What is it? A brief history, its objectives and a
review of its evolution and current state.
The Belt and Road Initiative primarily addresses an
"infrastructure gap" and thus has the potential to accelerate
economic growth across the Asia Pacific, Africa and Central and
Eastern Europe. It is a central mechanism of Chinese foreign policy
and development finance. The initial focus has been infrastructure investment,
education, construction materials, railway and highway, automobile, real
estate, power grid, and iron and steel. Already, some estimates list the Belt
and Road Initiative as one of the largest infrastructure and investment
projects in history, covering more than 68 countries. The BRI outlined six
economic corridors for trade and investment connectivity.
The BRI develops new markets for Chinese firms,
channels excess industrial capacity overseas, increases China's access to
resources, and strengthens its ties with partner countries. The initiative
generates its own export demand because Chinese loans enable participating
countries to develop infrastructure projects involving Chinese firms, banks and
expertise. The infrastructure developed also helps China to address the
imbalance between its more developed eastern regions and its less
developed western regions.
For developing countries, the BRI is appealing because
of the opportunities it offers to alleviate their economic disadvantages
relative to Western countries. The BRI offers them infrastructure development,
financial assistance, and technical assistance from China. The increase in
foreign direct investment and increased trade linkages also increases
employment and poverty alleviation for these countries. The link below explains
where the BRI stands today.
By July 2025 roughly 150 countries had signed
memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with China under the BRI, although a handful
have re-evaluated or withdrawn (Italy in December 2023 and Panama in February
2025). GreenFDC calculates cumulative economic engagement (construction
contracts + investment) since 2013 at US $1.308 trillion as of mid-2025. In
fact, 2025 saw the highest BRI engagement ever for any year, with USD 128.4
billion in construction contracts and about USD 85.2 billion in investments;
China's energy related engagement in 2025 were the highest in any period since
the start of the BRI's reaching USD 93 billion.
The BRI’s new strategy:
Smaller – "small and beautiful"
projects. After years of megaprojects, Beijing announced in
November 2021 that BRI projects should be "small and beautiful"—i.e.,
better targeted, less wasteful and often co-financed.
Greener – China
introduced a green taxonomy in 2020/2021 that put most fossil-fuel projects in
a "red" category and committed in September 2021 to stop building new
coal-fired power plants abroad. Green investments nonetheless account for a
minority of new spending, and fossil-fuel engagements—especially oil and gas in
the Middle East—remain significant.
Debt sustainability – China
has engaged in debt workouts under the G-20's Debt Service Suspension
Initiative (DSSI) and Common Framework. For example, China and France co-led a
restructuring of US$6.3 billion of Zambia's debt in June 2023. The new emphasis
on project finance and syndicated loans (e.g., Peru's Chancay port secured a
US$975 million project loan) aims to reduce sovereign exposure
Private-sector participation – Private
Chinese firms now lead many BRI investments, whereas state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) dominated the first decade. This shift reflects domestic overcapacity,
the drive to secure critical minerals and technology supply chains in a
potential trade-war.
Geoeconomic competition.
Alternatives to the BRI include the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure
and Investment (PGII), which has mobilised over US$60 billion since 2021 and
aims for US$200 billion by 2027; the EU Global Gateway; the India–Middle
East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC); Japan's Quality Infrastructure; and GCC
sovereign funds. While these initiatives are smaller than the BRI, they shape
host-country options and raise standards.
Why Italy withdrew from the BRI and relations today:
https://www.iai.it/en/publications/c05/timing-everything-italy-withdraws-belt-and-road-initiative
https://www.dw.com/en/eu-china-relations-hit-rock-bottom-before-beijing-summit/a-73213412
https://www.economia-italia.com/meloni-asia-contratti-italia-investimenti-2026
https://chinaobservers.eu/italy-china-relations-the-diplomacy-of-conscious-pragmatism/
See the link at the bottom of the page – Italy’s “golden
power” rules
Has the BRI helped Africa and Asia to develop?
Revently China has reduced lending to Africa
https://www.semafor.com/article/01/23/2026/china-pulls-back-on-funding-african-projects
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2yl88wd3lo
Corruption in Africa remains a challenge to investment
and develpment
https://theglobepost.com/2024/08/08/africa-corruption-barrier-investment/
Criticisms of the BRI:
https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/chinas-sahel-gamble-falters-as-insurgencies-rage/
However, one should return to the article we looked at
before for a more positive view https://www.sanchez.vc/geocoded-special-reports/the-state-of-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-august-2025
While China's leadership promoted a "green,
high-quality" BRI at the 2023 forum, 2025 data reveal a return to large
fossil-fuel and resource-backed deals.
https://greenfdc.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2025/
Chinese companies are now exporting to the African
consumer markets
A possible line of argument for an essay – Given China’s
huge trade surplus (see the link below), it is vital that a significant proportion
of these funds is recycled as investment back into the global economy. Countries
may have doubts about the planning and effectiveness of particular BRI
projects, overall management of the BRI, the environmental effects of the BRI,
the risk of a debt-trap for poor countries and the potential export of the
Chinese political model or its support for authoritarian regimes, a kind of
neocolonialism. However, while all this calls for caution, careful monitoring
and oversight and alternative investors and investment initiatives (the US and
the EU?) or perhaps partnering China in these investments, blanket oppostion
would seem to be unlikely to succeed. The EU is pushing to make sure that trade
deals with China are fair while moving to protecting sectors it considers
crucial for its economic and geopolitical security. A similar approach will
need to be adopted by countries which have joined or are joining the BRI.
Cauious cooperation and negotiation after careful assessment of the risks
involved.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/28/tidal-wave-how-75-nations-face-chinese-debt-crisis-in-2025
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/eu-toughen-trade-stance-china-germany-pivots-2025-11-20/
Italy’s “golden power” rules
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