Is
the rise of populism a real threat to the international liberal
order and to EU unity?
Introduction: Start with a reference to one or two recent developments relating to the question to show you are up to date on the issue e.g. the election of Donald Trump, both Macron and the Yellow Vest movement, Bolsonaro, Brexit, new political groups in Germany, Austria, Spain, (Italy?) etc...
Introduction: Start with a reference to one or two recent developments relating to the question to show you are up to date on the issue e.g. the election of Donald Trump, both Macron and the Yellow Vest movement, Bolsonaro, Brexit, new political groups in Germany, Austria, Spain, (Italy?) etc...
Line
of argument:
This essay will argue that the threat to the liberal international
order and UN unity is not populism itself but the unresolved causes of populism.
Introduction:
Give a definition of populism – for, example your own or the one by
the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde who argues that it it is not
based simply on emotional rhetoric and is not a temporary
opportunistic phenomenon or a detailed ideology but instead has two
essential characteristics. First, it divides the political world into
the 'people' and the political élite, which, it argues, is corrupt
and pursues its own interests rather than those of the people.
Second, populists believe that politics should be the expression of
the 'general will' of the people (a rather frightening concept if one
thinks of the French Revolution!). Evidence that they may be
badly-informed is rejected as 'fake news'.
Causes
of the rise of populism – in developed economies the failure of the
traditional parties of the centre-right and centre-left to guarantee
the prosperity (low unemployment and a moderate rise in living
standards) that they had previously guaranteed for the middle and
lower classes / for those without a university qualification, there
has been the loss of manufacturing jobs in developed economies,
stagnant salaries and growing income inequality / the lack of
employment opportunities particularly for the younger generation,
even those who are well-qualified / unemployment or underemployment
for those in their 30s and 40s (the Yellow Vest movement) /
widespread anger with rising immigration (at unprecedented levels
into the EU in 2015-2016) seen as competition for jobs, a downward
pressure on incomes and a threat to identity / and thus a growing
sense of exclusion
from politics.
Other
concerns in Europe, whether legitimate or not, include:
the
idea that the institutional architecture of the EU is in some way
undemocratic and requires reform / that EU leaders are too distant
from EU voters and fail to respond to them and communicate properly
with them / that the currency union has not been a success for all
member states / that some members are treated better while others are
punished or abandoned (Italy, Spain and Greece and migration).
In
developing countries which have seen periods of economic expansion,
the anger may be more focused on inequalities of wealth and land
ownership, widespread corruption or on the weakness of the government
to control the cost of living and provide basic services like a
public health service (Chile, Brazil, Lebanon, Iraq, Argentina, Iran,
the Arab Spring), security (Mexico and the drug cartels). One
more traditional sense of populism remains and that is popular
opposition to an undemocratic regime and that is what happened in the
Arab Spring(s), and is happening now in Hong Kong. In the Arab Spring
the desire for political reform was mixed with high expectations that
greater democracy would bring rapid improvement in terms of lower
prices for food and other basics, increasing prosperity and social
reform, expectations that a revolution, even when successful, can
rarely meet in the short term. In contrast, Tunisia remains a source
of hope.
One
interesting question would be the role of IT (internet, social media
and cell phones) in all this, in forming opinion, fostering the
formation of non-Parliamentary movements and in providing a means for
a looser, more flexible form of political organization.
Consequences
– growing disillusion, scepticism and cynicism regarding the
political ruling class and 'political correctness' (seen as favouring
minorities and ignoring the majority), anger with the traditional
parties, seen as self-interested, corrupt, élitist or simply
incompetent and unable to respond to these challenges, and an anger
with international bodies, such as the EU or UN, the WTO and IMF (for
example, from nationalists but also from the anti-globalization
movement)
also seen as too expensive, too far from the people and corrupt, or
not interested
in the problems of ordinary people, or simply irrelevant. This has
often led to the rise of 'anti-system' movements, a return to
nationalism, a political arena that populists believe is more natural
in cultural terms and can be controlled by the people (give examples,
Hungary, Poland, Brexit). The new populists, however, often have
little experience of government and may make unrealistic promises,
raising unrealistic expectations, and this has led to instability in
both domestic politics (give an example) and foreign relations e.g.
Trump and NATO allies, Trump and China, recent relations between
Italy and France and a weakening of the existing international
institutions as the US seems to refuse to want to continue to be the
guarantor of the system.
Conclusion
– all this is a real threat to international cooperation and the
effectiveness of international institutions, given that populist
movements tend to prioritize national issues and solutions, at a time
when many of our problems are of a global, or at least international
nature and can only be successfully dealt with at that level.
However, the problem is not populism itself but the underlying causes
which seem to be our failure at the national, regional (EU) and
global level to manage the economic and social effects of
globalization in a way that reassures people about social stability
and their prospects and their children's prospects for the future.
If
Western Europe is characterized by the welfare state, the great
challenges to that model are the pressures from a globalized economy.
For example, some experts argue that in a globalized economy private
companies in Italy should give jobs to the best-qualified and
cheapest, even if they are foreigners based abroad, and move
production to countries where labor is cheaper. Is that an acceptable
model? If so, how do we adapt our society to it? If not, how to we
redesign an effective European alternative that preserves the basics
of the welfare state and our commitment to social inclusiveness?
How
could EU leaders and institutions respond to the call for greater
democracy and better communication? How can the UN pledge on poverty
in the developing world 'to
leave no one behind',
be applied in the EU economically and politically to its citizens and
members? Or is its future likely to be further
fragmentation, the "multi-speed
Europe" (or
'a core Europe and a periphery') as with the existing situation with
the Euro and the Schengen area?
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