lunedì 13 novembre 2017

What are the main factors that will influence the evolution of relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation?

Preliminary background reading on Russia (old but interesting if you have time)
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25800386.pdf?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Introduction: This relationship is important to the EU because Russia is the EU’s largest neighbor, the EU’s third biggest trading partner (see notes below) and a major (re-)emerging economy (one of the BRICS), an important market for European exports, a major military power, and one of the world’s two biggest nuclear powers, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and so a major player in international relations, and for Europe a vital supplier of energy (e.g. the opening of Nord Stream pipeline in 2011).
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact,  the decline and collapse of Communism, the reunification of Germany and the  end of the Soviet Union in December 1991, there was, in the early 1990s, real hope and expectation that Russia would, with some unavoidable difficulties due to the transition, gradually turn into a Western-style democracy, allowing the EU to develop the same kind of relationship with Russia that it has with the US, Canada, Australia or Japan.
This did not happen and there was a period of economic chaos, corruption and decline which led first to the emergence of a small number of extremely rich ‘oligarchs’ and a general impoverishment of the mass of the population, and then to a return to an authoritarian model under Putin and Medvedev. Relations today are dominated by 2 factors which are in contradiction. The EU in particular, and the West in general, needs a close relationship with Russia as a partner both politically (e.g. on security questions) and economically. At the same time Russia is not perceived as a real democracy based on respect for human and civil rights, so this partnership is one of convenience rather than of conviction (in clear contrast to the EU's relations with Canada, Japan, Brazil and South Africa, for example). There is a fundamental element of trust missing, which is what characterizes relations among EU members, and between them and many other democratic states or states committed to implementing democratic development. With the conflict in Georgia, the current conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s growing assertiveness in international relations new questions have been raised about the prospects for good future relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation.
The main factors:
1) In Soviet times there was very little trade between The Communist bloc and Western Europe. Today there is very significant trade between the two. Russia is Europe’s main gas supplier and an important oil supplier and a market for European luxury goods, capital equipment, technology, transport equipment, chemicals, medicines and agricultural products, and this has created real economic interdependence. There are concerns about whether Russia might try to use energy supplies as a weapon to put short term pressure on the EU regarding political questions, as it did regarding economic questions with its non-EU neighbor, Ukraine, in 2009, with follow-on effects also on EU members. As a result, the EU is involved in various projects to build new pipelines and gain access to resources outside Russia’s control and thus to diversify suppliers. At the same time it is committed to developing new, greener energy sources and since the Fukushima Daiichi disaster several EU countries (notably Germany) have been trying to cut back on their dependence on energy production from nuclear power. This may, at least in the short term, make it difficult to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russia. Some critics argue that as a result the EU is surprisingly quiet about violations of civil and human rights within Russia (certainly in terms of action but often also in terms of words) and until recent events in Ukraine, the EU clearly gave priority to economic security. On the other hand, some experts argue that building a strong and reliable relationship with Russia will act as a demonstration of Europe’s good will towards Russia and encourage Russia to reform and overcome its democratic deficit. The rapid development and exploitation of US and Canadian shale oil and gas resources (as well as potential European resources, e.g. in Poland) could one day provide real alternatives to Russian energy supplies and a welcome diversification of suppliers but this remains only a long-term and ecologically dubious prospect. Crude oil prices remain relatively low at $52 a barrel in 2017.
Meanwhile, trade between the EU and Russia fell for the first time in 2014 with the introduction of sanctions in response to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. This situation remained the same in 2015 and 2016 but 2017 has seen a partial recovery.
Russia too is trying to diversify by finding new customers. In 2014 and 2017 it signed deals with China to supply crude oil and build a new pipeline to supply gas.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-08/china-s-cefc-buys-stake-in-rosneft-from-glencore-and-qatar
It also obtained funding from China
and signed deals with Iran in 2014 and 2017
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/european-business-summit-2014/eu-russia-trade-drops-sharply-bilateral-relations-sour-302144
and with Turkey to sell missiles in 2017
2) In the last twenty years many former Soviet satellite states have joined NATO and the EU, at least partly as a guarantee of their continuing independence from Russia. This has been seen by Russia as an aggressive act and an attempt to reduce Russia’s sphere of influence. Early on Russia made clear its opposition to Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia joining NATO or the EU. Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008, in support of the break-away republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, is a good example of the dangers raised by the question of further NATO/EU expansion to the east. Further real progress towards EU and NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia seems unlikely at present given Russia’s opposition and the situation in the separatist regions seems to be frozen.
Above all, it is the evolution of events in Ukraine which have really thrown into question all certainties about relations with the Russian Federation. A decision in November 2013 by Ukraine's President Viktor Yanukovych to pull out of an association deal with the European Union and opt for closer ties with Russia sparked huge street protests and then police violence that eventually led to his downfall and flight in February 2014. In March Russia reacted by annexing the largely Russian-speaking Ukrainian region of Crimea after the Crimean parliament held a referendum and declared independence from Ukraine. At the same time unrest began growing in eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russian sentiment is strong. The US and NATO denounced the Russian move as illegal and aggressively expansionist. Russia responded by repeatedly asserting that it saw NATO and the EU’s expansion to the East over the last 20 years as far more aggressive and a violation of a promise made in 1990 that in exchange for Russian agreement to German reunification NATO agreed not to expand towards the East.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315-2.html
A Brief Summary of Events in Ukraine - Relations between the West and Moscow worsened dramatically as the risk of civil conflict grew and the status of Crimea remained unresolved. In March 2014 the EU and US imposed travel bans and asset freezes on several officials from Russia and Ukraine over the Crimea referendum. A ban on financial transactions was introduced the following month. Washington put military cooperation with Russia on hold and ended negotiations on the NATO missile defense program. Also in April NATO suspended all cooperation with Russia, and in June the G7 met without Russia (G8). A UN General Assembly resolution described the Crimea referendum as illegal but Russia blocked a similar resolution on the Security Council (some countries such as Cuba, Afghanistan, Syria, Venezuela, Bolivia recognized the validity of the referendum in Ukraine). Meanwhile Russia, Ukraine, the US and the EU held talks in Geneva on steps to "de-escalate" the crisis in eastern Ukraine, but were later unable to halt the violence between pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian government forces.
Protests in Donetsk and Luhansk escalated into an armed separatist insurgency. In May pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk declared independence after referendums which were not recognized by Kiev or the West. In the same month elections were held in Ukraine and in June Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President-elect Petro Poroshenko called for a quick end to the bloodshed in eastern Ukraine. On June 16th Russia cut off all gas supplies to Ukraine, with Gazprom saying Ukraine had failed to settle its debts. On 25th June Russia's parliament canceled a parliamentary resolution authorizing the use of Russian forces in Ukraine. EU leaders welcomed the move but warned of more sanctions if Russia did not do more to de-escalate tensions in Ukraine. On 27th June the EU signed an association agreement with Ukraine, along with Georgia and Moldova, in what President Petro Poroshenko described as the most important day in the country's history since independence in 1991. On July 1st Poroshenko ended a tentative ceasefire and launched military operations against pro-Russia rebels, saying "we will attack and liberate our land."
On July 17th Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot down in eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 people on board. An adviser to Ukraine's interior ministry stated the plane was hit by a missile from a Buk surface-to-air launcher. Kiev later accused rebel forces of tampering with evidence at the crash site, saying the armed groups were moving bodies and destroying evidence. Other reports indicated the OSCE monitoring group sent to the site was only granted limited access. Several EU leaders threatened to impose further sanctions on Russia if the Kremlin did not pressure rebels thought to have shot down the MH17 passenger plane to grant more access to the crash site. On July 21st fighting broke out in Donetsk as Ukrainian forces tried to regain control of the city. On the 23rd US intelligence officials said they believed the plane was shot down by pro-Russian separatists "by mistake." On 5 August Russia began a build-up of forces on the Ukrainian border, and continued a series of training exercises that had been held on and off since the start of the conflict. On 22 August A Russian aid convoy of more than 100 lorries entered eastern Ukraine and made a drop in rebel-controlled Luhansk without government permission, sparking allegations of a “direct violation of international law”. On 29 August NATO released satellite images appearing to show Russian soldiers, artillery and armoured vehicles engaged in military operations in eastern Ukraine. Russia’s alleged military involvement to back the rebels was seen as a major escalation in the crisis, which was described as a full-blown civil war. Vladimir Putin was also accused of hostility towards Kiev, telling the outgoing president of the European Commission that he could take the city “in two weeks” if he wanted. However, by the start of September most of the Donetsk region, apart from the city itself and a small area around it, was under the control of the Ukrainian armed forces.
On 5 September 2014 Ukraine's government and separatist leaders signed a ceasefire deal, the Minsk Protocol, after talks in Belarus, raising hopes of an end to the nearly five-month conflict in eastern Ukraine. It included provisions for a release of prisoners, withdrawal of forces and the establishment of a buffer zone and the decentralization of power from Kiev to the eastern region. The cease-fire seemed fragile and in danger of collapse. However, on 16 Sept. Ukraine, as agreed, voted to give the east of the country limited self-rule as part of proposals aimed at ending the separatist fighting. President Poroshenko said these measures would pave the way for decentralisation while guaranteeing the 'territorial integrity and independence' of Ukraine.
The United Nations' refugee agency, UNHCR, said that the number of people displaced in Ukraine by the fighting, particularly around Donetsk and Luhansk, as of 1 September 2014, was 260,000. A UN report published on 29 August 29, said 2,220 people died and about 6,000 were injured in the Ukrainian crisis between mid-April and August 17 2014.
As the conflict continued a new round of sanctions was imposed, by the US, the EU, and others like Canada, Japan Australia, Switzerland during the summer and autumn of 2014 to deter Russia from supporting the insurrectionist movement in the Donbass area. These sanctions involve banking and financial facilities and transactions, trade restrictions on military and technological exports (particularly to the Russian energy sector) and investment in and exports to the Crimea. The US also banned the export to Russia of technology with potential military applications, suspended cooperation on civilian nuclear energy projects and cut off NASA’s contacts with its Russian counterparts. President Putin defended Russia’s annexation of Crimea by saying that Washington and its European allies were guided by “the rule of the gun” rather than international law and respect for the principle of state sovereignty.
Russia, meanwhile, made a resolution of the impasse over NATO’s missile defense system a precondition to further strategic arms control talks. It moved forward with plans for a Eurasian Economic Union and a stronger Collective Security Treaty Organization with partners such as Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Some Russian commentators have even argued that its authoritarian model is a viable alternative to Western liberal democracy and one which will gain support in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where some Western ideas are seen as going against tradition and religion. In August 2014 Russia responded to Western sanctions with counter-measures, its own sanctions on the import of agricultural products from the US, the EU and the other countries which imposed sanctions on Russia.
The economic sanctions weakened the Russian economy and intensified the challenges that Russia was already facing after the dramatic fall in global oil prices in 2014 (see chart in article below for trend 2015-2017), a decline in the value of the ruble (usually dependent on the price of oil) and the flight of international capital.
Data confirms Russia entered a recession, with negative GDP growth of -3.7% in 2015 and -0.4% in 2016 but has returned to modest growth in 2017.
So the sanctions had the economic effect intended (although the fall in oil prices has been more important for Russia's economy). However, they have not forced Russia into a change of policy in Ukraine. In June 2017 the EU renewed sanction on Russia for another 6 months.
The US imposed new sanctions on Russia in August 2017 (partly in response to Russian interference in US elections). The EU expressed concern about further costs to its trade with Russia.
The Italian government says it wants to continue to work closely with Russia ans has doubts about the long-term viability of anti-Russian sanctions.
Anti-Russia sanctions cost the economy of the European Union $3.2 billion a month, while the Russian economy lost $55 billion because of the sanctions over last three years, according to a report (September 2017) of the UN Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive measures.
Many European leaders might like to change policy on the sanctions but this politically difficult with Russia's continued occupation of Crimea.
At the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014, the military alliance approved plans for a new "spearhead" force (a rapid deployment force of 4,000 soldiers able go into action in 48 hours) as a response to growing concern about the Ukraine crisis and the advance of Islamic State militants in the Middle East. Despite calls from eastern European members (Poland and the Baltic states), NATO did not at that time approve the proposal to create new permanent bases in these member states. Germany in particular wished to avoid further antagonizing Russia by such an action. President Obama, however, assured them of NATO and US commitment to their protection.
In February 2015, as a result of the failure of the original Minsk Protocol, a new agreement was reached, Minsk II, which involved an immediate ceasefire on Feb. 15th, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the restoration of social and economic links. Despite violations and a fear of a break-down the ceasefire seems to be holding. Total casualties in the eastern Ukraine amounted to 9,640 between April 2014 and September 2015.
At the NATO Warsaw summit in July 2016 NATO repeated its determination to maintain and repair the dialogue with Russia while continuing to support Ukraine's independence. It agreed to deploy multi-lateral forces to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. At the NATO Brussels summit in May 2017 NATO repeated its position.

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement entered into force on 1 September 2017 and Ukraine is

to join NATO but any definitive moves towards the accession of the Ukraine into the EU and NATO still seem unlikely, given the situation there today and the West's desire not to further antagonize Russia. The situation in Ukraine is likely to remain frozen, like that in Georgia and the Moldova/Transnistria situation which dates back to 1990-1992. Moreover, as we have seen, the rapid evolution of the situation in Ukraine intensified calls for the EU to move more rapidly towards a diversification of energy suppliers and sources to escape overdependence on Russia. It has also led to a reassessment of the whole relationship with Russia and the terms of political cooperation between Russia and the West (the EU, the US and NATO), and a debate about what kind of measures should be taken in dealing with Russia and how effective or desirable the current sanctions are. After all, although Russia is criticized for its actions in Ukraine and for its support of the Assad regime in Syria, it remains a fundamental ally in the fight against terrorism and for the moment an essential trading partner. However, the election of Donald Trump as US President could lead to significant changes. The EU may need to take the lead.
3) EU members need to show more unity in dealing with Russia through EU institutions. In the past EU members tended to negotiate bilateral agreements with Russia and this could allow Russia to exploit divisions between EU members.
4) Russia’s domestic political situation is characterized by a lack of freedom of the press and a concentration of media power, economic power and political power in the hands of the government, or friends of the government (opponents call this ‘cronyism and corruption’), repression of opposition leaders and strong critics of the government (e.g. Aleksei A. Navalny, Garry Kasparov, Pussy Riot), restrictions on freedom of expression and the right to demonstrate (freedom of assembly and association), opposition to the activities of NGOs in Russia involved in human rights issues, accusations of state-sponsored murder regarding the death or disappearance of some critics, (e.g. investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya), accusations from many sources of massive human rights violations and atrocities during and after the military campaigns in Chechnya, the repression of  or discrimination against other ethnic or social groups (e.g. immigrants and gays) by the police, secret services, military or paramilitary supporters and allies of the government. The government, first under Putin, then under Medvedev, and now under Putin again seems authoritarian and nationalist, determined to maintain control over society. In fact, since his re-election Putin has moved to undo some of Medvedev’s more liberal legislation. Those in positions of power are often from the FSB secret service (many like Putin originally from the KGB) or from among those who have made money and given their support to the government. Rich opponents have been charged with corruption and imprisoned, silenced or driven abroad. However, the government so far seems genuinely popular and although its control of the media raises some doubts about how far elections in  Russia can be considered free and fair, it seems likely that the government still has widespread support (including, despite some demonstrations against intervention in Ukraine, general support for the intervention in Crimea) and popular legitimacy. This may be due to the fear of terrorism or of a return to the economic chaos of the early 1990s and a resurgence of national pride after the embarrassment of a weak and economically helpless Russia in the early 1990s. Russia has a stable government but the uneven distribution of wealth makes Russia much less stable socially. It still lacks the large, independent-minded middle class on which a functioning democracy is often said to rest. The protests and demonstrations in 2014 on social and economic questions and the anti-corruption protests and unrest in 2017 suggest, however, that the middle class is growing and starting to find its voice although the government remains firmly in control. Putin's approval ratings remain high and Russia is coming out of recession.
5) Russia’s economy is too narrowly based on the export of energy resources and other raw materials. As mentioned above, the Russian economy in 2015 contracted (-3.7% GDP growth, -0.4% in 2016) largely as a result of the fall in oil prices, from well over $100 a barrel between 2011 and 2013 to around $60 a barrel in June 2015, to a low of $30 in January 2016, to $45 in September 2016 and $55 in November 2017.
Successful diversification would strengthen the economy and spread the wealth. This would help stabilize the country socially. Many experts argue that given Russia’s interest in buying shares in western European energy companies it must now open its economy much more to EU investment in its own energy companies and loosen government control. However, any move in this direction is now blocked by the Ukraine conflict and resulting sanctions, and Russia is turning to China as a new export market for its oil and to Iran for the export of its nuclear expertise. There is also a need for a better business environment in Russia, less bureaucracy and red-tape etc.. to attract investment. Organized crime is still powerful. In August 2012 Russia finally joined the WTO and this should have led to a real liberalization of the economy, increased foreign investment and significant economic expansion. All of this is now threatened by the Ukraine sanctions and counter-sanctions, and by the business environment (corruption and doubts about security of ownership, legal transparency etc...) which remains poor.
Moreover, in ‘The Dying Bear’ in 2011 (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136511/nicholas-eberstadt/the-dying-bear) Nicholas Eberstadt argued that Russia is facing a demographic disaster with a population that fell from 148.8 million in 1993 to 141.9 million in 2010, an aging population, a falling rate of family formation, more deaths than births each year and an average life expectancy of 67 years (lower than in 1961). The low life expectancy is the result of high rates of alcoholism, fatal accidents and violence (violence at the level of some post-conflict African countries), a decline in the quality of the health service and a decline in education levels. Thus Eberstadt predicted a decline in the quality and quantity of human resources available to the Russian economy in the future. All this could undermine Russia’s economic prospects as one of the BRICS. The state is currently trying to raise the birth rate by rewarding families financially for having more children but it is not clear how successful this policy is. Russia also benefits from the growing presence of millions of immigrants from ex-Soviet republics, who provide cheap labor but are not well-integrated into Russian society and are often resented, and from remittances worth billions of dollars from Russians working abroad. However, there is also a general internal migration from East to West that may soon leave the Asian areas of Russia critically underpopulated. Eberstadt also argues that Russia is an economy based on the export of raw materials and that, although this can strengthen a developed economy like Norway or Canada, without a strong industrial-technological base the Russian economy remains weak. In fact, without such a developed economic base Russia’s export earnings are less than those of Belgium. According to Eberstadt all the factors listed above will tend to weaken the Russian Federation economically, politically and, in the end, also militarily. Russia’s future position and role within the international community may thus be threatened with decline and Russia may become a more difficult partner to work with due to domestic tensions. .
However, recent trends suggest at least a partial demographic recovery. Following the 2014 annexation of Crimea, over 98% of Crimea residents acquired Russian citizenship. Russia's population thus expanded by 2,294,110 people. Moreover, as of 2014, the Russian fertility rate of 1.750 children per woman was the highest in Eastern, Southern and Central Europe. In 2013, Russia experienced the first natural population growth since 1990 at 22,700 people. Taking into account immigration, the population grew by 294,500 people. According to official Russian sources Russia's population was 143.4 million in January 2016 (excluding Crimea) and 144.5 million in January 2017. We will need to see if this low growth trend continues.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Russia
6) Terrorism – Russia is faced with separatism and Islamic fundamentalism in some of its federated republics (Chechnya and Dagestan are republics in the Russian Federation) and independent allied republics (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are in the Commonwealth of Independent States) in the Caucasus. The war in Chechnya was only the most obvious example. The Russian response has been fairly drastic in some places, milder in others, but it is not clear if Russia is winning the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign in the area. This was both a reason for Russia to support NATO logistically in Afghanistan, but also a reason for Russia to avoid bad publicity with its Moslem citizens by getting too heavily involved (also the Soviet Union, of course, fought and lost a war there in the 1970s, so it evokes bad memories). However, Russia and the West cooperate closely on major security issues, through the exchange of information and intelligence between secret services on terrorist threats and illegal trafficking. This also means that in order to have Russian cooperation against al Qaeda the West said little in criticism of Russia’s handling of the Chechen question.
7) Syria – On Syria, initially, a clear division emerged on the UN Security Council in 2011-12 between Russia, and to a lesser extent China, which were against sanctions and international intervention and argued their case in terms of the UN principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of an independent state, and the West which viewed and views the Assad regime as delegitimized by its involvement in massacres and massive human rights abuses. The West attempted to support ‘moderate’ opponents of the regime with money and arms and called for Assad to step down. Russia’s support for Assad may have been, in part, because they believed their ally could defeat the rebels and, in part, a response to what happened in Libya where the West convinced Russia to allow the UNSC to authorize an intervention to protect civilians. The Russians argue that NATO exceeded its mandate by helping the rebels to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. With the rise of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, Russia at first argued that US interventionism in the Middle East since 2003 had only led to the strengthening of radical Islamist forces and was thus a misguided policy.
However, despite all of the above, in September 2015 Russia began to intervene in the Syrian civil war directly with air strikes. Russia supports the Assad regime and claims it is acting legally (at the invitation of the 'legitimate' Syrian government) against Islamic State but seems to have mainly targeted the opposition rebels and Kurdish fighters. Russia has invited the US to form a grand alliance with it against IS (referring to their WWII alliance) but the Obama administration, despite launching its own air strikes and supporting those of its allies, refused to accept the long-term survival of the Assad regime or Russia’s targeting of Assad’s other opponents. However, the stakes are very high and the situation is in constant evolution. With the terrorist attack on Paris on November 13th 2015 Russia, the EU and the US began moving towards greater cooperation in their efforts to contain and defeat IS (Da’esh). It remains unclear whether Russia might be willing to pressure Assad to step down at some point under the right conditions. On 21st November 2015 the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously in favour of a a French-sponsored resolution ‘calling on ‘Member States that have the capacity to do so to take all necessary measures, in compliance with international law, in particular with the United Nations Charter, as well as international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, on the territory under the control of IS(IL) also known as Da’esh, in Syria and Iraq, to redouble and coordinate their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by IS(IL)’ This has been interpreted by many politicians and commentators as fully authorizing military intervention in Syria, although this is not strictly true. See the third comment below by the European Journal of International Law.
For the 2016-7 campaign to contain and push back Islamic State see:
8) Russia and the US have negotiated and implemented significant cuts in their nuclear arsenals and this is an ongoing process*. However, there is friction over the question of NATO’s planned Missile Defense System (not scheduled to become fully functional before 2020 or later). In November 2010 at the NATO summit in Lisbon, to which Russia was invited (NATO Russia Council),  Russia seemed originally to be in favor of the plan if the cooperation offered by NATO meant Russia’s  real integration into a system of shared defense against third parties (e.g. Iran). Russia was not willing to accept a system based in Eastern European NATO member states from which it would only receive information and intelligence as a courtesy. The implication from the Russian point of view is that it could still be used against Russia. However, NATO has now rejected the idea of Russia’s participation in the control arrangements for the Missile Defense System and Russia is now threatening to deploy missiles on its Western borders if NATO goes ahead with its plans. At the 2012 Chicago summit NATO said its missile defense system had reached interim capability. In May 2013 Russia repeated that it wants to share joint control (a possibility rejected by the US Senate) or to negotiate a new security agreement covering the whole of Europe, including Russia, and implicitly reducing the role of NATO. The impasse here has led Russia to break off negotiations for further nuclear arms reductions. In July 2016 NATO took command of the US-built missile shield. Talks betwee Russia and the US on further nuclear arms reductions resumed in September 2017 but experts are not optimistic about the chances of making real progress.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-shield-idUSKCN0ZO1Q1
9) The creation of the BRICS group has given Russia a new forum in which to exercise its influence. While this group will continue to be of growing importance economically (see notes on the BRICS and the The New Development Bank) its political value is still unclear. Will authoritarian states like Russia and China share common positions with functioning democracies like India, Brazil and South Africa? This may be possible in a negative sense, e.g. restraining US and Western interventionism, bur when it comes to promoting democratic values and denouncing human rights violations it is difficult to imagine Brazil and Russia in full agreement. However, the growing strength of the relationship between Russia and China was demonstrated by the signing of a $400 billion oil supply deal in May 2014 and the start on construction of a new oil pipeline costing $5 billion on September 1st 2014. See above for more recent Russia-China deal. Russia, Brazil and South Africa all faced economic difficulties in 2015 and 2016. This will also limit the group's influence.
10) Russia and how international events, like the World Athletics Championships in Moscow in August 2013 and the Winter Olympics in 2014, affected its foreign policy stance and image at the international level. However, the World Anti-Doping Agency’s report on Russia’s state-sponsored support for Russian athletes using drugs to enhance their performance did enormous damage to the country’s sporting image.
11) Institutional relations between the EU and the Russian Federation:
Conclusion: Russia appears to want to reassert its power and play a more decisive role on the world stage and in eastern Europe. The EU and the West should perhaps welcome or at least try to accommodate its first ambition and try to work with Russia wherever possible, while trying to reach a reasonable compromise as regards its second ambition. If the EU and Russia do not have the kind of friendly relations that the EU has with countries like the US, Brazil, Australia and Japan this is because Russia is still not perceived as a fully democratic state. Events in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine since 2014 have undermined this relationship and suggest that there has been a return to a more adversarial relationship. According to some experts there is even the danger of a second Cold War, though this seems an exaggerated reaction. Further progress on US-Russia nuclear arms reductions, cooperation between NATO and Russia and real agreement on the future of Ukraine and other states bordering on Russia seem unlikely for the moment. Indeed, NATO seems destined to return, at least in part, to its Cold War task of guaranteeing the independence of its European members. Many diplomats on both sides see the main task as that of ‘damage control’ and trying to reduce tensions and repair relations. After the terrorist attack on Paris, the role the evolving situation in Syria (and the need for cooperation between Russia and the West to deal with it) will play is uncertain.
Nonetheless, compared with relations with the old Soviet Union and Soviet bloc, enormous progress has been made politically and economically in the last 25 years. Russia is clearly no longer a state that Europe regards simply as an enemy. Europe will maintain close ties with the US through NATO as an ultimate guarantee of its freedom from Russian pressure, but needs at the same time to intensify its dialogue with Russia. This may mean quiet diplomacy to encourage Russia to implement democratic reforms with a campaign of renewed goodwill to win the confidence of the Russian government and people. Both sides need the relationship to return to stability and cooperation. This will mean reaching some kind of practical compromise on the Ukrainian question and the economic sanctions. The Minsk II agreement of February 2015 was a clear attempt to take a first step towards reaching such a settlement by stabilizing the situation.
The election of Donald Trump has been welcomed by Russia and may lead to a real change in relations. What this will be and whether this will mean closer cooperation between the US and Russia, or US isolationism and less support for its allies in dealing with Russia, or the risk of a confrontation between Russia and the US, remains unclear. The likely involvement of Russia in attempts to manipulate voting in the 2016 US presidential election could further destabilize US-Russian relations.
Some Background notes:
Ukraine
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_II older material on EU-US sanctions on Russia and their effect
Russia’s economy
Ukraine’s economy
See also:
‘Managing the New Cold War’, in Foreign Affairs July/August 2014, by Robert Legvold
And for the Russian position:
‘What the Kremlin Is Thinking’, in Foreign Affairs July/August 2014, by Alexander Lukin

* US and Russian Nuclear Arms Reductions
The New START (for Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) is a nuclear arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. It was signed on April 8, 2010 in Prague, and, after ratification, entered into force on February 5, 2011. It is expected to last at least until 2021. The New START replaced the Treaty of Moscow (SORT), which was due to expire in December 2012. In terms of name, it is a follow-up to the START I treaty, which expired in December 2009, and to proposed START II and START III treaties that have never entered into force. Under terms of the treaty, the number of strategic nuclear missile launchers will be reduced by half.
Summary of New START Limits
Type Limit
Deployed missiles and bombers 700
Deployed warheads (RVs and bombers) 1550
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers (missile tubes and bombers) 800
A new inspection and verification regime will be established, replacing the SORT mechanism. It does not limit the number of operationally inactive stockpiled nuclear warheads, that remain in the high thousands in both the Russian and United States inventories. However, total nuclear warheads have seen huge reductions as a result of the treaties from a maximum of 65,000 nuclear warheads to current levels.
Situation as of 2017
Country
Deployed
Strategic
Deployed
Nonstrategic
Reserve/
Nondeployed
Military
Stockpile
Total Inventory
 Russia
1950
0
 2,350
4300
7000
 US
1650
150
 2,200
4000
6800
In June 2013 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov commented on US President Barack Obama’s proposal from earlier that week to slash US and Russian nuclear arsenals by one third from the limit imposed by the bilateral New START treaty in 2010.
“The New START limits deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550 per country, though the actual slashing of nuclear arsenals is still ongoing. Moving beyond the New START will make nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia comparable to those of other countries with nuclear weapons”, Lavrov said. “This means that further moves possibly proposed for reduction of actual strategic offensive arms will have to be reviewed in a multilateral format,” Lavrov told Rossia-1 television. “And I’m talking not just official nuclear powers, but all countries that possess nuclear weapons,” the minister added.
Further Background notes on economic relations between the EU and Russia BEFORE the economic sanctions
On 22 March 2013, in Moscow, the Coordinators of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue signed the "Roadmap EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050".
Russia is the largest oil, gas, uranium and coal exporter to the EU. Likewise, the EU is by far the largest trade partner of the Russian Federation. Based on this mutual interdependency and common interest in the energy sector, the EU and Russia developed a close energy partnership and launched an EU-Russia Energy Dialogue in 2000.
Russia – the Union's largest energy resources supplier (2009)
  • 36% of the EU’s total gas imports originate from Russia (39.0 % in 2013)
  • 31% of the EU's total crude oil imports originate from Russia (33.5 % in 2013)
  • 30% of the EU's coal imports originate from Russia (28.8 % in 2013)
The EU – Russia's largest trade partner for energy goods
  • 80% of all Russian oil exports go to the EU
  • 70% of all Russian gas exports go to the EU
  • 50% of all Russian coal exports go to the EU
The EU is Russia's largest trading partner by far with the EU accounting for 52.3% of all foreign Russian trade in 2008 and 75% of foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks in Russia also come from the EU. The EU exported €105 billion of goods to Russia in 2008 and Russia exported €173,2 billion to the EU. 68.2% of Russian exports to the EU are accounted for by energy and fuel supplies. For details on other trade, see the table below;
Direction of trade
Goods
Services
FDI
EU to Russia €105 billion €18 billion €17 billion
Russia to EU €173,2 billion €11,5 billion €1 billion
Russia and the EU are both members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The EU and Russia are currently implementing the common spaces (see below) and negotiation to replace the current Partnership and Co-operation Agreement to strengthen bilateral trade.
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia has been the framework of the EU-Russia relations since 1997 and regulates the political and economic relations between the two parties.
Russia joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on 22 August 2012. This development was strongly supported by the EU.
Trade picture
  • Russia is the third trading partner of the EU and the EU is the first trading partner of Russia.
  • Trade between the two economies showed steep growth rates until mid-2008 when the trend was interrupted by the economic crisis and unilateral measures adopted by Russia, which had a negative impact on EU-Russia trade. Since 2010 mutual trade has resumed its growth reaching record levels in 2011.
  • EU exports to Russia are dominated by machinery and transport equipment, chemicals and agricultural products.
  • EU imports from Russia are dominated by raw materials, in particular, oil (crude and refined) and gas. For these products, as well as for other important raw materials, Russia has committed to freeze or reduce  its export duties.
  • The EU is the most important investor in Russia. It is estimated that up to 75% of Foreign Direct Investment stocks in Russia come from EU Member States.
EU Energy Imports
The dependency of the European Union (EU) on energy imports, particularly of oil and more recently of gas, forms the backdrop for policy concerns relating to the security of energy supplies. This article looks at the production of primary energy in the EU and, as a result of the shortfall between production and consumption, the EU’s increasing dependency on energy imports from non-member countries. Indeed, more than half (54.1 %) of the EU-27’s gross inland energy consumption in 2010 came from imported sources.
The downturn in the primary production of hard coal, lignite, crude oil, natural gas and more recently nuclear energy has led to a situation where the EU is increasingly reliant on primary energy imports in order to satisfy demand. The EU-27’s imports of primary energy exceeded exports by some 952.3 million toe in 2010. The largest net importers of primary energy were generally the most populous Member States, with the exception of the United Kingdom and Poland (where indigenous reserves of oil/natural gas and coal remain). Since 2004 the only net exporter of primary energy among the EU Member States has been Denmark (see Table 2).
The origin of EU-27 energy imports has changed somewhat in recent years, as Russia has maintained its position as the main supplier of crude oil and natural gas and emerged as the leading supplier of hard coal (see Table 3). In 2010, some 34.5 % of the EU-27’s imports of crude oil were from Russia; this was the highest share recorded between 2002 and 2010 having fallen to a temporary low of 31.4 % in 2008. Russia became the principal supplier of hard coal in 2006, overtaking South Africa, having overtaken Australia in 2004 and Colombia in 2002; Russia’s share of EU-27 hard coal imports rose from 13.1 % in 2002 to 30.2 % by 2009, before falling somewhat in 2010 to 27.1 %. Despite this contraction, Russia remained the primary source of hard coal imports into the EU in 2010 and its share was well ahead of the next highest, recorded by Colombia (20.2 %). In contrast, Russia’s share of EU-27 imports of natural gas declined from 45.1 % to 31.8 % between 2003 and 2010, while Qatar’s share rose from less than 1 % to 8.6 %.
The security of the EU’s primary energy supplies may be threatened if a high proportion of imports are concentrated among relatively few partners. Close to three quarters (74.4 %) of the EU-27’s imports of natural gas in 2010 came from Russia, Norway or Algeria – as such there was a diversification of imports as in 2009 the same three countries accounted for 79.2 % of natural gas imports. A similar analysis shows that 58.5 % of EU-27 crude oil imports came from Russia, Norway and Libya, while 64.3 % of hard coal imports were from Russia, Colombia and the United States. Although their import volumes remain relatively small, there was some evidence of new partner countries emerging between 2002 and 2010. This was notably the case for crude oil imports from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, or natural gas imports from Qatar and Libya.
EU-27 dependency on energy imports increased from less than 40 % of gross energy consumption in the 1980s to reach 54.1 % by 2010 (see Table 4). This latest figure marked a second slight decrease in the dependency rate, which had stood at a high of 56.3 % in 2008. The highest energy dependency rates in 2010 were recorded for crude oil (85.2 %) and for natural gas (62.4 %). The growth in the last decade (between 2000 and 2010) in the dependency on non-member countries for supplies of solid fuels (29.2 %) and natural gas (27.6 %) was faster than for crude oil (12.7 %), which was already at a high level. Since 2003, the EU-27’s net imports of energy have been greater than its primary production; in other words, more than half of the EU-27’s gross inland energy consumption was supplied by net imports.
As it was a net exporter, Denmark was the only EU-27 Member State in 2010 with a negative dependency rate (see Figure 3). Among the other Member States, the lowest dependency rates were recorded by Estonia, Romania, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom (the only other countries to report dependency rates below 30 %); meanwhile, Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg were (almost) entirely dependent on primary energy imports.
Also:
Germany imported around 35 billion cubic metres from Russia in 2011, over 60% of its gas imports and some 40% of its total gas consumption, of 99 bn cubic metres, while its domestic gas production continuing to shrink sharply, to about 15 bn cubic metres in 2011 but its consumption continued sharply growing. Germany is set to become, like a string of east European FSU and ex-Warsaw Pact countries, almost totally dependent on Russian gas. 
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