If you are asked to write a presentation speech at the concorso can you assume that you are allowed to use bullet points? If so, you could incorporate them into your text where they can serve as headings for paragraphs. Remember they should not be a whole long sentence but a few words that capture the essence of a of the key point explained in that section of your text. And don't overdo it, so not too many:
https://www.thinkoutsidetheslide.com/how-to-write-powerful-bullet-points/
domenica 31 marzo 2019
mercoledì 27 marzo 2019
martedì 26 marzo 2019
Some possible titles
1) The 'dark side' of the Web. Discuss with regard to international relations.
2) Iran and the Middle East 40 years after the revolution.
3) MDGs and SDGs. What progress has been made? What are the main challenges?
4) Is the resurgence of nationalism a real threat to the liberal order?
5) Is populism undermining the status quo in Europe?
6) What role can civil society, ordinary citizens, play in today's world?
2) Iran and the Middle East 40 years after the revolution.
3) MDGs and SDGs. What progress has been made? What are the main challenges?
4) Is the resurgence of nationalism a real threat to the liberal order?
5) Is populism undermining the status quo in Europe?
6) What role can civil society, ordinary citizens, play in today's world?
sabato 23 marzo 2019
venerdì 22 marzo 2019
Answers
How to organise a successful business conference
15 holiday
16 breakout
17 notice
18 summary
19 badge
20 questionaires
How to deal with the annual performance appraisal
21 promotion
22 questions
23 responsibilities
24 calmly
25 goats
26 progress
27 dedication
Efforts to save a special bird
28 vii
29 iv
30 ii
31 vi
32 iii
33 viii
34 B
35 D
36 C
37 A
38 tundra
39 insects
40 predators
Riddle of ancient mariners
24 A
25 B
26 C
27 D
28 A
29 B
30 C
15 holiday
16 breakout
17 notice
18 summary
19 badge
20 questionaires
How to deal with the annual performance appraisal
21 promotion
22 questions
23 responsibilities
24 calmly
25 goats
26 progress
27 dedication
Efforts to save a special bird
28 vii
29 iv
30 ii
31 vi
32 iii
33 viii
34 B
35 D
36 C
37 A
38 tundra
39 insects
40 predators
Riddle of ancient mariners
24 A
25 B
26 C
27 D
28 A
29 B
30 C
mercoledì 20 marzo 2019
martedì 19 marzo 2019
Is the leadership of the US and the West within the international community coming to an end? And some comments on China's changing role within the international community
As
of December 31, 2018, debt held by the public was$16.1 trillion and
intragovernmental holdings were$5.87 trillion, for a total or US
"National Debt" (or Gross Federal Debt) of $21.97 trillion.
$20.66
trillion(Q3 2018)
Gross
Federal Debt to GDP ratio
was 104.2%
in the third quarter of 2018, and estimated to be 105.4% in the Q4
2018
In
the long-term, the United States Gross Federal Debt to GDP is
projected to trend around 109% in 2020.
Given
the difficulties its economy has faced recently and its huge and
growing public debt,
some
commentators argue that the US has now begun an inevitable decline as
the dominant superpower, a decline that may soon erode not only its
economic position but also impact its military dominance. However,
according to other experts the relative decline of US power is at
least partially exaggerated and can better be seen as an opportunity
for Washington to redefine its strategic commitments, renegotiate
alliances with its partners and free up resources to relaunch its
economy.
While the global and US economies are recovering from the economic crisis a decade ago, the credit rating agencies continue to show concern about the size of the US debt and the future prospects for the recovery in the US (and much of Europe) given the likely future expansion of the US public debt due to President Trump's program of tax cuts.
While the global and US economies are recovering from the economic crisis a decade ago, the credit rating agencies continue to show concern about the size of the US debt and the future prospects for the recovery in the US (and much of Europe) given the likely future expansion of the US public debt due to President Trump's program of tax cuts.
The
debate between pessimists and more sanguine observers has grown. The
former predict a serious and rapid decline in US influence and the
growth of a much more multipolar world strongly influenced by China,
while the latter are confident that for the foreseeable future the US
will be able to maintain its leadership role in international
relations. Moreover, they argue that if we consider the West as a
whole, rather than the US alone, then, despite Europe’s continuing
economic difficulties, China cannot really hope to achieve dominance
in terms of economic and military power. In addition, the world’s
principal global institutions are all expressions of the West’s
value system and China seems basically to be in the process of
joining this system, adapting to it and trying to gain more influence
within it, rather than wanting to overturn it or see it collapse as
the Soviet Union did.
In spite of the economic crisis in 2008, which hit the US hard, forecasts of absolute decline seem premature. The US economy continues its economic recovery. GDP growth was 3% at the end of 2018
In spite of the economic crisis in 2008, which hit the US hard, forecasts of absolute decline seem premature. The US economy continues its economic recovery. GDP growth was 3% at the end of 2018
and
the US remains the principal power at the center of the international
stage. In 2018, according to the INF, China’s GDP in nominal terms
was $13.46 trillion, still much less than that of the US ($20.51
nominal),
although China's was bigger than it in terms of GDP Purchasing Power
Parity (2018 IMF figures China $25.31 trillion est. against US $19.40
PPP). In 2018 the EU stood at $18.80
trillion
nominal /$20.85
PPP
in 2017).The American economy was still much larger than those of its
other closest competitors, India (2018 $2.69 nominal/$9.50 PPP) and
Japan (2018 $5.07 nominal/$5.43 PPP) even in PPP terms. US GDP
represented about 23.3% of global nominal GDP in 2018 and 15.1% of
global GDP PPP. China's was 16.1 /18.7% respectively (the EU stood at
22.0%
/16.3%).https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29
China
is forecast to overtake the US in nominal GDP terms by 2030 if not
sooner.
As
for military power, the US military budget still represented 36% of
total global military spending, $610 billion in 2017. Global spending
was $1.73 trillion. The US still spent more than China, Britain,
France, Germany, India, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Russia combined
in
2016.
Moreover, NATO, the US-led alliance, accounted for more than $936
billion (54%) of global military spending in 2017 (down from 60% in
2013). However, if the military spending of other US allies (e.g.
Japan, Australia, South Korea etc…) is added, this figure rises and
suggests that the US easily remains the dominant power in
international relations.** The US has 38 major military bases around
the world compared with: Russia 9, France 13, Britain 16 and
China
1.
So
the 2017 figures show the US military budget still over 2.5 times
bigger than that of China even before Trump's proposed defense
spending increases in 2017 (the
final Senate version of the bill includes a base budget of $640
billion and another $60 billion for the so-called Overseas
Contingency Operations war funding, which includes money for the wars
in Iraq, Afghanistan and other locations).
Finally,
the US is still the world leader for investment in research (although
China is starting to challenge seriously), and in the list of the top
20 universities worldwide, between 11 and 15 are American, according
to which list you choose to believe.Many others are European and only
one or two Asian.
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2018/world-ranking#!/page/0/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats
However, over the last decade, the US share of global GDP (PPP) fell from 23% to 15.1 %, while China´s share of global GDP PPP increased from 7% to 18.7% ( however the EU also accounts for 16.3% of global GDP PPP). Moreover, at this pace of growth China may overtake US nominal GDP by as early as 2024. So, although US strength is evident, its relative decline is real. In fact, at the start of the 21st century, the country´s reliance on imports, combined with low taxes and the then high cost of borrowing (in order to fund the public debt), together with Washington’s soaring military expenditure after 9⁄11 as it expanded its military and counter-terrorism operations around the world, inflated its annual budget deficit which stood at 8.6% of GDP for the 2011 fiscal year. After significant spending cuts it returned to its historical average relative to the size of the economy (around 3% of GDP) registering 2.4% in 2015. Since then the annual budget deficit has begun to rise again, 3.1% in 2016 and 3.4% in 2017. The Trump tax cuts are forecast to cause the annual deficit and public debt to rise in the next few years.
However, over the last decade, the US share of global GDP (PPP) fell from 23% to 15.1 %, while China´s share of global GDP PPP increased from 7% to 18.7% ( however the EU also accounts for 16.3% of global GDP PPP). Moreover, at this pace of growth China may overtake US nominal GDP by as early as 2024. So, although US strength is evident, its relative decline is real. In fact, at the start of the 21st century, the country´s reliance on imports, combined with low taxes and the then high cost of borrowing (in order to fund the public debt), together with Washington’s soaring military expenditure after 9⁄11 as it expanded its military and counter-terrorism operations around the world, inflated its annual budget deficit which stood at 8.6% of GDP for the 2011 fiscal year. After significant spending cuts it returned to its historical average relative to the size of the economy (around 3% of GDP) registering 2.4% in 2015. Since then the annual budget deficit has begun to rise again, 3.1% in 2016 and 3.4% in 2017. The Trump tax cuts are forecast to cause the annual deficit and public debt to rise in the next few years.
The
annual growth rate of the US economy was 2.2% in 2012, 1.7% in 2013,
2.6% in 2014, 2.9% in 2015, 1.5% in 2016 and 2.6% in 2017. 3.0% in
2018https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp-growth
The US trade deficit for 2012 was -2.7% of GDP, -2.4% in 2013, -2.2% in 2014, -2.6% in 2015 and -2.6% in 2016, -2.4% in 2017, -2.4% in 2018 (nearly half of this with China alone)https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/current-account-to-gdp
The US trade deficit for 2012 was -2.7% of GDP, -2.4% in 2013, -2.2% in 2014, -2.6% in 2015 and -2.6% in 2016, -2.4% in 2017, -2.4% in 2018 (nearly half of this with China alone)https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/current-account-to-gdp
https://piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-trade-deficit-china-keeps-growing-even-tariffs
https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-china-trade-deficit-causes-effects-and-solutions-3306277
On
the other hand, GDP PPP per
capita
clearly indicates that American citizens are still far richer than
their Chinese counterparts (nearly 3.5 times
richer).https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29_per_capita
Per capita income is a good indicator of how much money governments can generate in taxes for government projects at home and abroad. Meanwhile, in China growth remained strong in 2018 at 6.5%. However, the Chinese authorities may face some obstacles as they try to steer their economy away from a model where growth is based on exports to one where domestic consumption plays a much greater role. These problems include growing debt within the Chinese economic system, potential domestic unrest, continuing high levels of savings and fast-growing but relatively low domestic consumption, an aging population (which will become a significant factor in the next 20 years), a still relatively weak health care system and widespread corruption. As China moves to respond to these challenges its labor costs are likely to begin to rise.
Per capita income is a good indicator of how much money governments can generate in taxes for government projects at home and abroad. Meanwhile, in China growth remained strong in 2018 at 6.5%. However, the Chinese authorities may face some obstacles as they try to steer their economy away from a model where growth is based on exports to one where domestic consumption plays a much greater role. These problems include growing debt within the Chinese economic system, potential domestic unrest, continuing high levels of savings and fast-growing but relatively low domestic consumption, an aging population (which will become a significant factor in the next 20 years), a still relatively weak health care system and widespread corruption. As China moves to respond to these challenges its labor costs are likely to begin to rise.
China
holds very large foreign exchange reserves, particularly in dollars.
China
held about 5.5% of the US national debt
in December 2018, Japan about 4.5% ( China about $1.14 trillion,
Japan about $1.02 trillion).
The
US has long accused China of currency manipulation, keeping the
Yuan/Renminbi
at a low exchange rate value in order to boost exports. It
appreciated against the dollar in 2017 but fell in 2018 as the
US/China trade war began.
Meanwhile,
China is the principal stake-holder in the BRICS’ New Development
Bank and the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB).
China is also the main trading partner for Africa and an important
investor in Africa (but behind the EU and US),
And
with the its Belt
and Road Initiative China
is set to become a major investor and source of investment capital
for many developing countries, which will increase both its economic
and political leverage with these countries.
The
pace of domestic consumption accelerated recently as China shifts to
a an economic model involving more domestic demand
but
it has moderated with the effects of the trade war
High
levels of personal savings are thought to represent one of the most
striking characteristics of the Chinese economy but this may not be
accurate.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-08/chinese-savers-won-t-save-the-chinese-economy
While
consumer spending still only amounted to 39.1% of GDP in Dec 2017,
compared with more than 68% in the US (June 2018) and 57.8% in India
(June 2018)
investments
stood at a level estimated at about 43.45% of GDP (IMF for 2018). The
US stood at 20.59%.
https://www.quandl.com/data/ODA/USA_NID_NGDP-United-States-Total-Investment-of-GDP
Along
with massive investments in industrial infrastructure (a good
indicator of future competitivity) there has also been a continual
rise in property prices in urban, industrial areas with significant
social consequences. Moreover, the Chinese government is now having
to to try to cope with the rising demand for social services by
shifting resources from other kinds of investments to welfare.
China is rapidly increasing investment in technology, particularly in IT, and education. US companies operating in China have registered very high productivity levels while benefiting so far from much lower labor costs. However, there are now signs that as labor flows from rural areas begin to slow and demand for skilled workers rises, labor costs in China are now beginning to rise though they obviously remain below levels in the US and Europe.
China is rapidly increasing investment in technology, particularly in IT, and education. US companies operating in China have registered very high productivity levels while benefiting so far from much lower labor costs. However, there are now signs that as labor flows from rural areas begin to slow and demand for skilled workers rises, labor costs in China are now beginning to rise though they obviously remain below levels in the US and Europe.
And
if the US chooses not to lead?
This
is a more difficult question to respond to, especially given the role
of isolationism in US history.
The
US may or may not be retreating from world affairs. President Trump's
foreign policy stance sounds isolationist at times (the Paris climate
agreement, the Mexican border, comments about NATO partners,
withdrawal from the Iran deal, the ban on Muslim visitors to the US
from some Islamic countries, US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement,“TPP”,
the reintroduction of tariffs on a wide range of goods, plans to
withdraw more troops from Syria and Afghanistan) hard-line at others
(position on China, supporting Israel, against terrorism, against
Iran, against Maduro in Venezuela, withdrawal from the
Intermediate
Nuclear Forces Treaty).
So the long-term position of the US on any particular international
issue is difficult to predict as it will be the Trump administration
that will decide what 'America first' means in practice and what US
interests are in any situation that arises. The main characteristic
of the administration's foreign policy seems to be its rejection of
multilateralism in favor of a stricter concentration on perceived US
interests and greater attention to avoiding 'unnecessary' commitments
and expenditure.
A
re-evaluation and reduction in US strategic commitments in some areas
in order to exercise more influence in others seems likely. After the
fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
European continent lost relevance in the eyes of America as the
threat level was reduced. However, recent events in Ukraine and
growing tension with Russia have forced a review of this policy and
the launching of
NATO's
Enhanced Forward Presence mission. However, Mr Trump's ambivalence
towards Mr Putin remains a concern for America's European allies.
The
US formally withdrew its last 'combat troops' from Iraq in December
2011and from Afghanistan in December 2014. However, in December 2018
it had 14,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. The
US plans to withdraw 7,000 of these troops in the next few months.
In
January 2019 there were around 2,000 US troops in Syria. Claiming
thar Islamic State has been completely defeated on the ground in
Syria and Iraq, the US announced that it would withdraw its troops in
the coming months.
In
December 2018 there were 5,200 US troops in Iraq and in February 2019
President Trump said he wanted
to maintain a military presence there in order to “watch” Iran ,
despite thinking the invasion of Iraq was ‘one of the greatest
mistakes’
The
future of Obama's pivot to Asia is unclear but there has been a
build-up of US naval forces in the
Western Pacific in response to earlier North Korean threats and
perceived Chinese 'expansionism' and Trump has talked of a 'free
and open Indo-Pacific
' region with the US not
seeking domination but rather a partnership with strong, independent
nations willing to play by the rules.
China
is aware of the policy being adopted by the US and clearly sees it as
an attempt to undermine its growing influence in the region. Tensions
over developments regarding Taiwan are also indicative of the
frictions which are perhaps inevitable as a rapidly growing regional
power challenges a global power whose resources, while vast, are now
limited. If China continues to grow at current rates but fails to
democratize and develop towards the Western model then a
strengthening of security ties between China’s neighbors, many of
which are democratic states is a likely response to safeguard
independence and shared values.
More importantly, the combined economic resources (in terms of GDP) and military resources of the West (NATO in its narrowest sense, perhaps the OECD in its widest sense) as a whole is and will remain far beyond the capacity of China to challenge. US military spending alone is two and a half times that of China (2018). Certainly China’s power and influence is going to grow both regionally and globally, perhaps in partnership with Russia at the UN and through the BRICS group. However, there is a more likely scenario than confrontation. China is a major stakeholder in the current liberal international order, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, an important WTO and IMF member, and, above all, as a state holding vast foreign currency reserves (e.g. US Treasury bonds) estimated at around 1.14 trillion dollars, and one which also has growing overseas investments (estimated to reach $1-2 trillion by 2020). So even though China may continue to stand on its sovereignty and use nationalist rhetoric that defines international comment (on issues such as human rights in China, its lack of democracy and the situation in Tibet) as interference in its domestic affairs, it is probable that its stake in the existing global order will continue to grow and that, although it may try at times to make the liberal order rather less liberal, it will, nevertheless, have good reason to adopt a policy of accommodation and cooperation rather than one of confrontation.
In the end perhaps it is the definition of what we mean by the ‘West’ that is of paramount importance in today’s world. Once that meant Europe and North America, plus countries like Australia and New Zealand. It would be difficult today not to include Japan. And then there is the OECD. More importantly, it is the core liberal democratic values enshrined in the main global institutions from the UN down which best define the West. These are values which many countries (Brazil, India, but many more in Latin America and Africa and Southern Asia) and not only the richer, developed ones but developing ones too, have invested in, or are investing in, and which increasingly represent the normative political expectations (how things should be) for ordinary people all over the world. The wave of democratization since the 1990s and at least part of the political hopes expressed in the early days of the Arab Spring suggest that the West in this sense is very much alive and flourishing, with or without US leadership. And a ‘West’ which is global and multipolar, rather than simply a US-led NATO, may be a very positive evolution. Strangely, al-Qaeda and Islamic State, in describing the UN and other international agencies as agents of Western cultural imperialism may simply be acknowledging the extent to which once-Western values are now becoming universal.
Those who doubt the attraction of the West’s cultural model should perhaps pay more attention to the vast number of migrants and refugees for most of whom the West remains the preferred destination in terms of their hopes for prosperity, security and freedom.
More importantly, the combined economic resources (in terms of GDP) and military resources of the West (NATO in its narrowest sense, perhaps the OECD in its widest sense) as a whole is and will remain far beyond the capacity of China to challenge. US military spending alone is two and a half times that of China (2018). Certainly China’s power and influence is going to grow both regionally and globally, perhaps in partnership with Russia at the UN and through the BRICS group. However, there is a more likely scenario than confrontation. China is a major stakeholder in the current liberal international order, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, an important WTO and IMF member, and, above all, as a state holding vast foreign currency reserves (e.g. US Treasury bonds) estimated at around 1.14 trillion dollars, and one which also has growing overseas investments (estimated to reach $1-2 trillion by 2020). So even though China may continue to stand on its sovereignty and use nationalist rhetoric that defines international comment (on issues such as human rights in China, its lack of democracy and the situation in Tibet) as interference in its domestic affairs, it is probable that its stake in the existing global order will continue to grow and that, although it may try at times to make the liberal order rather less liberal, it will, nevertheless, have good reason to adopt a policy of accommodation and cooperation rather than one of confrontation.
In the end perhaps it is the definition of what we mean by the ‘West’ that is of paramount importance in today’s world. Once that meant Europe and North America, plus countries like Australia and New Zealand. It would be difficult today not to include Japan. And then there is the OECD. More importantly, it is the core liberal democratic values enshrined in the main global institutions from the UN down which best define the West. These are values which many countries (Brazil, India, but many more in Latin America and Africa and Southern Asia) and not only the richer, developed ones but developing ones too, have invested in, or are investing in, and which increasingly represent the normative political expectations (how things should be) for ordinary people all over the world. The wave of democratization since the 1990s and at least part of the political hopes expressed in the early days of the Arab Spring suggest that the West in this sense is very much alive and flourishing, with or without US leadership. And a ‘West’ which is global and multipolar, rather than simply a US-led NATO, may be a very positive evolution. Strangely, al-Qaeda and Islamic State, in describing the UN and other international agencies as agents of Western cultural imperialism may simply be acknowledging the extent to which once-Western values are now becoming universal.
Those who doubt the attraction of the West’s cultural model should perhaps pay more attention to the vast number of migrants and refugees for most of whom the West remains the preferred destination in terms of their hopes for prosperity, security and freedom.
Note – the West in modern English is not normally used as a synonym for European colonialism (I think this is mainly because European colonialism – often based on slavery and doctrines of racial superiority – is now seen as something clearly in contrast with many basic, modern Western values) . It is mainly used in international relations to refer to those countries evolving towards liberal democracy and a free (today usually mixed) market economy, from the late 18th century, through the 19th century and up to 1945. Since the end of the Second World War it has been used to describe first NATO and other allies outside NATO (like Australia) and then gradually to include all those countries which generally embrace Western values.
Longer
term background
On January 26, 2016, the debt held by the public was $13.62 trillion or about 75% of the previous 12 months of GDP. Intragovernmental holdings stood at $5.34 trillion, giving a combined total gross national debt of $18.96 trillion or about 104% of the previous 12 months of GDP. $6.2 trillion or approximately 47% of the debt held by the public was owned by foreign investors, the largest of which were the People's Republic of China and Japan at about $1.3 trillion each for the two countries as of November 2015 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/current
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/government-debt-to-gdp
Washington’s fiscal position is even more alarming if viewed as an ongoing trend. Over the last few years, the US public debt as a percentage of GDP rose rapidly, from 56.4% in 2001 to 100.8% in 2012, 100.9% in 2013 and 103.2% in 2014. As indicated before, it stood at 103.8% in the third quarter of 2017.
On January 26, 2016, the debt held by the public was $13.62 trillion or about 75% of the previous 12 months of GDP. Intragovernmental holdings stood at $5.34 trillion, giving a combined total gross national debt of $18.96 trillion or about 104% of the previous 12 months of GDP. $6.2 trillion or approximately 47% of the debt held by the public was owned by foreign investors, the largest of which were the People's Republic of China and Japan at about $1.3 trillion each for the two countries as of November 2015 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/current
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/government-debt-to-gdp
Washington’s fiscal position is even more alarming if viewed as an ongoing trend. Over the last few years, the US public debt as a percentage of GDP rose rapidly, from 56.4% in 2001 to 100.8% in 2012, 100.9% in 2013 and 103.2% in 2014. As indicated before, it stood at 103.8% in the third quarter of 2017.
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GFDEGDQ188S
For China’s spending on household consumption see:http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/household-final-consumption-expenditure-etc-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PETC.ZS
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/consumer-spending
For an alternative estimate of global military spending and by country see: http://www.janes.com/article/76463/global-defence-spending-to-hit-post-cold-war-high-in-2018-jane-s-by-ihs-markit-says
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151216006109/en/Growing-Security-Fears-Boost-Defence-Budgets-IHS
For China’s spending on household consumption see:http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/household-final-consumption-expenditure-etc-percent-of-gdp-wb-data.html
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.PETC.ZS
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/consumer-spending
For an alternative estimate of global military spending and by country see: http://www.janes.com/article/76463/global-defence-spending-to-hit-post-cold-war-high-in-2018-jane-s-by-ihs-markit-says
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151216006109/en/Growing-Security-Fears-Boost-Defence-Budgets-IHS
US
economy
How is the relationship between China and the West developing?
A
few aspects of China’s changing role in international relations
Signs
of a trend towards stronger cooperation
That
China is starting to get more involved in international relations is
demonstrated by various diplomatic initiatives launched by the
Chinese government in the economic field. First of all, China joined
the a project aimed at establishing a free trade zone with various
Asian-Pacific countries, namely the Free Trade Area of the
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). The goal is to increase its exports in the
Asia-Pacific area in order to boost its economic growth and forecasts
suggest that this initiative could lead to an increase in China’s
GDP of one percentage point. This initiative was seen by some as an
attempt to counter the Trans-Pacific Partnership initiative, backed
by the US and Japan and signed on 4th
Feb 2016 (from which the Trum administration has now withdrawn), but
China publicly backed the Trans-Pacific Partnership showing itself to
be a promoter of free trade agreements. Simultaneously, China is
carrying out a diplomatic initiative in Central Asia with the goal of
reestablishing the old “Silk Road”.
This
initiative has led to wider cooperation with many countries, such as
Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and
Kyrgyzstan,
aimed at creating a safe-area for international trade and at ensuring
gas and oil supplies to China, which are extremely important to
China’s industrial production. This initiative has also led to
competition between China and the EU for influence in the region and
for gas and oil supplies. However, this competition may actually lead
to cooperation between China and the EU in Central Asia, in terms of
building new pipelines, which could have both Europe and China as
final delivery points.
As
China has become more involved in the international community from an
economic point of view, political cooperation has followed. In
recent years, Chinese military personnel have taken part in UN
missions in Cambodia, the Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sudan and
Lebanon. In 2015, a combat deployment was sent to South Sudan, where
China has significant oil investments.
In addition, China’s navy is actively participating in the
anti-piracy mission of the UN in the Gulf of Aden.
Basically
the expansion of China’s economic interests around the world has
led to growing political awareness among the Chinese leadership of
the need to protect those interests and engage on international
issues, especially those closely related to international security.
This has resulted in China playing a more active role within the
international community. This trend culminated with the agreement
signed with Djibouti concerning the creation of China’s first real
military base abroad in order to secure trade between China and
Africa. China’s concerns about international security, aggravated
by the participation of Uyghurs in the campaign waged by the
self-proclaimed Islamic State, could be an opportunity for Western
countries to persuade China to take on an increasingly active role in
sharing some of the international community’s responsibilities,
especially in the security domain. However, in the Middle East
region, China has taken a carefully balanced position in the dispute
between Sunni and Shia Muslims and between their main sponsors,
namely Saudi Arabia and Iran. In fact, the recent publication of
China’s Arab Policy Paper shows that the China wants to adopt a
global approach to the Islamic world without taking sides. Such a
policy will makes it possible for China to deal with both Saudi
Arabia and Iran to obtain from both parties an agreement on oil
supplies agreement, which is fundamental for China’s economic
growth. It also explains China’s willingness to act as a mediator
between the US and Iran (which resulted in the 5+1 Nuclear Agreement
with Iran and in the lifting of economic sanctions) and in the Syrian
civil war.
Potential areas
of disagreement between China and the West
As mentioned above
China’s neighbours are worried about its expansionist ambitions in
the East Asian area e.g. the dispute over the Senkaku Islands,
located in the South China Sea and claimed by both China and Japan.
China is the world’s
biggest polluter in terms of CO2 emissions. Although China took part
in a series of international conferences and welcomed the agreement
at the Climate Conference, CoP21 in Paris in December 2015, some
countries remain doubtful about China’s commitment to making real
changes, given that the agreement is not binding in any practical
way.
China’s domestic
human rights record, including the use of the death penalty and
repression of political and religious opposition leaders, critics and
dissidents and discrimination against minorities (e.g. Tibetans and
Uyghurs).
Global
Defense Spending and by country
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures
lunedì 18 marzo 2019
venerdì 15 marzo 2019
Some language to get used to before the prova preselettiva
This is the EU source for one of the texts at the 2016 prova preselettiva. Of course, they only used part of it. Don't panic. I think you need to get used to the style of this language if you are not a graduate in Law. Make a list of common vocabulary.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015R0478
You can check the meaning with the Italian version.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015R0478
You can check the meaning with the Italian version.
Then go to 2018, here:
and choose some regulations to look at in Italian and English e.g.
Have a nice weekend studying!!
lunedì 11 marzo 2019
venerdì 8 marzo 2019
giovedì 7 marzo 2019
Essay title for 8th March
In terms of achieving real equality what are the main challenges that women face today?
domenica 3 marzo 2019
A possible essay plan on the decline of the US and the West
Is
the leadership of the US and the West within the international
community coming to an end?
Introduction:
Refer to a piece of recent news about China that suggests that US
leadership of the international community is in doubt. Contrast this
with the US role since 1945. The Bretton Woods institutions, Marshall
Plan and and Western alliance.
Line
of argument: This essay will argue that the decline of the US in
economic terms is real but exaggerated and that militarily it remains
the most powerful state. However, its real strength against any
challenge launched by China is twofold, its leadership of NATO (and
its other non-NATO allies), whose combined military and economic
resources outweigh any challengers, and its soft power in terms of
the values it shares with its allies and which are embedded in the
liberal international order.
Provide
a summary of the current size and performance of the US and Chinese
economies, the recent past and forecasts for the future. GDP in
nominal and PPP terms and then in per capita terms. Compare and
contrast including technology, research and education. China's
economic
expansionism,The
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),
The
New Development Bank (NDB), The Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI)
and its investments in Africa.
Then add in the weight of the other Western economies and compare
again.
Compare
and contrast the US and China's military spending and assets.
China has Russian support on some issues. China is already or will be
a major regional power although its neighbors may move closer to the
US for security. Point out that the US has its NATO and other allies
and their resources far exceed those of China.
Conclusion:
It is unclear how far China really intends to challenge the current
international order or if it simply wants to play a greater role
within it. At the economic level this would be a good thing for the
global community and should be welcomed.
It
is also unclear whether the Chinese political order is an attractive
model for other states compared with the democratic model, even for
China's BRICS partners like India, Brazil and South Africa. The US
uni-polar era is over and a genuinely multi-polar order may be a
positive evolution. Argue that although the US is in relative decline
compared with China this is not true of the West as a whole and even
less true if we consider the 'West' as all those states, groups and
individuals aspiring to Western values. As regards US leadership a
different question has emerged with President Trump's administration,
not whether the US is no longer able to lead but whether it may
choose not to lead. This is another reason for a more multi-polar
approach to international relations and suggests that other Western
states, the EU in particular, may have to play a greater role in
preserving and strengthening the liberal order.
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