mercoledì 6 novembre 2019

How is the role of NATO evolving? What are the main challenges facing the organization? Discuss the EU Defence Agency and cooperation with NATO.

Look at the latest news and decisions to keep up to date. Here always
You should also read the Lisbon Declaration of November 2010

the Chicago Declaration of May 2012

the Wales summit Declarations of September 2014
The Warsaw summit Communiqué of July 2016 
The Brussels summit of May 2017 
The Brussels summit of July 2018 
The next summit in London in December 2019 
The current NATO Secretary General is Jens Stoltenberg of Norway, former PM of Norway.
Read this information carefully, as necessary background, take notes on what you think you can use. You won’t need everything.
e.g. North Atlantic Treaty Organization or North Atlantic Alliance – formed April 1949 – at present 29 members (Montenegro joined in June 2017) – HQ Brussels, Belgium (with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, the central command of NATO military forces). The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, famously stated the organization's goal was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down" (Do not quote this at the Concorso!!).
Developments regarding European Defence and NATO
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/07/16/strengthening-eu-nato-relations/index.html https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/28286/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheet_en https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_a_new_beginning_for_european_defence https://www.eda.europa.eu/ https://www.eda.europa.eu/aboutus/who-we-are/member-states https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_and_civilian_missions_of_the_European_Union https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_41_EU_military_operations.pdf https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/permanent-structured-cooperation-(pesco) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_Structured_Cooperation#Participating_armed_forces https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_Structured_Cooperation#Neutral_states https://ec.europa.eu/ireland/news/key-eu-policy-areas/permanent-structured-cooperation-on-security-and-defence_en https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ZYOUM7GbSA https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/eu-defence-co-operation-is-no-threat-to-irish-neutrality-1.3343293 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3McmcY-3d9I https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=99AkjuMgaB4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebvJ9OzMRjY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dh8EKNZ8O7Y http://defencesummit.eu/ https://warsawinstitute.org/finnish-ministry-national-defence-sceptical-european-army/ http://tahdistolehti.fi/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-new-beginning-increased-cooperation-eu-defence/ https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2018/12/12/gismo-s-geohub-aims-at-full-operational-capability-by-early-2019 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/05/defence-cooperation-council-adopts-conclusions-on-eu-nato-cooperation-endorsing-common-set-of-new-proposals-for-further-joint-work/
and then really as much background as you have time to read https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/28286/EU-NATO%20cooperation%20-%20Factsheet http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2018)625109 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_nato_factsheet_16-06-2017_0.pdf https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2017/03/27/nato-deputy-secretary-general-rose-gottemoeller-visits-eda https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_138829.htm https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/15449/Mogherini:%20%22EU-Nato%20cooperation%20crucial%20for%20the%20continent%22 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/search/site/european%20defence_en http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/19/eu-nato-cooperation/# https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2017-11/2017%20-%20163%20DSCTC%2017%20E%20rev%201%20fin%20-%20EU%20AND%20NATO%20COOPERATION%20-%20MESTERHAZY%20REPORT.pdf https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_49217.htm https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160630_1607-factsheet-nato-eu-en.pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_operations_of_the_European_Union http://piracy-studies.org/beyond-rivalry-eu-nato-cooperation-in-counter-piracy-operations/ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/595855/EPRS_BRI(2016)595855_EN.pdf https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36195/most-important-moment-european-defence-decades-mogherini_fr http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/american-withdrawal-presents-opportunity-for-europe-a-1135172.html http://www.adnkronos.com/aki-en/security/2017/11/10/pinotti-backs-more-integrated-european-defence_ctDIgGhps1J3p37WCRwlmL.html http://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/future-eu-defence-european-space-data-and-cyber-agency https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/34226/Permanent%20Structured%20Cooperation%20(PESCO)%20-%20Factsheet https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/defence-security-timeline/# http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1516_en.htm http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/22-euco-security-defence/ http://www.newsweek.com/eu-defense-fund-tackle-russia-military-trump-nato-622648 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40217085 http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/07/eu-prepares-a-defense-union-that-could-alleviate-not-aggravate-trumps-concerns-on-nato.html http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari1-2017-keohane-threes-company-france-germany-uk-european-defence-post-brexit http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4385_en.htm

and plans for the European Border and Coast Guard

NATO background:
NATO was created at the start of the Cold War as an alliance among states sharing core democratic values, and was a way to extend the US commitment to the stability and defense of Western and Southern Europe (resulting from WWII) indefinitely. Its principal objective was to deter ( hence 'deterrence') a Soviet invasion or interference in the area. This was based on article 5 of the treaty, under which members are committed to come to the aid and defense of any member state which is attacked by a non-member (i.e. Russia). This was achieved by the deployment of US and allied forces throughout Europe in such a way that the invasion of a NATO member would automatically involve the forces of the US and other countries, thus committing them to action. Conventional Russian forces were always superior to those of the Alliance, so the ultimate deterrence was provided by US (and later British and French) nuclear weapons. In the event of a conflict NATO conventional forces were there to gain time for diplomacy before using nuclear weapons. In response the Soviet Union created the Warsaw Pact with its Eastern European allies in May 1955 (after West Germany joined NATO). NATO never had to go to war, and was thus successful in fulfilling its main objective of deterring Russia.
With the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (1989-1992), NATO seemed to have lost its historic reason for existing. The US and its NATO allies reduced the size of their forces in Europe and since then there has been an ongoing debate about what, if any, NATO’s role can and should now be in world affairs. The Lisbon declaration (Nov. 2010) seemed to provide some clear indications regarding the direction in which NATO was moving. However, it also raised certain questions and left some unanswered. With the events of 2008 in Georgia and, above all, of 2014 in Ukraine there has been a rise in tensions with Russia, a decline in cooperation between Russia and NATO and fears that we are returning, if not to the Cold War, at least to an adversarial relationship rather than one based on working together. Given this scenario, NATO may now have to return more to its original purpose of guaranteeing its members’ (particularly its Eastern European members’) sovereignty and independence. President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty has added to tensions and raised fears of a new nuclear arms race.
(see also the dispute since 1992 between Moldova and Russia over Transnistria)
There are also concerns in Europe that President Trump could decide to withdraw the US from NATO, which would mean the death of the organization, or simply reduce the US role within it in a more isolationist approach, leaving its European allies to face threats on their own.
Main points:
1)      After the end of the Cold War the US reduced its forces in Europe and shifted a significant proportion of what remained southwards. NATO reduced its heavy conventional forces and European armies based largely on military service in favor of smaller, more professional and much more high-tech forces with ‘out of area’ (outside Europe) capabilities (including logistical support). This process will continue with more attention paid to cost effectiveness and the full integration of different national forces and weapons systems.
2)      NATO’s new Strategic Concept is based on the idea of intervention in crisis management and security questions beyond NATO’s borders (‘out of area’ operations beyond Europe, the area NATO was originally created to defend) and in cooperation with other countries and regional organizations (ISAF in Afghanistan was NATO-led but included forces from other countries). This idea has gradually evolved since the early 1990s with NATO’s intervention in the Balkans (in 1993 against Serbia, and in 1999 in Kosovo).After 9/11 NATO invoked article 5 for the first time and sent the ISAF to Afghanistan in 2001 under a UN mandate (the first major ‘out of area’ operation) and later also became involved in training Iraqi forces to take over responsibility for security. Since August 2009 it has conducted operation Ocean Shield against piracy off the Horn of (North-East) Africa. It launched an operation to protect Libyan civilians from the Gaddafi regime in March-October 2011 which led to the fall of the regime, and is now involved in operations in the Mediterranean against illegal immigration. As a result of 9/11 and the threat of further terrorist attacks there is now also intensified cooperation between the security services and police forces of NATO members, and between them and other countries facing the same threat. It also created a NATO Response Force (NRF) to make it easier for NATO to provide a rapid response to a crisis before the deployment of heavier forces.
3)      NATO began to see its role less in strictly military terms and more and more in terms of cooperating with the UN, the EU, other international or regional organizations, and other countries (whether democratic like Brazil and Australia or less so, like Russia, or not at all but stable, like China) on a range of issues considered threats to NATO members’ security, e.g. terrorism, international crime and trafficking, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear arms, piracy, cyber attacks, climate change and environmental degradation and crisis management (intervention to stabilize failed states and prevent escalating local crises).See the Lisbon Summit Declaration November 2010
and the Chicago Summit Declaration (May 2012)
4)    In the years following the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, many former Soviet satellite states joined NATO and the EU which expanded to the East (German unification in 1990, NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, for the Baltic states, Rumania, Bulgaria and Slovakia in 2004, for Albania and Croatia in 2009, Montenegro 2017). The remaining Balkan states will probably join NATO soon (As of 2018, however, NATO officially recognizes only four aspiring members: Macedonia , Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans, and then Georgia and Ukraine where progress seems difficult because of Russian opposition) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO
For Eastern European countries this move was mainly a guarantee of continued independence from Russia. However, this has been seen by Russia as aggressive and a way to reduce Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Russia made clear its opposition to Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia joining NATO or the EU. Georgia has been promised NATO membership at an unspecified date in the future but Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008, in support of the break-away republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, was the first real sign of the dangers raised by the question of further NATO/EU expansion to the East. In fact, Russia’s opposition to Georgia joining NATO seems to have blocked further progress.
However, it is the evolution of events in Ukraine which have really thrown into question all certainties about relations with the Russian Federation. Ukraine also expressed interest in NATO membership in 2008, but later adopted a position of neutrality in 2010 probably because of Russia’s opposition. A decision in November 2013 by Ukraine's President Viktor Yanukovych to pull out of an association deal with the European Union sparked huge street protests that eventually led to his downfall in February 2014. In March Russia reacted by annexing the Ukrainian region of Crimea after the Crimean parliament declared independence from Ukraine, and unrest began growing in eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russian sentiment is strong. The US and NATO denounced the Russian move as illegal and its support for the separatist insurgencies in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions since 2014 as aggressively expansionist. Following Russia’s support for the separatists in 2014, the Ukrainian government launched a military counter-offensive against the insurgents, which resulted in the ongoing War in Donbass. After parliamentary elections in October 2014, the new Ukraine government made joining NATO a priority. In December 2014, the Ukrainian parliament renounced Ukraine's non-aligned status that had “proved to be ineffective in guaranteeing Ukraine's security and protecting the country from external aggression and pressure”. Russia obviously opposes this.
Russia has continued to argue that it sees NATO and the EU’s expansion to the East over the last 20 years as far more aggressive than its own response to protect Russian minorities and that this expansion is a violation of a promise made in 1990 that in exchange for Russian agreement to German reunification NATO agreed not to expand towards the East. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation
NATO's growing concern and its strategy to respond to Russia's moves can be seen in
The Wales Summit Declaration Sept 2014 (paragraphs 16-31)
the Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security July 2016

and in detail in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué July 2016 (paragraphs 9-24)

With the situation in Georgia, the current conflict in Ukraine and the resulting sanctions, as well as Russia’s growing assertiveness in international relations (e.g. Syria) new questions have been raised about the prospects for good future relations between the European Union, NATO and the West in general and the Russian Federation. With Russian minorities in other Eastern European and Baltic NATO and EU members (and also in Moldova) NATO decided in March 2015 to strengthen its Baltic Air Policing mission and presence in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea area. It has also conducted joint military exercises with Ukraine but has avoided overt military involvement in both Ukraine and Georgia, not wanting a direct confrontation with Russia and the risk of a complete break-down in relations. Although they are not NATO members, Ukraine and Georgia began participating in the NATO Response Force (NRF), respectively, in 2014 and 2015.http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315.html
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315-2.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014%E2%80%9315_Russian_military_intervention_in_Ukraine
(See the notes in ‘The EU and the Russian Federation’ for an account of the evolution of events in Ukraine in 2014 and the growth in tension between NATO and the Russian Federation).
At the NATO summit in Wales on 4th and 5th September 2014, the military alliance finalized plans for its new spearhead NATO Response Force (a rapid deployment force of 4,000 soldiers able go into action in 48 hours) as a response to growing concern about the Ukraine crisis and the rise of Islamic State militants. Despite calls from eastern European members (Poland and the Baltic states), NATO did not approve the proposal to create new permanent bases in these member states. Germany in particular wished to avoid further antagonizing Russia by such an action. President Obama, however, assured them of NATO and US commitment to their protection (see below for change of policy at Warsaw Summit) NATO also confirmed the suspension (April 2014) of its partnership for civilian and military cooperation with Russia and offered support for Ukraine’s plans to strengthen its military capacity.
President Putin defended Russia’s annexation of Crimea by saying that Washington and its European allies were guided by “the rule of the gun” rather than international law and respect for the principle of state sovereignty. In March 2014 Washington put military cooperation with Russia on hold and ended negotiations on the NATO missile defense program. It also banned the export to Russia of technology with potential military applications, suspended cooperation on civilian nuclear energy projects and cut off NASA’s contacts with its Russian counterparts. Russia, meanwhile, made a resolution of the impasse over NATO’s missile defense system a precondition to further strategic arms control talks. It formed the Eurasian Economic Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan in May in 2014 and Armenia and Kyrgyzstan became full members in 2015. The Eurasian Economic Union has an integrated single market of 183 million people and a gross domestic product of over 4 trillion US dollars (PPP). All EAEU member states participate in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, an intergovernmental mutual defense alliance. Some Russian commentators even argue that its authoritarian model is a viable alternative to Western liberal democracy and one which will gain support in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where some Western ideas are seen as going against tradition and religion.
At the 2016 Warsaw summit NATO reversed its position on deploying forces to Russia's borders. NATO agreed to deploy military forces to the Baltic states and eastern Poland from January 2017 to deter Russia, a response to Moscow's 2014 seizure of Crimea from Ukraine. The four battalions totaling between 3,000 and 4,000 troops would be led by Britain in Estonia, the United States in Poland, Canada in Latvia and Germany in Lithuania. This has been called by various names, Operation Reassurance, Operation Deterrence and now NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence. There is also the Enhanced NATO Response Force and Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhanced_Forward_Presence https://kariuomene.kam.lt/en/e_f_p.html
further NATO and EU response to Ukraine
5)      NATO continues to want and need to stabilize and improve relations with Russia. There has been extensive practical cooperation in many fields in the recent past. How far is each side willing to make concessions to return to this cooperation? And how far have the events and growing tensions in Eastern Europe put all future cooperation at risk? See point 4.
a)     NATO has developed a ballistic missile defense system in Europe for the protection of NATO forces and the populations of NATO member states.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm This is supposedly intended to deal with a threat from a country like Iran, accused of wanting to develop nuclear weapons, or against terrorists (!), but has been consistently opposed by the Russians as potentially aimed at them. In Lisbon NATO relaunched the idea, offering to work with Russia on this project. The immediate Russian response at the Lisbon summit in November 2010 (NATO Russia Council) was positive providing that the cooperation offered by NATO meant Russia’s  real integration into a system of shared defense against third parties (e.g. Iran). Russia was not willing to accept a system based in Eastern European NATO member states from which it would only receive information and intelligence as a courtesy. The implication from the Russian point of view is that it could still be used against Russia.  In fact, NATO rejected the idea of Russia’s participation in the control arrangements for the missile defense system and Russia has deployed missiles to Kaliningrad and other sections of its borders with NATO.
During its 2012 Chicago Summit NATO leaders declared that the ballistic missile defense system had reached ‘interim’ capability. For what this means see the link to the Wikipedia notes on the Chicago summit. It seems to involve installations in the Czech Republic, Poland and the Black Sea region (Turkey and Romania) as well as submarine based missiles. The project will not be completed till 2020 at the earliest, perhaps, more realistically, only by 2022.
At its 2016 Warsaw summit NATO took command of the U.S.-built missile shield in Europe to defend against ballistic missiles from Iran.
b)      NATO and the US have frequently reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, and continuing large-scale reductions (see Telegraph article below) in nuclear armaments and missile delivery systems initiated with the START I treaty (July 1991) and continued in START II (Jan 1993) and SORT (May 2002). In fact, further reductions were agreed in the most recent round of negotiations between the US and Russia that led to the New START treaty which came into force in February 2011 and replaced the START II and SORT treaties. Some commentators suggest that it seems slightly contradictory to launch a project for missile defense (point 5a) while supporting arms reductions. Others argue that it is simply a question of realism, and that NATO’s first priority must be its founding purpose, collective security.
Russia for several years made a resolution of the impasse over NATO’s missile defense system a precondition to further strategic arms control talks. However, Putin may now be more open to new negotiations than the US
There is a danger that with the gradual evolution of nuclear and missile technology much of the impressive progress made on nuclear arms reductions could unravel unless negotiations are relaunched soon. At the same time in the US there are doubts about whether Russia has respected its New START commitments to arms reductions. This is what led President Trump to announce the US withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty, with some commentators saying there is a danger of a new nuclear arms race. Some experts argue that with the increased reliance on IT systems in nuclear defence systems the catastrophic risks of a computer error or computer-related human error are leading us towards the nightmare scenario of Dr Strangelove.
Unresolved Questions for NATO:
1)      The decision-making process. The existing system depends on consensus and agreement at all levels, without formal voting. There is an unwritten rule that a country (or countries) which is not in agreement with the other members on an issue remains silent (e.g. Greece and the NATO intervention in the Balkans) and simply does not participate in the operation. However, as the organization grows, like the EU, it will probably need to modify this decision-making process. Can this be done without damaging NATO’s effectiveness? What seems likely to happen is that NATO actions may be authorized by all or most members but not undertaken by all the 28 members. In addition, there may be space for small groups of NATO allies to undertake operations that have first been discussed with the other members. In practice this is want happened in Libya, although the US criticized the lack of participation by the NATO members which had authorized the mission.
2)      Relations with Russia – at the start of the 21st century, despite a clear commitment from both NATO and Russia to warmer relations and closer cooperation it was not clear what this meant in practice, or if they were thinking along the same lines. Russia seemed to believe that without formally joining NATO it should have the right to share in NATO decisions (and block those it does not like) and also to take part fully in NATO’s military/technological programs. NATO seemed to think that cooperation simply meant keeping Russia informed and providing it with any information NATO gets regarding possible threats to Russia. While Russia is a vital partner from the point of view of global security and within international decision-making bodies (and in economic terms, e.g. energy supplies to the EU), most NATO members, particularly those in Eastern Europe are doubtful about whether Russia really shares NATO’s core democratic beliefs, and how far Russia can be trusted. Events in Georgia and Ukraine have only strengthened this point of view. However, terrorist attacks like those in Paris on November 13th 2015 will continue to require cooperation between Russia and the West in a coordinated effort to defeat Islamic extremists. However, for the moment how this relationship will develop is unclear. The document puts NATO's position very clearly:
a)      The proposed NATO missile defense system – this is a good example of the above. How exactly could Russia be persuaded to cooperate with, or simply accept this project? Since Russia is not being offered access to the technology and a right to participate fully in any decisions, it is likely to remain hostile to the project.
b)      NATO membership for Georgia, Ukraine and the Balkan states – NATO believes these states have the right to join. Russia sees this as an aggressive expansion by NATO into Russia’s ‘near abroad’ and is against more of its neighbors joining NATO. It seems ready to actively protect what it sees as Russia’s interests and ethnic Russian minorities (the war with Georgia and support for separatists in Ukraine). This seems to have frozen progress on expanding NATO membership to both Georgia and Ukraine and cooperation between NATO and Russia for the moment.
c)      Russia and the US are both aware that further progress on arms reductions depends not only on agreement on the ballistic missile defense system. Russia argues that the US must be committed to working with, and not against, Russia for real progress to be made and progress on an agreement on NATO’s missile defense system is now a Russian precondition for nuclear arms reduction talks. The US withdrawal from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty raises the danger of a new nuclear arms race.
d) Enhanced Forward Presence is a NATO deployment in Europe aimed at countering possible Russian expansionism after events in Georgia and Ukraine.
3)      What happens if in the end NATO loses in Afghanistan? – This is not an impossibility. Although NATO withdrew most of its forces from the country by the end of 2014, transferring military and security responsibilities to the Afghan authorities and forces, about 16,000 NATO troops (including 10,000 US soldiers) remained. At its Warsaw summit NATO allies agreed to help fund Afghan security forces between 2018 and 2020 with around $1 billion annually. NATO countries will also keep troops in Afghanistan to train Afghan forces.
The Trump administration initially increased US troops in Afghanistan by 4,000 but decided in December 2018 to reduce US forces there by 7,000 (about half).
So the Afghan government could still be defeated by the Taliban and local warlords (which explains attempt to launch negotiations with ‘moderate’ Taliban groups). This would be a repeat of the US experience in South Vietnam and in effect a defeat for NATO and the UN. Would such an outcome, and the enormous cost of the operation, damage NATO’s reputation and confidence so much that it would be unable or unwilling to undertake other ‘out of area’ (i.e. outside Europe) operations? Would this be the end of NATO’s commitment to proactive crisis management around the world? Would it mean a return to a much more traditional defensive role limited to the European area? The NATO operation in Libya, which initially was seen as a success, led to internal chaos, faction-fighting and the growing presence of Islamic State and other radical groups in the area. Again this may have reduced the willingness of NATO members to take part in similar operations in the future. It may also be Donald Trump's position.
4)      Finances – Both the US and Europe were hit hard by the recession and financial crisis. There is reluctance on both sides of the Atlantic to face the question of paying for NATO forces and operations. The US contributes between one-fifth and one-quarter of NATO's budget (22%) and most of its forces, equipment and technology for actual operations (in Afghanistan, for example) since it accounts for a massive 72% of NATO members’ military spending (while representing only 41% of the NATO countries’ combined GDP), and the US wants European members to spend more on their military. For them this has not been a good time to increase their contributions to NATO. Most of them have made cuts to their military spending. This could damage NATO’s operational effectiveness. Cuts in European military forces after the 2008 financial crisis may have been so large as to compromise their ability to launch sustained independent operations, or even to participate effectively in large-scale combined operations. ‘Smart defense’ is an attempt to combine cuts in spending with rationalization of resources in order to remain fully effective. It is also difficult to calculate what the balance should be between the US and Europe because clearly US military spending also covers US operations and forces which are not intended for NATO.
How realistic is it to talk about a more democratic basis for decision- making within the organization, with more of a say for European members, if NATO is essentially an organization in which the US pays for and does most of the work? # NATO used to be formed by large armies based on military service. After the end of the Cold War there was a move to much smaller professional armies based on career volunteers and greater investment in high-tech equipment to give these forces a decisive combat advantage. As was mentioned above, in a period of austerity the key concept seems to be ‘smart defense’, * a more intelligent use of limited financial resources, more sharing of equipment and back-up support and integration between NATO forces (e.g. Britain and France signed a defense cooperation treaty in November 2010 which involves plans to share military assets and technologies). How realistic all this will be in maintaining NATO as an effective force remains to be seen.
However, at the Warsaw summit NATO'S European allies agreed a defence spending increase worth more than £6 billion. Most members, however, failed in 2017 and 2018 to reach the target of 2% of GDP for military spending.

5)      Is NATO (a defensive military alliance with espionage capabilities) really the right kind of organization to deal with threats like cyber-attacks, terrorism, various kinds of illegal trafficking, illegal immigration, piracy, nuclear proliferation and peace-keeping, -building and -enforcement operations and environmental concerns? Perhaps it is and NATO should gradually be re-organized and lose some of its military character.
6)      Is there a contradiction between a NATO ballistic missile defense system and  the goal of nuclear arms reductions? After all, the missiles used to eliminate incoming missiles (defense) are often weapons that could also be rearmed and used as delivery systems (offense).
7)      The operation in Libya holds several lessons and, as a case study, offers an interesting comparison with the operation in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq and the situation in Syria, both in terms of similarities and differences. First, it was, like Afghanistan, an out of area operation (but only slightly) and had a UN mandate. However, the Russians claim it exceeded its mandate to protect civilian lives. It was limited to air raids against specific targets, as requested by the Arab League and Libyan fighters, and did not involve sending land forces to Libya. The US played an active role only at the start but provided logistics, supplies and support. Generally, it had support from the local population on the ground, and it was successful and of short duration. However, it also demonstrated that it is difficult to build consensus to act within NATO even for an operation very close to NATO’s borders (Germany was initially strongly opposed). Secondly, the operation was expensive and complex (but obviously nowhere near as long and costly as the operation in Afghanistan) and only possible with the political, military, technological and financial support of the US, despite the attempt to make it a ‘European’ operation. However, what was seen as the operation's technical success led to the fall of the Gaddafi regime but, as in Afghanistan, this did not produce a smooth transition to a functioning democracy but the collapse of law and order. In the absence of an international mission like the one in Afghanistan Libya remains a country dominated by armed factions and so far unable to produce a stable and effective central government with real control over its territory. As a result it is a base for terrorism and human-trafficking and is the point of departure for many refugees trying to enter Europe via Italy. It is hard to see how the new but fragile unity government will re-establish the rule of law. However at its Warsaw summit NATO leaders agreed to provide support for the European Union's military mission off the Libyan coast to crack down on smugglers. NATO may provide vessels, surveillance aircraft and radars to help uphold a U.N. arms embargo, although details are still being worked out.
All of this should make us think carefuly about what kind of operation NATO is able or not able to carry out / is willing or unwilling to carry out / should or should not carry out, and in what circumstances and under what conditions it is likely to be successful.

8) In contrast to the fairly rapid response to events in Libya in 2011, there was little desire among NATO members to intervene in Syria when the civil war began except in terms of sanctions. NATO began to deploy Patriot missiles to Turkey in 2013 to protect it from any potential spread of the Syrian conflict.
The US in the summer 2015 and its allies (notably France and the UK after the terrorist attacks in Paris in Nov. 2015) carried out air raids against IS in coordination with other Middle East allies but there are no plans for a NATO operation. However, there is neither the legal basis for a major NATO ground intervention in Syria, nor real support for the idea among NATO members. There has been extensive intervention by Russia, Turkey and Iran but there is no agreed and coordinated plan between these three and Western countries as they have different objectives. In December 2018 Donald Trump ordered a full withdrawal of American forces from Syria. At the same time the US administration said that it accepted that President Assad, Russia’s ally, could stay in power as a part of a long term solution to the Syrian crisis but called on the Syrian regime to make fundamental changes in exchange for aid in reconstruction.
As the fighting goes on there continue to be very large number of refugees arriving from Syria at the EU’s borders as a result of the civil war and the initial success of Islamic State forces. Meanwhile, although Islamic State has been checked and defeated, it has been eliminated.
9) Events in Turkey, a key NATO ally, have also raised concern. The attempted military coup in July 2016 and the Turkish government’s hard-line response to it added to existing questions about the treatment of the Kurdish minority and human rights in general. Turkey is also a key partner for the EU in dealing with the migrant crisis. So commentators are now asking whether Turkey is still and will remain a reliable NATO ally, and if not, what this may mean for the alliance's strategy in the Middle East and Mediterranean.
10) In recent years the potential security threats to the EU have grown. There has been increased instability in North Africa and the Middle East with the collapse of decades-old regimes and areas of civil war (Syria) or ineffective government and faction-fighting (Libya), leading to mass migration towards Europe and the spread of terrorism to Europe itself. Meanwhile Russia has begun to use its military power to reassert its influence both in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe. Its intervention first in Georgia and later in the Ukraine have alarmed the EU and in particular the EU's Eastern members. The decision of the UK to withdraw from the EU (Brexit) and, even more, the election of Donald Trump as US President (a figure whose statements have sometimes made him sound potentially isolationist, at least in relation to Europe) have, in the last two years, galvanised attempts to finally create an integrated European Defence structure through the EU Defence Agency https://www.eda.europa.eu/. This is not intended or expected to substitute NATO any time soon (given the scale and strength of the US military and logistical infrastructure) but to function alogside it. Europe needs to be able to respond effectively and independently to threats in the event that the US, for whatever reason, is unwilling or reluctant to assist, or to carry out operations in areas that the US does not consider of strategic importance but the EU deems to be vital. Things seem to be moving fast and the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence (PESCO) should become operational in the very near future. To put things in perspective, however, one should remember that while the EU's Eastern European members have welcomedl this process which reassures them of support from their EU partners they have also welcomed as crucia the deployment of NATO forces, including US and Canadian units, to their countries. Similary, Italy which hosts both the US Sixth Fleet and a growing number of US bases, would surely count at least on US naval, air and logistical support in any major operation in the Mediterranean.
(Gentiloni 15/09/2016) In Italy’s vision, there are three main areas worth exploring in the pursuit of a common European defense.
The first concerns a comprehensive approach to regional crises. We should work to create a more streamlined and integrated civilian-military structure, in order to ensure a more effective response to complex emergencies. The establishment of a permanent civilian-military headquarters — as has also been suggested by France and Germany — would represent an ambitious step forward in the EU’s capacity for crisis management.
The second area regards the development of defense capabilities. Europe has to acquire the defense capabilities needed to be a prominent player on the international scene. This will necessitate common EU efforts to support the Continent’s defense industry and broaden its industrial and technological base.
The third area involves multinational forces: the establishment of a division-level European Multinational Force, able to carry out a set of pre-determined missions and operations. This initiative would differ from the multinational forces already in place, such as the battlegroups, in the size and composition of the military units. It would also possess a unified strategic command, the endowment of permanent forces and a common budget for operations.
These three areas are not entirely new. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that in the past we have found it difficult to make significant progress as 28 member states. Today, at a time when decisive external action is required, we need to move forward rapidly.
Italy proposes that a core group of EU countries accelerate their integration in the area of defense, leaving others the option to join at a later stage through an inclusive exercise. Rather than advancing ready-made solutions, this would be the beginning of a political process.
Many of the technical aspects of European Defence integration are the same as those facing NATO (financing, standardization of weapons and equipment, integration of multilingual military forces) but the fact that the EU has a large, existing civilian structure maybe a considerable advantage.

Conclusion:
Despite point 4 NATO still accounts for more than 60% of global military spending: http://www.globalresearch.ca/1-6-trillion-military-mafia-nato-countries-account-for-70-of-world-military-budget/22155
http://www.scribd.com/doc/85583522/AFB-DefenceandSecurity
http://www.stripes.com/news/despite-cuts-nato-still-accounts-for-most-of-world-s-military-spending-1.269882
In 2013 the US spend 3.8% of its nominal GDP on the military, Russia 4.2 % and China 2.1%. but of course the US GDP is much bigger and there are all the other NATO members.http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS
During the early phase of the Cold War the Warsaw Pact’s conventional forces significantly outnumbered NATO forces. A comparison of NATO conventional resources today with those of the Russian Federation gives NATO a clear advantage because of huge, accumulated US assets (and the transfer of the Eastern European bloc countries to NATO), despite increased military spending by Russia in recent years and some reductions in Europe by the US and the rest of NATO.
So NATO continues to be the world’s largest and most powerful alliance system, and remains committed to its core values and primary security goals. It is now playing a much wider, much more proactive role than during the Cold War, and intends to continue to do so while seeking new partners within the international community. Time will show whether NATO can be effective in this role and whether it will continue to have the material and financial resources, internal cohesion and international consensus that it will need in order to do so. Events in Ukraine are forcing NATO to re-examine its priorities. It may be compelled to return to its original purpose, the guaranteeing of its members’ sovereignty, freedom and security in a mainly European context. A counter-argument to explore: There are also many critics of NATO who feel that since the end of the Cold War NATO has taken on a more and more proactive role. They fear that even when acting with UN authorization, this too easily leads to an increasingly aggressive militaristic response to local and global problems. They argue that anti-terrorist or humanitarian intervention by military means is a high risk strategy in terms of both collateral damage (civilian deaths, displaced persons, refugees, physical destruction of housing and essential infrastructure, economic collapse and soaring operational costs) and final objectives (creating a functioning democratic state or simply bringing an end to the fighting). They would prefer to see NATO adopt a much more cautious and conservative stance, defensive in the traditional sense, while cooperating with the UN on normal peace-keeping operations and in humanitarian assistance.http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/20/new-thinking-needed-nato
http://peaceandhealthblog.com/2012/05/21/nato-world-security/
Some fairly recent sources:
Also important:
US bases in Italy
NATO Funding – How it works. Read all sections

Lots more old background material for those who want it!
Outcomes of NATO Warsaw summit July 2016:
In ‘NATO’s Next Act – How to Handle Russia and Other Threats’ (Foreign Affairs, July- August 2016)
Philip M. Breedlove, former NATO Supreme Commander 2013-16, describes how over the past 3 years NATO has begun shifting its forces from operations outside Europe (e.g. Afghanistan) to the threats closer to the heart of the continent – namely Russian aggression and the challenges associated to the ongoing instability in the Middle East and North Africa (international displacement of people and transnational terrorism). Breedlove argues that the US and its NATO allies need to increase, modernize and rationalize their available resources in Europe given that the sanctions imposed on Russia after its seizure of Crimea have not deterred Russia which is continuing its Cold War- style provocations against NATO ships and planes and territorial waters and air space and its militarization of the Arctic. He suggests that a rapid military action by Russia against a NATO ally (e.g. Poland or one of the Baltic states), presumably in support of a Russian minority or ‘vital interest’, might meet little effective resistance from NATO in the short term and the situation could become a fait accompli.
He points out that US and NATO funding for Europe has been insufficient to deal with this growing threat from Russia, due to US budget cuts, the US prioritizing of other global threats, the US Asia-Pacific rebalance, the recession and the economic difficulties faced by many of America’s European NATO allies, their continuing commitments in Kosovo and Afghanistan and their growing commitments in dealing with the refugee crisis due to the Syrian civil war and instability in Libya. While Poland and the Baltic states see Russia as a real threat, other NATO allies, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey are more concerned with the threats coming from the Middle east and North Africa.
In 2014 in response to events in Ukraine, the US announced the European Reassurance Initiative and NATO agreed the Readiness Action Plan. These involve:
More combined military exercises
The rotational deployment of US forces in Poland and the Baltic states, the Black Sea
A greater NATO presence in the Mediterranean
A very rapid response brigade (part of the NATO Response Force)
The prepositioning of NATO military resources and equipment in advanced positions to facilitate a rapid response to an aggression
Small headquarters in 6 vulnerable central and eastern European NATO members
2 new tactical headquarters in Poland and Romania
Breedlove argues that NATO must continue the fight against Islamic State but play a supporting role, concentrating on institution building and education rather than intervention. He argues that the US and NATO must also continue to work with Russia where possible and where necessary, to deal with Iran, North Korea and the terrorist threat. However, he is against the lifting of sanctions on Russia and takes a hard-line position, claiming that Russia will only respect NATO if it has the means to respond to any aggressive initiative undertaken by Russia.
# US defense chief blasts Europe over NATO guardian.co.uk,  Friday 10 June 2011
Robert Gates blames a failure of political will and defense cuts as he warns that younger US politicians could abandon the alliance. He delivered a speech entitled ‘reflections on the status and future of the transatlantic alliance’, warning that NATO risks 'military irrelevance' unless spending is increased by members other than the US.
The US defense secretary, Robert Gates, has warned that a new post-cold war generation of leaders in America could abandon NATO and 60 years of security guarantees to Europe, exasperated by Europe's failures of political will and the gaps in defense funding needed to keep the alliance alive.
In a blistering attack on Europe - which he accused of complacency over international security - Gates predicted a NATO consigned to "military irrelevance" in a "dim if not dismal" future unless allies stepped up to the plate.
"If current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future US political leaders - those for whom the cold war was not the formative experience that it was for me - may not consider the return on America's investment in NATO worth the cost," Gates, a former CIA chief, warned.
Three weeks before standing down as Pentagon head and retiring from decades at the heart of the US security establishment, Gates used a 20-minute valedictory speech in Brussels to read the riot act to a stunned elite audience of European officers, diplomats, and officials.
NATO had degenerated into a "two-tiered" alliance of those willing to wage war and those only interested in "talking" and peacekeeping, he fumed in his bluntest warning to the Europeans in nearly five years as the Pentagon head.
Washington's waning commitment to European security could spell the death of the alliance, he said. The speech was laced with exasperation with and contempt for European defense spending cuts, inefficiencies, and botched planning.
The Libyan mission was a case in point, Gates said, pointing out that the Anglo-French-led campaign was running out of munitions just weeks into operations against an insubstantial foe. The US had again had to come to the rescue of the Europeans in a campaign on Europe's shores and deemed to be of vital interest to the Europeans, he complained.
"The mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country. Yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference."
In March, all 28 NATO members had voted for the Libya mission, he said. "Less than half have participated, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission … Many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can't. The military capabilities simply aren't there." The air campaign had been designed to mount 300 sorties daily but was struggling to deliver 150, Gates added.
Away from the specifics of the current operations in Libya and Afghanistan, Gates charged Europe's leaders with lacking the political will to sustain NATO, complained bitterly about unending defense budget cuts, but conceded that the reduction in spending was probably irreversible.
The US share of NATO military spending had soared to 75%, much more than during the cold war heyday when Washington maintained hundreds of thousands of US troops across Europe, he said. The US public would not stand for this much longer. Congress would rebel against spending "increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets", he said.
Noting he was 20 years older than Barack Obama, Gates said his peers' "emotional and historical attachment" to NATO was "ageing out". "In the past, I've worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance, between members who specialize in 'soft' humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the 'hard' combat missions ... This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable."
From: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/10/nato-dismal-future-pentagon-chief
*In fact, at its summit on the 20th and 21st May 2012 in Chicago NATO concentrated on these issues. Faced with cuts by member states in military spending it adopted a strategy of ‘smart or intelligent’ defense which meant better coordination of the human and technical resources of its members in order to share capabilities and reduce costs. NATO is also trying to prioritize its core tasks and responsibilities while remaining committed to its current security and peace-keeping operations. Members are also trying to reduce the gap in contributions between the US and its European allies. NATO’s withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan was scheduled for 2014 but members agreed to continue to provide training and support for local Afghan security forces beyond that date in order to guarantee the Afghan government’s survival and effectiveness. The Warsaw summit extended this deadline beyond 2016. http://www.rferl.org/content/Funding_Squeeze_Casts_A_Pall_Over_NATOs_Future/2067992.html
http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2011/06/20/natos-biggest-problems-in-the-future-will-be-internal-not-external/
http://www.voanews.com/content/financial-crisis-hits-nato-funding-133906423/148219.html
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-01-29/world/35437915_1_nato-allies-defense-budgets-european-members
http://www.cfr.org/nato/future-nato/p21044?gclid=CNSLjsiS8q0CFcVN3godkB_6tw
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO%E2%80%93Russia_relations
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/NATO_sees_little_progress_in_missile_talks_with_Russia_999.html
http://www.rferl.org/content/nato_no_russia_summit_without_missile_defense_deal/24464286.html
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/2012-security-predictions/gridlocked-world/EN/index.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_START
http://www.globalresearch.ca/1-6-trillion-military-mafia-nato-countries-account-for-70-of-world-military-budget/22155
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures


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