
the strengthening of radical Islamist forces and was thus a misguided
policy.
However,
despite all of the above, in September 2015 Russia began to intervene
in the Syrian civil war directly with air strikes. Russia supports
the Assad regime and claims it is acting legally (at the invitation
of the 'legitimate' Syrian government) against Islamic State but
seems to be mainly targeting the opposition rebels and Kurdish
fighters. Russia has invited the US to form a grand alliance with it
against IS (referring to their WWII alliance) but the US, despite
launching its own air strikes and supporting those of its allies,
refuses to accept the long-term survival of the Assad regime or
Russia’s targeting of Assad’s other opponents. However, the
stakes are very high and the situation is in constant evolution. With
the terrorist attack on Paris on November 13th
2015 Russia, the EU and the US began moving towards greater
cooperation in their efforts to contain and defeat IS (Da’esh). It
seems that Russia might be willing to pressure Assad to step down at
some point under the right conditions. On 21st
November 2015 the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously
in favour of a a French-sponsored resolution ‘calling on ‘Member
States that have the capacity to do so to take all necessary
measures, in compliance with international law, in particular with
the United Nations Charter, as well as international human rights,
refugee and humanitarian law, on the territory under the control of
IS(IL) also known as Da’esh, in Syria and Iraq, to redouble and
coordinate their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts
committed specifically by IS(IL)’ This has been interpreted by many
politicians and commentators as fully authorizing military
intervention in Syria, although this is not strictly true. See
the third comment below by the European
Journal of International Law.
8)
Russia and the US have negotiated and implemented significant cuts in
their nuclear arsenals and this is an ongoing process*. However,
there is friction over the question of NATO’s planned Missile
Defense System (not scheduled to become fully functional before 2020
or later). In November 2010 at the NATO summit in Lisbon, to which
Russia was invited (NATO Russia Council), Russia seemed
originally to be in favor of the plan if the cooperation offered by
NATO meant Russia’s real integration into a system of shared
defense against third parties (e.g. Iran). Russia was not willing to
accept a system based in Eastern European NATO member states from
which it would only receive information and intelligence as a
courtesy. The implication from the Russian point of view is that it
could still be used against Russia. However, NATO has now rejected
the idea of Russia’s participation in the control arrangements for
the Missile Defense System and Russia is now threatening to deploy
missiles on its Western borders if NATO goes ahead with its plans. At
the 2012 Chicago summit NATO said its missile defense system had
reached interim capability. In May 2013 Russia repeated that it wants
to share joint control (a possibility rejected by the US Senate) or
to negotiate a new security agreement covering the whole of Europe,
including Russia, and implicitly reducing the role of NATO. The
impasse here has led Russia to break off negotiations for further
nuclear arms reductions. In July 2016 NATO took command of the
US-built missile shield.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-shield-idUSKCN0ZO1Q1
9)
The creation of the BRICS group has given Russia a new forum in which
to exercise its influence. While this group will continue to be of
growing importance economically (see notes on the BRICS and the The
New Development Bank)
its political value is still unclear. Will authoritarian states like
Russia and China share common positions with functioning democracies
like India, Brazil and South Africa? This may be possible in a
negative sense, e.g. restraining US and Western interventionism, bur
when it comes to promoting democratic values and denouncing human
rights violations it is difficult to imagine Brazil and Russia in
full agreement. However, the growing strength of the relationship
between Russia and China was demonstrated by the signing of a $400
billion oil supply deal in May 2014 and the start on construction of
a new oil pipeline costing $5 billion on September 1st
2014. Russia, Brazil and South Africa all faced economic difficulties
in 2015. This will also limit the group's influence.
10)
Russia and how international events, like the World Athletics
Championships in Moscow in August 2013 and the Winter Olympics in
2014, affected its foreign policy stance and image at the
international level. However, the World Anti-Doping Agency’s report
on Russia’s state-sponsored support for Russian athletes using
drugs to enhance their performance has done enormous damage to the
country’s sporting image.
11)
Institutional relations between the EU and the Russian Federation:
Conclusion:
Russia appears to want to reassert its power and play a more decisive
role on the world stage and in eastern Europe. The EU and the West
should perhaps welcome or at least try to accommodate its first
ambition and try to work with Russia wherever possible, while trying
to reach a reasonable compromise as regards its second ambition. If
the EU and Russia do not have the kind of friendly relations that the
EU has with countries like the US, Brazil, Australia and Japan this
is because Russia is still not perceived as a fully democratic state.
Recent events in Georgia in 2008 and now in Ukraine since 2014 have
undermined this relationship and suggest that there has been a return
to a more adversarial relationship. According to some experts there
is even the danger of a second Cold War, though this seems an
exaggerated reaction. Further progress on nuclear arms reductions,
cooperation between NATO and Russia and real agreement on the future
of Ukraine and other states bordering on Russia seem unlikely for the
moment. Indeed, NATO seems destined to return, at least in part, to
its Cold War task of guaranteeing the independence of its European
members. Many diplomats on both sides see the main task as that of
‘damage control’ and trying to reduce tensions and repair
relations. After the terrorist attack on Paris, the role the evolving
situation in Syria (and the need for cooperation between Russia and
the West to deal with it) will play is uncertain.
Nonetheless,
compared with relations with the old Soviet Union and Soviet bloc,
enormous progress has been made politically and economically in the
last 25 years. Russia is clearly no longer a state that Europe
regards simply as an enemy. Europe will maintain close ties with the
US through NATO as an ultimate guarantee of its freedom from Russian
pressure, but needs at the same time to intensify its dialogue with
Russia. This may mean quiet diplomacy to encourage Russia to
implement democratic reforms with a campaign of renewed goodwill to
win the confidence of the Russian government and people. Both sides
need the relationship to return to stability and cooperation. This
will mean reaching some kind of practical compromise on the Ukrainian
question and the economic sanctions. The Minsk II agreement of
February 2015 was a clear attempt to take a first step towards
reaching such a settlement by stabilizing the situation.
The
election of Donald Trump has been welcomed by Russia and may lead to
a real change in relations. What this will be and whether this will
mean closer cooperation between the US and Russia, or US isolationism
and less support for its allies in dealing with Russia, or the risk
of a confrontation between Russia and the US, remains unclear.
Some
Background notes:
Ukraine
EU-US
sanctions on Russia and their effect
Russia’s
economy
Ukraine’s
economy
See
also:
‘Managing
the New Cold War’,
in Foreign Affairs July/August 2014, by Robert Legvold
And
for the Russian position:
‘What
the Kremlin Is Thinking’,
in Foreign Affairs July/August 2014, by Alexander Lukin
*
US and Russian Nuclear Arms Reductions
The
New
START (for Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) is a nuclear
arms reduction
treaty
between the United
States
and the Russian
Federation.
It was signed on April 8, 2010 in Prague,
and, after ratification, entered into force on February 5, 2011. It
is expected to last at least until 2021. The New START replaced the
Treaty of Moscow (SORT),
which was due to expire in December 2012. In terms of name, it is a
follow-up to the START
I
treaty, which expired in December 2009, and to proposed START
II
and START
III
treaties that have never entered into force.
Under
terms of the treaty, the number of strategic nuclear missile
launchers will be reduced by half.
Summary
of New START Limits
Type Limit
Deployed
missiles and bombers 700
Deployed
and Non-deployed Launchers (missile tubes and bombers) 800
A
new inspection and verification regime will be established, replacing
the SORT mechanism. It does not limit the number of operationally
inactive stockpiled
nuclear warheads,
that remain in the high thousands in both the Russian and United
States inventories. However, total nuclear warheads have seen huge
reductions as a result of the treaties from a maximum of 65,000
nuclear warheads to
Country Operational Total
Inventory
Russia
1,800 8,500
United
States 1,950 7,700
In
June 2013 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov
commented on US President Barack Obama’s proposal from earlier that
week to slash US and Russian nuclear arsenals by one third from the
limit imposed by the bilateral New START treaty in 2010.
“The
New START limits deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550 per country,
though the actual slashing of nuclear arsenals is still ongoing.
Moving beyond the New START will make nuclear arsenals of the United
States and Russia comparable to those of other countries with nuclear
weapons”, Lavrov said.
“This
means that further moves possibly proposed for reduction of actual
strategic offensive arms will have to be reviewed in a multilateral
format,”
Lavrov told Rossia-1 television. “And
I’m talking not just official nuclear powers, but all countries
that possess nuclear weapons,”
the minister said.
Ukraine
Crisis Timelines
Further
Background notes on economic relations between the EU and Russia
BEFORE
the economic sanctions
On
22 March 2013, in Moscow, the Coordinators of the EU-Russia Energy
Dialogue signed the "Roadmap EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until
2050".
Russia
is the largest oil, gas, uranium and coal exporter to the EU.
Likewise, the EU is by far the largest trade partner of the Russian
Federation. Based on this mutual interdependency and common interest
in the energy sector, the EU and Russia developed a close energy
partnership and launched an EU-Russia
Energy Dialogue
in 2000.
Russia
– the Union's largest energy resources supplier (2009)
- 36% of the EU’s total gas imports originate from Russia (39.0 % in 2013)
- 31% of the EU's total crude oil imports originate from Russia (33.5 % in 2013)
- 30% of the EU's coal imports originate from Russia (28.8 % in 2013)
(2013
figures from:
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports#Imports
)
The
EU – Russia's largest trade partner for energy goods
- 80% of all Russian oil exports go to the EU
- 70% of all Russian gas exports go to the EU
- 50% of all Russian coal exports go to the EU
The
EU is Russia's largest trading partner by far with the EU accounting
for 52.3% of all foreign Russian trade in 2008 and 75% of foreign
direct investment
(FDI) stocks in Russia also come from the EU. The EU exported €105
billion of goods to Russia in 2008 and Russia exported €173,2
billion to the EU. 68.2% of Russian exports to the EU are accounted
for by energy and fuel supplies. For details on other trade, see the
table below;
|
Direction
of trade
|
Goods
|
Services
|
FDI
|
|
EU
to Russia
|
€105
billion
|
€18
billion
|
€17
billion
|
|
Russia
to EU
|
€173,2
billion
|
€11,5
billion
|
€1
billion
|
Russia
and the EU are both members of the World
Trade Organisation
(WTO). The EU and Russia are currently implementing the common spaces
(see below) and negotiation to replace the current Partnership
and Co-operation Agreement
to strengthen bilateral trade.
The
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia has
been the framework of the EU-Russia relations since 1997 and
regulates the political and economic relations between the two
parties.
Russia
joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
on
22 August 2012.
This development was strongly supported by the EU.
Trade
picture
- Russia is the third trading partner of the EU and the EU is the first trading partner of Russia.
- Trade between the two economies showed steep growth rates until mid-2008 when the trend was interrupted by the economic crisis and unilateral measures adopted by Russia, which had a negative impact on EU-Russia trade. Since 2010 mutual trade has resumed its growth reaching record levels in 2011.
- EU exports to Russia are dominated by machinery and transport equipment, chemicals and agricultural products.
- EU imports from Russia are dominated by raw materials, in particular, oil (crude and refined) and gas. For these products, as well as for other important raw materials, Russia has committed to freeze or reduce its export duties.
- The EU is the most important investor in Russia. It is estimated that up to 75% of Foreign Direct Investment stocks in Russia come from EU Member States.
EU
Energy Imports
The
dependency of the European
Union (EU)
on energy imports,
particularly of oil and more recently of gas, forms the backdrop for
policy concerns relating to the security of energy supplies. This
article looks at the production
of primary energy
in the EU and, as a result of the shortfall between production and
consumption, the EU’s increasing dependency on energy imports from
non-member countries. Indeed, more than half (54.1 %) of the
EU-27’s gross
inland energy consumption
in 2010 came from imported sources.
The
downturn in the primary production of hard coal, lignite, crude oil,
natural gas and more recently nuclear energy has led to a situation
where the EU is increasingly reliant on primary energy imports in
order to satisfy demand. The EU-27’s imports of primary energy
exceeded exports by some 952.3 million toe in 2010. The largest net
importers of primary energy were generally the most populous Member
States, with the exception of the United Kingdom and Poland (where
indigenous reserves of oil/natural gas and coal remain). Since 2004
the only net exporter of primary energy among the EU Member States
has been Denmark (see Table 2).
The origin of EU-27 energy imports has changed somewhat in recent years, as Russia has maintained its position as the main supplier of crude oil and natural gas and emerged as the leading supplier of hard coal (see Table 3). In 2010, some 34.5 % of the EU-27’s imports of crude oil were from Russia; this was the highest share recorded between 2002 and 2010 having fallen to a temporary low of 31.4 % in 2008. Russia became the principal supplier of hard coal in 2006, overtaking South Africa, having overtaken Australia in 2004 and Colombia in 2002; Russia’s share of EU-27 hard coal imports rose from 13.1 % in 2002 to 30.2 % by 2009, before falling somewhat in 2010 to 27.1 %. Despite this contraction, Russia remained the primary source of hard coal imports into the EU in 2010 and its share was well ahead of the next highest, recorded by Colombia (20.2 %). In contrast, Russia’s share of EU-27 imports of natural gas declined from 45.1 % to 31.8 % between 2003 and 2010, while Qatar’s share rose from less than 1 % to 8.6 %.
The security of the EU’s primary energy supplies may be threatened if a high proportion of imports are concentrated among relatively few partners. Close to three quarters (74.4 %) of the EU-27’s imports of natural gas in 2010 came from Russia, Norway or Algeria – as such there was a diversification of imports as in 2009 the same three countries accounted for 79.2 % of natural gas imports. A similar analysis shows that 58.5 % of EU-27 crude oil imports came from Russia, Norway and Libya, while 64.3 % of hard coal imports were from Russia, Colombia and the United States. Although their import volumes remain relatively small, there was some evidence of new partner countries emerging between 2002 and 2010. This was notably the case for crude oil imports from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, or natural gas imports from Qatar and Libya.
EU-27 dependency on energy imports increased from less than 40 % of gross energy consumption in the 1980s to reach 54.1 % by 2010 (see Table 4). This latest figure marked a second slight decrease in the dependency rate, which had stood at a high of 56.3 % in 2008. The highest energy dependency rates in 2010 were recorded for crude oil (85.2 %) and for natural gas (62.4 %). The growth in the last decade (between 2000 and 2010) in the dependency on non-member countries for supplies of solid fuels (29.2 %) and natural gas (27.6 %) was faster than for crude oil (12.7 %), which was already at a high level. Since 2003, the EU-27’s net imports of energy have been greater than its primary production; in other words, more than half of the EU-27’s gross inland energy consumption was supplied by net imports.
As it was a net exporter, Denmark was the only EU-27 Member State in 2010 with a negative dependency rate (see Figure 3). Among the other Member States, the lowest dependency rates were recorded by Estonia, Romania, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom (the only other countries to report dependency rates below 30 %); meanwhile, Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg were (almost) entirely dependent on primary energy imports.
The origin of EU-27 energy imports has changed somewhat in recent years, as Russia has maintained its position as the main supplier of crude oil and natural gas and emerged as the leading supplier of hard coal (see Table 3). In 2010, some 34.5 % of the EU-27’s imports of crude oil were from Russia; this was the highest share recorded between 2002 and 2010 having fallen to a temporary low of 31.4 % in 2008. Russia became the principal supplier of hard coal in 2006, overtaking South Africa, having overtaken Australia in 2004 and Colombia in 2002; Russia’s share of EU-27 hard coal imports rose from 13.1 % in 2002 to 30.2 % by 2009, before falling somewhat in 2010 to 27.1 %. Despite this contraction, Russia remained the primary source of hard coal imports into the EU in 2010 and its share was well ahead of the next highest, recorded by Colombia (20.2 %). In contrast, Russia’s share of EU-27 imports of natural gas declined from 45.1 % to 31.8 % between 2003 and 2010, while Qatar’s share rose from less than 1 % to 8.6 %.
The security of the EU’s primary energy supplies may be threatened if a high proportion of imports are concentrated among relatively few partners. Close to three quarters (74.4 %) of the EU-27’s imports of natural gas in 2010 came from Russia, Norway or Algeria – as such there was a diversification of imports as in 2009 the same three countries accounted for 79.2 % of natural gas imports. A similar analysis shows that 58.5 % of EU-27 crude oil imports came from Russia, Norway and Libya, while 64.3 % of hard coal imports were from Russia, Colombia and the United States. Although their import volumes remain relatively small, there was some evidence of new partner countries emerging between 2002 and 2010. This was notably the case for crude oil imports from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, or natural gas imports from Qatar and Libya.
EU-27 dependency on energy imports increased from less than 40 % of gross energy consumption in the 1980s to reach 54.1 % by 2010 (see Table 4). This latest figure marked a second slight decrease in the dependency rate, which had stood at a high of 56.3 % in 2008. The highest energy dependency rates in 2010 were recorded for crude oil (85.2 %) and for natural gas (62.4 %). The growth in the last decade (between 2000 and 2010) in the dependency on non-member countries for supplies of solid fuels (29.2 %) and natural gas (27.6 %) was faster than for crude oil (12.7 %), which was already at a high level. Since 2003, the EU-27’s net imports of energy have been greater than its primary production; in other words, more than half of the EU-27’s gross inland energy consumption was supplied by net imports.
As it was a net exporter, Denmark was the only EU-27 Member State in 2010 with a negative dependency rate (see Figure 3). Among the other Member States, the lowest dependency rates were recorded by Estonia, Romania, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom (the only other countries to report dependency rates below 30 %); meanwhile, Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg were (almost) entirely dependent on primary energy imports.
Source:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports
Also:
Germany
imported around 35 billion cubic metres from Russia in 2011, over 60%
of its gas imports and some 40% of its total gas consumption, of 99
bn cubic metres, while its domestic gas production continuing to
shrink sharply, to about 15 bn cubic metres in 2011 but its
consumption continued sharply growing. Germany is set to become, like
a string of east European FSU and ex-Warsaw Pact countries, almost
totally dependent on Russian gas.
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