lunedì 28 febbraio 2022

Ukraine, Russia, the EU and NATO

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ytr9pkGQE1Q

https://uk.yahoo.com/news/putin-ukraine-russia-catherine-belton-skullduggery-152902828.html

https://www.statista.com/chart/26940/russian-central-bank-foreign-currency-and-gold-reserves-by-holder/?utm_source=Statista+Newsletters&utm_campaign=2e509234f2-All_InfographTicker_daily_COM_PM_KW08_2022_Fr_COPY&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_662f7ed75e-2e509234f2-338756430

https://www.statista.com/chart/26944/valuation-of-the-russian-ruble-against-the-us-dollar/?utm_source=Statista+Newsletters&utm_campaign=6e5904fff9-All_InfographTicker_daily_COM_AM_KW03_2022_Tu_COPY&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_662f7ed75e-6e5904fff9-338756430

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-president-signs-formal-request-join-european-union-2022-02-28/

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_192489.htm

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220227-europe-must-prepare-for-millions-of-ukrainian-refugees-eu-commissioner-says

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60539303

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220227-live-ukraine-s-zelensky-agrees-to-talks-with-russia-monday-putin-raises-nuclear-alert

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220228-belarus-approves-hosting-nuclear-weapons-russian-forces-permanently

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220227-germany-to-raise-defence-spending-sharply-in-response-to-putin-s-aggression

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/26/germany-approves-delivery-of-rpgs-from-netherlands-to-ukraine

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTk44HA3F34

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220227-us-allies-target-fortress-russia-with-new-sanctions-including-swift-ban

https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220226-live-ukraine-vows-to-fight-on-as-kyiv-readies-for-russian-missile-attacks

https://www.france24.com/en/video/20220227-eu-to-paralyse-russian-central-bank-assets-said-von-der-leyen

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/24/politics/us-troops-ukraine-russia-nato/index.html

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_192408.htm

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-has-no-plans-send-troops-into-ukraine-stoltenberg-says-2022-02-24/

Italy’s Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic

https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/index.html see all sections on the menu

https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/english.html

2021

https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/RELAZIONE-ANNUALE-2021.pdf

2020

https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/RELAZIONE-ANNUALE-2020.pdf

Italy’s National Strategic Framework for Cyberspace Security

In Italian: https://www.agid.gov.it/sites/default/files/repository_files/leggi_decreti_direttive/quadro-strategico-nazionale-cyber_0.pdf

In English: https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/italian-national-strategic-framework-for-cyberspace-security.pdf

The Italian Cybersecurity Action Plan

In Italian: https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/piano-nazionale-cyber-2017.pdf

In English: https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Italian-cybersecurity-action-plan-2017.pdf


mercoledì 16 febbraio 2022

International intervention for humanitarian purposes

What are the main factors to be weighed by the international community in deciding whether to undertake intervention for humanitarian purposes?

https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a8e5b072.pdf

       Delivering Humanitarian Aid

http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/deliver-humanitarian-aid/ This covers a lot of UN emergency and longer-term interventions, where natural disasters have occurred or food resources are insufficient. These programs are usually authorized and welcomed by the local government if it is unable to respond on its own, and are not controversial, except in terms of effectiveness (speed, organization, costs etc.).

https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Security%20Council%20Norms_Final%20version%20for%20print%2017%20June%202014.pdf

https://www.unocha.org/our-work/coordination/un-disaster-assessment-and-coordination-undac

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK11792/

https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/disaster_preparedness_en

Where a government is simply reluctant to authorize a foreign presence on its territory, this may present a serious challenge for the international community if that government is unable to deal with the situation, even when we are simply talking about relief in the event of a natural disaster.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/27/regime-blocked-aid-to-burma-cyclone-victims

https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/03/lessons-cyclone-nargis

And how should the international community respond if a government is unwilling to respond to a humanitarian crisis on its territory perhaps because there is a civil conflict going on?

Syria: https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/un-aid-northern-syria-which-neutral-absolutely-essential-and-delivered

https://www.unocha.org/story/un-impartial-syria-it-elsewhere

https://www.unocha.org/syria

https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-2020-humanitarian-response-plan-december-2020#:~:text=The%202020%20Humanitarian%20Response%20Plan,undertaken%20across%20and%20within%20sectors.

https://hum-insight.info/plan/1044

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/syria_2021_humanitarian_needs_overview.pdf

https://hum-insight.info/plan/1088

https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/statement-security-council-briefing-humanitarian-situation-syria-27

Yemen:   https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/yemen/

 https://www.unocha.org/yemen/about-ocha-yemen

https://disasterphilanthropy.org/disaster/yemen-humanitarian-crisis/#:~:text=UNICEF%20says%20that%20the%20humanitarian,a%20critically%20underfunded%20UN%20system%E2%80%9D.

https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/yemen-crisis

https://www.unicef.org/appeals/yemen

And what should the international community do if that government itself is held to be the cause of, and responsible for, the crisis?

Responsibility to Protect

https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/eventi/2020/09/del-re-all-onu-sforzo-instancabile-italia-a-protezione-civili_0/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect  

https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/unga-r2p-debate-2021/

https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/un-general-assembly-adopts-new-resolution-on-the-responsibility-to-protect/

https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/#:~:text=The%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect%20%E2%80%93%20known,cleansing%20and%20crimes%20against%20humanity.

https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml

https://unric.org/en/unric-library-backgrounder-r2p/

https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/

https://archive.unric.org/en/responsibility-to-protect/26981-r2p-a-short-history

https://archive.unric.org/en/responsibility-to-protect/26982-responsibility-to-protect-two-case-studies-with-alex-vines-

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect   (read carefully)

 

in particular: The Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect

Pillar I: The protection responsibilities of the state. This stresses that states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

Pillar II: International assistance and capacity-building. This addresses the international community's commitment to help states build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and to help those under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 

Pillar III: Timely and decisive response. This focuses on the responsibility of international community to act in a timely and decisive way to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity when a state manifestly fails to protect its population. 

Note that:

The ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) argued that any form of military intervention is "an exceptional and extraordinary measure", and, as such, to be justified it must meet certain criteria, including:

·      Just cause: There must be "serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur".

·      Right intention: The main intention of the military action must be to prevent human suffering.

·      Last resort: Every other measure besides military invention has to have already been taken into account. (This does not mean that every measurement has to have been applied and been shown to fail, but that there are reasonable grounds to believe that only military action would work in that situation.)

·      Proportional means: The military means must not exceed what is necessary "to secure the defined human protection objective".

·      Reasonable prospects: The chance of success must be reasonably high, and it must be unlikely that the consequences of the military intervention would be worse than the consequences without the intervention.

·      Right authority: The military action has to have been authorized by the Security Council.

Various experts have highlighted some of the problems that military intervention for humanitarian purposes may involve:

The mixed-motives problem - The legitimacy of R2P rests upon its altruistic aim. However, states will often be wary to engage in humanitarian intervention unless the intervention is partly rooted in self-interest. The appearance that the intervention is not strictly altruistic consequently leads some to question its legitimacy.

·      The counterfactual problem - When R2P is successful, there will not be any clear-cut evidence of its success: a mass atrocity that did not occur but would have occurred without intervention. Defenders of R2P consequently have to rely on counterfactual arguments.

·      The conspicuous harm problem - While the benefits of the intervention will not be clearly visible, the destructiveness and costs of the intervention will be visible. This makes it more difficult for proponents of the intervention to defend the intervention. The destruction caused by the intervention also makes some question the legitimacy of the intervention due to the stated purpose of preventing harm.

·      The end-state problem - Humanitarian intervention is prone to expand the mission beyond simply averting mass atrocities. When successful at averting mass atrocities, the intervenors will often be forced to take upon themselves more expansive mandates to ensure that threatened populations will be safe after the intervenors leave.

·      The inconsistency problem - Due to the aforementioned problems, in addition to the belief that a particular military action is likely to cause more harm than good, states may fail to act in situations where mass atrocities loom. The failure to intervene in any and all situations where there is a risk of mass atrocities lead to charges of inconsistency.

See also praise and criticism of R2P

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect#Praise

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect#Criticism

and very critical:  https://fpif.org/the_crisis_of_humanitarian_intervention/

So in any discussion about using military force as part of an attempt at humanitarian intervention in order to prevent genocide and human rights abuses, there are a series of issues to be examined. First, there is the question of legitimacy. Is what is happening sufficient cause to infringe a state's sovereignty under Pillar III? Is there a clear mandate from the UN Security Council? (In Yemen and Syria there is no mandate for military intervention.) If there is not, should countries act without it if there is widespread support in the UN General Assembly? Then there is the bigger question of effectiveness. Do such missions usually achieve their basic goal of bringing peace and stability and ending the violence, or do they lead to more violence? Is the mission welcomed by the local people involved? (Compare for example: Somalia UNOSOM I and II 1992-5, Afghanistan ISAF 2001-present, and military intervention in Libya in 2011) Moreover, would the funds used for such a mission be better spent elsewhere as direct aid on a more concrete problem? (e.g. on providing food, water, medicine and shelter to an area not requiring a military presence). There is another important consideration that is often raised. Many experts argue that since the foundation of the UN humanitarian, intervention has always been 'politicized'. What exactly the international community should do in response to the situation in Syria, for example, cannot be debated 'neutrally', simply as a humanitarian crisis. Each member state on the UNSC and in the UNGA will inevitably bring to the discussion its own economic and strategic interests, and its own cultural or ideological perspective. In international relations this is the normal context in which a diplomatic discussion of a question like that of Syria or Libya takes place.             http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/03/libya-escalating-drama-case-liberal-intervention

In order to respond to a question like:

What are the main factors to be weighed when the international community is considering military intervention in response to a humanitarian crisis? 

You will probably need to look at these sources again and think about the points raised (concerning the idea that for the international community there is a responsibility to protect civilians from massive human rights abuses by their own government which may override the principle of state sovereignty) in relation to past and present humanitarian crises and intervention or non-intervention by the international community:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 

https://www.globalr2p.org/   

https://reliefweb.int/report/world/reflection-responsibility-protect-2020

https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-responsibility-to-protect-the-people-of-myanmar/

https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/01/revised-agreement-on-african-union-mission-in-somalia/

You should also consider whether national public opinion is manipulated by a government or the media to support a proposed intervention or whether it drives media reporting and government action or inaction by calling for intervention of responding with indifference to an event.

https://www.cato.org/white-paper/public-opinion-war-terror

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137364401_12

https://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/avoiding-avoidable-tragedy-public-opinion-and-r2p/

 

You should also look at an article in Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014, by Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan called: Drop Your weapons.

https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Drop-Your-Weapons_Foreign-Affairs_Chenoweth+Stephan.pdf

This argues against armed resistance and for civil resistance on a statistical basis, claiming that the latter is more likely to produce positive change. It is then argued that this means there is a greater responsibility for the international community to ‘assist’ (civil protest and civil resistance against a dictatorship) rather than to embrace the responsibility to protect principle.

For a wider discussion of this and related issues, see:

The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention by Benjamin A. Valentino

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-10-17/true-costs-humanitarian-intervention

Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age by Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein 

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265478467_Humanitarian_Intervention_Comes_of_Age_Lessons_From_Somalia_to_Libya

And Justice for All by Gary Haugen and Victor Boutros

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-05-01/and-justice-all

summary    https://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-haugen/and-justice-for-all-enfor_b_583217.html

Humanitarian Intervention: Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Rwanda by Timothy Stacey

http://www.telospress.com/humanitarian-interventioniraq-afghanistan-kosovo-rwanda/

From Libya to Syria: The Rise and Fall of Humanitarian Intervention by Füsun Türkmen

https://www.academia.edu/24049222/From_Libya_to_Syria_The_Rise_and_Fall_of_Humanitarian_Intervention

The Crisis of Peacekeeping, Why the UN Can’t End Wars, by Séverine Autesserre

file:///C:/Users/HP/Downloads/FA%20UN%20Peacekeeping.pdf

More on Libya

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/libya-the-responsibility-_b_841168

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/revisiting-the-humanitari_b_9445270

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/10/libya-unlawful-lethal-force-and-mass-arrests-in-unprecedented-migrant-crackdown/

http://www.jamespattison.org/uploads/1/2/5/1/12518815/libya.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_military_intervention_in_Libya

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/libya/

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/01/libya-eu-conditions-remain-hellish-as-eu-marks-5-years-of-cooperation-agreements/

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/04/12/everyone-says-the-libya-intervention-was-a-failure-theyre-wrong/

https://newrepublic.com/article/121085/libya-no-model-humanitarian-intervention

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/libya-intervention-daalder_n_6809756

https://journal-neo.org/2015/10/17/nato-s-humanitarian-intervention-in-libya-exacerbated-humanitarian-suffering/

Syria      

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/

https://www.reddit.com/r/MapPorn/comments/rybrf6/syria_in_2022_strategic_map_2600_2149/

https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/14/syria-war-un-security-council-responsibility-to-protect-r2p-humanitarian-intervention-assad-russia-human-rights-civilians/#:~:text=The%20principal%20norm%20that%20has,being%20committed%20against%20civilian%20populations.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-law-idUSKCN12O2S3

http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/11/syria-and-the-crisis-of-humanitarian-intervention/

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/vanity-bombing

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/10/syria-washington-obama-iraq-middle-east-intervention-assad-isis/505202/

https://www.lawfareblog.com/uk-legal-position-humanitarian-intervention-syria

https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/1108462

 

Central African Republic (CAR)

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/central-african-republic/

https://ecr2p.leeds.ac.uk/the-central-african-republic-and-the-responsibility-to-protect/

https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/central-african-republic/

http://www.auschwitzinstitute.org/blog/r2p-response-to-crisis-in-car-too-little-too-late/

https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/02/24/central-african-republic-what%E2%80%99s-gone-wrong

https://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwihvbjM3vPSAhXGUBQKHfY3D4wQFggoMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gpplatform.ch%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FPP%252012%2520-%2520What%2520went%2520wrong%2520in%2520the%2520Central%2520African%2520Republic%2520-%2520Mar%25202015.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHmHZBQDE5yS4QLpNRLQT12aJruaQ

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/02/18/how-the-international-community-failed-the-central-african-republic/?utm_term=.08f891c56e29

South Sudan

https://unmiss.unmissions.org/

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/south-sudan/report-south-sudan/

https://www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/Events/2022/The-UN-in-South-Sudan-2022-Risks-and-opportunities-in-an-uncertain-peace-process

https://www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/Assessing-the-Effectiveness-of-the-United-Nations-Mission-to-South-Sudan-UNMISS 

Somalia                  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Operation_in_Somalia_I  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Operation_in_Somalia_II http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a178.pdf http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/readings/lessons.html

current mission:

https://unsom.unmissions.org/

https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/somalia/report-somalia/

https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/01/revised-agreement-on-african-union-mission-in-somalia/

Rwanda https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Role_of_the_international_community_in_the_Rwandan_Genocide https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/02/rwanda-20-years-genocide-fork-road

What lessons does the outcome of the military intervention in Afghanistan provide for the US, NATO, the UN and the international community in general?

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/afghanistan/report-afghanistan/

https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231633.shtml

https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2021/08/18/failure-in-afghanistan-over-40-years-in-the-making/?sh=4c162cb7c437

https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231633.shtml

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/17/nato-blames-afghan-government-for-taliban-takeover.html

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/czech-president-natos-failure-afghanistan-puts-its-legitimacy-question-2021-08-17/

https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/europe-urges-unity-taliban-quiet-failed-mission-79480086

For me the fundamental condition remains this one:

·      Reasonable prospects: The chance of success must be reasonably high, and it must be unlikely that the consequences of the military intervention would be worse than the consequences without the intervention.

So the R2P doctrine does not, in itself, authorize reckless military interventions

https://opencanada.org/r2p-is-not-a-license-for-military-recklessness/

the basic question remains –  will an intervention be effective?                                    https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/01/revised-agreement-on-african-union-mission-in-somalia/

Would we want to send large-scale UN forces into Syria or Yemen even if this were authorized? Are we sure there are reasonably high prospects of success or might we make things even worse? Of course, watching the suffering going on and doing nothing is also tremendously frustrating. The UN in Yemen is trying to get both sides to stick to a ceasefire but the prospects for fostering real respect for human rights seem poor.

https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1110312

https://osesgy.unmissions.org/

https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/11/1050711

https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14352.doc.htm

https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14470.doc.htm

https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1087462

But is this really the best we can do? Is it enough? I don't know. Perhaps it is.

https://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/CeMiSS/DocumentiVis/Rcerche_da_pubblicare/Ricerche_2017/AL_SA_25_Citossi_Intervento_umanitario.pdf

https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/64721/node/64721_ko

https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/eventi/2020/09/del-re-all-onu-sforzo-instancabile-italia-a-protezione-civili_0/

A possible essay plan on the Covid-19 pandemic

‘What are the main features and consequences of the current health crisis, what has been our response to it and what lessons should the international community draw from it?’

Introduction: Start with a reference to a recent event or statement of importance relating to the question. For example:

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/01/ten-covid19-lessons-from-the-pandemic-ipsos/

https://eu.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2022/02/08/who-covid-treaty-pandemic-preparedness/6686628001/

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/01/25/covid-19-council-adopts-new-person-based-recommendation-on-free-movement-restrictions/

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/02/covid19-top-news-omicron-coronavirus-8-february-2022/

https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/omicron-rewrites-covid-plan-2022-2021-12-17/

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/02/3-keys-to-a-resilient-post-pandemic-recovery/

Line of argument: this essay will argue first that the current pandemic has shown that the world was poorly prepared for such an event, though there had been warnings from the WHO and other authoritative bodies. So there is a lesson for the world community to learn. Moreover, this crisis has demonstrated the need for international cooperation in dealing effectively with a major shared challenge, from sharing data to policy development, to public/private collaboration to research and produce not one but a series of possible vaccines and treatments. Hopefully, this will encourage states to be more aware of the need to work together and more willing to cooperate in other fields, such as dealing with migration and climate change.

Give a brief outline of the nature, evolution, spread, scale of the pandemic in its first phase and the lack of preparedness, focusing on Italy and Europe and providing a few facts and figures and a timeline. By looking at the first wave explain why the Italian government decided to impose a national lockdown

The economic and social impact, consequences and costs of the Covid-19 pandemic and the lockdown, globally and in Italy and the EU, using a few figures and estimates from Italian institutions (e.g. the Bank of Italy), EU institutions and international organizations like the WTO, WB etc… / the acceleration of society’s transition to using more IT and smart working / impact on developing world and SDGs – see links below.

https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/relazione-annuale/2020/sintesi/index.html?com.dotmarketing.htmlpage.language=1

The summer of 2020 and then the second wave in autumn / the change of strategy and the rationale for that strategy / the development of a vaccine /2021/the current situation and strategy in 2022 / lessons to be learnt from all of this, public transparency, decision-making, inequalities, successes and failures.

The EU recovery plan – NextGenerationEU, and the Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza, The National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP)

https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/relazione-annuale/2020/sintesi/index.html?com.dotmarketing.htmlpage.language=1

https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/recovery-plan-europe_en

https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piano_Nazionale_di_Ripresa_e_Resilienza

https://www.mef.gov.it/en/focus/The-National-Recovery-and-Resilience-Plan-NRRP/

and current economic outlook

https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/notizia/economic-bulletin-no-1-2022/

Argue that the NextGenerationEU plan could be a model for and a first step towards greater international cooperation and EU integration.

Conclusion: Thus, given what we have said above, it seems clear that when necessary, and sufficiently scared and motivated, both the international community and the EU are capable of moving from purely national strategies to a collective one involving rapid developments in terms greater and more effective cooperation. The real lesson is that we need to move from cooperation on a mainly ad hoc basis towards a permanent framework for a collaborative approach to global challenges. And we need truly global strategies, not strategies geared purely to the needs and capabilities of developed economies.

Maybe finish with another reference to a recent event or statement of importance related to the topic. For example, on a positive note:

https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/coronavirus/covid-19-lessons-offer-hope-global-efforts-address-climate-change-impacts

The extremely negative impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the SDGs (obviously, much less optimistic)

 

https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal1

https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/hunger/

https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3

https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal4

https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-brief-81-impact-of-covid-19-on-sdg-progress-a-statistical-perspective/

https://sdg.iisd.org/news/sdgs-report-2021-covid-19-lead-to-first-rise-in-extreme-poverty-in-a-generation/

https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty

https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/goal-of-the-month/

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/01/25/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2022

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2020/10/21/the-impact-of-covid-19-on-global-extreme-poverty/

https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/un_framework_report_on_covid-19.pdf

https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/11/1077542

https://news.un.org/en/news/topic/sdgs

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-12/italy-readies-small-pandemic-aid-package-without-extra-deficit