Given
the difficulties its economy has faced recently and its huge public
debt (103.8%
in the third quarter of 2017),
some
commentators argue that the US has now begun an inevitable decline as
the dominant superpower, a decline that may soon erode not only its
economic position but also impact its military dominance. However,
according to other experts the relative decline of US power is at
least partially exaggerated and can better be seen as an opportunity
for Washington to redefine its strategic commitments, renegotiate
alliances with its partners and free up resources to relaunch its
economy.
While the global and US economies are recovering from the economic crisis a decade ago, the credit rating agencies continue to show concern about the size of the US debt and the fragility of the recovery in the US (and much of Europe) and the likely future expansion of the US public debt due to President Trump's program of tax cuts.
While the global and US economies are recovering from the economic crisis a decade ago, the credit rating agencies continue to show concern about the size of the US debt and the fragility of the recovery in the US (and much of Europe) and the likely future expansion of the US public debt due to President Trump's program of tax cuts.
The
debate between pessimists and more sanguine observers has grown. The
former predict a serious and rapid decline in US influence and the
growth of a much more multipolar world strongly influenced by China,
while the latter are confident that for the foreseeable future the US
will be able to maintain its leadership role in international
relations. Moreover, they argue that if we consider the West as a
whole, rather than the US alone, then, despite Europe’s continuing
economic difficulties, China cannot really hope to achieve dominance
in terms of economic and military power. In addition, the world’s
principal global institutions are all expressions of the West’s
value system and China seems basically to be in the process of
joining this system, adapting to it and trying to gain more influence
within it, rather than wanting to overturn it or see it collapse as
the Soviet Union did.
In spite of the economic crisis in 2008, which hit the US hard, forecasts of absolute decline seem premature. The US economy continues its long but rather weak economic recovery, and the US remains the principal power at the center of the international stage. In 2016, according to the World Bank, China’s GDP in nominal terms was $11.20 trillion, still much less than that of the US ($18.57 nominal), although China's was bigger than it in terms of GDP Purchasing Power Parity (China $21.42 trillion against US $18.57 PPP). The EU stood at $16.34 trillion nominal /$19.72 PPP).The American economy was still much larger than those of its other closest competitors, India ($2.26 nominal/$8.70 PPP) and Japan ($4.94 nominal/$5.27 PPP) even in PPP terms. US GDP represented about 24.6% of global nominal GDP in 2016 and 16.1% of global GDP PPP. China's was 14.9 /18.6% respectively (the EU stood at 21.6% /17.7%).https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29
In spite of the economic crisis in 2008, which hit the US hard, forecasts of absolute decline seem premature. The US economy continues its long but rather weak economic recovery, and the US remains the principal power at the center of the international stage. In 2016, according to the World Bank, China’s GDP in nominal terms was $11.20 trillion, still much less than that of the US ($18.57 nominal), although China's was bigger than it in terms of GDP Purchasing Power Parity (China $21.42 trillion against US $18.57 PPP). The EU stood at $16.34 trillion nominal /$19.72 PPP).The American economy was still much larger than those of its other closest competitors, India ($2.26 nominal/$8.70 PPP) and Japan ($4.94 nominal/$5.27 PPP) even in PPP terms. US GDP represented about 24.6% of global nominal GDP in 2016 and 16.1% of global GDP PPP. China's was 14.9 /18.6% respectively (the EU stood at 21.6% /17.7%).https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29
China
is forecast to overtake the US in nominal GDP terms by 2030 (2027?)
As
for military power, the US military budget still represented 36% of
total global military spending, $1.69 trillion in 2016 (this was
before Trump's proposed defense spending increases in 2017). Despite
recent cuts under President Obama the US still spent more than China,
Britain, France, Germany, India, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Russia
combined
in
2016.
Moreover, NATO, the US-led alliance, accounted for more than $892
billion (53%) of global military spending in 2016 (down from 60% in
2013). However, if the military spending of other US allies (e.g.
Japan, Australia, South Korea etc…) is added, this figure rises and
suggests that the US easily remains the dominant power in
international relations.** The US has 38 major military bases around
the world compared with: Russia 9, France 13, Britain 16 and
China
1.
http://www.businessinsider.com/us-military-spending-remains-massive-compared-to-the-rest-of-the-world-2016-4?IR=T
2016
figures show the US military budget ($611.2,
3.3% of GDP)
still over 2.5 times bigger than that of China ($215.7,
1.9% of GDP)
even before Trump's proposed defense spending increases in 2017 (the
final Senate version of the bill includes a base budget of $640
billion and another $60 billion for the so-called Overseas
Contingency Operations war funding, which includes money for the wars
in Iraq, Afghanistan and other locations).
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/18/senate-passes-700-billion-defense-policy-bill-backing-trump-call-for-steep-increase-in-military-spending.html
Finally,
the US is still the world leader for investment in research (although
China is starting to challenge seriously), and in the list of the top
20 universities worldwide, between 11 and 15 are American, according
to which list you choose to believe.
However, over the last decade, the US share of global GDP (PPP) fell from 23% to 16.1 %, while China´s share of global GDP PPP increased from 7% to 18.6% ( however the EU also accounts for 17.7% of global GDP PPP). At this pace of growth China may overtake US nominal GDP by as early as 2027. So, although US strength is evident, its relative decline is real. In fact, at the start of the 21st century, the country´s reliance on imports, combined with low taxes and the then high cost of borrowing (in order to fund the public debt), together with Washington’s soaring military expenditure after 9⁄11 as it expanded its military and counterterrorism operations around the world, inflated its annual budget deficit which stood at 8.6% of GDP for the 2011 fiscal year. After significant spending cuts it returned to its historical average relative to the size of the economy (around 3% of GDP) registering 2.4% in 2015. Since then the annual budget deficit has begun to rise again, 3.1% in 2016 and 3.4% in 2017. The Trump tax cuts are forecast to cause the annual deficit and public debt to rise in the next few years.
The
annual growth rate of the US economy was 2.2% in 2012, 1.7% in 2013,
2.6% in 2014, 2.9% in 2015, 1.5% in 2016 and 2.6% in
2017.https://www.thebalance.com/us-gdp-by-year-3305543
The US trade deficit for 2012 was -2.7% of GDP (perhaps -2% with China alone), -2.4% in 2013, -2.2% in 2014, -2.6% in 2015 and -2.6% in 2016.https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/current-account-to-gdp
The US trade deficit for 2012 was -2.7% of GDP (perhaps -2% with China alone), -2.4% in 2013, -2.2% in 2014, -2.6% in 2015 and -2.6% in 2016.https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/current-account-to-gdp
On
the other hand, GDP PPP per
capita
clearly indicates that American citizens are still far richer than
their Chinese counterparts (nearly 4 times
richer).https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29_per_capita
Per capita income is a good indicator of how much money governments can generate in taxes for government projects at home and abroad. Meanwhile, in China growth remained strong in 2017 at 6.9%. However, the Chinese authorities may face some obstacles as they try to steer their economy away from a model where growth is based on exports to one where domestic consumption plays a much greater role. These problems include growing debt within the Chinese economic system, potential domestic unrest, continuing high levels of savings and fast-growing but relatively low domestic consumption, an ageing population (which will become a significant factor in the next 20 years), a still relatively weak health care system and widespread corruption. As China moves to respond to these challenges its labor costs are likely to begin to rise.
Per capita income is a good indicator of how much money governments can generate in taxes for government projects at home and abroad. Meanwhile, in China growth remained strong in 2017 at 6.9%. However, the Chinese authorities may face some obstacles as they try to steer their economy away from a model where growth is based on exports to one where domestic consumption plays a much greater role. These problems include growing debt within the Chinese economic system, potential domestic unrest, continuing high levels of savings and fast-growing but relatively low domestic consumption, an ageing population (which will become a significant factor in the next 20 years), a still relatively weak health care system and widespread corruption. As China moves to respond to these challenges its labor costs are likely to begin to rise.
China
holds very large foreign exchange reserves, particularly in dollars.
China
and Japan each owned about 5.5% of the US national debt
in November 2017 ( China about $1.2 trillion, Japan about $1.1
trillion).
The
US has long accused China of currency manipulation, keeping the
Yuan/Renminbi
at a low exchange rate value in order to boost exports. However, over
the year (2017) it appreciated by 6.72% as the dollar weakened. See
this article below for a good explanation of the causes:
Moreover,
China is the principal stake-holder in the BRICS’ New Development
Bank and the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB).
China is also the main trading partner for Africa and an important
investor in Africa (but behind the EU and US),
The
pace of domestic consumption has accelerated recently as China shifts
to a an economic model involving more domestic demand.
However,
the high levels of savings represent one of the most striking
characteristics of the Chinese economy.
While
consumer spending still only amounted to 39% of GDP in 2016 (compared
with more than 68..8% in the US and 59.4% in India)
investments
have reached a level estimated at about 44% of GDP (World Bank for
2016).
Along
with massive investments in industrial infrastructure (a good
indicator of future competitivity) there has also been a continual
rise in property prices in urban, industrial areas with significant
social consequences. Moreover, the Chinese government is now having
to to try to cope with the rising demand for social services by
shifting resources from other kinds of investments to welfare.
China is rapidly increasing investment in technology, particularly in IT, and education. US companies operating in China have registered very high productivity levels while benefitting from much lower labor costs. However, there are now signs that as labor flows from rural areas begin to slow and demand for skilled workers rises, labor costs in China are now beginning to rise though they obviously remain well below levels in the US and Europe.
China is rapidly increasing investment in technology, particularly in IT, and education. US companies operating in China have registered very high productivity levels while benefitting from much lower labor costs. However, there are now signs that as labor flows from rural areas begin to slow and demand for skilled workers rises, labor costs in China are now beginning to rise though they obviously remain well below levels in the US and Europe.
And
if the US chooses not to lead?
This
is a more difficult question to respond to, especially given the role
of isolationism in US history.
The
US may or may not be retreating from world affairs. President Trump's
foreign policy stance sounds isolationist at times (the Paris
agreement, the Mexican border, some comments about NATO partners, the
Iran deal, the ban on Muslim visitors to the US from some Islamic
countries, US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement,“TPP”,
plans to reintroduce tarriffs on some goods) hard-line at others
(position on North Korea, Israel, terrorism, NATO deployment in
Eastern Europe). So the long-term position of the US on any
particular international issue is difficult to predict as it will be
the Trump administration that will decide what 'America first' means
in practice and what US interests are in any situation that arises.
A
re-evaluation and reduction in US strategic commitments in some areas
in order to exercise more influence in others seems likely. After the
fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
European continent lost relevance in the eyes of America as the
threat level was reduced. However, recent events in Ukraine and
growing tension with Russia have forced a review of this policy.
The
US formally withdrew its last 'combat troops' from Iraq in December
2011and from Afghanistan in December 2014. However in January 2018
it has 14,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. Despite initially saying he
was in favor of withdrawing Trump has authorised troo increases
there.
In
January 2018, the U.S. Army chief of staff, Gen. Mark Milley, on
returning from a trip to Iraq, said U.S. troops there will continue
to help Iraqi security forces root out Islamic State militants, but
what comes after that for the army in the war-torn country remains to
be seen.
The US had nearly 9,000 troops in Iraq and 1,700 in Syria in November
2017.
http://abcnews.go.com/International/thousands-us-military-service-members-iraq-syria-believed/story?id=51411555
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American-led_intervention_in_Syria
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American-led_intervention_in_Syria
The
future of Obama's pivot to Asia is unclear but there has been a
build-up of US naval forces in the Western Pacific in response to
North Korean threats and perceived Chinese 'expansionism'.
China
is aware of the policy being carried out by the US and clearly sees
it as an attempt to undermine its influence in the region. Tensions
over developments regarding Taiwan are also indicative of the
frictions which are perhaps inevitable as a rapidly growing regional
power challenges a global power whose resources, while vast, are now
limited. If China continues to grow at current rates but fails to
democratize and develop towards the Western model then a
strengthening of security ties between China’s neighbors, many of
which are democratic states is a likely response to safeguard
independence and shared values.
More importantly, the combined economic resources (in terms of GDP) and military resources of the West (NATO in its narrowest sense, perhaps the OECD in its widest sense) as a whole is and will remain far beyond the capacity of China to challenge. US military spending alone is two and a half times that of China (2016). Certainly China’s power and influence is going to grow both regionally and globally, perhaps in partnership with Russia at the UN and through the BRICS group. However, there is a more likely scenario than confrontation. China is a major stakeholder in the international liberal order, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, an important WTO and IMF member, and, above all, as a state holding vast foreign currency reserves (e.g. US Treasury bonds) estimated at around 1.2 trillion dollars, and one which also has growing overseas investments (estimated to reach $1-2 trillion by 2020). So even though China may continue to stand on its sovereignty and use nationalist rhetoric that defines international comment (on issues such as human rights in China, its lack of democracy and the situation in Tibet) as interference in its domestic affairs, it is probable that its stake in the existing global order will continue to grow and that it will thus have good reason to adopt a policy of accommodation and cooperation rather than one of confrontation.
In the end perhaps it is the definition of what we mean by the ‘West’ that is of paramount importance in today’s world. Once that meant Europe and North America, plus countries like Australia and New Zealand. It would be difficult today not to include Japan. And then there is the OECD. More importantly, it is the core liberal democratic values enshrined in the main global institutions from the UN down which best define the West. These are values which many countries (Brazil, India, but many more in Latin America and Africa and Southern Asia) and not only the richer, developed ones but developing ones too, have invested in, or are investing in, and which increasingly represent the normative political expectations (how things should be) for ordinary people all over the world. The wave of democratization since the 1990s and at least part of the political hopes expressed in the early days of the Arab Spring suggest that the West in this sense is very much alive and flourishing, with or without US leadership. And a ‘West’ which is global and multipolar, rather than simply a US-led NATO, may be a very positive evolution. Strangely, al-Qaeda and Islamic State, in describing the UN and other international agencies as agents of Western cultural imperialism may simply be acknowledging the extent to which once-Western values are now becoming universal.
Those who doubt the attraction of the West’s cultural model should perhaps pay more attention to the vast number of migrants and refugees for most of whom the West remains the preferred destination in terms of their hopes for prosperity, security and freedom.
More importantly, the combined economic resources (in terms of GDP) and military resources of the West (NATO in its narrowest sense, perhaps the OECD in its widest sense) as a whole is and will remain far beyond the capacity of China to challenge. US military spending alone is two and a half times that of China (2016). Certainly China’s power and influence is going to grow both regionally and globally, perhaps in partnership with Russia at the UN and through the BRICS group. However, there is a more likely scenario than confrontation. China is a major stakeholder in the international liberal order, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, an important WTO and IMF member, and, above all, as a state holding vast foreign currency reserves (e.g. US Treasury bonds) estimated at around 1.2 trillion dollars, and one which also has growing overseas investments (estimated to reach $1-2 trillion by 2020). So even though China may continue to stand on its sovereignty and use nationalist rhetoric that defines international comment (on issues such as human rights in China, its lack of democracy and the situation in Tibet) as interference in its domestic affairs, it is probable that its stake in the existing global order will continue to grow and that it will thus have good reason to adopt a policy of accommodation and cooperation rather than one of confrontation.
In the end perhaps it is the definition of what we mean by the ‘West’ that is of paramount importance in today’s world. Once that meant Europe and North America, plus countries like Australia and New Zealand. It would be difficult today not to include Japan. And then there is the OECD. More importantly, it is the core liberal democratic values enshrined in the main global institutions from the UN down which best define the West. These are values which many countries (Brazil, India, but many more in Latin America and Africa and Southern Asia) and not only the richer, developed ones but developing ones too, have invested in, or are investing in, and which increasingly represent the normative political expectations (how things should be) for ordinary people all over the world. The wave of democratization since the 1990s and at least part of the political hopes expressed in the early days of the Arab Spring suggest that the West in this sense is very much alive and flourishing, with or without US leadership. And a ‘West’ which is global and multipolar, rather than simply a US-led NATO, may be a very positive evolution. Strangely, al-Qaeda and Islamic State, in describing the UN and other international agencies as agents of Western cultural imperialism may simply be acknowledging the extent to which once-Western values are now becoming universal.
Those who doubt the attraction of the West’s cultural model should perhaps pay more attention to the vast number of migrants and refugees for most of whom the West remains the preferred destination in terms of their hopes for prosperity, security and freedom.
Note – the West in modern English is not normally used as a synonym for European colonialism (I think this is mainly because European colonialism – often based on slavery and doctrines of racial superiority – is now seen as something clearly in contrast with many basic, modern Western values) . It is mainly used in international relations to refer to those countries evolving towards liberal democracy and a free (today usually mixed) market economy, from the late 18th century, through the 19th century and up to 1945. Since the end of the Second World War it has been used to describe first NATO and other allies outside NATO (like Australia) and then gradually to include all those countries which generally embrace Western values.
Longer
term background
On January 26, 2016, the debt held by the public was $13.62 trillion or about 75% of the previous 12 months of GDP. Intragovernmental holdings stood at $5.34 trillion, giving a combined total gross national debt of $18.96 trillion or about 104% of the previous 12 months of GDP. $6.2 trillion or approximately 47% of the debt held by the public was owned by foreign investors, the largest of which were the People's Republic of China and Japan at about $1.3 trillion each for the two countries as of November 2015 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/current
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/government-debt-to-gdp
Washington’s fiscal position is even more alarming if viewed as an ongoing trend. Over the last few years, the US public debt as a percentage of GDP rose rapidly, from 56.4% in 2001 to 100.8% in 2012, 100.9% in 2013 and 103.2% in 2014. As indicated before, it stood at 103.8% in the third quarter of 2017.
On January 26, 2016, the debt held by the public was $13.62 trillion or about 75% of the previous 12 months of GDP. Intragovernmental holdings stood at $5.34 trillion, giving a combined total gross national debt of $18.96 trillion or about 104% of the previous 12 months of GDP. $6.2 trillion or approximately 47% of the debt held by the public was owned by foreign investors, the largest of which were the People's Republic of China and Japan at about $1.3 trillion each for the two countries as of November 2015 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/current
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/government-debt-to-gdp
Washington’s fiscal position is even more alarming if viewed as an ongoing trend. Over the last few years, the US public debt as a percentage of GDP rose rapidly, from 56.4% in 2001 to 100.8% in 2012, 100.9% in 2013 and 103.2% in 2014. As indicated before, it stood at 103.8% in the third quarter of 2017.
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GFDEGDQ188S
For China’s spending on household consumption see:http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/household-final-consumption-expenditure-etc-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PETC.ZS
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/consumer-spending
For an alternative estimate of global military spending and by country see: http://www.janes.com/article/76463/global-defence-spending-to-hit-post-cold-war-high-in-2018-jane-s-by-ihs-markit-says
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151216006109/en/Growing-Security-Fears-Boost-Defence-Budgets-IHS
For China’s spending on household consumption see:http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/household-final-consumption-expenditure-etc-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PETC.ZS
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/consumer-spending
For an alternative estimate of global military spending and by country see: http://www.janes.com/article/76463/global-defence-spending-to-hit-post-cold-war-high-in-2018-jane-s-by-ihs-markit-says
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151216006109/en/Growing-Security-Fears-Boost-Defence-Budgets-IHS
US
economy
How is the relationship between China and the West developing?
A
few aspects of China’s changing role in international relations
Signs
of a trend towards stronger cooperation
That
China is starting to get more involved in international relations is
demonstrated by various diplomatic initiatives launched by the
Chinese government in the economic field. First of all, China joined
the a project aimed at establishing a free trade zone with various
Asian-Pacific countries, namely the Free Trade Area of the
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). The goal is to increase its exports in the
Asia-Pacific area in order to boost its economic growth and forecasts
suggest that this initiative could lead to an increase in China’s
GDP of one percentage point. This initiative was seen by some as an
attempt to counter the Trans-Pacific Partnership initiative, backed
by the US and Japan and signed on 4th
Feb 2016 (from which the Trum administration has now withdrawn), but
China publicly backed the Trans-Pacific Partnership showing itself to
be a promoter of free trade agreements. Simultaneously, China is
carrying out a diplomatic initiative in Central Asia with the goal of
reestablishing the old “Silk Road”.
This
initiative has led to wider cooperation with many countries, such as
Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and
Kyrgyzstan,
aimed at creating a safe-area for international trade and at ensuring
gas and oil supplies to China, which are extremely important to
China’s industrial production. This initiative has also led to
competition between China and the EU for influence in the region and
for gas and oil supplies. However, this competition may actually lead
to cooperation between China and the EU in Central Asia, in terms of
building new pipelines, which could have both Europe and China as
final delivery points.
As
China has become more involved in the international community from an
economic point of view, political cooperation has followed. In
recent years, Chinese military personnel have taken part in UN
missions in Cambodia, the Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sudan and
Lebanon. In 2015, a combat deployment was sent to South Sudan, where
China has significant oil investments.
In addition, China’s navy is actively participating in the
anti-piracy mission of the UN in the Gulf of Aden.
Basically
the expansion of China’s economic interests around the world has
led to growing political awareness among the Chinese leadership of
the need to protect those interests and engage on international
issues, especially those closely related to international security.
This has resulted in China playing a more active role within the
international community. This trend culminated with the agreement
signed with Djibouti concerning the creation of China’s first real
military base abroad in order to secure trade between China and
Africa. China’s concerns about international security, aggravated
by the participation of Uyghurs in the campaign waged by the
self-proclaimed Islamic State, could be an opportunity for Western
countries to persuade China to take on an increasingly active role in
sharing some of the international community’s responsibilities,
especially in the security domain. However, in the Middle East
region, China has taken a carefully balanced position in the dispute
between Sunni and Shia Muslims and between their main sponsors,
namely Saudi Arabia and Iran. In fact, the recent publication of
China’s Arab Policy Paper shows that the China wants to adopt a
global approach to the Islamic world without taking sides. Such a
policy will makes it possible for China to deal with both Saudi
Arabia and Iran to obtain from both parties an agreement on oil
supplies agreement, which is fundamental for China’s economic
growth. It also explains China’s willingness to act as a mediator
between the US and Iran (which resulted in the 5+1 Nuclear Agreement
with Iran and in the lifting of economic sanctions) and in the Syrian
civil war.
Potential areas
of disagreement between China and the West
As mentioned above
China’s neighbours are worried about its expansionist ambitions in
the East Asian area e.g. the dispute over the Senkaku Islands,
located in the South China Sea and claimed by both China and Japan.
China is the world’s
biggest polluter in terms of CO2 emissions. Although China took part
in a series of international conferences and welcomed the agreement
at the Climate Conference, CoP21 in Paris in December 2015, some
countries remain doubtful about China’s commitment to making real
changes, given that the agreement is not binding in any practical
way.
China’s domestic
human rights record, including the use of the death penalty and
repression of political and religious opposition leaders, critics and
dissidents and discrimination against minorities (e.g. Tibetans and
Uyghurs).
Global
Defense Spending and by country
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures
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