mercoledì 29 gennaio 2020
martedì 28 gennaio 2020
Another possible question
Mr Trump's peace plan for Israel and the Palestinians. What are its main points? What are the problems? Can it work?
Speeches and presentations
Go back and check
https://youngdip.blogspot.com/2019/10/making-speech-in-english.html
especially the examples in the second part
https://youngdip.blogspot.com/2019/10/making-speech-in-english.html
especially the examples in the second part
A possible essay plan on Populism and the future
Is
the rise of populism a real threat to the international liberal order
and to EU unity?
Introduction: Start with a reference to one or two
recent developments relating to the question to show you are up to
date on the issue e.g. the election of Donald Trump, both Macron and
the Yellow Vest movement, Bolsonaro, Brexit, new political groups in
Germany, Austria, Spain, (Italy?) etc...
Line
of argument:
This essay will argue that the threat to the liberal international
order and
UN unity
is not populism itself but the unresolved causes of populism.
Introduction:
Give a definition of populism – for, example your own or the one by
the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde who argues that it it is not
based simply on emotional rhetoric and is not a temporary
opportunistic phenomenon or a detailed ideology but instead has two
essential characteristics. First, it divides the political world into
the 'people' and the political élite, which, it argues, is corrupt
and pursues its own interests rather than those of the people.
Second, populists believe that politics should be the expression of
the 'general will' of the people (a rather frightening concept if one
thinks of the French Revolution!). Evidence that they may be
badly-informed is rejected as 'fake news'.
Causes
of the rise of populism – in developed economies the failure of the
traditional parties of the centre-right and centre-left to guarantee
the prosperity (low unemployment and a moderate rise in living
standards) that they had previously guaranteed for the middle and
lower classes / for those without a university qualification, there
has been the loss of manufacturing jobs in developed economies,
stagnant salaries and growing income inequality / the lack of
employment opportunities particularly for the younger generation,
even those who are well-qualified / unemployment or underemployment
for those in their 30s and 40s (the Yellow Vest movement) /
widespread anger with rising immigration (at unprecedented levels
into the EU in 2015-2016) seen as competition for jobs, a downward
pressure on incomes and a threat to identity / and thus a growing
sense of exclusion
from politics.
Other
concerns in Europe, whether legitimate or not, include:
the
idea that the institutional architecture of the EU is in some way
undemocratic and requires reform / that EU leaders are too distant
from EU voters and fail to respond to them and communicate properly
with them / that the currency union has not been a success for all
member states / that some members are treated better while others are
punished or abandoned (Italy, Spain and Greece and migration).
In
developing countries which have seen periods of economic expansion,
the anger may be more focused on inequalities of wealth and land
ownership, widespread corruption or on the weakness of the government
to control the cost of living and provide basic services like a
public health service (Chile, Brazil, Lebanon, Iraq, Argentina, Iran,
the Arab Spring), security (Mexico and the drug cartels). One
more traditional sense of populism remains and that is popular
opposition to an undemocratic regime and that is what happened in the
Arab Spring(s), and is happening now in Hong Kong. In the Arab Spring
the desire for political reform was mixed with high expectations that
greater democracy would bring rapid improvement in terms of lower
prices for food and other basics, increasing prosperity and social
reform, expectations that a revolution, even when successful, can
rarely meet in the short term. In contrast, Tunisia remains a source
of hope.
One
interesting question would be the role of IT (internet, social media
and cell phones) in all this, in forming opinion, fostering the
formation of non-Parliamentary movements and in providing a means for
a looser, more flexible form of political organization.
Consequences
– growing disillusion, scepticism and cynicism regarding the
political ruling class and 'political correctness' (seen as favouring
minorities and ignoring the majority), anger with the traditional
parties, seen as self-interested, corrupt, élitist or simply
incompetent and unable to respond to these challenges, and an anger
with international bodies, such as the EU or UN, the WTO and IMF (for
example, from nationalists but also from the anti-globalization
movement)
also seen as too expensive, too far from the people and corrupt, or
not interested
in the problems of ordinary people, or simply irrelevant. This has
often led to the rise of 'anti-system' movements, a return to
nationalism, a political arena that populists believe is more natural
in cultural terms and can be controlled by the people (give examples,
Hungary, Poland, Brexit). The new populists, however, often have
little experience of government and may make unrealistic promises,
raising unrealistic expectations, and this has led to instability in
both domestic politics (give an example) and foreign relations e.g.
Trump and NATO allies, Trump and China, recent relations between
Italy and France and a weakening of the existing international
institutions as the US seems to refuse to want to continue to be the
guarantor of the system.
Conclusion
– all this is a real threat to international cooperation and the
effectiveness of international institutions, given that populist
movements tend to prioritize national issues and solutions, at a time
when many of our problems are of a global, or at least international
nature and can only be successfully dealt with at that level.
However, the problem is not populism itself but the underlying causes
which seem to be our failure at the national, regional (EU) and
global level to manage the economic and social effects of
globalization in a way that reassures people about social stability
and their prospects and their children's prospects for the future.
If
Western Europe is characterized by the welfare state, the great
challenges to that model are the pressures from a globalized economy.
For example, some experts argue that in a globalized economy private
companies in Italy should give jobs to the best-qualified and
cheapest, even if they are foreigners based abroad, and move
production to countries where labor is cheaper. Is that an acceptable
model? If so, how do we adapt our society to it? If not, how to we
redesign an effective European alternative that preserves the basics
of the welfare state and our commitment to social inclusiveness?
How
could EU leaders and institutions respond to the call for greater
democracy and better communication? How can the UN pledge on poverty
in the developing world 'to
leave no one behind',
be applied in the EU economically and politically to its citizens and
members? Or is its future likely to be further fragmentation, the
"multi-speed
Europe" (or
'a core Europe and a periphery') as with the existing situation with
the Euro and the Schengen area?
venerdì 24 gennaio 2020
A possible essay plan on the BRICS
What
is the role of the BRICS in international relations?
Introduction:
Refer to a recent piece of news about the BRICS or their last summit
meeting. Give a brief description of the BRICS group and why they are
important. Explain the idea of complementarity rather than
similarity. Current intra-BRIC cooperation. How are their economies
performing at the moment.
Line
of argument: This essay will argue that the BRICS are an
important group at the economic level and their activity should be
welcomed by the international community as a way to boost the world
economy and should not be seen as a rival to the existing
institutions of the liberal order but as a complement to them. At the
political level it will be argued that the BRICS are not a coherent
group and do not represent a threat to democratic values although the
evolution of the situation will need to be monitored.
What
are their declared shared aims (take these from summaries of previous
summits)? How much have they achieved so far? How realistic are their
other aims? At the economic level are they dominated by China? The
New Development Bank, the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),
the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Are
they a threat to developed Western economies and the post-War liberal
order and its existing institutions (the
World Bank, the International Fund and the Asian Development Bank)
or should their expanding role in the global economy be welcomed?
Italy and the BRICS:
Though
they are all likely to play a greater political role in international
relations as their economies grow, will they play that role together
or separately or in alliance with other partners? What differences
are there between them? Chinese-Indian border dispute / China is a
one-party state, Russia an authoritarian state, India, Brazil and
South Africa democracies (if rather dysfunctional). Are some of them
too focused on domestic developments to want to play a major role in
world affairs? Will other developing countries want to join their
group or form alternative groupings.
Conclusion:
I would argue that the growing role of the BRICS in the global
economy should be encouraged and that as a political group they are
likely to each act separately. Russia and China may cooperate on the
UNSC in opposition to the US and its allies but that may provide a
welcome level of restraint in international affairs. However, a
joint operation involving all the BRICS in the style of NATO or a
single, unified position on an international question like Syria or
Venezuela (Russia for Maduro, Bolsonaro for Guaido)
seems
unlikely given their differences in terms of political ideology.
What is the role of the BRICS in international relations?
Good
summaries and information to start with:
The
BRICS
is an international political association of leading emerging
economies,
arising out of the inclusion of South
Africa
in the BRIC
group in 2010. As of 2019, its five members are Brazil,
Russia,
India,
China
and South
Africa.
With the (partial) exception of Russia, the BRICS are all developing
or newly industrialized
countries (often called ‘emerging markets’ or ‘emerging
economies’, although at this point China, for
example, has clearly emerged!) with very high growth rates between
the end of the 1990s and 2010. They have large and till recently
fast-growing economies and significant influence on regional and
global affairs. As of 2018, the five BRICS countries represent 27 %
of the world’s land area, 41.7% of its population ( 3.23 billion,
but mainly China and India),
and
45 % of its workforce in 2017, according to IMF estimates. As
of 2018, the five nations have a combined nominal GDP of
US$18.6 trillion, about 23.2% of the gross
world product,
combined GDP (PPP) of around US$40.55 trillion (32% of World's GDP
PPP),
a figure which is expected to continue to rise, although estimates
seem to vary a lot. Their share of nominal global GDP trebled in 15
years. They held combined foreign reserves worth US$
3.9 trillion in 2018 (mainly China). In
2015 they also accounted for around 55% of the output of emerging and
developing economies. The
BRICS accounted, on average, for 56% of the growth of global GNP (at
2005 $PPP) during 2008-17.
However intra-BRICS trade flows are considered low at only 4.9% of
the total foreign trade of these countries.
https://developingeconomics.org/2017/09/27/the-brics-and-a-changing-world/
IMF
estimates of GDP, nominal and PPP per member for 2019 were: China
$14.1 trillion nominal and $27.3 trillion PPP, Brazil $1.8 trillion
and $3.5 trillion, Russia $1.6 and $4.3 trillion, India at $2.9
trillion and $11.3 trillion, South Africa $0.4 trillion and $0.8
trillion. Compared with the United States $21.4 trillion nominal and
$21.4 trillion PPP, European Union $18.7 trillion nominal and 22.8
PPP.
However, according to the IMF per capita GDP nominal and PPP for 2018 was reported as: China $10,098 nominal and $18,110 PPP, Brazil $8,796 and $16,154, Russia $11,162 and $29,267, India $2,171 and $7,874, South Africa $6,100 and $13,675 (compared with US $65,111 nominal and $65,111 PPP).http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRICS
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29_per_capita
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29_per_capita
http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/03/26/brics-summit-factbox-idINDEE92P09120130326
http://www.treasury.gov.za/brics/sbe.aspx
http://www.mni-indicators.com/files/focus_on_brics_economic_growth.pdf
Their economies are said to be complementary rather than similar, since China and India are industrial and service producers, while Russia and Brazil are major energy and raw materials suppliers. Russia is also a major grain exporter. However, economic complementarity is limited by the low level of intra-BRICS trade mentioned above. Clearly their percentage of global GDP is likely to continue to grow in the long term, although other developing countries may achieve even faster growth rates. The BRICS group may expand its membership in response to this.http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-09-06/news/33650208_1_bric-countries-brics-share-punita-kumar-sinha
http://www.cfr.org/brazil/brics-summit-delhi-declaration/p27805
As we have seen, given their enormous populations the BRICS have relatively low average per capita income (particularly India) with large numbers of people still living in poverty.
According to OECD figures, with easy credit, rising commodity prices and favorable demographics (i.e. cheap labor) the BRIC(S) economies grew at a rapid pace from 2001 to 2010. In 2010, while central banks in developed markets were printing cash and lowering interest rates to breathe some life into their sluggish economies, Gross Domestic Product in Brazil, Russia, India, and China, expanded by 7.5%, 4.5%, 10.5% and 10.4% respectively.
However, according to the IMF per capita GDP nominal and PPP for 2018 was reported as: China $10,098 nominal and $18,110 PPP, Brazil $8,796 and $16,154, Russia $11,162 and $29,267, India $2,171 and $7,874, South Africa $6,100 and $13,675 (compared with US $65,111 nominal and $65,111 PPP).http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRICS
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29_per_capita
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29_per_capita
http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/03/26/brics-summit-factbox-idINDEE92P09120130326
http://www.treasury.gov.za/brics/sbe.aspx
http://www.mni-indicators.com/files/focus_on_brics_economic_growth.pdf
Their economies are said to be complementary rather than similar, since China and India are industrial and service producers, while Russia and Brazil are major energy and raw materials suppliers. Russia is also a major grain exporter. However, economic complementarity is limited by the low level of intra-BRICS trade mentioned above. Clearly their percentage of global GDP is likely to continue to grow in the long term, although other developing countries may achieve even faster growth rates. The BRICS group may expand its membership in response to this.http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-09-06/news/33650208_1_bric-countries-brics-share-punita-kumar-sinha
http://www.cfr.org/brazil/brics-summit-delhi-declaration/p27805
As we have seen, given their enormous populations the BRICS have relatively low average per capita income (particularly India) with large numbers of people still living in poverty.
According to OECD figures, with easy credit, rising commodity prices and favorable demographics (i.e. cheap labor) the BRIC(S) economies grew at a rapid pace from 2001 to 2010. In 2010, while central banks in developed markets were printing cash and lowering interest rates to breathe some life into their sluggish economies, Gross Domestic Product in Brazil, Russia, India, and China, expanded by 7.5%, 4.5%, 10.5% and 10.4% respectively.
However,
the BRICS were eventually hit by the economic crisis of 2008 as it
reduced demand in developed economies. GDP growth rates for 2015,
2016, 2017, 2018 according to the IMF were Brazil -3.8%,
-3.4%,
0.7%, 1.4% Russia -2.8%,
-0.2%,
1.8%, 1.7% India 8.0%, 7.1%, 6.7%, 7.3% China 6.9%, 6.7%, 6.8%, 6.6%
and South Africa by 1.3%, 0.3%, 0.7%, 0.8%. So China’s growth has
cooled significantly from the double digits rates of previous years.
India is still doing well. South Africa is growing at a very modest
rate. However, Russia and Brazil have been in serious difficulty till
very recently and went through recession, due to falling oil and
commodity prices and inflation (15.8% in Russia in August 2015, but
down to 4.5% in September 2018, and 9.5% in Brazil in August 2015,
down to 4.5% in September 2018). Interest rates in Russia stood at
7.5% in September 2018 and at 6.5% in Brazil in the same period.
Russia is also facing sanctions from the US and EU and other
countries as a result of the Ukraine crisis. A recent rise in oil
prices has been good for Russia (bad for China) but this should
stabilize in 2019. Commodity prices for food and raw materials should
remain fairly stable across 2018-19 unless new tariffs lead to a
trade war. So because of these political factors the outlook for
commodity prices, exports, imports and GDP growth is highly
uncertain.
For
the BRICS (with the exception of India, this is all in contrast to
previous performance over the last 20-25 years:
Average
GDP growth in the past:
Russia
3.6% (1996-2015), India 6.01% (1951-2015), China 10.92.% (1989-2015),
South Africa 3.03% (1994-2015), Brazil 3.01% (1991 to 2015).
However,
according to many sources, prospects for the BRICS’ future
long-term growth, appear good and, compared with many of the most
developed economies, two of the BRICS, China and India, are still
doing very well. (We will need to see if significant long-term gaps
in growth rates open up between the BRICS members.) Moreover, if
their economies slowed down simply as a result of the world recession
and if the global economy continues to recover, their growth rates
may return to previous levels. On the other hand, some experts argue
that they may face real challenges relating to structural problems
within their domestic economies and political systems. See:
http://time.com/4923837/brics-summit-xiamen-mixed-fortunes/
https://personal.vanguard.com/pdf/ISGBRIC.pdf
and
the longer articles from Foreign Affairs cited at the end of this
post.
We
should also note that some other developing economies may out-perform
the BRICS in terms of rapid GDP growth over the next decade. There is
the ‘N 11’ group, the ‘Next
Eleven’, Bangladesh,
Egypt,
Indonesia,
Iran,
Mexico,
Nigeria,
Pakistan,
Philippines,
Turkey,
South
Korea,
and Vietnam
according to Goldman
Sachs. However, they too now face serious economic problems.
There
are also the TIMPS, Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico and the
Philippines, a group which in 2010 was beating the BRICS by almost
every economic measure. There are also the MINTs,
an acronym coined for a group
of
four countries—Mexico,
Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey
Will
such countries be invited to join the BRICS group at some point or
are they in competition with the group’s members? Will they really
be able to sustain GDP growth? The BRICS
Plus
initiative seems to suggest that the BRICS group could soon expand
At
all events, the BRICS group is here to stay and clearly represents a
growing movement towards a more multipolar world economic order and
since the BRICS summit in New Delhi in 2012 various goals have been
outlined.
The
reform of global economic governance
– They want to move forward with the revision of the quota
mechanism for governance of the World Bank and IMF in order to
reflect the growing economic weight of developing countries and
emerging markets.
Trade
and Development
– They would welcome a new global reserve currency as an reliable
alternative to the dollar. This might be a cryptocurrency:
For
the moment they want to boost intra-BRICS trade using their own
currencies (instead of dollars) in order to compensate for any drop
in demand due to a global future recession or falling US/EU demand
(and protect their national currencies from financial crises), and to
link up their stock markets.
In
2012, they examined the idea of setting up a new development bank,
whose aims would include funding development and major infrastructure
projects initially in BRICS countries, but later in developing and
least developed countries too; lending, in the long term, during
global financial crises such as the Eurozone
crisis;
and issuing convertible
debt,
which could be bought by the central banks of all the member states
and hence act as a means of risk-sharing.
Foreign
policy
– In 2012
at the New Delhi summit,
then President
of China
Hu
Jintao
described
the BRICS countries as defenders and promoters of developing
countries and a force for world peace. At the summit the BRICS
criticized the West’s pressure on Iran and its attempts to convince
other countries to restrict their trade with Iran, and said that
dialogue was the best way to resolve the nuclear question. The group
took a similar position on Syria, against military intervention, and
in general emphasized the dangers of a war in the Middle East and the
fact that it would immediately lead to a rise in oil prices. The deal
with Iran was welcomed by the BRICS but Russia itself moved to
intervene in Syria.
AT
the BRICS summit in Durban in March 2013, further progress was made
with the approval of the plans to create the development bank.
Russia, Brazil and India agreed to contribute $18 billion to the
BRICS currency reserve pool, China $41 billion and South Africa $5
billion.)
At
the July 2014 sixth BRICS summit in Fortaleza, Brazil the group
signed a document to create the $100 billion funded New
Development Bank
(NDB) and a reserve currency pool worth an additional $100 billion to
help make currency transaction more diversified, stable and
predictable and
to act as “a kind of mini-IMF”. The NDB opened in July 2015. The
NDB’s headquarters are in Shanghai,
the institution's first president is from India, the bank's first
regional office is in Johannesburg,
the
inaugural chairman of the board of governors is from Russia and the
first chairman of the board of directors is from Brazil. The
presidency, with a term of five years, will rotate among the members
of the BRICS.
However,
the BRICS’ NDB may be overshadowed by the other new Chinese-based
multilateral lender, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),
which is headquartered in Beijing. China is its biggest shareholder
with about 30%, according to the legal framework signed by 50
founding member countries. It opened for business on 16 January 2016
. Major European and Asian economies, including Germany, Italy,
Britain, France, Russia, Australia, and South Korea have joined the
AIIB, but the US and Japan, two of the world’s largest economies,
have declined to do so.
Some
Chinese leaders have also talked of the need to prepare for a
'de-Americanised' world economy. However, Chinese Finance Minister
Lou Jiwei played down the competitive aspect (2015). And prospects
for cooperation between the banks seem good
https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2017/20170401_001.html
The
new banks can offer an alternative to the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank and can be
seen not as competition to the existing system but as complementary
and a way for China to reinvest productively some of its vast $4
trillion foreign-exchange reserves. In 2017 the NDB moved
ahead with 4 projects in China,
Russia and India with
loans totaling more than $1.4bn. The
scope of the NDB’s activities includes renewable energy,
information technology, energy conservation, flood control, water
quality and developing the rural drinking water supply. Going
forward, another $30bn in loans, including a total of 15 projects by
the end of 2017 and up to 50 in 2021, has already been announced.
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/brics-new-development-bank-four-sustainability/
http://ndbbrics.org/
https://www.ft.com/content/cc7c7ee6-918b-11e7-a9e6-11d2f0ebb7f0
The
2015
BRICS summit
was held in Ufa in Russia. The summit coincided with the entry into
force of constituting agreements of the New Development Bank and the
BRICS
Contingent Reserve Arrangement, a
framework for the provision of support through liquidity and
precautionary instruments in response to actual or potential
short-term balance of payments pressures.
The
2016
BRICS summit
was held from 15 to 16 October 2016 in Goa, India. It condemned
terrorism, recognized the difficulties for the group created by the
global recession and underlined the importance of cooperation with
and work within traditional global institutions like the WTO.
There
was some controversy over the issue of terrorism.
The
2017
BRICS summit in
Xiamen, China helped to reduce tensions between China and India over
the Doklam
border issue.
The
summit approved a three-year action plan (2017-2020) for cooperation
innovation and
agreed to
promote the development of BRICS Local Currency Bond Markets and
jointly establish a BRICS Local Currency Bond Fund, as a means of
contribution to the capital sustainability of financing in BRICS. The
BRICS grouping continued to push for cautious reform of global order
but in its final declation made it clear that it did not wish to
weaken the institutions of the international order and reaffirmed the
BRICS' commitment to the UN and the G20, globalization, sustainable
development and the fight against climate change.
The
2018
BRICS summit in
Johannesburg,
South Africa
released this declaration
https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30190/10th_BRICS_Summit_Johannesburg_Declaration
and
Chinese President Xi Jinping said:
“It
is important that we continue to pursue innovation-driven development
and build the BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution
(PartNIR)
to strengthen coordination on macroeconomic policies, find more
complementarities in our development strategies, and reinforce the
competitiveness of the BRICS countries, emerging market economies and
developing countries.”
He
also discussed the BRICS Plus initiative.
The 2019
BRICS summit was
was held at the Itamaraty
Palace
in
the
Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and saw members reaffirm
their commitment to cooperation on a range of topics.
So
do the BRICS represent a fundamental change in the world order either
today, or in the near future or in the long term?
No
one doubts that the influence of these countries will continue to
grow. After all, as emerging economies, their growth rates have been
much higher than those the developed economies averaged over most of
the last 20 years and although some of them face economic
difficulties now, their prospects for the long-term future remain
good. So the real question is whether Brazil, Russia, India, China
and South Africa form a coherent group with a coherent set of
interests which are clearly opposed to those of the traditional
‘West’ or not. In other words are all of these countries really
outside the ‘West’ if we do not restrict the meaning of the term
‘West’ to a synonym for NATO or fully developed economies? Are
they a challenge to the West’s leadership, or will all or some of
these countries simply become an integral part of it?
Much
of what the BRICS aim to do with regard to trade and development, as
outlined above, should simply be welcomed by the West and the UN.
Many Western NGOs and UN agencies have been working towards these
development goals for decades, but with limited resources and limited
success. A new reserve currency alongside the dollar would make the
international financial system more stable, and the creation and
growth of the New Development Bank should provide a way for countries
like China to reinvest their surpluses in various local and global
projects and provide a further global lender of last resort. How
realistic all this is in the short term is, however, less clear given
the structural weakness of the Russian and Brazilian economies and
the fears about China's growing total debt.
The
Italian position:
Population
trends within the BRICS also differ significantly. The population of
China continues to grow, but continues to slow (0.47% in 2018, 0.43%
in 2019) and is predicted to reach 1.45 billion in 2030 and then to
go into decline with an already aging population.
India’s
population is youthful and expanding at 1.1% (2017) annually and will
probably overtake China as the world’s most heavily populated state
by 2024.
Brazil’s
population growth rate was also high in previous years but fell to
0.80% in 2013 and has remained there, 0.79% in 2018 and 0.73% in
2019. Meanwhile the population in South Africa grew by I.37% in 2018
and 1.33% in 2019. After the break-up of the Soviet Union Russia’s
population fell significantly for more than a decade but has now
started to slowly recover, 0.14% in 2018 and 0.09% in 2019.# These
trends impact GDP growth rates and social welfare costs in the
future, making forecasts difficult to make and suggesting growing
divergence among the members of the group.
Commentators
also point out that there are already real differences and potential
divisions and weaknesses among the group’s members which will
inevitably affect the coherence and effectiveness of the group in
responding to any particular issue, and the ultimate objectives of
each of its members. Here are a few of them:
Russia
and China are permanent members of the UNSC with veto power. They
initially did not seem in a hurry to support India, Brazil and South
Africa with more than words in any bid to obtain permanent seats on
the Council and do not support attempts to reform the SC by
eliminating or reducing the scope of the veto power.
The
Durban Declaration included this sentence:
“In
this regard, China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to
the status of Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs
and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.”
This
seemed to stop short of unconditional support for seats on the UNSC
for Brazil and India, but in August 2015 Russia finally expressed
clear support for permanent seats for Brazil and India:
The
BRICS Xiamen summit declaration in 2017 stated that "China
and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status and
role of Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs and
support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN."
Rusia
and China do not support the extension of the veto to India and
Brazil.
Would
a permanent seat without a veto now be acceptable to the G4?
However, while Russia now clearly supports India's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, China is more ambivalent since India's bid is linked to Japan's in the G4.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-unsc-alliance-with-japan-biggest-mistake-chinese-media/articleshow/49042814.cms
Moreover, it seems
likely that Russia and China will continue to use their position and
their vetoes primarily to forward their own interests, as they
perceive them, rather than the interests of the BRICS or the
interests of the majority of developing nations in the General
Assembly. For example, from the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011
China and Russia were ready to block any resolution on Syria by the
SC, like that proposed by the Arab League in Feb. 2012 and approved
by the UNGA by 137 votes to 12 with 17 abstentions, which could open
the door to outside intervention or simply called for the current
regime to step down. In contrast, when Russia decided to launch its
own air strikes into Syria in September 2015, at the invitation of
President Assad, it is not clear if it first informed and coordinated
its action with its BRICS partners and sought approval from them.
Russia has used its veto to block criticism of the Assad regime or of
its own intervention. Currently China also supports some form of
intervention and says it is cooperating with both Russia and the US.
Brazil’s former
President Rousseff criticized Russia over its intervention in Syria
in Oct 2015.
India accepts
Russia’s intervention but argues that any long-term solution must
be political.
China is, of course,
a one-party state with regional ambitions, perceived as a threat by
several of its democratic and non-democratic neighbors who have
turned to the US for support. Russia is, although formally a
democracy, an authoritarian state and one with substantial military
power. By contrast, Brazil, India and South Africa are all
functioning (or dysfunctional!) democracies, with a variety of
problems relating to poverty, but sharing many ‘Western’ values.
India has border disputes with China and is also involved in the
dispute over the status of Tibet (a ‘domestic’ Chinese issue for
the Chinese, as is Taiwan). So while the BRICS appear to represent a
calming force in international relations, in favor of conflict
resolution through dialogue and against military intervention and
regime change, something that the West, or at a least large section
of Western public opinion, probably welcomes after the long and
costly campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not clear that this
respect for every nation’s sovereignty will be universally accepted
and approved of by public opinion around the world, by all the
members of the UNGA and by public opinion within the democratic BRICS
themselves. Humanitarian intervention remains a subject of heated
debate within, as well as between countries, experts and ordinary
people. Some argue that a situation like Syria requires international
action. Others argue that the humanitarian costs of intervention may
easily outweigh the gains. Given Russia's intervention in Syria it
would be an oversimplification to see this as a division between an
aggressive NATO and a peaceful BRICS. Opinion in the West was always
divided over the non-UN mandated operation in Iraq, but also over the
UN-mandated interventions in Afghanistan and Libya. After Russia's
intervention in Syria it is interesting to see the reaction of its
BRICS partners and the level of cooperation between Russia and France
(after the Nov. 2015 terrorist attack on Paris), the EU, the US and
other regional powers like Turkey. The article below highlights the
pragmatism that now seems to shape the foreign policy of each of the
BRICS.
Each of the BRICS
also faces serious domestic challenges (mainly relating to widespread
poverty, inequalities of wealth and corruption) and there are also
rivalries between them and wide variation in their economic
performance and political focus.
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/04/what-is-the-state-of-the-brics-economies/
And
these, together with growing regional commitments by its members may
take precedence over the BRICS' aspirations to play a more global
role in international relations as a group. For example, Brazil in
2015 saw widespread protests by the poorest sections of society, with
people saying that they had not benefited from GDP growth, that money
had been wasted on the Olympics and World Cup and calling for the
government to do something about economic inequalities and widespread
bribery and political corruption. This scandal led to the impeachment
of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, the arrest of former President
Lula and contributed to the election of Jair Bolsonaro
as President in October 2018, a candidate whose right-wing rhetoric
has proved divisive.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/07/crowds-in-sao-paulo-block-lula-from-handing-himself-in
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/28/jair-bolsonaro-wins-brazil-presidential-election
Meanwhile
South African President Jacob Zuma, faced with a debt crisis, and
corruption and cronyism scandals was forced to resign in February
2018.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2018/feb/14/jacob-zuma-south-africas-scandal-struck-president-resigns-video
New
President Cyril
Ramaphosa
has pledged to deal with
corruption.
https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2018-07-20-we-want-that-money-back-ramaphosa-talks-tough-on-corruption/
Meanwhile,
some commentators argue that the change in the world order is really
a result simply of the rise of China (or at most China and India)
rather than the BRICS as a whole.
Finally,
one should note that the BRICS are not really like the old Communist
bloc, which defined itself by its opposition to the West and to
capitalism. (Perhaps politically it has been more similar to the old
Non-Aligned Movement of the Cold War period, of which India was a
member – at least until Russia’s increasingly proactive foreign
policy). Economically, there is no clear division between the ‘West’
and the BRICS. In both groups we find a range of approaches to
managing the economy, those that adopt a more free market approach,
those that belief in government supervision and those that believe in
a welfare state – and varying proportions of all three.
Politically, as with the rest of the world, the BRICS countries have
their national interests and will no doubt seek to protect them, but
there is no basic ideological division between the West and the
BRICS. (China is hardly recognizable today as a ‘Communist’ state
in terms of economic policy). China and Russia are authoritarian
states but they are part of an international community based fairly
solidly on Western liberal democratic values that they do not wish to
challenge publicly (although they may violate them) and which shows
no real signs of losing its appeal to the majority of people around
the world. Brazil, South Africa and India are active supporters of
this community’s values. In fact, one might hope that both Russia
and China will conform to those values in the long term, evolving
slowly towards a more democratic and rights-based society. Thus a
more multipolar world with a more diffuse leadership does not
necessarily mean a weaker West, but perhaps simply a more inclusive
and wider definition of that idea. Alternatively, we may see the
BRICS acting together on crucial economic issues, and also negatively
to block, discourage or restrain what they perhaps see as Western
adventurism as regards military interventions (for humanitarian
purposes) in other countries, but much less able to agree a positive,
proactive line in foreign policy due to their different political
systems. Their cooperation could prove valuable in areas where US
involvement has
been reduced or ended by President Trump, for example in supporting
the Paris Climate Change agreement and in efforts to save the Iran
deal.
See:
'Russia
and India also underlined the importance of the full and effective
implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on
the Iranian nuclear programme in order to support international peace
and security, to strengthen non-proliferation regime and to develop
normal economic cooperation with Iran.'
from
in
2018, the population of Russia is 146,270,033.
The
population hit a historic peak at 148,689,000 in 1991, just before
the breakup of the Soviet Union, but then began a decade-long
decline, falling at a rate of about 0.5% per year due to declining
birth rates, rising death rates and emigration. The decline slowed
considerably in the late 2000s, and in 2009 Russia recorded
population growth for the first time in 15 years, adding 23,300
people. Key reasons for the slow current population growth are
improving health care, changing fertility patterns among younger
women, falling emigration and steady flows of immigrants from the
ex-USSR countries.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Russia#Population_statistics
With
the 2014
annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
in a move condemned by many countries as illegal
Russia
occupied additional territory with 1,965,200 inhabitants.
New
citizenship rules allowing citizens of former Soviet countries to
gain Russian citizenship have gained strong interest among Uzbeks. So
the population could return to levels seen just before the breakup of
the Soviet Union as well as resolve problems of statelessness.
Trade
between the EU and the BRICS
https://insights.abnamro.nl/en/2017/11/global-daily-euro-exports-to-brics-booming/http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151892.pdf
file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/partnershipstrategy_eng.pdf
The
future
https://mg.co.za/article/2019-11-15-00-use-brics-to-help-build-a-better-country/
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/09/the-global-economic-balance-of-power-is-shifting
http://theconversation.com/brics-needs-a-new-approach-if-its-going-to-foster-a-more-equitable-global-order-84229
Other
sources and older material as background:
for
the group without South Africa
then
Three
old longer articles from Foreign Affairs as background:
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