posizionandosi come primo contributore per le operazioni dell’UE, secondo contributore della NATO dopo gli USA – quindi primo tra gli europei – e primo tra i contributori occidentali alle missioni delle Nazioni Unite.

Italian military personnel in missions: NATO (5,170), UN (2,764) and EU (742).

From: https://www.affarinternazionali.it/le-missioni-internazionali-2024-quanti-e-dove-sono-i-militari-italiani/

Where are they?

https://www.difesa.it/operazionimilitari/op-intern-corso/operazioni-int/26752.html

https://www.analisidifesa.it/2025/04/le-missioni-militari-italiane-allestero-nel-2025/#:~:text=Il%20contesto,-Nella%20%E2%80%9CRelazione%20analitica&text=In%20questo%20contesto%2C%20l'Italia,%2C%20infine%2C%20il%20Medio%20Oriente.

NATO's New Strategic Concept 2022

https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/

https://www.nti.org/atomic-pulse/natos-new-strategic-concept-what-it-is-and-why-it-matters/#:~:text=At%20the%20summit%2C%20NATO%20leaders,alliance's%20new%20and%20enduring%20objectives.

https://www.osorin.it/uploads/model_4/.files/117_item_2.pdf?v=1664283035

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61397478

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/what-next-eu-security-and-defence-0_en

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/110084/%E2%80%9Ceurope-danger-what-next-eu-security-and-defence%E2%80%9D-speech-high-representativevice-president_en the EU’s view

https://www.nato.int/ or https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm NATO-Russia

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50090.htm#:~:text=For%20more%20than%20two%20decades,channels%20of%20communication%20remain%20open.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_191254.htm?selectedLocale=en NATO warning before the Russian invasion

and earlier https://www.nato.int/nato2030/ NATO 2030

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm operations

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_NATO_operations operations

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-the-us-failure-in-afghanistan-wont-break-nato/ withdrawal from Afghanistan

https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/speciale-afghanistan-nato-ritirata-31386

https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/02/01/nato-an-unexpected-driver-of-climate-action/index.html climate action

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm funding

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074 defence spending

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/02/12/nato-countries-defense-spending-gdp-trump/

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074 the US and its partners

NATO and the European Defence Agency

https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/eda-in-short

https://eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue26

https://eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue17/nato-view/enhancing-cooperation-improving-effectiveness-ensuring-coherence

watch?v=3McmcY-3d9I EU-NATO Cooperation Mogherini 9 years ago

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jtrW6ivIuJA EU-NATO Cooperation Borrell 5 years ago

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dfpqdygGV8 Greenland Kallas

However, ‘the European Union (EU) does not have a permanent military command structure along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Allied Command Operations (ACO).’

From: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command_and_control_structure_of_the_European_Union#:~:text=The%20European%20Union%20(EU)%20does,of%20the%20EU's%20CSDP%20missions.

But https://www.eppgroup.eu/newsroom/europe-must-take-command

https://www.euronews.com/business/2026/01/16/can-europes-military-spending-revive-economic-growth#:~:text=Europe%20is%20ramping%20up%20defence,limit%20the%20economic%20pay%2Doff.

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20190612STO54310/defence-how-the-eu-is-boosting-its-security

https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/802-the-four-challenges-facing-european-defence

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1480

This is perhaps the real point – https://www.visionofhumanity.org/europes-military-awakening-and-the-real-challenge-of-defence-integration/

https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/06/11/satellites-space-defense-the-eu-steps-up-efforts-for-a-common-space-strategy-amid-ambitions-and-obstacles/

https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/eu-space-strategy-security-and-defence_en

https://ip-quarterly.com/en/lost-space-europes-role-spatial-defense

https://eda.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/2025/01/22/commissioner-kubilius-calls-for-'big-bang'-in-eu-defence

world military spending by country

https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/military-spending-by-country

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_highest_military_expenditures

https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/unprecedented-rise-global-military-expenditure-european-and-middle-east-spending-surges

https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/sep/14/nato-military-spending-emissions

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/urgently-needed-europeanized-nato-212357 EU military spending compared with Russia

https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2025/06/25/the-hague-summit-declaration last NATO summit

https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/strengthening-natos-eastern-flank NATO’s eastern flank

Enhanced Forward Presence

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhanced_Forward_Presence

https://lc.nato.int/operations/enhanced-forward-presence-efp with map

https://www.max-security.com/resources/global-forecast/nato-future-strategy-2025/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PX4a6d3qNbU Mattarella visiting the troops

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YnDNOMbu0bg

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ACNW-PMYuMY Meloni

https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/operations-and-missions/nato-operations-and-missions NATO Missions

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en#11929 EU Missions

US bases and NATO installations in Italy

https://militarybases.com/overseas/italy/

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/03/us-military-base-expansion-italy

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:NATO_installations_in_Italy

https://rappnato.esteri.it/en/litalia-e-la-nato/ the US and Italy

NATO Funding – How it works. Read all sections

https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/funding-nato

Cybersecurity cooperation

https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/cyber-defence

https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2024/07/10/allies-agree-new-nato-integrated-cyber-defence-centre

https://nextgendefense.com/nato-cyber-defense-center/

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-union-and-nato-hold-first-structured-dialogue-cyber-0_en

Lessons from Afghanistan?

https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/legacy-wcm/media_pdf/2021/12/pdf/2112-factsheet-afgh-lessons-en.pdf

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/i-wrote-natos-lessons-from-afghanistan-now-i-wonder-what-have-we-learned/

https://www.geopolitica.info/la-guerra-in-afghanistan-perche-siamo-andati-e-cosa-abbiamo-imparato-parla-il-gen-cuzzelli/

https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/lessons-wests-long-war-afghanistan-35961

and Libya? https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/lessons-libya-how-not-intervene

Some Background

https://thehill.com/policy/international/524971-nato-secretary-general-warmly-welcomes-biden-as-president-elect

https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2020/11/12/great-optimism-eu-and-nato-brussels-looks-biden https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/27/biden-win-macron-independent-europe/

https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-germany-usa-defence-idUKKBN2800QS

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29220/curb-your-enthusiasm-what-france-expects-from-a-biden-presidency

https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/biden-e-la-nato-ricucire-gli-strappi-28081

https://formiche.net/2020/11/esteri-nato-europa-stoltenberg/

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html

https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/nato-stato-morte-cerebrale-ambizioni-macron-francia-e-ue-ACDUwQx

https://www.france24.com/en/20191107-macron-claims-nato-is-suffering-brain-death You could also read the Lisbon Declaration of November 2010
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease
the Chicago Declaration of May 2012
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease
the Wales summit Declarations of September 2014
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112517.htm

The Warsaw summit Communiqué of July 2016 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Warsaw_summit

The Brussels summit of May 2017 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Brussels_summit

The Brussels summit of July 2018 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Brussels_summit

London summit December 2019: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm

https://bianet.org/english/world/216686-nato-releases-final-declaration-of-london-summit

The Brussels summit of June 2021 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm

The Madrid summit of June 2022

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_196144.htm

and then https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50651695 Trump https://thedefensepost.com/2019/12/04/nato-joint-statement-london/ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50653597
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forze_armate_dell%27Unione_europea http://www.adnkronos.com/fatti/esteri/2017/09/03/nato-apre-hub-napoli-per-sud_k0JzpzCvEqdnpu1Dqo271N.html NATO’s Naples’ hub

More on developments regarding the European Defence Agency and NATO

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/430/Military%20and%20civilian%20missions%20and%20operations EU missions and operations https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_and_civilian_missions_of_the_European_Union EU missions and operations https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SpS4TIdAQ9k https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DnT-gCypgNo https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaEGS5muCSA https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uj385Rq_66I https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3McmcY-3d9I https://www.eda.europa.eu/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bs8xXf-2PBY https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/security/20190612STO54310/eu-army-myth-what-is-europe-really-doing-to-boost-defence https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/07/16/strengthening-eu-nato-relations/index.html https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/28286/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheet_en https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_a_new_beginning_for_european_defence https://www.eda.europa.eu/ https://www.eda.europa.eu/aboutus/who-we-are/member-states https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_and_civilian_missions_of_the_European_Union https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_41_EU_military_operations.pdf https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/permanent-structured-cooperation-(pesco) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_Structured_Cooperation#Participating_armed_forces https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_Structured_Cooperation#Neutral_states https://ec.europa.eu/ireland/news/key-eu-policy-areas/permanent-structured-cooperation-on-security-and-defence_en https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ZYOUM7GbSA https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/eu-defence-co-operation-is-no-threat-to-irish-neutrality-1.3343293 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=99AkjuMgaB4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebvJ9OzMRjY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dh8EKNZ8O7Y http://defencesummit.eu/ https://warsawinstitute.org/finnish-ministry-national-defence-sceptical-european-army/ http://tahdistolehti.fi/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-new-beginning-increased-cooperation-eu-defence/ https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2018/12/12/gismo-s-geohub-aims-at-full-operational-capability-by-early-2019 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/05/defence-cooperation-council-adopts-conclusions-on-eu-nato-cooperation-endorsing-common-set-of-new-proposals-for-further-joint-work/ and then really as much as you have time to read https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/28286/EU-NATO%20cooperation%20-%20Factsheet http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2018)625109 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_nato_factsheet_16-06-2017_0.pdf https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2017/03/27/nato-deputy-secretary-general-rose-gottemoeller-visits-eda https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_138829.htm https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/15449/Mogherini:%20%22EU-Nato%20cooperation%20crucial%20for%20the%20continent%22 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/search/site/european%20defence_en http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/19/eu-nato-cooperation/# https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2017-11/2017%20-%20163%20DSCTC%2017%20E%20rev%201%20fin%20-%20EU%20AND%20NATO%20COOPERATION%20-%20MESTERHAZY%20REPORT.pdf https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_49217.htm https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160630_1607-factsheet-nato-eu-en.pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_operations_of_the_European_Union http://piracy-studies.org/beyond-rivalry-eu-nato-cooperation-in-counter-piracy-operations/ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/595855/EPRS_BRI(2016)595855_EN.pdf https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36195/most-important-moment-european-defence-decades-mogherini_fr http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/american-withdrawal-presents-opportunity-for-europe-a-1135172.html http://www.adnkronos.com/aki-en/security/2017/11/10/pinotti-backs-more-integrated-european-defence_ctDIgGhps1J3p37WCRwlmL.html http://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/future-eu-defence-european-space-data-and-cyber-agency https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/34226/Permanent%20Structured%20Cooperation%20(PESCO)%20-%20Factsheet https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/defence-security-timeline/# http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1516_en.htm http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/22-euco-security-defence/ http://www.newsweek.com/eu-defense-fund-tackle-russia-military-trump-nato-622648 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40217085 http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/07/eu-prepares-a-defense-union-that-could-alleviate-not-aggravate-trumps-concerns-on-nato.html http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari1-2017-keohane-threes-company-france-germany-uk-european-defence-post-brexit http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4385_en.htm

and plans for the European Border and Coast Guard https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/fact-sheets/docs/a_european_border_and_coast_guard_en.pdf http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-5715_en.htm https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Border_and_Coast_Guard_Agency https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Risk_Analysis_for_2019_0.pdf https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/11/08/european-border-and-coast-guard-council-adopts-revised-regulation/

NATO notes and history:

The current NATO Secretary General is Mark Rutte, former Prime Ministero of the Netherlands.
Read this information carefully, as necessary background, take notes on what you think you can use. You won’t need everything.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization or North Atlantic Alliance – formed in April 1949 – at present 32 members (Finland 2023, Sweden 2024)) – HQ Brussels, Belgium (with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, the central command of NATO military forces).
The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, famously stated the organization's goal was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down" (Do not quote this at the Concorso!!).

NATO was created at the start of the Cold War as an alliance among states sharing core democratic values, and was a way to extend the US commitment to the stability and defense of Western and Southern Europe (resulting from WWII) indefinitely. Its principal objective was to deter (hence 'deterrence') a Soviet invasion or interference in the area. This was based on article 5 of the treaty, under which members are committed to come to the aid and defense of any member state which is attacked by a non-member (i.e. Russia). This was achieved by the deployment of US and allied forces throughout Europe in such a way that the invasion of a NATO member would automatically involve the forces of the US and other countries, thus committing them to action. Conventional Russian forces in Europe were always superior to those of the Alliance, so the ultimate deterrence was provided by US (and later British and French) nuclear weapons. In the event of a conflict NATO conventional forces were there to gain time for diplomacy before using nuclear weapons. In response, the Soviet Union created the Warsaw Pact with its Eastern European allies in May 1955 (after West Germany joined NATO). NATO never had to go to war, and was thus successful in fulfilling its main objective of deterring Russia.
With the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (1989-1992), NATO seemed to have lost its historic reason for existing. The US and its NATO allies reduced the size of their forces in Europe and then there was an intense debate about what, if any, NATO’s role could and should now be in world affairs. The Lisbon declaration (Nov. 2010) seemed to provide some clear indications regarding the direction in which NATO was moving (e.g. international crisis management).. However, it also raised certain questions and left some unanswered. With the events of 2008 in Georgia and, above all, of 2014 in Ukraine there was a rise in tensions with Russia, a decline in cooperation between Russia and NATO and fears that we were returning, if not to the Cold War, at least to an adversarial relationship rather than one based on working together. Given the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO now seems to have returned to its original purpose of guaranteeing its members’ (particularly its Eastern European members’) sovereignty and independence. President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty added to tensions and raised fears of a new nuclear arms race. As did Russia’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 2023.

https://www.france24.com/en/20190802-usa-russia-withdrawal-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-treaty-mikhail-gorbachev-ronald-rea

https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2023-11/nuclear-disarmament-monitor

(see also the dispute since 1992 between Moldova and Russia over Transnistria)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria

http://opiniojuris.org/2020/03/17/looking-for-a-solution-under-international-law-for-the-moldova-transnistria-conflict/

There were also concerns in Europe that President Trump might decide to withdraw the US from NATO, which could have meant either the death of the organization, or simply a reduction in the US role within it and a more isolationist approach, leaving its European allies to face threats on their own. This led the EU to look more to its own defence but also to welcome Biden’s election.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_from_NATO#United_States_of_America

Main points:

1) After the end of the Cold War the US reduced its forces in Europe and shifted a significant proportion of what remained southwards. NATO reduced its heavy conventional forces and European armies based largely on military service in favor of smaller, more professional and much more high-tech (smart) forces with ‘out of area’ (outside Europe) capabilities (including logistical support). This process has continued with more attention paid to cost effectiveness and greater integration of different national forces and weapons systems. However, these goals are difficult to achieve due to national economic interests in the arms industry.

2) NATO’s Strategic Concept after 2010 was based on the idea of intervention in crisis management and security questions beyond NATO’s borders (‘out of area’ operations beyond Europe, the area NATO was originally created to defend) and in cooperation with other countries and regional organizations (ISAF in Afghanistan was NATO-led but included forces from other countries). This idea had gradually evolved since the early 1990s with NATO’s intervention in the Balkans (in 1993 against Serbia, and in 1999 in Kosovo). After 9/11 NATO invoked article 5 for the first time and sent the ISAF to Afghanistan in 2001 under a UN mandate (the first major ‘out of area’ operation) and later also became involved in training Iraqi forces to take over responsibility for security. From 2009 to 2015 it conducted operation Ocean Shield against piracy off the Horn of (North-East) Africa. It launched an operation to protect Libyan civilians from the Gaddafi regime in March-October 2011 which led to the fall of the regime, and is now involved in a security operation (Sea Guardian) in the Mediterranean. As a result of the 9/11 terrorist attack, and the threat of further terrorist attacks there is now also intensified cooperation between the security services and police forces of NATO members, and between them and other countries facing the same threat. The organization also created a NATO Response Force (NRF) to make it easier for NATO to provide a rapid response to a crisis before the deployment of heavier forces.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Response_Force

However, after the failure of the operation in Afghanistan, the US and its NATO partners may be less willing to engage in ‘out-of-area’ operations and much more focused on Europe.

See the New Strategic Concept 2022

https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/

3) NATO began to see its role less in strictly military terms and more and more in terms of cooperating with the UN, the EU, other international or regional organizations, and other countries (whether democratic like Brazil, Japan and Australia or less democratic, or not at all but stable, like China) on a range of issues considered threats to NATO members’ security, e.g. terrorism, international crime and trafficking, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear arms, piracy, cyberattacks, climate change and environmental degradation and crisis management (intervention to stabilize failed states and prevent escalating local crises).See the Lisbon Summit Declaration November 2010

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease

and the Chicago Summit Declaration (May 2012)

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease

but again, as we have seen, Ukraine has changed the focus back to military defence in Europe.

4) In the years following the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, many former Soviet satellite states joined NATO and the EU which expanded to the East (German unification in 1990 This meant NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, for the Baltic states, Rumania, Bulgaria and Slovakia in 2004, for Albania and Croatia in 2009, Montenegro 2017, North Macedonia 2020). Finland joined in 2923 and Sweden in 2024. The entrance of these formally neutral countries indicates how concerned many European nations are about Russian expansionism.

Currently, three partner countries have declared their aspirations to NATO membership: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/7/sweden-officially-becomes-32nd-member-of-nato-military-alliance

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49212.htm

For Eastern European countries this move was mainly a guarantee of continued independence from Russia. However, this has been seen by Russia as aggressive and a way to reduce Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Russia made clear its opposition to Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia joining NATO or the EU. Georgia has been promised NATO membership at an unspecified date in the future but Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008, in support of the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, was the first real sign of the dangers raised by the question of further NATO/EU expansion to the East. In fact, Russia’s opposition to Georgia joining NATO seems to have blocked further progress. This year’s election results in Georgia may also mean that the country moves away from NATO and the EU.

However, it is the evolution of events in Ukraine which has really thrown into question all certainties about relations with the Russian Federation. Ukraine also expressed interest in NATO membership in 2008, but later adopted a position of neutrality in 2010 probably because of Russia’s opposition. A decision in November 2013 by Ukraine's President Viktor Yanukovych to pull out of an association deal with the European Union sparked huge street protests that eventually led to his downfall in February 2014. In March Russia reacted by annexing the Ukrainian region of Crimea after the Crimean parliament declared independence from Ukraine, and unrest began growing in eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russian sentiment is strong. The US and NATO denounced the Russian move as illegal and its support for the separatist insurgencies in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions since 2014 as aggressively expansionist. Following Russia’s support for the separatists in 2014, the Ukrainian government launched a military counter-offensive against the insurgents, which resulted in the ongoing War in Donbass. After parliamentary elections in October 2014, the new Ukraine government made joining NATO a priority. In December 2014, the Ukrainian parliament renounced Ukraine's non-aligned status that had “proved to be ineffective in guaranteeing Ukraine's security and protecting the country from external aggression and pressure”. Russia obviously opposed this.
Russia has continued to argue that it sees NATO and the EU’s expansion to the East over the last 20 years as far more aggressive than its own response to protect Russian minorities and that this expansion is a violation of a promise made in 1990 that in exchange for Russian agreement to German reunification NATO agreed not to expand towards the East. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation
NATO's growing concern and its evolving strategy to respond to Russia's moves can be seen in

The Wales Summit Declaration Sept 2014 (paragraphs 16-31)

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm

the Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security July 2016

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133168.htm

and in detail in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué July 2016 (paragraphs 9-24)

Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine#:~:text=On%2024%20February%202022%2C%20Russia,crisis%20since%20World%20War%20II.

reactions https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactions_to_the_2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine#:~:text=Public%20reaction,-Further%20information%3A%20Protests&text=The%20invasion%20received%20widespread%20public,vandalism%20with%20some%20even%20demolished.

EU response

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/timeline-eu-response-ukraine-invasion/

NATO response

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3188194/nato-unified-resolute-in-face-of-russias-illegal-ukraine-invasion-austin-says/#:~:text=Social%20Media%20Policy-,NATO%20Unified%2C%20Resolute%20in%20Face%20of%20Russia's,Illegal'%20Ukraine%20Invasion%2C%20Austin%20Says&text=NATO%20stands%20united%20in%20its,said%20today%20at%20NATO%20headquarters.

See the links at the start of this post for a summary of current tensions with Russia over the war in Ukraine and NATO’s official stance.

With the situation in Georgia, the conflict in Ukraine and the resulting sanctions, as well as Russia’s growing assertiveness in international relations (e.g. in Africa) new questions have emerged about the poor prospects for rebuilding good future relations between the European Union, NATO and the West in general and the Russian Federation. With Russian minorities in other Eastern European and Baltic NATO and EU members (and also in Moldova), NATO decided in March 2015 to strengthen its Baltic Air Policing mission and presence in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea area. It has also conducted joint military exercises with Ukraine but has avoided overt military involvement in both Ukraine and Georgia, not wanting a direct confrontation with Russia. Although they are not NATO members, Ukraine and Georgia began participating in the NATO Response Force (NRF), respectively, in 2014and 2015.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315.html
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315-2.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014%E2%80%9315_Russian_military_intervention_in_Ukraine
At the NATO summit in Wales on 4^th and 5^th September 2014, the military alliance finalized plans for its new spearhead NATO Response Force (a rapid deployment force of 4,000 soldiers able go into action in 48 hours) as a response to growing concern about the Ukraine crisis and the rise of Islamic State militants. Despite calls from eastern European members (Poland and the Baltic states), NATO did not approve the proposal to create new permanent bases in these member states. Germany in particular wished to avoid further antagonizing Russia by such an action. President Obama, however, assured them of NATO and US commitment to their protection (see below for the change of policy at the Warsaw Summit) NATO also confirmed the suspension (April 2014) of its partnership for civilian and military cooperation with Russia and offered support for Ukraine’s plans to strengthen its military capacity.

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/03/timeline-ukraine-political-crisis-201431143722854652.html

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-a-timeline-of-the-conflict-from-the-euromaidan-protests-to-mh17-and-civil-war-in-the-east-9706999.html

http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/05/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/index.html

http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/02/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/

http://en.ria.ru/world/20140829/192463965/UN-Observer-Report-Acknowledges-Horrifying-Number-of-Dead-in.html

http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20140904/NEWS08/309040030/Eastern-European-hopes-permanent-NATO-bases-stymied-by-Russia

http://www.voanews.com/content/eastern-ukraine-ceasefire/2440781.html

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/16/ukraine-votes-more-power-separatist-east

President Putin defended Russia’s annexation of Crimea by saying that Washington and its European allies were guided by “the rule of the gun” rather than international law and respect for the principle of state sovereignty. In March 2014 Washington put military cooperation with Russia on hold and ended negotiations on the NATO missile defense program. It also banned the export to Russia of technology with potential military applications, suspended cooperation on civilian nuclear energy projects and cut off NASA’s contacts with its Russian counterparts. Russia, meanwhile, made a resolution of the impasse over NATO’s missile defense system a precondition for further strategic arms control talks. It formed the Eurasian Economic Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan in May in 2014 and Armenia and Kyrgyzstan became full members in 2015. The Eurasian Economic Union has an integrated single market of 183 million people and a gross domestic product of over 4 trillion US dollars (PPP). All EAEU member states participate in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, an intergovernmental mutual defense alliance. Some Russian commentators even argue that its authoritarian model is a viable alternative to Western liberal democracy and one which will gain support in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where some Western ideas are seen as going against tradition and religion.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurasian_Economic_Union

At the 2016 Warsaw summit NATO reversed its position on deploying forces to Russia's borders. NATO agreed to deploy military forces to the Baltic states and eastern Poland from January 2017 to deter Russia, a response to Moscow's 2014 seizure of Crimea from Ukraine. The four battalions totaling between 3,000 and 4,000 troops would be led by Britain in Estonia, the United States in Poland, Canada in Latvia and Germany in Lithuania. This has been called by various names, Operation Reassurance, Operation Deterrence and now NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence. There is also the Enhanced NATO Response Force, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and the Multinational Division South – East in Romania.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhanced_Forward_Presence https://kariuomene.kam.lt/en/e_f_p.html

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_09/20180903_180905-MAP-eFP-eng.pdf

http://www.en.mndse.ro/about

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170316_170316-def-det-map.pdf

https://www.difesa.it/SMD_/Eventi/Pagine/NRDC_ITA_assume_responsabilita_sulla_compinente_terrestre_NRF_2018.aspx

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-decisions-factbox-idUSKCN0ZP0MX

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/nato-deploys-troops-poland-russian-border-170413213541667.html

https://euobserver.com/foreign/135681

https://www.google.it/search?rlz=1C1GCEA_enGB759GB759&biw=1280&bih=694&tbm=isch&sa=1&ei=-3AqWrT_F4G2Us3mp6AO&q=nato+forces+in+baltic+states++by+country+2017+map&oq=nato+forces+in+baltic+states++by+country+2017+map&gs_l=psy-ab.3...87656.91928.0.93067.11.11.0.0.0.0.95.784.11.11.0....0...1c.1.64.psy-ab..0.0.0....0.Ib1z84rd4X8#imgrc=JknmmPrCDI43nM:

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad/nato-ee.page

https://www.voanews.com/a/nato-summit-shows-shift-from-reassurance-to-deterrence/3409096.html

further NATO and EU response to the Ukraine conflict

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46425777

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/q-a-russia-attacks-ukraine-again-how-should-ukraine-nato-and-the-west-respond

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_160789.htm

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156623.htm

http://nato.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-nato/Partnership

https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_25457.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93European_Union_Association_Agreement

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/11/ukraine-association-agreement/

and since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm current

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_229538.htm

5) NATO and the EU continue to want and need to stabilize and improve relations with Russia. There was extensive practical cooperation in many fields prior to 2022. How far is each side willing to make concessions to return to this cooperation? And how far have the events and growing tensions in Eastern Europe put all future cooperation at risk?

a) NATO has developed a ballistic missile defense system in Europe for the protection of NATO forces and the populations of NATO member states.

https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/ballistic-missile-defence

https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/nato-integrated-air-and-missile-defence

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm#:~:text=NATO%20Ballistic%20Missile%20Defence%20(NATO,task%20of%20deterrence%20and%20defence%20.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-and-nato-officials-inaugurate-missile-defense-shield-in-romania-1463056944

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm This is supposedly intended to deal with a threat from a country like Iran, accused of wanting to develop nuclear weapons, or against terrorists (!), but has been consistently opposed by the Russians as potentially aimed at them. In Lisbon NATO relaunched the idea, offering to work with Russia on this project. The immediate Russian response at the Lisbon summit in November 2010 (NATO Russia Council) was positive providing that the cooperation offered by NATO meant Russia’s real integration into a system of shared defense against third parties (e.g. Iran). Russia was not willing to accept a system based in Eastern European NATO member states from which it would only receive information and intelligence as a courtesy. The implication from the Russian point of view is that it could still be used against Russia. In fact, NATO rejected the idea of Russia’s participation in the control arrangements for the missile defense system and Russia later deployed missiles to Kaliningrad and other sections of its borders with NATO.

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-nuclear-missiles-kaliningrad-baltic-sea-poland-lithuania-nato-a8199011.html

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-missiles/russia-deploys-iskander-nuclear-capable-missiles-to-kaliningrad-ria-idUSKBN1FP21Y

During its 2012 Chicago Summit NATO leaders declared that the ballistic missile defense system had reached ‘interim’ capability. For what this means see the link to the Wikipedia notes on the Chicago summit. It seems to involve installations in the Czech Republic, Poland and the Black Sea region (Turkey and Romania) as well as submarine-based missiles. The project is ongoing.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_missile_defence_system
http://www.rt.com/news/246709-nato-missile-shield-iran/

At its 2016 Warsaw summit NATO took command of the U.S.-built missile shield in Europe to defend against ballistic missiles from Iran.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-decisions-factbox-idUSKCN0ZP0MX

latest: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm

https://ac.nato.int/page8021748

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-shield-timeline/after-long-wait-u-s-to-unveil-european-missile-shield-idUSKCN0Y217P

b) NATO and the US have frequently reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, and continuing large-scale reductions in nuclear armaments and missile delivery systems initiated with the START I treaty (July 1991) and continued in START II (Jan 1993) and SORT (May 2002). In fact, further reductions were agreed in negotiations between the US and Russia that led to the New START treaty which came into force in February 2011 and replaced the START II and SORT treaties. Some commentators suggest that it seems slightly contradictory to launch a project for missile defense (point 5a) while supporting arms reductions. Others argue that it is simply a question of realism, and that NATO’s first priority must be its founding purpose, collective security.

Russia for several years made a resolution of the impasse over NATO’s missile defense system a precondition to further strategic arms control talks. Shortly before its expiry in February 2021, the US and Russia agreed to extend the New Start Treaty for 5 years and engage in new talks on nuclear arms control.

https://www.state.gov/new-start/

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-03/news/us-russia-extend-new-start-five-years

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11694#:~:text=Presidents%20Biden%20and%20Putin%20agreed,in%20the%20past%2C%20and%20both

However, on 21 February 2023, during the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin announced the suspension of Russia's participation in the New START treaty, saying that Russia would not allow the US and NATO to inspect its nuclear facilities.

So there is a real danger that with the gradual evolution of nuclear and missile technology that much of the impressive progress made on nuclear arms reductions will unravel unless negotiations are relaunched soon. At the same time in the US there are doubts about whether Russia ever really respected its New START commitments to arms reductions. This is what led President Trump to announce the US withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty, with some commentators saying there is now a danger of a new nuclear arms race. Some experts argue that with the increased reliance on IT systems in nuclear defence systems, the catastrophic risks of a computer error or computer-related human error are leading us towards the nightmare scenario of Dr Strangelove. As mentioned above, in November 2023 Moscow revoked its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) after also confirming its withdrawal (June 2023) from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which was intended to turn the page on the Cold War. The US and NATO then suspended their obligations under the latter Treaty.

https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2023-11/nuclear-disarmament-monitor

https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/press-room/latest-news/article/russia-announcement-of-russia-s-withdrawal-from-the-conventional-armed-forces#:~:text=The%20Russian%20Federation's%20decision%20to%20withdraw%20from%20the%20CFE%20Treaty,implement%20the%20treaty%20proved%20fruitless.

https://www.state.gov/united-states-will-suspend-the-operation-of-its-obligations-under-the-treaty-on-conventional-armed-forces-in-europe/

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/trump-us-nuclear-arms-treaty-russia http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-17511816http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7674962/US-has-more-than-5000-nuclear-warheads.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_with_nuclear_weapons http://www.mapsofworld.com/world-top-ten/world-top-ten-countries-by-nuclear-warheads-map.html https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-future-of-u-s-russian-arms-control/ http://www.nipp.org/2016/06/21/schneider-mark-russias-growing-strategic-nuclear-forces-and-new-start-treaty-compliance/

Unresolved Questions for NATO:

1) The decision-making process. The existing system depends on consensus and agreement at all levels, without formal voting. There is an unwritten rule that a country (or countries) which is not in agreement with the other members on an issue remains silent (e.g. Greece and the NATO intervention in the Balkans) and simply does not participate in the operation. However, as the organization grows, like the EU, it will probably need to modify this decision-making process. Can this be done without damaging NATO’s effectiveness? What seems likely to happen is that NATO actions may be authorized by all or most members but not undertaken by all the 30 members. In addition, there may be space for small groups of NATO allies to undertake operations alone that have first been discussed with the other members. In practice this is want happened in Libya, although the US criticized the lack of participation by the NATO members which had authorized the mission.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm

2) Relations with Russia – at the start of the 21^st century, despite a clear commitment from both NATO and Russia to warmer relations and closer cooperation it was not clear what this meant in practice, or if they were thinking along the same lines. Russia seemed to believe that without formally joining NATO it should have the right to share in NATO decisions (and block those it did not like) and also to take part fully in NATO’s military/technological programs. NATO seemed to think that cooperation simply meant keeping Russia informed and providing it with any information NATO gets regarding possible threats to Russia. While Russia is a vital partner from the point of view of global security and within international decision-making bodies (and in economic terms), most NATO members, particularly those in Eastern Europe no longer believe Russia really shares NATO’s core democratic values and its commitment to peaceful relations in Europe, and have doubts about how far Russia can be trusted. Events in Ukraine have only strengthened this point of view and cooperation with Russia seems dead for the moment, in favour of cooperation against Russia. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/10/world/europe/russia-eu-nato.html

However, terrorist attacks like those in Paris on November 13^th 2015 will continue to require some cooperation between Russia and the West in a coordinated effort to defeat Islamic extremists. So, for the moment, how this relationship will develop is unclear. This document puts NATO's position very clearly:

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm

a) The NATO missile defense system – this is a good example of the cooperation/conflict dilemma mentioned above. How exactly could Russia ever be persuaded to cooperate with, or simply accept this project? Since Russia was not being offered access to the technology and a right to participate in any decisions, it will remain hostile to the project.

b) NATO membership for Georgia, Ukraine and the Balkan states – NATO believes these states have the right to join.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO#:~:text=Two%20other%20states%20have%20informed,Malta%2C%20Moldova%2C%20and%20Serbia.

Russia sees this as an aggressive expansion by NATO into Russia’s ‘near abroad’ and is against more of its neighbors joining NATO. It seems ready to actively protect what it sees as Russia’s interests and ethnic Russian minorities (the war with Georgia and support for separatists in Ukraine and the Russian invasion in 2022). This seems to make progress on expanding NATO and EU membership beyond candidate status for both Georgia and Ukraine a risky process.

c) Russia and the US are both aware that further progress on arms reductions depends not only on agreement on the ballistic missile defense system. Russia argues that the US must be committed to working with, and not against, Russia for real progress to be made and progress on an agreement on NATO’s missile defense system is now a factor if no longer a precondition for nuclear arms reduction talks. The US withdrawal from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty in 2019 raised the danger of a new nuclear arms race as did the Russian response.

d) Enhanced Forward Presence is a NATO deployment in Europe aimed at countering possible Russian expansionism in response to events in Georgia and Ukraine.

https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/strengthening-natos-eastern-flank

https://shape.nato.int/efp

https://kariuomene.kam.lt/en/e_f_p.html

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PX4a6d3qNbU

3) What happens after NATO’s failure in Afghanistan? Will the US and/or its NATO partners be willing to engage in future out-of-area operations?

https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-fall-of-the-afghan-government-and-what-it-means-for-europe/

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/aug/21/after-afghanistan-the-pax-americana-is-over-as-is-nato-about-time-too

Has the outcome, and the enormous cost of the operation, damaged NATO’s reputation and confidence so much that it will be unable or unwilling to undertake other operations outside Europe? Will this be the end of NATO’s commitment to proactive crisis management around the world? Or will it mean a return to a much more traditional defensive role limited to the European area and supply routes in the Middle East? The NATO operation in Libya, which initially was seen as a success, led to internal chaos, faction-fighting and the growing presence of Islamic State and other radical groups in the area. Again, this may have reduced the willingness of NATO members to take part in similar operations in the future.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm https://www.routledge.com/The-EU-NATO-and-the-Libya-Conflict-Anatomy-of-a-Failure/Marcuzzi/p/book/9780367545512

https://fundforpeace.org/2021/11/02/libya-state-fragility-10-years-after-intervention/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=libya-state-fragility-10-years-after-intervention

Is the EU facing a similar risk in its members’ interventions in Mali, Niger and the Sahel?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_military_withdrawal_from_West_Africa_(2022%E2%80%932025)#:~:text=Beginning%20in%202022%2C%20France%20began,of%20military%20presence%20and%20interventions.

https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2021/sahel-europes-forever-war#:~:text=The%20Sahel%20conflict%20is%20a,fighting%20broke%20out%20in%202012.

https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/megatrends-afrika-why-should-europe-re-engage-with-the-sahels-military-led-states

https://apnews.com/article/niger-france-sahel-coup-troops-security-macron-97c8ccfe880169832965c33e96d7befe

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/16/last-french-troops-leave-mali-ending-nine-year-deployment#:~:text=France%20announced%20withdrawal%20in%20February,coups%20in%202020%20and%202021.&text=France%20has%20said%20its%20final,Sahel%20region's%20spiralling%20security%20crisis.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Capacity_Building_Mission_in_Mali

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Capacity_Building_Mission_in_Niger

4) Finances – Both the US and Europe were hit hard by the 2008 recession and financial crisis and the recent Covid-19 pandemic. There was reluctance on both sides of the Atlantic to face the question of paying for NATO forces and operations. The US contributes between one-fifth and one-quarter of NATO's budget (22%) and most of its forces, equipment and technology for actual operations (in Afghanistan, for example). The US accounts for a massive two thirds of NATO members’ military spending in 2024, about 68% in 2023 (while representing far less in terms of the NATO countries’ combined GDP), and the US wants NATO members to spend more on their military.

https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/07/nato-defence-spending-a-bumper-year/

https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2024/global-military-spending-surges-amid-war-rising-tensions-and-insecurity

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/11/how-much-does-each-nato-country-spend-in-2024#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20remains%20the,budgeting%20an%20estimated%20%24967bn.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm

For many of them this has not been a good time to increase their contributions to NATO. Most of them made cuts to their military spending after the 2008 recession. This could have damaged NATO’s operational effectiveness. The cuts in European military forces after the 2008 financial crisis may have been so large as to compromise their ability to launch sustained independent operations, or even to participate effectively in large-scale combined operations. ‘Smart defense’ is an attempt to combine cuts in spending with rationalization of resources in order to remain fully effective. It is also difficult to calculate what the balance should be between the US and Europe because clearly US military spending also covers US operations and forces which are not intended for NATO.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074

How realistic is it to talk about a more democratic basis for decision-making within the organization, with more of a say for European members, if NATO is essentially an organization in which the US pays for and does most of the work? NATO used to be formed by large armies based on military service. After the end of the Cold War there was a move to much smaller professional armies based on career volunteers and greater investment in high-tech equipment to give these forces a decisive combat advantage. As was mentioned above, in a period of austerity the key concept seemed to be ‘smart defense’, a more intelligent use of limited financial resources, more sharing of equipment and back-up support and integration between NATO forces (e.g. Britain and France signed a defense cooperation treaty in November 2010 which involved plans to share military assets and technologies). How realistic all this will be in maintaining NATO as an effective force remains to be seen.

However, at the Warsaw summit NATO'S European allies agreed a defence spending increase worth more than £6 billion. Most members, however, failed in 2017 and 2018 to reach the target of 2% of GDP for military spending, but since 2022 have increased their spending significantly.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/11641852/Poland-increases-military-spending-in-response-to-Russias-belligerence.html

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-spending/european-allies-boost-defense-spending-most-still-miss-natos-u-s-backed-goal-idUSKCN1GR1UL

https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/07/10/defense-expenditure-of-nato-members-visualized-infographic/#7c66eed414cf

With new interest in the European Defence Agency, NATO’s European members seemed more willing to raise defence spending, but in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic theyfaced challenges in doing so. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 real and planned defence spending has risen dramatically but ultimately is also dependent on economic growth.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/14/eighteen-nato-members-to-hit-2-defence-spending-target-says-stoltenberg

https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/defence-expenditures-and-natos-5-commitment

https://epthinktank.eu/2025/10/08/eu-defence-funding/#:~:text=In%202024%2C%20defence%20spending%20across,%2C%20or%202.1%20%25%20of%20GDP.

5) Is NATO, a defensive military alliance with capabilities for dealing with cyberattacks (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm), really the right kind of organization to deal with threats like terrorism, various kinds of illegal trafficking, illegal immigration, piracy, nuclear proliferation, peace-keeping, -building and -enforcement operations and environmental concerns? Perhaps it is, and NATO should gradually be re-organized and lose some of its military character outside the European theatre.

6) Is there a contradiction between a NATO ballistic missile defense system and the goal of nuclear arms reductions? After all, the missiles used to eliminate incoming missiles (defense) are often weapons that could also be rearmed and used as delivery systems (offense).

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm

7) The operation in Libya holds several lessons and, as a case study, offers an interesting comparison with the operation in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq and the situation in Syria, both in terms of similarities and differences. First, it was, like Afghanistan, an out-of-area operation (but only slightly) and had a UN mandate. However, the Russians claim it exceeded its mandate to protect civilian lives. It was limited to air raids against specific targets, as requested by the Arab League and Libyan fighters, and did not involve sending land forces to Libya. The US played an active role only at the start but provided logistics, supplies and support. Generally, it had support from the local population on the ground, and it was successful and of short duration. However, it also demonstrated that it is difficult to build consensus to act within NATO even for an operation very close to NATO’s borders (Germany was initially strongly opposed). Secondly, the operation was expensive and complex (but obviously nowhere near as long and costly as the operation in Afghanistan) and only possible with the political, military, technological and financial support of the US, despite the attempt to make it a ‘European’ operation. However, what was seen as the operation's technical success led to the fall of the Gaddafi regime but, as in Afghanistan, this did not produce a smooth transition to a functioning democracy but the collapse of law and order. In the absence of an international mission, Libya remains a country dominated by armed factions and so far unable to produce a stable and effective central government with real control over its territory. As a result, it is a base for terrorism and human-trafficking and is the point of departure for many refugees trying to enter Europe via Italy. It is hard to see how the new but fragile unity government will re-establish the rule of law.

https://debuglies.com/2025/12/16/the-fragmented-state-geopolitical-economic-civil-and-military-dimensions-of-libya-in-2025/

EUBAM Libya supports the Libyan authorities in developing border management and security at the country’s land, sea and air borders. As a civilian crisis management mission with a capacity-building mandate, EUBAM assists Libyan authorities at the strategic and operational levels. The work is carried out through advising, training and mentoring Libyan counterparts in strengthening the border services in accordance with international standards and best practices, and by advising the Libyan authorities on the development of a national Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy.

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eubam-libya_en?s=327

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eubam-libya/empowering-libyan-coast-guard-and-advancing-libyas-maritime-security_en

The European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Irini (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) was launched on 31 March 2020

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Irini

Operation Sea Guardian is NATO’s maritime security operation in the Mediterranean

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136233.htm

EUNAVFOR ASPIDES is an EU military operation contributing to the protection of freedom of navigation, to safeguarding maritime security, especially for merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf under the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eunavfor-aspides_en?s=410381

Operation Atalanta, formally European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia, is an ongoing counter-piracy military operation at sea off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Atalanta#:~:text=Operation%20Atalanta%2C%20formally%20European%20Union,in%20the%20Western%20Indian%20Ocean.

All of this should make us think carefully about what kind of operations NATO and the EU are able or not able to carry out / are willing or unwilling to carry out / should or should not carry out, and in what circumstances and under what conditions they are likely to be successful.

8) In contrast to the fairly rapid response to events in Libya in 2011, there was little desire among NATO members to intervene in Syria when the civil war began except in terms of sanctions. NATO began to deploy Patriot missiles to Turkey in 2013 to protect it from any potential spread of the Syrian conflict. The US in the summer 2015 and its allies (notably France and the UK after the terrorist attacks in Paris in Nov. 2015) carried out air raids against IS in coordination with other Middle East allies but there were no plans for a NATO operation. There was neither the legal basis for a major NATO ground intervention in Syria, nor real support for the idea among NATO members. There was extensive intervention by Russia, Turkey and Iran but there was no agreed and coordinated plan between these three and Western countries as they had different objectives. In December 2018 Donald Trump ordered a partial withdrawal of American forces from Syria. At the same time the US administration said that it accepted that President Assad, Russia’s ally, could stay in power as a part of a long-term solution to the Syrian crisis but called on the Syrian regime to make fundamental changes in exchange for aid in reconstruction.

However, the civil war continued and on 8 December 2024, the Assad regime collapsed despite Russian support during a major offensive by opposition forces.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_of_the_Assad_regime

In January 2026 the Syrian government retook swathes of northern and eastern Syria from Kurdish forces, consolidating President Ahmed al-Sharaa's rule. And the US was contonsidering the withdrawal of its remaining troops.

9) Events in Turkey, a key NATO ally, also raised concern. There was the attempted military coup in July 2016 and the Turkish government’s hardline response to it added to existing questions about the treatment of the Kurdish minority and human rights in general. Turkey is also a key partner for the EU in dealing with the migrant crisis. So some commentators have asked whether Turkey is still and will remain a reliable NATO ally in terms of aims and values, and if not, what this may mean for the alliance's strategy in the Middle East and Mediterranean. However, Turkey seems determined to remain close to NATO while at the same time opening to other countries and following a more independent strategy. As a partner it remains a key player for both NATO and the EU.

https://cepa.org/article/why-we-must-tolerate-turkey/

https://www.brusselstimes.com/1481346/nato-chief-calls-on-eu-to-work-more-closely-with-turkey

10) In recent years the potential security threats to the EU have grown. There has been increased instability in North Africa and the Middle East with the collapse of decades-old regimes and areas of civil war (Syria) or ineffective government and faction-fighting (Libya), leading to mass migration towards Europe and the spread of terrorism to Europe itself. Meanwhile Russia has begun to use its military power to reassert its influence both in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe. Its interventions first in Georgia and later in the Ukraine have alarmed the EU and in particular the EU's Eastern members. The decision of the UK to withdraw from the EU (Brexit) and, even more, the election of Donald Trump as US President (a figure whose statements sometimes made him sound potentially isolationist, at least in relation to Europe) galvanized attempts to finally create an integrated European Defence structure through the EU Defence Agency https://www.eda.europa.eu/. This is not intended or expected to substitute NATO any time soon (given the scale and strength of the US military and logistical infrastructure) but to function alongside it. Europe needs to be able to respond effectively and independently to threats in the event that the US, for whatever reason, is unwilling or reluctant to assist, or to carry out operations in areas that the US does not consider of strategic importance but the EU deems to be vital. Things seem to be moving fast and the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence (PESCO) is now fully operational. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/107267/council-adopts-14-new-pesco-projects-deepen-eu-defence-cooperation_en

To put things in perspective, however, one should remember that while the EU's Eastern European members have welcomed this process which reassures them of support from their EU partners they have also welcomed as crucial the deployment of NATO forces, including US and Canadian units, to their countries. Similarly, Italy which hosts both the US Sixth Fleet and a large number of US bases, would surely prefer to be able to count at least on US naval, air and logistical support in any major operation in the Mediterranean.

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/34226/Permanent%20Structured%20Cooperation%20(PESCO)%20-%20Factsheet Many of the technical questions and challenges of European Defence integration are the same as those facing NATO (financing, standardization of weapons and equipment, integration of multilingual military forces) but the fact that the EU has a large, existing civilian structure may be a considerable advantage.

Conclusion:
Despite point 4 NATO still accounted for well over half (55%) of global military spending in 2024.

https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/2504_fs_milex_2024.pdf

During the early phase of the Cold War the Warsaw Pact’s conventional forces significantly outnumbered NATO forces. A comparison of NATO conventional resources today with those of the Russian Federation gives NATO a clear advantage because of huge, accumulated US assets (and the transfer of the Eastern European bloc countries to NATO), despite increased military spending by Russia in recent years and some reductions in Europe by the US and the rest of NATO. Whether it has and is spending its money well and how it could do this better is perhaps the most pressing question currently.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-allies-need-a-better-approach-to-industrial-strategy/

The EU alone spends more than Russia though without US support would be weaker than Russia in some areas. So NATO continues to be the world’s largest and most powerful alliance system, and remains committed to its core values and primary security goals. It is now playing a much wider, much more proactive role than during the Cold War, and intends to continue to do so while seeking new partners within the international community. After the failure in Afghanistan and growing tensions with Russia only time will show whether NATO can be effective in this role and whether it will continue to have the material and financial resources, internal cohesion and international consensus that it will need in order to do so. Events in Ukraine are forcing NATO to re-examine its priorities and to return to its original purpose, the guaranteeing of its members’ sovereignty, freedom and security in a mainly European context. At the same time, statements made by President Trump since returning to office seem to be undermining NATO’s unity and risking divisions between the US and its allies and even the the break-up of the alliance as the dispute over Greenland has demonstrated.

A counter-argument to explore: There are also many critics of NATO who feel that the fact that NATO took on a more and more proactive role after the end of the Cold War was a mistake. They fear that even when acting with UN authorization, this too easily led to an increasingly aggressive militaristic response to local and global problems. They argue that anti-terrorist or humanitarian intervention by military means is a high-risk strategy in terms of both collateral damage (civilian deaths, displaced persons, refugees, physical destruction of housing and essential infrastructure, economic collapse and soaring operational costs) and final objectives (creating a functioning democratic state or simply bringing an end to the fighting). They would prefer to see NATO adopt a much more cautious and conservative stance, defensive in the traditional sense, while cooperating with the UN on normal peace-keeping operations and in humanitarian assistance.

More on the lessons does the outcome of the military intervention in Afghanistan provide for the US, NATO, the UN and the international community in general.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2021/08/18/failure-in-afghanistan-over-40-years-in-the-making/?sh=4c162cb7c437

https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231633.shtml

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/17/nato-blames-afghan-government-for-taliban-takeover.html

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/czech-president-natos-failure-afghanistan-puts-its-legitimacy-question-2021-08-17/

https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/europe-urges-unity-taliban-quiet-failed-mission-79480086