Latest developments: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_181814.htm?selectedLocale=en https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-russia-rejects-eus-olive-branch/a-56483003 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/92722/my-visit-moscow-and-future-eu-russia-relations_en https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55954162 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/08/germany-poland-sweden-expel-russia-diplomats-eu-retaliation https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-foreign-ministers-push-new-russia-sanctions/ https://www.ft.com/content/548067b9-2ff0-4a2a-94af-b74d763f4561 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/18/cyber-attack-brutal-reminder-russia-problem-facing-joe-biden https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberwarfare_by_Russia#:~:text=Over%20several%20months%20in%202020,the%20National%20Nuclear%20Security%20Administration. https://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/interviste/2019/07/le-sanzioni-alla-russia-dimezzano-l-export-italiano-ambasciatore-pasquale-terracciano-il-sole-24ore.html https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/70111/statement-spokesperson-human-rights-developments-russian-federation_en https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20210131-russia-braces-for-fresh-protests-in-support-of-navalny-despite-crackdown
Some preliminary
background reading on Russia (old – the last 20 years – but interesting if you have time)
http://www.economist.com/node/9682621/print
http://www.ihavenet.com/World-Russia-Federal-Security-Service-FSB-New-Nobility-Foreign-Affairs.html
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/07/russia_leaves_the_west.html
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/shleifertreismansept282010fa.pdf
http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/22.%20NIT14_Russia_final_0.pdf
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2011-01-01/why-moscow-says-no
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25800386.pdf?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Introduction: This relationship
is important to the EU because Russia is the EU’s largest neighbor, the EU’s fifth
biggest trading partner (and the EU is Russia's largest
trading partner) and a major (re-)emerging economy (one of the BRICS), an important
market for European exports, a major military power, and one of the world’s two
biggest nuclear powers, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and so a
major player in international relations, and for Europe a vital supplier of
energy (e.g. the opening of Nord Stream pipeline in 2011). Russia is the main
EU supplier of crude oil, natural gas and solid fossil fuels.
Russia was the origin of about 40% of EU imports of gas and 27% of EU imports
of oil. Due to the large value these imports, EU’s trade deficit with
Russia (€ 57 billion in 2019) is only second to EU’s trade deficit with China. The
stability of the EU's energy supply may be threatened if a high
proportion of imports are concentrated among relatively few external partners.
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/russia/
After the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the
decline and collapse of Communism, the reunification of Germany and the end of
the Soviet Union in December 1991, there was, in the early 1990s, real hope and
expectation that Russia would, with some unavoidable difficulties due to the
transition, gradually turn into a Western-style democracy, allowing the EU to
develop the same kind of relationship with Russia that it has with the US,
Canada, Australia or Japan.
This did not
happen and there was a period of economic chaos, corruption and decline which
led first to the emergence of a small number of extremely rich ‘oligarchs’ and
a general impoverishment of the mass of the population, and then to a return to
an authoritarian model under Putin and Medvedev. Relations today are dominated
by 2 factors which are in contradiction. The EU in particular, and the West in
general, needs a close relationship with Russia as a partner both politically
(e.g. on security questions) and economically.
At the same
time Russia is not perceived as a real democracy based on respect for human and
civil rights, so this partnership is one of convenience rather than of
conviction (in clear contrast to the EU's relations with Canada, Japan, Brazil
and South Africa, for example). There is a fundamental element of trust
missing, which is what characterizes relations among EU members, and between
them and many other democratic states or states committed to implementing
democratic development. With the conflict in Georgia, the current conflict in
Ukraine and Russia’s growing assertiveness in international relations (e.g. Syria,
cyberattacks) new questions have been raised about the prospects for good
future relations between the European
Union and the Russian Federation.
The main
factors:
1) In Soviet
times there was very little trade between The Communist bloc and Western
Europe. Today there is very significant trade between the two. Russia is Europe’s
main gas supplier and an important oil supplier and a market for European
luxury goods, capital equipment, technology, transport equipment, chemicals,
medicines and agricultural products, and this has created real economic
interdependence, only partly weakened by sanctions. There are some, however,
concerns about whether Russia might try to use energy supplies as a weapon to
put short-term pressure on the EU regarding political questions, as it did
regarding economic questions with its non-EU neighbor, Ukraine, in 2009, with follow-on
effects also on EU members. As a result, the EU is involved in various projects
to build new pipelines and gain access to resources outside Russia’s control
and thus to diversify suppliers. At the same time, it is committed to
developing new, greener energy sources and since the Fukushima Daiichi disaster
in Japan several EU countries (notably Germany) have been trying to cut back on
their dependence on energy production from nuclear power. This may, at least in
the short term, make it difficult to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russia. Some
critics argue that as a result the EU is surprisingly quiet about violations of
civil and human rights within Russia (certainly in terms of action but
often also in terms of words) and until recent events in Ukraine, the EU
clearly gave priority to economic security. On the other hand, some experts
argue that building a strong and reliable relationship with Russia will act as
a demonstration of Europe’s good will towards Russia and encourage Russia to
reform and overcome its democratic deficit. The rapid development and exploitation
of US and Canadian shale oil and gas resources (as well as potential European
resources, e.g. in Poland and Arctic reserves) could one day provide real
alternatives to Russian energy supplies and a welcome diversification of
suppliers but this remains only a long-term and ecologically dubious prospect
(since we should really aim at a green transition). Crude oil prices fell in
2019 to about $57 a barrel (in 2018 they were $75/b).
At their lowest they were $26.55 in January 2016 and at their highest in June 2014, they were $100.26. With the Covid-19
pandemic oil prices have been hit again and in December 2020 were at $47 a barrel.
https://www.thebalance.com/oil-price-forecast-3306219
Trade
between the EU and Russia fell significantly in 2014 with the introduction of sanctions
in response to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. EU-Russia
trade dropped by 44% between 2012 and 2016 from €339 billion in 2012 to
€191 billion in 2016. EU- Russia trade rose in 2017 but in December 2017 was
still down on trade in December 2013. There was a further improvement in trade
in 2018 but in February 2019 EU exports to Russia still remained
about 20% (EUR 30 billion) below the pre-sanctions level of 2013. Again, with
Covid-19 EU exports to Russia have declined.
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20200519-2
Nevertheless, in 2019 Russia was the 5th largest partner for EU
exports of goods (4 %) and the 3rd largest partner for EU imports of goods
(7 %).
For more data see:
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/russia/
https://www.rt.com/business/413537-eu-russia-trade-rise-sanctions/
https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports-to-european-union
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/energy-security_en
https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/geopolitics-gas-european-union-25103
Russia
too is trying to diversify by finding new customers. and has expanded its trade
with China in response to EU sanctions.
https://wiiw.ac.at/trade-reorientation-in-russia-will-china-replace-the-eu--n-327.html
In 2014 and
2017 it signed deals with China to supply crude oil and build a new pipeline to
supply gas.
https://www.agrimoney.com/news/russia-upgraded-to-top-rank-in-world-wheat-exports-in-2017-18-36734
http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/yuzhno-sakhalinsk/china-russia-pipeline-deal-to-shape-global-lng-27663702 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-25/russian-oil-seen-heading-east-not-west-in-crimea-spat.html
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-08/china-s-cefc-buys-stake-in-rosneft-from-glencore-and-qatar
It also obtained funding from China
http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/06/news/economy/russia-china-investment-deal-sanctions/index.html
and signed deals with Iran in 2014 and
2017
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/european-business-summit-2014/eu-russia-trade-drops-sharply-bilateral-relations-sour-302144
and
with Turkey to sell missiles in 2017
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41237812
2) In the
last twenty years many former Soviet satellite states have joined NATO and the
EU, at least partly (perhaps mainly) as a guarantee of their continuing
independence from Russia. This has been seen by Russia as an aggressive act and
an attempt to reduce Russia’s sphere of influence. Early on Russia made clear
its opposition to Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia joining NATO or the EU. Russia’s
intervention in Georgia in 2008, in support of the break-away republics of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, is a good example of the dangers raised by the
question of further NATO/EU expansion to the East. Further real progress towards
EU and NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia seems unlikely at present given
Russia’s opposition and the situation in the separatist regions seems to be
frozen.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_enlargement_of_the_European_Union
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/georgia_en
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/ukraine_en
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/24/russia-and-europe-stuck-on-autopilot-pub-82773
Above all,
it is the evolution of events in Ukraine which really threw into question all
certainties about relations with the Russian Federation. A decision in November
2013 by Ukraine's President Viktor Yanukovych to pull out of an association
deal with the European Union and opt for closer ties with Russia sparked huge
street protests and then police violence that eventually led to his downfall and
flight in February 2014. In March Russia reacted by annexing the largely
Russian-speaking Ukrainian region of Crimea after the Crimean parliament held a
referendum and declared independence from Ukraine. At the same time unrest
began growing in eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russian sentiment is strong. The US
and NATO denounced the Russian move as illegal and aggressively expansionist.
Russia responded by repeatedly asserting that it saw NATO and the EU’s expansion
to the East over the last 20 years as far more aggressive and a violation of a
promise made in 1990 that in exchange for Russian agreement to German
reunification NATO agreed not to expand towards the East.
A Brief Summary of Events in Ukraine - Relations
between the West and Moscow worsened dramatically as the risk of civil conflict
grew and the status of Crimea remained unresolved. In March 2014 the EU and US
imposed travel bans and asset freezes on several officials from Russia and Ukraine
over the Crimea referendum. A ban on financial transactions was introduced the
following month.
(Time line
of EU sanctions: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_restrictive_measures_in_response_to_crisis_in_ukraine_en_0.pdf )
Washington
put military cooperation with Russia on hold and ended negotiations on the NATO
missile defense program. Then in April NATO suspended all cooperation with
Russia, and in June the G7 met without Russia (G8). A UN General Assembly
resolution described the Crimea referendum as illegal but Russia blocked a
similar resolution on the Security Council (some countries such as Cuba, Afghanistan,
Syria, Venezuela, Bolivia recognized the validity of the referendum in
Ukraine). Meanwhile Russia, Ukraine, the US and the
EU held talks in Geneva on steps to "de-escalate" the crisis in eastern
Ukraine, but were later unable to halt the violence between
pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian government forces.
Protests
in Donetsk and Luhansk escalated into an armed separatist insurgency.
In May pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk declared independence
after referendums which were not recognized by Kiev or the West. In the same
month elections were held in Ukraine and in June Russian President Vladimir
Putin and Ukrainian President-elect Petro Poroshenko called for a quick end to the bloodshed in eastern Ukraine.
On June 16th Russia cut off all gas supplies to Ukraine,
with Gazprom saying Ukraine had failed to settle its debts. On 27th June the EU signed an association agreement
with Ukraine, along with Georgia and Moldova, in what President Petro
Poroshenko described as the most important day in the country's history since
independence in 1991. On July 1st
Poroshenko ended a tentative ceasefire and launched military operations
against pro-Russia rebels, saying "we will attack and liberate our
land."
On July 17th Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot down in eastern
Ukraine, killing all 298 people on board. On the 23rd US intelligence
officials said they believed the plane was shot down by pro-Russian separatists
"by mistake." On 29 August NATO released satellite images appearing
to show Russian soldiers, artillery and armored vehicles engaged
in military operations in eastern Ukraine. On 5 September 2014 Ukraine's
government and separatist leaders signed a ceasefire deal, the Minsk Protocol,
after talks in Belarus, raising hopes of an end to the nearly five-month
conflict in eastern Ukraine. It included provisions for a release of prisoners,
withdrawal of forces and the establishment of a buffer zone and the
decentralization of power from Kiev to the eastern region. The cease-fire
seemed fragile and in danger of collapse. However, on 16 Sept. Ukraine, as agreed, voted to give the east
of the country limited self-rule as part of proposals aimed at ending the
separatist fighting.
The United Nations' refugee agency, UNHCR, said that the number of people
displaced in Ukraine by the fighting, particularly around Donetsk and Luhansk,
as of 1 September 2014, was 260,000. A UN report published on 29 August 29,
said 2,220 people died and about 6,000 were injured in the Ukrainian crisis
between mid-April and August 17 2014.
As the conflict
continued a new round of sanctions was imposed, by the US, the EU, and others
like Canada, Japan Australia, Switzerland during the summer and autumn of 2014
to deter Russia from supporting the insurrectionist movement in the Donbass
area. These sanctions involve banking and financial facilities and transactions,
trade restrictions on military and technological exports (particularly to the
Russian energy sector) and investment in and exports to the Crimea. The US also
banned the export to Russia of technology with potential military applications, suspended cooperation on civilian
nuclear energy projects and cut off NASA’s contacts with its Russian counterparts.
Russia,
meanwhile, made a resolution of the impasse over NATO’s missile defense system
a precondition to further strategic arms control talks (although later in 2019
President Putin indicated that he would welcome a resumption of arms talks). It
moved forward with plans for a Eurasian Economic Union and a stronger
Collective Security Treaty Organization with partners such as Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Some Russian commentators have even
argued that its authoritarian model is a viable alternative to Western liberal
democracy and one which will gain support in the Caucasus and Central Asia,
where some Western ideas are seen as going against tradition and religion. In
August 2014 Russia responded to Western sanctions with counter-measures, its
own sanctions on the import of agricultural products from the US, the EU and
the other countries which imposed sanctions on Russia.
The Minsk
Protocol of 5 September 2014 was an agreement aimed at ensuring a ceasefire in
the Donbass region but it ultimately failed. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_Protocol
The economic
sanctions weakened the Russian economy and intensified the challenges that
Russia was already facing after the dramatic fall in global oil prices in 2014,
a decline in the value of the ruble (usually dependent on the price of oil) and
the flight of international capital.
Data
confirms Russia entered a recession, with negative GDP growth of -3.7% in 2015
and -0.4% in 2016 but returned to moderate growth in 2017-18, which then weakened
in 2019.
https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp-growth-annual
So the
sanctions had the economic effect intended (although the fall in oil prices was
more important for Russia's economy). However, they did not force Russia into a
change of policy in Ukraine. The US imposed new sanctions on Russia in August
2017 (partly in response to Russian interference in US elections). And the
sanctions have been regularly renewed by the US and EU. In June2020 the EU
renewed sanctions on Russia till January 2021 and Russia responded by extending
its own food import embargo on Western countries until the end of 2021.
US also sanctions
on Russia remain in place.
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/infographics/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine/#
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45415.pdf
However,
President Biden may intend to impose harsher sanctions
https://globalriskinsights.com/2020/11/the-future-of-us-russia-relations-post-2020/
The EU has,
however, expressed concern about further costs to its trade with Russia.
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-2302_en.htm
The Trump
administration imposed more sanctions on Russia under a chemical and biological
warfare law following the poisoning of a former Russian agent and his daughter
in the UK
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/08/politics/us-state-department-russia-sanctions/index.html
The Gentiloni
government said it wanted to continue to work closely with Russia and had
doubts about the long-term viability of anti-Russian sanctions.
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/806012/Russia-European-Union-EU-Italy-Gentiloni-Putin
the
first Conte
government wanted to lift
the sanctions
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603847/EXPO_STU(2017)603847_EN.pdf
In
2017 sanctions on Russia cost the economy of the European Union $3.2 billion a
month, while the Russian economy lost $55 billion because of the sanctions over
three years, according to a report (September 2017) of the UN Special
Rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive measures.
http://russiafeed.com/much-anti-russian-sanctions-cost-eu-economy-per-month/
https://www.rt.com/business/403938-italy-russia-eu-sanctions/
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603847/EXPO_STU(2017)603847_EN.pdf
and here is a 2019 summary of the effects of the
sanctions
Many
European states and leaders, including the Italian government, might like to
change policy on the sanctions but this is politically difficult given Russia's
continued occupation of Crimea and the tensions about cyber-attacks.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-summit-russia-ukraine-idUSKCN1TL1I4
At the NATO
summit in Wales in September 2014, the military alliance approved plans for a
new "spearhead" force (a rapid deployment force of 4,000 soldiers
able go into action in 48 hours) as a response to growing concern about the
Ukraine crisis and the advance of Islamic State militants in the Middle East. Despite
calls from eastern European members (Poland and the Baltic states), NATO did
not at that time approve the proposal to create new permanent bases in these
member states. Germany in particular wished to avoid further antagonizing
Russia by such an action. President Obama, however, assured them of NATO and US
commitment to their protection.
In February 2015, as a result of the failure of the original Minsk Protocol, a
new agreement was reached, Minsk II, which involved an immediate ceasefire on
Feb. 15th, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the restoration of
social and economic links. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/minsk-conundrum-western-policy-and-russias-war-eastern-ukraine-0/minsk-2-agreement
Experts
argue that Minsk II is not clear, and is open to diverging interpretations by
the two sides. The lifting of the sanctions would depend on the full
implementation of the Minsk II agreement as interpreted by the West. The
conflict continued at a low level and total casualties stood at 4,291 deaths (4,150
identified and 141 unidentified) in June 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Ukrainian_crisis
NATO agreed
to deploy multi-lateral forces to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland at its
2016 Warsaw summit and this took the form of NATO's
Enhanced Forward Presence strategy in those counties.
https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_50090.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_136388.htm?selectedLocale=en
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_09/20180903_180905-MAP-eFP-eng.pdf
The
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement entered into force on 1 September 2017 and
Ukraine is
determined
to join NATO. On the 10th of
March 2018, NATO added Ukraine to the list of NATO aspiring
members (others including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the Macedonia)
but any definitive moves towards the accession of the Ukraine to the EU and
NATO still seem unlikely, given the situation there today and the West's desire
not to further antagonize Russia. NATO says it is determined to maintain and
repair the dialogue with Russia while continuing to support Ukraine's independence.
However, NATO continues to take a hard line on Russia aggression.
Extract
from a speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, 12 November 2019
He said that currently 'we
continue to combine meaningful dialogue with credible deterrence and defence. including
when it comes to dealing with Russia. We see a more assertive Russia illegally
annexing Crimea. and destabilizing
Ukraine, meddling in our political processes and investing in modern military
equipment, including in new intermediate-range missiles which led to the demise
of the INF treaty.
In these difficult times, we must avoid
miscalculations and misunderstandings. And we need to rebuild trust where
possible. We aspire for a more constructive relationship with Russia. All of
this is why we keep our diplomatic channels to Moscow open. But our diplomatic
efforts can only be effective if we engage Russia from a position of credible
deterrence and credible defence.
In recent years, we have implemented the
largest reinforcement of our collective defence since the end of the Cold War.
We have strengthened our military posture from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.
And increased the readiness of our forces. For the first time in our history,
we have combat-ready troops in the eastern part of our Alliance. And American forces
are there too.
We are also responding in a defensive and
measured way to Russia’s violation of the INF treaty. And to the presence of
new Russian missiles in Europe. Missiles that are mobile, easy to hide and able
to reach major European cities with little warning time.
We will not mirror what Russia is doing.
We have no intention to deploy new ground-based nuclear missiles in Europe. But
we will consider our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
Our air and missile defences. And our conventional capabilities. Because
ultimately, it is our military strength that provides the conditions for our
diplomatic achievements.'
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_170714.htm?selectedLocale=en
The election
of a new President in Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, in
May 2019 and an exchange of prisoners in September 2019 seemed to offer
some grounds for hope of an improvement in relations (see above).
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49986007
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/07/long-awaited-russia-ukraine-prisoner-exchange-begins
However, in October
2019 the situation in Ukraine remained substantially frozen, like that in
Georgia (2008) and the Moldova/Transnistria situation which dates back to
1990-1992.
https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/conflict-in-ukraine
Moreover, as
we have seen, the rapid evolution of the situation in Ukraine intensified calls
for the EU to move more rapidly towards a diversification of energy suppliers
and sources to escape over-dependence on Russia. It has also led to a
reassessment of the whole relationship with Russia and the terms of political cooperation
between Russia and the West (the EU, the US and NATO), and a debate about what
kind of measures should be taken in dealing with Russia and how effective or
desirable the current sanctions are. After all, although Russia is criticized
for its actions in Ukraine and for its support of the Assad regime in Syria, it
remains a fundamental ally in the fight against terrorism and for the moment an
essential trading partner.
Nevertheless,
on 17 December 2020 the EU renewed its sanctions till July 2021.Lifting the
sanctions continues to depend on Russia respecting the Minsk agreements
Russian
cyberattacks on the US and some European states has strengthened the position
of those wanting to pursue a harder line with Russia.
3) EU members
need to show more unity in dealing with Russia through EU institutions. In the
past EU members tended to negotiate bilateral agreements with Russia and this
could allow Russia to exploit divisions between EU members. The Italian government
is sometimes accused of adopting this approach.
4) Russia’s
domestic political situation is characterized by a lack of freedom of the press
and a concentration of media power, economic power and political power in the
hands of the government, or friends of the government (opponents call this
‘cronyism and corruption’), attacks on and the repression of opposition leaders
and strong critics of the government (e.g. Aleksei A. Navalny, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexei_Navalny
Garry
Kasparov, Pussy Riot), restrictions on freedom of expression and the right to
demonstrate (freedom of assembly and association), opposition to the activities
of NGOs in Russia involved in human rights issues, accusations of
state-sponsored murder regarding the death or disappearance of some critics,
(e.g. investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya),
accusations from many sources of massive human rights violations and atrocities
during and after the military campaigns in Chechnya, the repression of or
discrimination against other ethnic or social groups (e.g. immigrants and gays)
by the police, secret services, military or paramilitary supporters and allies of
the government. The government, first under Putin, then under Medvedev, and now
under Putin again seems authoritarian and nationalist, determined to maintain
control over society. In fact, since his re-election Putin has moved to undo
some of Medvedev’s more liberal legislation. Those in positions of power are
often from the FSB secret service (many like Putin originally from the KGB) or
from among those who have made money and given their support to the government.
Rich opponents have been charged with corruption and imprisoned, silenced or
driven abroad. However, the government so far seems genuinely to have been popular
and although its control of the media raises some doubts about how far
elections in Russia can be considered free and fair, it seems likely that the
government still has widespread support (including, despite some demonstrations
against intervention in Ukraine, general support for the intervention in
Crimea) and popular legitimacy. This may be due to the fear of terrorism or of a
return to the economic chaos of the early 1990s and also to a resurgence of
national pride after the embarrassment of a weak and economically helpless
Russia in the early 1990s. Russia has a stable government but the uneven
distribution of wealth makes Russia much less stable socially. It still lacks
the large, independent-minded middle class on which a functioning democracy is often
said to rest. The protests and demonstrations in 2014 on social and economic
questions and the anti-corruption protests and unrest in 2017 as well as
current support for Navalny suggest, however, that the middle class is growing
and starting to find its voice, although the government remains firmly in
control. Putin's official approval rating dropped to 49% in June 2019 (and perhaps
the unofficial level would be lower).
Moreover, the
Covid-19 pandemic may have led to an increase in discontent.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/6/17/putins-rating-is-collapsing-as-anger-grows-in-russia
Russian
sources continue to claim that Putin enjoys widespread support.
https://tass.com/society/1101849
However, in local
municipal elections in September 2020 President Putin’s United Russia party won
only a narrow victory in what are generally recognized as ‘managed’ elections.
So at the start of 2021, Putin’s popular legitimacy
may now be weakening although the regime shows no signs of weakening.
5) The
Russian economy
Russia’s
economy is too narrowly based on the export of energy resources and other raw
materials. As mentioned above, the Russian economy in 2015 contracted (-3.7%
GDP growth, -0.4% in 2016) largely as a result of the fall in oil prices, from
well over $100 a barrel between 2011 and 2013 to around $60 a barrel in June
2015, to a low of $27 in January 2016, to $45 in September 2016 and $55 in November
2017, $74 in 2018, $57 in 2019 and $47 in 2020.
http://www.macrotrends.net/2516/wti-crude-oil-prices-10-year-daily-chart
Successful
diversification would strengthen the economy and spread the wealth. This would
help stabilize the country socially. Many experts argue that given Russia’s interest
in buying shares in western European energy companies it must now open its
economy much more to EU investment in its own energy companies and loosen
government control. However, any move in this direction is now blocked by the
Ukraine conflict and resulting sanctions, and Russia is turning to China as a
new export market for its oil and to Iran for the export of its nuclear
expertise. There is also a need for a better business environment in Russia,
less bureaucracy and red-tape etc.. to attract investment. Organized crime is
still powerful. In August 2012 Russia finally joined the WTO and this should have
led to a real liberalization of the economy, increased foreign investment and
significant economic expansion. All of this is now threatened by the Ukraine
sanctions and counter-sanctions, and by the business environment (corruption
and doubts about security of ownership, legal transparency etc...) which
remains poor.
Moreover, in ‘The Dying Bear’ in 2011
(http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136511/nicholas-eberstadt/the-dying-bear) Nicholas
Eberstadt argued that Russia is facing a demographic disaster with a population
that fell from 148.8 million in 1993 to 141.9 million in 2010, an aging population,
a falling rate of family formation, more deaths than births each year and an
average life expectancy of 67 years (lower than in 1961). The low life
expectancy is the result of high rates of alcoholism, fatal accidents and
violence (violence at the level of some post-conflict African countries), a
decline in the quality of the health service and a decline in education levels.
Thus Eberstadt predicted a decline in the quality and quantity of human resources
available to the Russian economy in the future. All this could undermine
Russia’s economic prospects as one of the BRICS. The state is currently trying
to raise the birth rate by rewarding families financially for having more children
but it is not clear how successful this policy is. Russia also benefits from
the growing presence of millions of immigrants from ex-Soviet republics, who
provide cheap labor but are not well-integrated into Russian society and are
often resented, and from remittances worth billions of dollars from Russians
working abroad. However, there is also a general internal migration from East
to West that may soon leave the Asian areas of Russia critically underpopulated. Eberstadt also argues that Russia is an
economy based on the export of raw materials and that, although this can
strengthen a developed economy like Norway or Canada, without a strong industrial-technological
base the Russian economy remains weak. In fact, without such a developed economic
base Russia’s export earnings are less than those of Belgium. According to Eberstadt
all the factors listed above will tend to weaken the Russian Federation
economically, politically and, in the end, also militarily. Russia’s future
position and role within the international community may thus be threatened
with decline and Russia may become a more difficult partner to work with due to
domestic tensions. .
However, recent trends have suggested at least a partial
demographic recovery. Following the 2014 annexation of Crimea, over 98% of
Crimea residents acquired Russian citizenship. Russia's population thus
expanded by 2,294,110 people. Moreover, as of 2014, the Russian fertility rate
of 1.750 children per woman was the highest in Eastern, Southern and
Central Europe. In 2013, Russia experienced the first natural population growth
since 1990 at 22,700 people. Taking into account immigration, the population
grew by 294,500 people. According to official Russian sources Russia's population
was 143.4 million in January 2016 (excluding Crimea) and 144.5 million in January
2017. We will need to see how the trend continues. (143,956,000 in 2018 and
145,895,142 in 2019, 144,386,830 in 2020).
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/russia-population/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Russia
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/russia-population/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Russia#Main_trends
6) Terrorism
– Russia has been faced with separatism and Islamic fundamentalism in some of
its federated republics (Chechnya and Dagestan are republics in the Russian
Federation) and independent allied republics (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are
in the Commonwealth of Independent States) in the Caucasus. The war in Chechnya
was only the most obvious example. The Russian response has been fairly drastic
in some places, milder in others, but it is not clear if Russia has won the
‘hearts and minds’ campaign in the area. This was both a reason for Russia to
support NATO logistically in Afghanistan, but also a reason for Russia to avoid
bad publicity with its Muslim citizens by getting too heavily involved (also because
the Soviet Union, of course, fought and lost a war there in the 1970s, so it
evokes bad memories). However, Russia and the West have cooperated closely on
major security issues, through the exchange of information and intelligence
between secret services on terrorist threats and illegal trafficking. This also
means that in order to have Russian cooperation against al Qaeda the West said
little in criticism of Russia’s handling of the Chechen question. For the
current situation see:
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/russias-quest-security-north-caucasus-syria-link-24318
7) Syria –
On Syria, initially, a clear division emerged on the UN Security Council in
2011-12 between Russia, and to a lesser extent China, which were against
sanctions and international intervention and argued their case in terms of the
UN principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of an independent state,
and the West which viewed the Assad regime as delegitimized by its involvement
in massacres and massive human rights abuses. The West attempted to support
what it thought were ‘moderate’ opponents of the regime with money and arms and
called for Assad to step down. Russia’s support for Assad may have been, in
part, because they were confident their ally could defeat the rebels and, in part,
a response to what had happened in Libya where the West convinced Russia to
allow the UNSC to authorize an intervention to protect civilians. The Russians
argued that NATO had exceeded its mandate by helping the rebels to overthrow
the Gaddafi regime. With the rise of Islamic State in Syria
and Iraq, Russia at first argued that US interventionism in the Middle East since
2003 had only led to the strengthening of radical Islamist forces and was thus
a misguided policy.
However,
despite all of the above, in September 2015 Russia began to intervene in the
Syrian civil war directly with air strikes. Russia supported the Assad regime
and claimed it is acting legally (at the invitation of the 'legitimate' Syrian
government) against Islamic State but seems to have mainly targeted the
opposition rebels and Kurdish fighters. Russia invited the US to form a grand
alliance with it against IS (referring to their WWII alliance) but the Obama
administration, despite launching its own air strikes and supporting those of
its allies, did not want to accept the long-term survival of the Assad regime
or Russia’s targeting of Assad’s other opponents. However, the stakes were very
high and the situation was in constant evolution. With the terrorist attack on
Paris on November 13th 2015 Russia, the EU and the US began moving
towards greater cooperation in their efforts to contain and defeat IS (Da’esh).
On 21st November 2015 the United Nations Security Council voted
unanimously in favour of a French-sponsored resolution ‘calling on ‘Member
States that have the capacity to do so to take all necessary measures, in
compliance with international law, in particular with the United Nations
Charter, as well as international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law,
on the territory under the control of IS(IL) also known as Da’esh, in Syria and
Iraq, to redouble and coordinate their efforts to prevent and suppress
terrorist acts committed specifically by IS(IL)’ This was interpreted by
many politicians and commentators as fully authorizing military intervention in
Syria, although this is not strictly true. By October 2017 ISIS had been largely defeated at least for
the moment. The humanitarian cost of the civil war has been enormous.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/21/isis-caliphate-islamic-state-raqqa-iraq-islamist
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria
After
President Trump decided to withdraw US troops from northern Syria and Turkey
invaded the area saying this was necessary to secure its border from
cross-border Kurdish attacks or infiltration, Russia accepted the Turkish move
but expressed concern that it would lead to the escape of ISIS prisoners in
Kurdish hands. These pose a threat not only to EU countries but to Russia too.
In
January 2021, ten years after the start of the Arab Spring, Syria remains a
human rights disaster with a ruined economy.
https://www.mei.edu/publications/2021-will-be-defining-year-syria
8)* in the 1990s
and 2000s Russia and
the US negotiated and implemented significant cuts in their nuclear arsenals and
this is in theory an ongoing process. However, there is growing friction over
the question of Russia’s
modernization of its weapons systems and NATO's Integrated
Air and Missile Defence.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2020.1728985
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8206.htm
including its Ballistic Missile Defence
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm
(this is
still an ongoing process) In November 2010 at the NATO summit in Lisbon, to which
Russia was invited (NATO Russia Council), Russia seemed originally to be in favor
of the plan if the cooperation offered by NATO meant Russia’s real
integration into a system of shared defense against third parties (e.g. Iran).
Russia was not willing to accept a system based in Eastern European NATO member
states from which it would only receive information and intelligence as a
courtesy. The implication from the Russian point of view is that it could still
be used against Russia. However, NATO later rejected the idea of Russia’s
participation in the control arrangements for the Missile Defense System and
Russia threatened to deploy missiles on its Western borders if NATO went ahead
with its plans. The impasse here led Russia to break off negotiations for further
nuclear arms reductions. In July 2016 NATO took command of the US-built missile
shield.
https://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/11/politics/nato-missile-defense-romania-poland/index.html
Talks
between Russia and the US on further nuclear arms reductions resumed in September
2017 but experts were not optimistic about the chances of making real progress.
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-09/news/disputes-cloud-us-russian-arms-talks
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-shield-idUSKCN0ZO1Q1
The US
withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002 (which banned the development of a missile
defence system) and both sides now seem to be willing to risk a new nuclear
arms race.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZOxhsrQH7Yw
On
Aug. 2, 2019, the United States formally withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty claiming that Russia had repeatedly violated it. The deal banned ground-launched
medium-range missiles, with a range of between 500 and 5,500km (310-3,400 miles.
e.g. Moscow to Paris).
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty
In
summer 2019 there were a series of reports saying that NATO had called upon
Russia to destroy a new land-based missile
that
Putin had offered a moratorium on missile deployment in Europe
that
NATO had rejected this offer. Both sides claim they are still open to dialogue
on arms control and reduction.
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-09/news/us-modifies-arms-control-aims-russia
https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2020-08/us-russian-nuclear-arms-control-watch
Unless agreement
on an extension is reached the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (New Start) will
expire on 5 February 2021. Agreement now seems possible
https://www.dw.com/en/us-russia-agree-to-extend-new-start-nuclear-arms-treaty/a-56354318
but the
treaty needs to be expanded
https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/25/extending-new-start-should-be-just-beginning-pub-83699
9) The
creation of the BRICS group gave Russia a new forum in which to exercise its
influence. While this group will continue to be of growing importance
economically (see notes on the BRICS and the New Development Bank) its political value is still
unclear. Will authoritarian states like Russia and China share common positions
with democracies like India, Brazil and South Africa? This may be possible in a
negative sense, e.g. restraining US and Western interventionism, bur when it comes
to democratic values and human rights violations it is difficult to imagine
these countries will be in full agreement. However, the growing strength of the
relationship between Russia and China was demonstrated by the signing of a $400
billion oil supply deal in May 2014 and the start on construction of a new oil
pipeline on September 1st 2014 (the pipeline was opened in December
2019). Further deals followed in 2016.
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-27503017
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rosneft-chemchina-idUSKCN0ZB0AV
Russia, Brazil and South Africa all faced economic
difficulties in 2015 and 2016 and weak or erratic growth since then. Meanwhile
China and India maintained high growth rates till the onset on Covid-19. This
will also limit the group's influence.
https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/brics-divided-we-stand/
https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/why-the-brics-grouping-is-here-to-stay/
10) Russia
and how international events, like the World Athletics Championships in Moscow
in August 2013 and the Winter Olympics in 2014, affected its foreign policy
stance and image at the international level.
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/politics-sports-mega-events-russia-kazan-sochi-and-beyond However, the World Anti-Doping Agency’s report
on Russia’s state-sponsored support for Russian athletes using drugs to enhance
their performance did enormous damage to the country’s sporting image and led
to a ban on Russia being banned from international athletics events for 4 years.
This has been reduced to 2 years but means Russia will miss the next Olympic
Games.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/over-1-000-russian-athletes-involved-in-doping-says-wada-1481285107
https://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/50710598
11)
Institutional relations between the EU and the Russian Federation and the
situation after the sanctions with the suspension of some areas of cooperation.
The NATO-Russia council was
created in 2002 as a consultative mechanism. NATO suspended all
practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia after the Ukraine
crisis broke out in April 2014. However, the
NATO-Russia Council, which brings together all 29 NATO Allies and Russia, met
in Brussels on 5 July 2019 to discuss Ukraine, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty, and transparency and risk reduction. This was the second meeting
of the NATO-Russia Council this year. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg,
who chaired the meeting, said: “Our discussion was frank but necessary. The
allies and Russia hold fundamentally different views but we are committed to
continuing our dialogue.”
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_167682.htm
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/tech_financial_cooperation/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia%E2%80%93European_Union_relations
http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/european-union-russia-crossroads-analysis-518702
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/04/05/the-institutional-aspects-of-russia-eu-relations/
http://www.russianmission.eu/en/brief-overview-relations
Conclusion: Russia
appears to want to reassert its power and play a more decisive role on the world
stage and in eastern Europe. The EU and the West should perhaps welcome or at
least try to accommodate its first ambition and try to work with Russia wherever
possible, while trying to reach a reasonable compromise as regards its second
ambition.
If the EU and
Russia do not have the kind of friendly relations that the EU has with
countries like the US, Brazil, Australia and Japan this is because Russia is
still not perceived as a fully democratic state. Events in Georgia in 2008 and
in Ukraine since 2014 have undermined this relationship and suggest that there has
been a return to a more adversarial relationship. According to some experts there
is even the danger of a second Cold War, though this seems an exaggerated
reaction. Further progress on US-Russia nuclear arms reductions, cooperation between
NATO and Russia and real agreement on the future of Ukraine and other states
bordering on Russia seem unlikely for the moment. Indeed, NATO seems destined
to return, at least in part, to its Cold War task of guaranteeing the independence
of its European members. Many diplomats on both sides see the main task as that
of ‘damage control’ and trying to reduce tensions and repair relations. The likely involvement of Russia in
attempts to manipulate voting in the 2016 US presidential election and the
recent revelations about Russian cyber-attacks on the US and Western European
states have further undermined relations.
Nonetheless,
compared with relations with the old Soviet Union and Soviet bloc, enormous
progress has been made politically and economically in the last 25 years.
Russia is clearly no longer a state that Europe regards simply as an enemy.
Europe will maintain close ties with the US through NATO as an ultimate
guarantee of its freedom from Russian pressure, but needs at the same time to
intensify its dialogue with Russia. This may mean quiet diplomacy to encourage
Russia to implement democratic reforms with a campaign of renewed goodwill to win
the confidence of the Russian government and people. Both sides need the
relationship to return to stability and cooperation. This will mean reaching
some kind of practical compromise on the Ukrainian question and the economic
sanctions. The Minsk II agreement of February 2015 was a clear attempt to take
a first step towards reaching such a settlement by stabilizing the situation.
What exactly
the election of Joe Biden will mean for cooperation between the US and Russia is
yet to be seen. Hopefully, it will bring greater stability and predictability.
Some Background
notes:
Ukraine
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18010123
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_Protocol
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/05/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/index.html
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/02/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/
http://www.voanews.com/content/eastern-ukraine-ceasefire/2440781.html
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/16/ukraine-votes-more-power-separatist-east
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_Protocol
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_II older material on EU-US
sanctions on Russia and their effect
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28400218
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/22-russia-sanctions/
http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm
Russia’s
economy
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/publication/rer
https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/russia
http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/russian-federation-economic-forecast-summary.htm
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/brief/monthly-economic-developments
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/04/chinas-troubles-make-russias-putin-into-a-loser.html
http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/august-2015-really-black-russia
Ukraine’s economy
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-war-on-ukraine-economy-by-anders-aslund-2015-07
See also:
‘Managing the New Cold War’, in Foreign
Affairs July/August 2014, by Robert Legvold
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280978634_Managing_the_New_Cold_War
And for the
Russian position:
‘What the Kremlin Is Thinking’, in Foreign
Affairs July/August 2014, by Alexander Lukin, page 74
http://www2.aladi.org/nsfaladi/portalrevistas.nsf/grandeWeb/F8_4_2014/$FILE/sumarioF8_4_2014.pdf
* US and Russian Nuclear Arms Reductions
2011 – The New START (for Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty) is a nuclear arms reduction treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. It was signed on April 8, 2010 in Prague, and, after ratification, entered into
force on February 5, 2011. New START replaced the Treaty of Moscow (SORT), which was due to expire in December
2012. In terms of name, it is a follow-up to the START I treaty, which expired in December
2009, and to the proposed START II and START III treaties that never entered into force. Under the terms of the treaty, the
number of strategic nuclear missile launchers was reduced by half.
Summary of
New START Limits
Type Limit
Deployed
missiles and bombers 700
Deployed warheads
(RVs and bombers) 1550
Deployed and
Non-deployed Launchers (missile tubes and bombers) 800
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_START
Questions and doubts about the verification
procedures
2020
– The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which entered
into force in 2011, would have expired on February 5, 2021, but the U.S. and
Russian Presidents decided to extend the treaty for another five years.
https://www.state.gov/on-the-extension-of-the-new-start-treaty-with-the-russian-federation/
The
following estimates from the Federation of American Scientists, September
2020.
|
Status of World
Nuclear Forces 2020* |
|||||
|
Country |
Deployed |
Deployed |
Reserve/ |
Military |
Total Inventoryb |
|
Russia |
1,572c |
0d |
2,740e |
4,312 |
6,372f |
|
United States |
1,600g |
150h |
2,050i |
3,800j |
5,800k |
|
France |
280l |
n.a. |
10l |
290 |
290 |
|
China |
0m |
? |
320 |
320 |
320m |
|
United Kingdom |
120n |
n.a. |
75 |
195 |
195n |
|
Israel |
0 |
n.a. |
90 |
90 |
90o |
|
Pakistan |
0 |
n.a. |
160 |
160 |
160p |
|
India |
0 |
n.a. |
150 |
150 |
150q |
|
North Korea |
0 |
n.a. |
35 |
35 |
35r |
|
Total:s |
~3,720 |
~150 |
~5,630 |
~9,320 |
~13,410 |
See https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ for an explanation of the figures.
# Background
notes on economic relations between the EU and Russia
Russia is
the largest oil, gas, uranium and coal exporter to the EU. Likewise, the EU is
by far the largest trade partner of the Russian Federation. Based on this
mutual interdependence and common interest in the energy sector, the EU and Russia
developed a close energy partnership and launched an EU-Russia Energy Dialogue in 2000. On
22 March 2013, in Moscow, the Coordinators of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue
signed the "Roadmap EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050".
http://www.worldstopexports.com/russias-top-import-partners/
https://oec.world/en/profile/country/rus/
The
Trade Picture in 2019 – choose some facts and figures!
Since 1997
the EU's political and economic relations with Russia have been based on a
bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The trade-relevant
sections of the Agreement aim to promote trade and investment and develop
mutually beneficially economic relations between the EU and Russia. Since 2014
the illegal annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine have
seriously affected the bilateral political dialogue. As a result, some of the
policy dialogues and mechanisms of cooperation, including in the area of trade,
have been suspended.
Since
2012, when Russia joined the WTO, EU-Russia trade relations have also been framed by WTO
multilateral rules.
Trade picture
§
Russia is the EU's fifth largest trading partner and the EU is Russia's
largest trading partner, with a two-way trade in goods value of €232 billion in
2019. In 2019 Russia was the origin of ca. 40% of EU imports of gas and 27% of
EU imports of oil. Due to the large value these imports, EU’s trade
deficit with Russia (€ 57 billion in 2019) is only second to EU’s trade deficit
with China.
§
EU-Russia bilateral trade in goods peaked in 2012, dropping by 43% between
2012 and 2016 from two-way €322 billion in 2012 to €183 billion in 2016.
Since 2016, bilateral trade has partially recovered. However, Overall EU
exports to Russia were in 2019 25% lower than in 2012, agri-food exports were 38%
lower.
§
In 2019 Russia was the destination of 4,1% of EU global exports, down from
6,7% in 2012. As for the origins of imports into Russia, the EU accounted in
2019 for 35%, down from 39% in 2012.
§
As for exports of goods from Russia, in 2019 the EU was the destination of
42% of them, down from 50% in 2012.
Main EU exports to Russia are
in the categories of machinery, transport equipment, medicines, chemicals and
other manufactured products.
Main EU imports from Russia
are raw materials, especially - oil (crude and refined) and gas, as well as metals
(notably iron/steel, aluminium, nickel).
§
As for services, EU exports to Russia amounted in 2019 to € 26,2 billion,
imports from Russia to € 12 billion EUR.
§
The EU is the largest investor in Russia, with an estimated stock of €276,8
billion in 2018, or 75% of total FDI stock in Russia. The stock of FDI in the
EU from Russia amounted in 2018 to €89,3 billion, or ca. 1% of the total in the
EU.
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/russia/
Russia – the
Union's largest energy resources supplier (2019)
39.4% of the
EU’s extra-EU gas imports originate from Russia
26.8% of the
EU's extra-EU total crude oil imports originate from Russia
pages 4 and
5 of https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/46126.pdf see also: https://oec.world/en/profile/country/rus/
The EU as a
whole is Russia's largest trading partner
The
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was supposed to be upgraded through the
negotiation of a New EU-Russia Agreement, providing a comprehensive framework
for bilateral relations. The negotiations, but also some of the activities in the existing
agreement, were suspended after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the
destabilization of Ukraine in 2014.
Still, the EU remains a key trading
partner for Russia. Imports from Russia to the EU increased by 16.7% in period
from 2017 to 2018 and were driven by the growth in imports of energy products
from Russia that account for about 70% of imports from Russia to EU. In the
first half of 2019 the EU-Russia trade has to a large extent remained at the
same level, compared to the first half of 2018. The same can be said of EU
exports to Russia.
The EU is by far the largest investor in
Russia. According to the Central Bank of Russia, the total stock of foreign
direct investment in Russia originating from the EU approached €235.2 billion
in 2018. Nevertheless, the share of investments originating from the EU in the
total FDI stock in Russia has been decreasing: e.g. from 73% in 2014 to 64.7%
in 2018. Overall inflow of direct investments in Russia from abroad fell to USD
8.8 billion in 2018 – a three-fold decline as compared with figures from 2017,
while outflow of investments from Russia in the same period constituted 31.9
billion dollars (36.8 billion dollars in 2017).
These last 3 paragraphs are an excerpt
from the document at the link below, which is still a good guide to the trade
and sanctions situation immediately before the Covid-19 pandemic (Feb 2020), and
worth reading in full, although the figures are for 2018 rather than 2019.
For the
effects of the pandemic, see:
http://eu-russia-expertnetwork.eu/en/news/euren-covid2
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/603511/EXPO_STU(2020)603511_EN.pdf
Real time
events January-February 2021
https://www.dw.com/en/russian-opposition-leader-alexei-navalny-sentenced-to-prison/a-56412686
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55876033
See https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ for these graphs.
