martedì 3 aprile 2018

What are the main questions that need to be resolved in the search for a lasting peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians?

A few ideas and sources:
Coming events 
70th anniversary of Israel’s founding on May 14-15; mourning by Palestinians who regard the same event as their “catastrophe” and observe May 15 as“Nakba Day”; and the scheduled opening of a U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem on May 14, courtesy of the administration of President Donald Trump. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-04/israel-palestine-gaza-violence-is-about-to-get-worse
Recent events                                                                                                                             President Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian leader, speaking at the UN General Assembly, formally requested full membership for his as yet undefined country on 23rd September 2011. However, the Security Council vote was called off when it became clear that the US would use its veto to block this request. Palestine is recognised by about 130 members of the General Assembly and UNESCO admitted Palestine as a member in October 2011. The Palestinian move at the UN encouraged the international community to try to re-launch direct Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. Some experts saw the prisoner swap (October 18th 2011)  between Israel and Hamas as a positive move in this direction, but talks failed to resume during the summer of 2012 despite international efforts. On September 27th 2012 President Abbas asked the UN to grant Palestine ‘non-member observer state’ (which will allow Palestine to join more UN agencies) and warned that time was running out on a 2-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if Israel continues with its settlement policy. In November of that year the UN voted overwhelmingly in favor. 
On July 30th 2013 US Secretary of State John Kerry announced that Israel and the Palestinians had started direct negotiations and made a commitment to serious dialogue over the next 9 months, with talks aimed at reaching a lasting settlement and resolution of all the outstanding questions by 29th April 2014. Little real progress seems to have been made during negotiations despite the release of 3 batches of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. Various proposals for land exchange seem to have been made and discussed, but on many of the key issues neither side made significant concessions. For example, on 6 November, Israeli negotiators said there will not be a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders and that the Separation Wall will be a boundary. Israel also made no commitment to accepting the right of return for all Palestinian refugees and the Palestinians repeated their refusal to recognize Israel as a specifically Jewish state. Abbas dismissed this demand, pointing out that the Palestinians had already agreed to recognition of the State of Israel, both in 1988 and in the 1993 Oslo Accords. He added that neither Jordan nor Egypt, with whom Israel had made peace treaties, had been asked to recognize Israel's Jewish character. He said the Palestinians would never accept Israel as a 'religious state' since, it would damage the rights of Israel's Palestinian minority and “to accept it now as a Jewish state would compromise the claims of millions of Palestinian refugees (to return) whose families fled the fighting that followed Israel's creation in 1948 and were not allowed to return."
The Israeli government made the release of a fourth batch of prisoners conditional on an extension of the negotiation deadline beyond April but went ahead with approval of plans to build further homes in the settlements on the West Bank. It was reported that Abbas then set 3 conditions for extending peace talks beyond the April 29 deadline; that the borders of a future Palestinian state be dealt with during the first three months of the extended talks, a complete freeze on all settlement construction, and the release without deportation of the fourth batch of Palestinian prisoners, including Israeli-Arabs. On 23 April 2014, the rival Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah agreed to form a unity government and hold new elections. Netanyahu said Abbas would have to choose between peace with Israel and peace with Hamas while Palestinian officials said it was an internal matter and peace would be reinforced by uniting the Palestinian people. Israel then suspended peace talks, saying it "will not negotiate with a Palestinian government backed by Hamas, a terrorist organization that calls for Israel's destruction".
On 12 June 2014, three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped in Gush Etzion, in the West Bank, as they were hitchhiking to their homes. The Israel Defense Forces initiated Operation Brother's Keeper in search of the three teenagers. As part of the operation, in the following 11 days Israel arrested around 350 Palestinians, including nearly all of Hamas' West Bank leaders. Five Palestinian militants were killed during the military operation. On 30 June, search teams found the bodies of the three missing teenagers in a field north-west of Hebron. They had apparently been killed shortly after their abduction. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed a tough response to the killings. On August 20, 2014, a Hamas official, Salah al-Aruri, said that the organization's armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was behind the kidnapping and murder. Hamas leader Khaled Mashal said that some Hamas members had kidnapped and murdered the Israeli teenagers but stated that they were not acting on orders from the Hamas leadership, which he said, were "not aware of this action taken by this group of Hamas members in advance".
On 8 July 2014, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched ‘Operation Protective Edge’ against the Hamas-governed Gaza Strip. Seven weeks of Israeli air strikes and Palestinian rocket attacks, in addition to shelling and fighting in the ground invasion and cross-border tunnel attacks, left more than 2,100 people dead, most of them Palestinians.
The stated aim of the Israeli operation was to stop rocket fire from Gaza into Israel, which non-Hamas factions had begun following the Israeli crackdown on Hamas in the West Bank (sparked by the kidnapping and murder of 3 Israeli teenagers by Hamas members, see above)), and which Hamas itself began, following an Israeli airstrike on 6 July which killed seven Hamas militants in Khan Yunis. On 17 July, the operation was expanded to a ground invasion with the stated aim of destroying Gaza's tunnel system.
By 26 August, the IDF reported that Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other militant groups had fired 4,500 rockets and mortars from Gaza into Israel, while the IDF attacked 5,263 targets in Gaza; at least 34 known tunnels were destroyed and two-thirds of Hamas's 10,000-rocket arsenal was used up or destroyed. Several ceasefires (including one on 5 August, during which all Israeli soldiers were withdrawn from the Gaza Strip) fell apart or expired. On 26 August, an open-ended ceasefire was announced. It seems to be holding. As some Gazans began returning to their homes and rebuilding, the international community was faced with a situation in which the current prospects for the two-state solution seem very slim. On 25th September Hamas and Fatah signed a new agreement to share power in governing Gaza, but this is not the first agreement of this kind and the problem is reaching practical compromises in implementing this pact.
Between 2,000 and 2,143 Gazans were killed (including 495–578 children) and between 10,895 and 11,100 were wounded, while 66 IDF soldiers, 5 Israeli civilians and 1 Thai civilian were killed and 450 IDF soldiers and 80 Israeli civilians were wounded. The Gaza Health Ministry, the UN and human rights groups say 70–75% of the Palestinian casualties were civilians; Israel states 50% were civilians. On 5 August 2014 the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(OCHA) stated that 520,000 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip (approximately 30% of its population) may have been displaced, of whom 485,000 needed emergency food assistance and 273,000 were taking shelter in 90 UN-run schools. 17,200 Gazan homes were totally destroyed or severely damaged, and 37,650 homes have suffered damage but are still inhabitable. In Israel, an estimated 5,000to 8,000 citizens fled their homes due to the threat of rocket and mortar attacks.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Israel%E2%80%93Gaza_conflict
According to Walla!, from January 2015 until April 26, 172 attacks against the Jerusalem Border Police and SWAT teams were recorded. 148 Molotov cocktails and 15 explosive devices were thrown at Border Police, 1 shooting incident, 4 stabbing attempts or attacks and 4 "car rampage"attacks (attempted or actualized) were launched. Many policemen were injured in these clashes.
According to OCHA, from January 1 to 22 April 2015, at least 8,139 trees and saplings planted by Palestinians were uprooted or vandalized by Israeli settlers. Israeli search and arrest operations in the Palestinian territories, which averaged 75 per week earlier, rose to 86 per week in the first five months of 2015. According to the same source, averaging statistics from January through to June, 2 Israelis were injured and, excluding settler assaults, 40 Palestinians were injured by Israeli forces, per week. In the Hebron governorate alone from January to June, 550 Palestinians, among them 105 teenagers, were arrested, and 225 sentenced to administrative detention without trial.However, the UN and US seemed ready to try again.http://www.timesofisrael.com/kerry-hopeful-israeli-palestinian-talks-can-be-relaunched/
How much are the prospects for negotiation affected by other developments in the area? IS is now present in the Sinai desert fighting Egypt’s forces. IS aims to overthrow the Egyptian secular government, destroy Israel, and, although supported by some (ex-?) members of Hamas, also intends to destroy Hamas itself. Given the collapse of Syria and Lebanon’s preoccupation with the civil war in Syria and the wave of refugees, does this turmoil represent a growing radicalization of the Arab world and a threat to Israel’s existence, or an opportunity for Israel to create informal alliances with secular governments and parties in the area that now see Israel as the lesser threat? IS negotiating a settlement with the Palestinians now less or more urgent?http://www.timesofisrael.com/un-chief-tries-to-breathe-fresh-life-into-peace-talks/http://www.timesofisrael.com/kerry-hopeful-israeli-palestinian-talks-can-be-relaunched/http://www.timesofisrael.com/pa-officials-reject-netanyahus-call-for-renewal-of-peace-talks/http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-says-willing-to-meet-abbas-for-peace-talks-right-now/
See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013%E2%80%9314_Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_peace_talks http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Fatah%E2%80%93Hamas_Gaza_Agreement http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kidnapping_and_murder_of_Mohammed_Abu_Khdeir http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Israel%E2%80%93Gaza_conflict http://online.wsj.com/articles/cease-fire-between-israel-and-hamas-holds-1409140924
also:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/11/united-nations-delays-palestinian-statehood-vote http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/unesco-votes-to-admit-palestine-over-us-objections/2011/10/31/gIQAMleYZM_story.html http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19746994 http://www.cnbc.com/id/49198865
For the current level of international recognition of Palestine see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_the_State_of_Palestine http://www.timesofisrael.com/ban-ki-moon-urges-arab-states-to-push-for-renewed-israeli-palestinian-negotiations/ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42551&Cr=palestin&Cr1#.UFYMFa502mA
Italy
Con il Ministro Avidgor Lieberman, che ha invitato Gentiloni ad una prossima visita in Israele, è stata confermata la solidità dei rapporti bilaterali e l’interesse reciproco a svilupparli ulteriormente. Il Ministro Gentiloni ha auspicato che possa essere presto ripreso il negoziato per il processo di pace in Medio Oriente e ha riaffermato la tradizionale posizione dell’Italia che auspica nuovi passi verso l’unica soluzione possibile che è quella dei due Stati. http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2014/11/20141103_telminpolisralb.html 3/11/2014
Mar. 16, 2015 - Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu Says No to Two-State Solution on Eve of Election
"Under pressure on the eve of a surprisingly close election, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel on Monday repeated his appeal to right-wing voters, declaring that if he was returned to office he would never establish a Palestinian state... The statement reversed Mr. Netanyahu’s endorsement of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a 2009 speech at Bar Ilan University, and fulfilled many world leaders’ suspicions that he was never really serious about peace negotiations."
New York Times "Netanyahu Says No to Statehood for Palestinians," nytimes.com, Mar. 16, 2015
However, in a Mar. 19 interview with NBC News Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent Andrea Mitchell, Netanyahu claimed that his pre-election statement was not a reversal of policy, but rather a statement about what is realistically possible in the current situation. In the interview, Netanyahu said, "I don't want a one-state solution. I want a sustainable, peaceful two-state solution. But for that, circumstances have to change."
May 13, 2015 - The Vatican Recognizes State of Palestine in New Treaty "The Vatican officially recognized the state of Palestine in a new treaty finalized Wednesday, immediately sparking Israeli ire and accusations that the move hurt peace prospects.
Associated Press (AP)"Vatican Recognizes State of Palestine in New Treaty," ap.org, May 13, 2015
Oct. 19, 2015 - Since the beginning of the month, at least nine Israelis have been killed, along with 41 Palestinians, 20 of whom Israeli authorities have identified as attackers. The remaining 21 Palestinians died in clashes with Israeli troops… The violence has been dominated by Palestinian teenagers stabbing Israelis in so-called ‘lone wolf’ attacks and without the political and organizational support that existed during the first and second intifadas." ABC News, "What's behind Escalating Violence in Israel," abcnews.go.com, Oct. 19, 2015
October 2017 The Palestinians form a unity government.
Israel will not negotiate with a Palestinian unity government if Hamas is involved.
On 7 December 2017 Donald Trump defied overwhelming global opposition by recognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, but insisted that the highly controversial move would not derail his own administration’s bid to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Two days later at the UN ambassadors from Britain, France, Italy, Japan, China and more warned that Trump’s announcement that the United States recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s capital is misguided or a threat to peace. Some called it reckless. Other envoys blasted the U.S. shift as a violation of past U.N. Security Council resolutions or possibly of international law.
So why is a peace settlement to the conflict so important to the international community?
1) The perceived threat that this conflict poses to the stability of the Middle East and to oil supplies
2) The way it affects the West’s image in the Arab world (and in the broader Muslim world)
3) As a measure of the effectiveness of the UN in resolving international disputes (a basic part of its mandate) and responding to a humanitarian crisis

Possible preconditions or sticking points for the launch of serious negotiations (this should be updated in line with current developments) 1) Mutual recognition of both people’s right to an independent state (the international community and the Quartet’s two-state solution). Moreover, Israel wants recognition specifically as a Jewish state (homeland).
(Some commentators argue that the two-state solution is making no progress and think the Palestinians should give up claims to an independent state, ask for unification of the occupied territories with Israel and for full Israeli citizenship for all Palestinians, thus threatening the Jewish popular majority within Israel. The argument goes that Israel would feel so threatened by such a prospect that it would be forced to make concessions on a two-state solution. See ‘The Death and Life of the Two-State Solution by Grant Rumley and Amir Tibon in Foreign Affairs July/August 2015. However, whether this is a realistic prospect is unclear. Certainly it is not the position of the international community or the Palestinian movement at the moment).
2) A truce and then a lasting cease-fire, a cessation of terrorist attacks and acts of violence to provide time and the right atmosphere to negotiate.
3) A further good-will  release of prisoners (this happened with the exchange in 2011 of an Israeli soldier captured by Hamas for about 1000 Palestinian prisoners. More prisoners were released during the 2013-14 negotiations.
4) A freeze on Israeli settlement building (accepted by the US but no longer by the Israeli government) and a halt to the intimidation and increasing violence by Israeli settlers. These remain perhaps the Palestinians’ main preconditions for real talks
5) A reduction in Israeli road blocks and military outposts on the West bank
6) Israel refuses to negotiate with a 'unified' Palestinian government which includes Hamas because Hamas refuses to recognise Israel's right to exist.
7) There seems to be no sace for negotiation on Jerusalem (December 2017)
Other elements in a potential negotiation
1) Perhaps the model should be the 1998 Northern Ireland Peace Agreement. This would mean starting with the moderates, for the Palestinians, the President and government of the PA (Al Fatah, which recognises Israel), in the hope of making progress and so involving more hard-line groups (Hamas, which does not recognise Israel) later. However, Fatah and Hamas are now cooperating again and to deal with one and not the other might be difficult. It is also difficult to see the current government of Israel as ‘moderate’ compared with the Yitzhak Rabin government of the 1990s which negotiated the Oslo Accords.
2) The need for widespread popular support and consensus building before, during and after talks.
3) Pressure and support from the international community, the Quartet, and Arab countries, to start and make real progress with negotiations
4) Should negotiation include other Arab states and other issues (e.g. Jordan and Lebanon as hosts to many Palestinian refugees, Syria because of the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights)?
5) External factors – how will the Arab Spring, the protests and demands for greater freedom and the overthrow of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and the civil war in Syria, affect the chances of a peace deal? Will the emergence of conservative Moslem governments in Tunisia and Egypt make a settlement more or less likely? Could the civil war in Syria lead to a general conflict in the area involving Israel? What will be the effect of the success (or defeat) of Islamic State in Syria, and Iraq and now of its presence in the Sinai desert? Will Israel launch a pre-emptive strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities? Is anti-American feeling in the Arab world (for, example, the killing of the US ambassador to Libya in Benghazi in September 2012) now so strong that the US can no longer act as a mediator?
Israel continues to see the Iran Nuclear Deal Framework of April 2015 (between the Islamic Republic of Iran and a group of world powers: the P5+1, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany, plus the European Union) as a mistake, a threat to the long-term balance of power in the Middle East and a threat to its own existence.
The main questions to be resolved
1) Borders: two states, Israel, and a Palestinian state on the West Bank (the problem of the status of the Gaza Strip and Hamas which controls it) Negotiations might begin with the UN Green Line of 1949 and be based on progress made in previous negotiations (e.g. Oslo). This will also require decisions on existing settlements and what would be done with the settlers (for statistics on the rapidly rising number of settlers see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_settlement ) (estimated figures, 350,000 in East Jerusalem and 400,000) on the West Bank and (2)
2) the status of Jerusalem, which is claimed by both as their capital and has Holy sites belonging to Judaism, Islam and Christianity. One example of the nature of the ongoing dispute over settlements and future borders (and the way these issues are intertwined with other aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) is the Israeli government’s plans to build homes for 3,000 settlers in the area known as E1, part of the internationally-recognised Palestinian inhabited territories. The Israeli decision to go ahead with these plans seems to be a response to the UN giving Palestine enhanced observer status and has been met with widespread Palestinian protests. A settlement in the area would cut off Arab East Jerusalem from the West Bank.
3) The political independence and real economic viability of a Palestinian state – water resources, the Israeli Defence barrier and the damage it did to the Palestinian economy, the port of Gaza, removal of (some, most, all and when?) Israeli road blocks and military outposts on the West Bank, aid from the IC, the UN, (the EU?) and rich Arab states.  This question has direct implications for (4)
4) Future security in the area. This is the crucial issue for Israel, which sees a danger in dismantling its defence barrier and then facing new terrorist attacks. Israel wants a peace settlement which is accepted by all the Palestinians (and its Arab neighbours) not with 75% of the Palestinians. Would a compromise also involve the temporary maintenance of some Israeli road blocks and military outposts within the newly created Palestinian state for a certain number of years as a guarantee of security as the Israelis demand?
5)The ‘right of return’ for descendants of the Palestinian refugees of the 1948 and 1967 wars (now estimated at about 4 million people: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_right_of_return ). And where would they return to?
a) Since 1948 many live  in refugee camps in neighbouring countries ( e.g. 1.9 million as refugees in Jordan, although if one includes Jordanians citizens of Palestinian descent this figure rises to 2.7 million, almost half the population of the country)
b) Many refugees claim the right to return to places which are now in Israel, not just on the West Bank
c) Alternatives – settlement on the West bank in the new Palestinian state? Or some form of economic compensation? Could some Palestinians be allowed to return to Israel and become Israeli citizens if they have documentary proof of land ownership in the past?
Conclusion
1) Today may be a difficult moment compared to 20 years ago (the Oslo Accords, 1993, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords and the Taba summit of 2001 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taba_Summit )
with a conservative Israeli government today, a fragile and still not fully united Palestinian leadership, and a radicalizationof positions and aspirations on both sides. Realistically, it is hard to be very optimistic. In fact, some experts argue that the Palestinians and the Arab world in general continue to regard Israel as a ‘colonial’ outpost (presumably of the West), a foreign imposition, and thus at a fundamental level they reject Israel’s right to exist, or its right to exist as a specifically Jewish state, and therefore question the basis of the two-state solution. The Israelis see the foundation of Israel as their ‘return’ to their homeland after 1800 years, and the creation of a necessary safe-haven for Jews after the pogroms of the 19th century and the Holocaust of WWII. They often regard the Palestinians as simply Arabs (who can therefore become citizens of any Arab state) rather than a specific Arab people with legitimate aspirations to their own independent homeland.
2) In any case, there is a clear need for popular support for the peace process. Political leaders can lead, but a successful peace process would require genuine and growing consensus and support among both populations. Without that basis little progress can be made, and it is not clear that there is a genuine desire for peace at the popular level on either side at the moment, not if ‘genuine desire’ means accepting the price of compromise and making real concessions. In surveys a majority on both sides says it favours peace, but each thinks it is the other side that must make concessions, not their own.
3) Link back to the start by explaining the most recent moves by the international community, and the latest news regarding negotiations or prospects for negotiations.
Some useful sources:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_Palestinian_territories#Population
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_refugee#Refugee_statistics
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Israel
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jews
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_exodus_from_Arab_and_Muslim_countries
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_conflict
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_conflict
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_conflict
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_process_in_the_Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_conflict
http://www.jta.org/news/article/2012/09/16/3106996/palestinian-economic-protests-point-to-uncertain-future-for-pa-israel
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/gilad-shalit-prisoner-swap-israel-prepares-for-the-captive-soldiers-release/2011/10/17/gIQAZ2lFsL_story.html
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/07/05/palestinian-statehood-showdown-at-un/
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/gilad-shalit-prisoner-swap-israel-prepares-for-the-captive-soldiers-release/2011/10/17/gIQAZ2lFsL_story.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_negotiations_between_Israel_and_the_Palestinians_(2010-2011)
Israel declared its independence in May 1948 and was recognized by the USA and Soviet Union in the same month (by Britain and France in January 1949, Italy in February 1949, and Germany in September 1952). It was admitted to the UN in May 1949 under UNSC resolution 273.The Holocaust certainly played a crucial role in determining the attitude of the West and Soviet Union, and the UN’s recognition of Israel. Despite growing sympathy for the Palestinians and sharp criticism of Israeli actions and intransigence over the last 2 decades the EU continues to stand by Israel’s fundamental right to exist in security and to be an accepted member of the international community and the UN, and it supports the Road Map, sponsored by the quartet, which means direct negotiations leading to a 2-state solution. It is not clear if the Oslo Accord(s) would provide a starting point for negotiations or if the 2 sides would prefer to start from scratch [ ripartire da zero].)
public opinion:

Israel's nuclear detterence
Negotiations
Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt

Is it reasonable for Israel to insist on being a Jewish state?

Let’s start with another country:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/09/201192614417586774.html
and now Israel, the Palestinians and the wider Muslim world:



Pubblicato da alle Nessun commento:

lunedì 2 aprile 2018

Negotiating with the ‘enemy’.


Negotiating with the ‘enemy’. When is this the right choice? Under what circumstances might a government consider negotiating with another state or group that it perceives as an enemy or an adversary?

Introduction
It is usually argued, especially in terms of the Functionalist theory of international relations, that when there is a conflict it is better for the two sides to sit down and negotiate in order to seek a reasonable compromise, instead of simply continuing the conflict with all the economic and human costs that this may involve. At the same time a good argument can be made for saying that there may be some states or groups (terrorists, for example) with which it is basically wrong or dangerous to negotiate. Thus the question of if and when to negotiate with a perceived ‘enemy’ has been and will remain for the foreseeable future a key issue for diplomacy.
After 9/11 the Bush administration decided to wage a ‘war on terror’ against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It also named North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Syria as’ rogue states’ arguing that these states supported terrorism and were not therefore reliable members of the international community. It was generally unwilling to negotiate with groups or states that it considered enemies. It claimed that it would use US power if necessary to ‘export democracy’ through regime change. This led to military intervention first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq. However, at the same time the US seemed to make a deal with Libya – no intervention in Libya in exchange for no further support for terrorism. And later it opened a partial though temporary dialogue with Syria, warning Syria of retribution if Syria tried to destabilize post-Saddam Iraq.
With the arrival of the Obama administration the US government said it was open to dialogue with old enemies if the conditions were right. Then, faced with the Arab spring, growing protests across the Arab world and the fall of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, the Obama administration decided to back this popular movement for change. This meant breaking with Gaddafi when he repressed public protests and supporting military intervention ‘to protect civilians’ and eventually regime change. The US and its allies also believed that the Assad regime in Syria should step down or be forced to step down after bloodily repressing public protest. While many Arab and Muslim countries agreed, the international community was divided on the question of continuing negotiations with the regime. The UNSC was also divided on the question of more forceful action, with Russia and China against US intervention against Assad. All members supported UN attempts to negotiate a truce as a precondition for negotiations between the government and the rebels, but Western and Arab countries imposed sanctions on the Syrian regime to try to discourage it from further acts of violence and in the hope of bringing it down. The Syrian regime agreed to dismantle its chemical arsenal under UN supervision. With the rise of Islamic State Russia (active backed by China) began intervention in support of the Syrian regime and Russia even called for an alliance with the US and its NATO allies. However, the US refused to accept Assad as someone it was prepared to do a deal with and Russian intervention has targetted the rebels as well as IS. Peace talks between the Syrian government and the rebel leadership have been ongoing for several years. Earlier efforts were followed in October 2015 by further talks in Vienna involving officials from the U.S., the EU, Russia, China and various regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and, for the first time Iran. Peace talks with the rebel leadership continued in Astana, Kazakhstan in 2017 Russia-backed Syrian peace talks in Sochi in January 2018 and the 9th round of the Astana Process on Syrian peace have so far failed to produce a settlement.
Meanwhile, after months of negotiations in July 2015 Iran agreed to a deal on its nuclear program with the P5+1 (the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council–the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China plus Germany) plus the European Union, in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. However, the Trump administration has threatened to abandon the deal on May 12th 2018 (the date by which Trump has to waive sanctions against Iran again) if Iran does not agree to new conditions.
Given all the ongoing arguments and negotiations with (and sanctions imposed on, lifted or threatened against) North Korea, Syria, Iran, Russia and Myanmar, identifying if and when it is a good idea for an actor to negotiate with a state or organization it considers an enemy is still a vital question for both individual democratic states and the international community as a whole.
Here are some of the factors that may influence the decision whether to negotiate or not, and some examples to think about, although you will no doubt be able to find for yourself more and better examples from current affairs and from history:
1) Is there some kind of believable/ feasible /viable/reasonable compromise that could be reached?
Cuba – after the rapprochement in December 2014 it seemed so, but there was still a long way to gohttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/18/us-cuba-relations-one-year-later-progress-report
and the Trump administration imposed new sanctions in November 2017, seeming once more intent on freezing relations between the 2 countries.
Al Qaeda and Islamic State –there seems no basis for a negotiationColombia and the FARC – a successful deal was negotiated in 2016 and FARC will take part in the 2018  legislative and presidential elections with a promise to fight poverty and corruption.
2) Can a temporary truce and release of prisoners be arranged to give a positive start to negotiations? Can negotiations begin with a moderate political interlocutor who can also act as a proxy for or channel to a more radical group that we are not yet ready to negotiate with directly? – Sinn Fein for the IRA in negotiating the 1998 Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland / Fatah for Hamas in negotiations for a settlement with Israel? This is a way to start things in the hope of broadening participation if progress is made
3) Does the adversary have some legitimate grievances even though we do not like their methods? – Hamas for the Palestinians / Russia in the Ukraine?
4) Do they have a leadership with whom to negotiate? Will their followers accept the settlement the leadership negotiates? This was part of Yasser Arafat’s problem at Oslo.
5) Do they have widespread local support? (Brigate Rosse – no/ Hamas –it seems so in Gaza.) And if they do, is not negotiating with them a dead end? – the Taliban in some areas, is it gaining support again
Is it possible and desirable to negotiate with 'moderate' Taliban? Or is this dangerous, a betrayal of princile or simply an illusion?
https://asiafoundation.org/2018/02/14/afghan-women-pessimistic-peace-talks-taliban/
6) Does 'the enemy' have international support – Cuba in the past, and Assad today, North Korea (from China) today?
7) Time and timing – is this the right moment to negotiate? Is the population in the area tired of the struggle? Is the enemy now ready to negotiate? Attitudes in Northern Ireland, Ireland and Britain in the 1990s / in France during the Algerian crisis. Has the struggle changed? ETA is no longer faced with Franco but with democratic Spain, has given up armed struggle and is now voting on its future
Cuba is seen by many as no longer a Cold War threat, a centre from which Communism can spread to the Americas. Or is the situation the same? The Trump administration believes the Cuban government is still a brutal regime. Has there been too much blood? Is there still too much hatred and distrust? Israel and the Palestinians? In elections and surveys both the Palestinians and Israelis say they want peace but both sides seem intransigent and very unwilling to make any concessions.
8) Does the group have two wings, one radical and one more moderate? Can the moderates be persuaded to start negotiations and abandon and isolate the extremists – the Taliban?
9) Are there outside sponsors for negotiations? – the UN, US, EU and Russia and the moderate Arab states for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians
10) Are these sponsors willing to offer money and other aid as an incentive to negotiate? The UN, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states if the Palestinians and Israelis reached a full and lasting settlement.
11) Realpolitik – how desperate are we? Afghanistan? How much does each side need an agreement? Can one side win without one? Does the present situation cost too much in terms of lives or money, or damage us in other ways? Should the Iraqi government include Sunni leaders who were ex-Baath party members, Shiites who are ex-insurgents or anti-US or more some of the radical Kurdish separatists? Should the US and NATO accept a dialogue with Assad in Syria? Should the Afghan government do a deal with some of the Taliban? Will the EU and NATO be forced to accept Russia’s annexation of Crimea?
12) Realpolitik – can we buy them out? North Korea and US-South Korean aid to North Korea in the past in exchange for promises to halt its nuclear program
13) Realpolitik – Are there domestic reasons for negotiating or not negotiating? Negotiations with North Vietnam and the Viet Cong (National Liberation Front) in the late sixties and early seventies and changing US public opinion on the Vietnam war / Russia’s refusal to negotiate with Chechen rebel separatists because of the fear that separatist hopes would spread from Chechnya to other Caucasian republics (and the same for radical Islamist groups in the area) /Turkey’s fears regarding Kurdish aspirations in Syria and the effect of the creation of a Kudish state on the aspirations of Kurds in Turkey itself and the consequences for its territorial integrity
14) Realpolitik – Is it better to use another approach? An embargo, an invasion, political isolation, pressure from an intermediary – for the latter, the US has often called on China to put pressure on its ally, North Korea to negotiate.
15) How weak are our allies? How much do they need peace to survive? The government of Pakistan and negotiations with moderate Taliban?/ the government of Iraq and possible negotiations with Sunni ex-Saddam Hussein supporters and ex- al Qaeda supporters and other non-government groups?
16) How expensive for us is what they want (in economic or non-economic terms)? What would happen if Islamist radicals were successful in the Middle East and threatened to take control of the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia? / Iran and nuclear weapons? / are the stakes too high to back down and negotiate? September 1939.
17) How final will the treaty be? In exchange for recognition of a fully independent Palestinian state, Israel wants a lasting settlement that guarantees security and means no more attacks and no more claims at a later date. It doesn’t want a treaty with 60% of the Palestinians on most but not all of the issues.
18) Is the situation a kind of civil war? A fight to the death between irreconcilable enemies? The Algerian government and Islamist rebels in the past? / Syria today?
19) Are there any really effective negotiators who can help? In Northern Ireland, Senator Mitchell and Mo Mowlam
20) Costs - Is the competition too expensive? The Soviet Union and the US, SALT I and II and the oil crisis / the US and the Russian Federation and START and New START? What now seems like the beginning of a new arms race?
21) Impasse – the need for coexistence / Israel and the Palestinians?/ the US and Soviet Union (Nixon and Kissinger) / the US and China (Nixon and Kissinger)
22) New opportunities, especially commercial ones – the US and Soviet Union (Nixon and Kissinger) / the US and China (Nixon and Kissinger)
Conclusion
There may be space for negotiations with some groups or countries which are currently considered adversaries, but it requires a case by case approach, realism so as not to waste time where progress is not really likely or the counterpart is unreliable, but also real commitment once negotiations are opened (there were accusations of diplomatic inactivity in many areas during the Bush administration). Obama’s willingness to listen and offer dialogue was a first step and a necessary condition as regards both Cuba and Iran, but the sincerity of the interlocutor in the eyes of skeptics remains doubtful as is the commitment of the Trump administration. Progress needs to be monitored in terms of actions in line with the settlement reached or simply in line with the conditions set for opening negotiations. Finally, the possibility of meaningful negotiations depends only in part on the decision and determination of political leaders. It is often largely conditioned by public perception of the idea. This is true in an area of conflict but also in a democratic country. ETA renounced armed activity in 2011 but the Spanish government refused any dialogue with it at least partly in response to Spanish public opinion after years of terrorist attacks..
In the case of ETA such dialogue no longer necessary.
However, the same question about popular support for dialogue is perhaps the key to any real hope for serious negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Good background:




Pubblicato da alle Nessun commento:
Iscriviti a: Post (Atom)