mercoledì 28 gennaio 2026
EU trade agreements
The EU and
India
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/lintesa-europa-india-in-un-mondo-diviso-228406
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_26_184
The EU and
Mercosur
https://accesspartnership.com/opinion/eu-mercosur-deal-game-changer-europe-latin-america/
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_24_6245
https://earth.org/the-eu-mercosur-deal-comes-with-serious-environmental-and-social-implications/
Japan
Canada
sabato 24 gennaio 2026
China’s Belt and Road Initiative
What is it? A brief history, its objectives and a
review of its evolution and current state.
The Belt and Road Initiative primarily addresses an
"infrastructure gap" and thus has the potential to accelerate
economic growth across the Asia Pacific, Africa and Central and
Eastern Europe. It is a central mechanism of Chinese foreign policy
and development finance. The initial focus has been infrastructure investment,
education, construction materials, railway and highway, automobile, real
estate, power grid, and iron and steel. Already, some estimates list the Belt
and Road Initiative as one of the largest infrastructure and investment
projects in history, covering more than 68 countries. The BRI outlined six
economic corridors for trade and investment connectivity.
The BRI develops new markets for Chinese firms,
channels excess industrial capacity overseas, increases China's access to
resources, and strengthens its ties with partner countries. The initiative
generates its own export demand because Chinese loans enable participating
countries to develop infrastructure projects involving Chinese firms, banks and
expertise. The infrastructure developed also helps China to address the
imbalance between its more developed eastern regions and its less
developed western regions.
For developing countries, the BRI is appealing because
of the opportunities it offers to alleviate their economic disadvantages
relative to Western countries. The BRI offers them infrastructure development,
financial assistance, and technical assistance from China. The increase in
foreign direct investment and increased trade linkages also increases
employment and poverty alleviation for these countries. The link below explains
where the BRI stands today.
By July 2025 roughly 150 countries had signed
memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with China under the BRI, although a handful
have re-evaluated or withdrawn (Italy in December 2023 and Panama in February
2025). GreenFDC calculates cumulative economic engagement (construction
contracts + investment) since 2013 at US $1.308 trillion as of mid-2025. In
fact, 2025 saw the highest BRI engagement ever for any year, with USD 128.4
billion in construction contracts and about USD 85.2 billion in investments;
China's energy related engagement in 2025 were the highest in any period since
the start of the BRI's reaching USD 93 billion.
The BRI’s new strategy:
Smaller – "small and beautiful"
projects. After years of megaprojects, Beijing announced in
November 2021 that BRI projects should be "small and beautiful"—i.e.,
better targeted, less wasteful and often co-financed.
Greener – China
introduced a green taxonomy in 2020/2021 that put most fossil-fuel projects in
a "red" category and committed in September 2021 to stop building new
coal-fired power plants abroad. Green investments nonetheless account for a
minority of new spending, and fossil-fuel engagements—especially oil and gas in
the Middle East—remain significant.
Debt sustainability – China
has engaged in debt workouts under the G-20's Debt Service Suspension
Initiative (DSSI) and Common Framework. For example, China and France co-led a
restructuring of US$6.3 billion of Zambia's debt in June 2023. The new emphasis
on project finance and syndicated loans (e.g., Peru's Chancay port secured a
US$975 million project loan) aims to reduce sovereign exposure
Private-sector participation – Private
Chinese firms now lead many BRI investments, whereas state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) dominated the first decade. This shift reflects domestic overcapacity,
the drive to secure critical minerals and technology supply chains in a
potential trade-war.
Geoeconomic competition.
Alternatives to the BRI include the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure
and Investment (PGII), which has mobilised over US$60 billion since 2021 and
aims for US$200 billion by 2027; the EU Global Gateway; the India–Middle
East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC); Japan's Quality Infrastructure; and GCC
sovereign funds. While these initiatives are smaller than the BRI, they shape
host-country options and raise standards.
Why Italy withdrew from the BRI and relations today:
https://www.iai.it/en/publications/c05/timing-everything-italy-withdraws-belt-and-road-initiative
https://www.dw.com/en/eu-china-relations-hit-rock-bottom-before-beijing-summit/a-73213412
https://www.economia-italia.com/meloni-asia-contratti-italia-investimenti-2026
https://chinaobservers.eu/italy-china-relations-the-diplomacy-of-conscious-pragmatism/
See the link at the bottom of the page – Italy’s “golden
power” rules
Has the BRI helped Africa and Asia to develop?
Revently China has reduced lending to Africa
https://www.semafor.com/article/01/23/2026/china-pulls-back-on-funding-african-projects
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2yl88wd3lo
Corruption in Africa remains a challenge to investment
and develpment
https://theglobepost.com/2024/08/08/africa-corruption-barrier-investment/
Criticisms of the BRI:
https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/chinas-sahel-gamble-falters-as-insurgencies-rage/
However, one should return to the article we looked at
before for a more positive view https://www.sanchez.vc/geocoded-special-reports/the-state-of-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-august-2025
While China's leadership promoted a "green,
high-quality" BRI at the 2023 forum, 2025 data reveal a return to large
fossil-fuel and resource-backed deals.
https://greenfdc.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-2025/
Chinese companies are now exporting to the African
consumer markets
A possible line of argument for an essay – Given China’s
huge trade surplus (see the link below), it is vital that a significant proportion
of these funds is recycled as investment back into the global economy. Countries
may have doubts about the planning and effectiveness of particular BRI
projects, overall management of the BRI, the environmental effects of the BRI,
the risk of a debt-trap for poor countries and the potential export of the
Chinese political model or its support for authoritarian regimes, a kind of
neocolonialism. However, while all this calls for caution, careful monitoring
and oversight and alternative investors and investment initiatives (the US and
the EU?) or perhaps partnering China in these investments, blanket oppostion
would seem to be unlikely to succeed. The EU is pushing to make sure that trade
deals with China are fair while moving to protecting sectors it considers
crucial for its economic and geopolitical security. A similar approach will
need to be adopted by countries which have joined or are joining the BRI.
Cauious cooperation and negotiation after careful assessment of the risks
involved.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/28/tidal-wave-how-75-nations-face-chinese-debt-crisis-in-2025
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/eu-toughen-trade-stance-china-germany-pivots-2025-11-20/
Italy’s “golden power” rules
Latin America – challenges and opportunities
https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/latin-americas-changing-web-of-risks/
https://www.iadb.org/en/news/complexities-inequality-latin-america-and-caribbean
https://americasmi.com/insights/latin-america-2026-economic-outlook/
https://accesspartnership.com/opinion/eu-mercosur-deal-game-changer-europe-latin-america/
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_24_6245
https://earth.org/the-eu-mercosur-deal-comes-with-serious-environmental-and-social-implications/
China’s growing presence in Latin America
https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/2026-outlook-china-latin-america/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ffJqMsCIU08&t=55s
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1-TehWi5rc0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eEn-1hOdLK8
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/769504/EPRS_BRI(2025)769504_EN.pdf
giovedì 22 gennaio 2026
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney ‘s speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 20 January 2026.
Thank you, Larry. It is both a pleasure, and a duty,
to be with you tonight in this pivotal moment that Canada and the world going
through.
Today I will talk about a rupture in the world order,
the end of a pleasant fiction and the beginning of a harsh reality, where
geopolitics, where the large, main power, geopolitics, is submitted to no
limits, no constraints.
On the other hand, I would like to tell you that the
other countries, especially intermediate powers like Canada, are not powerless.
They have the capacity to build a new order that encompasses our values, such
as respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the various states.
The power of the less power starts with honesty.
It seems that every day we're reminded that we live in
an era of great power rivalry, that the rules based order is fading, that the
strong can do what they can, and the weak must suffer what they must.
And this aphorism of Thucydides is presented as
inevitable, as the natural logic of international relations reasserting itself.
And faced with this logic, there is a strong tendency
for countries to go along to get along, to accommodate, to avoid trouble, to
hope that compliance will buy safety.
Well, it won't.
So, what are our options?
In 1978, the Czech dissident Václav Havel, later
president, wrote an essay called The Power of the Powerless, and in
it, he asked a simple question: how did the communist system sustain itself?
And his answer began with a greengrocer.
Every morning, this shopkeeper places a sign in his
window: ‘Workers of the world unite’. He doesn't believe it, no-one does, but
he places a sign anyway to avoid trouble, to signal compliance, to get along.
And because every shopkeeper on every street does the same, the system persist
– not through violence alone, but through the participation of ordinary people
in rituals they privately know to be false.
Havel called this “living within a lie”.
The system's power comes not from its truth, but from
everyone's willingness to perform as if it were true, and its fragility comes
from the same source. When even one person stops performing, when the
greengrocer removes his sign, the illusion begins to crack. Friends, it is time
for companies and countries to take their signs down.
For decades, countries like Canada prospered under
what we called the rules-based international order. We joined its institutions,
we praised its principles, we benefited from its predictability. And because of
that, we could pursue values-based foreign policies under its protection.
We knew the story of the international rules-based
order was partially false that the strongest would exempt themselves when
convenient, that trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. And we knew that
international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the
accused or the victim.
This fiction was useful, and American hegemony, in
particular, helped provide public goods, open sea lanes, a stable financial
system, collective security and support for frameworks for resolving disputes.
So, we placed the sign in the window. We participated
in the rituals, and we largely avoided calling out the gaps between rhetoric
and reality.
This bargain no longer works. Let me be direct. We are
in the midst of a rupture, not a transition.
Over the past two decades, a series of crises in
finance, health, energy and geopolitics have laid bare the risks of extreme
global integration. But more recently, great powers have begun using economic
integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as
coercion, supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited.
You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit
through integration, when integration becomes the source of your subordination.
The multilateral institutions on which the middle
powers have relied – the WTO, the UN, the COP – the architecture, the very
architecture of collective problem solving are under threat. And as a result,
many countries are drawing the same conclusions that they must develop greater
strategic autonomy, in energy, food, critical minerals, in finance and supply
chains.
And this impulse is understandable. A country that
can't feed itself, fuel itself or defend itself, has few options. When the
rules no longer protect you, you must protect yourself.
But let's be clear eyed about where this leads.
A world of fortresses will be poorer, more fragile and
less sustainable. And there is another truth. If great powers abandon even the
pretense of rules and values for the unhindered pursuit of their power and
interests, the gains from transactionalism will become harder to replicate.
Hegemons cannot continually monetize their
relationships.
Allies will diversify to hedge against uncertainty.
They'll buy insurance, increase options in order to
rebuild sovereignty – sovereignty that was once grounded in rules, but will
increasingly be anchored in the ability to withstand pressure.
This room knows this is classic risk management. Risk
management comes at a price, but that cost of strategic autonomy, of
sovereignty can also be shared.
Collective investments in resilience are cheaper than
everyone building their own fortresses. Shared standards reduce fragmentations.
Complementarities are positive sum. And the question for middle powers like
Canada is not whether to adapt to the new reality – we must. The question is
whether we adapt by simply building higher walls, or whether we can do
something more ambitious.
Now Canada was amongst the first to hear the wake-up
call, leading us to fundamentally shift our strategic posture.
Canadians know that our old comfortable assumptions
that our geography and alliance memberships automatically conferred prosperity
and security – that assumption is no longer valid. And our new approach rests
on what Alexander Stubb, the President of Finland, has termed “value-based
realism”.
Or, to put another way, we aim to be both principled
and pragmatic – principled in our commitment to fundamental values,
sovereignty, territorial integrity, the prohibition of the use of force, except
when consistent with the UN Charter, and respect for human rights, and
pragmatic and recognizing that progress is often incremental, that interests
diverge, that not every partner will share all of our values.
So, we're engaging broadly, strategically with open
eyes. We actively take on the world as it is, not wait around for a world we
wish to be.
We are calibrating our relationships, so their depth
reflects our values, and we're prioritizing broad engagement to maximize our
influence, given and given the fluidity of the world at the moment, the risks
that this poses and the stakes for what comes next.
And we are no longer just relying on the strength of
our values, but also the value of our strength.
We are building that strength at home.
Since my government took office, we have cut taxes on
incomes, on capital gains and business investment. We have removed all federal
barriers to interprovincial trade. We are fast tracking a trillion dollars of
investments in energy, AI, critical minerals, new trade corridors and beyond.
We're doubling our defence spending by the end of this decade, and we're doing
so in ways that build our domestic industries.
And we are rapidly diversifying abroad. We have agreed
a comprehensive strategic partnership with the EU, including joining SAFE, the
European defence procurement arrangements. We have signed 12 other trade and
security deals on four continents in six months. The past few days, we've
concluded new strategic partnerships with China and Qatar. We're negotiating
free trade pacts with India, ASEAN, Thailand, Philippines and Mercosur.
We're doing something else. To help solve global
problems, we're pursuing variable geometry, in other words, different
coalitions for different issues based on common values and interests. So, on
Ukraine, we're a core member of the Coalition of the Willing and one of the
largest per capita contributors to its defence and security.
On Arctic sovereignty, we stand firmly with Greenland
and Denmark, and fully support their unique right to determine Greenland's
future.
Our commitment to NATO's Article 5 is unwavering, so
we're working with our NATO allies, including the Nordic Baltic Gate, to
further secure the alliance's northern and western flanks, including through
Canada's unprecedented investments in over-the-horizon radar, in submarines, in
aircraft and boots on the ground, boots on the ice.
Canada strongly opposes tariffs over Greenland and
calls for focused talks to achieve our shared objectives of security and
prosperity in the Arctic.
On plurilateral trade, we're championing efforts to
build a bridge between the Trans Pacific Partnership and the European Union,
which would create a new trading bloc of 1.5 billion people. On critical
minerals, we're forming buyers’ clubs anchored in the G7 so the world can
diversify away from concentrated supply. And on AI, we're cooperating with
like-minded democracies to ensure that we won't ultimately be forced to choose
between hegemons and hyper-scalers.
This is not naive multilateralism, nor is it relying
on their institutions. It's building coalitions that work – issues by issue,
with partners who share enough common ground to act together.
In some cases, this will be the vast majority of
nations.
What it's doing is creating a dense web of connections
across trade, investment, culture, on which we can draw for future challenges
and opportunities.
Middle powers must act together, because if we're not
at the table, we're on the menu.
But I'd also say that great powers, great powers can
afford for now to go it alone. They have the market size, the military capacity
and the leverage to dictate terms. Middle powers do not.
But when we only negotiate bilaterally with a hegemon,
we negotiate from weakness. We accept what's offered. We compete with each
other to be the most accommodating.
This is not sovereignty. It's the performance of
sovereignty while accepting subordination. In a world of great power rivalry,
the countries in between have a choice – compete with each other for favour, or
to combine to create a third path with impact.
We shouldn't allow the rise of hard power to blind us
to the fact that the power of legitimacy, integrity and rules will remain
strong, if we choose to wield them together – which brings me back to Havel.
What does it mean for middle powers to live the truth?
First, it means naming reality. Stop invoking
rules-based international order as though it still functions as advertised.
Call it what it is – a system of intensifying great power rivalry, where the
most powerful pursue their interests, using economic integration as coercion.
It means acting consistently, applying the same
standards to allies and rivals. When middle powers criticize economic
intimidation from one direction, but stay silent when it comes from another, we
are keeping the sign in the window.
It means building what we claim to believe in, rather
than waiting for the old order to be restored. It means creating institutions
and agreements that function as described. And it means reducing the leverage
that enables coercion – that's building a strong domestic economy. It should be
every government's immediate priority.
And diversification internationally is not just
economic prudence, it's a material foundation for honest foreign policy,
because countries earn the right to principled stands by reducing their
vulnerability to retaliation.
Canada has what the world wants. We are an energy
superpower. We hold vast reserves of critical minerals. We have the most
educated population in the world. Our pension funds are amongst the world's
largest and most sophisticated investors. In other words, we have capital,
talent… we also have a government with immense fiscal capacity to act
decisively. And we have the values to which many others aspire.
Canada is a pluralistic society that works. Our public
square is loud, diverse and free. Canadians remain committed to sustainability.
We are a stable and reliable partner in a world that is anything but.. A
partner that builds and values relationships for the long term.
And we have something else. We have a recognition of
what's happening and a determination to act accordingly. We understand that
this rupture calls for more than adaptation. It calls for honesty about the
world as it is.
We are taking the sign out of the window. We know the
old order is not coming back. We shouldn't mourn it. Nostalgia is not a
strategy, but we believe that from the fracture, we can build something bigger,
better, stronger, more just. This is the task of the middle powers, the
countries that have the most to lose from a world of fortresses and most to
gain from genuine cooperation.
The powerful have their power.
But we have something too – the capacity to stop
pretending, to name reality, to build our strength at home and to act together.
That is Canada's path. We choose it openly and
confidently, and it is a path wide open to any country willing to take it with
us. Thank you very much.
How is the role of NATO evolving? What are the main challenges facing the organization? Developments at the European Defence Agency and cooperation with NATO.
2026 – is NATO in danger of breaking up or becoming unreliable?
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/21/trump-framework-greenland-tariffs-threats
https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/21/politics/military-force-us-greenland-trump
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/un-anno-di-trump-loccidente-non-e-piu-lo-stesso-227784
https://time.com/7346819/can-trump-pull-united-states-out-of-nato-legal-experts/
https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/the-future-of-nato-is-in-doubt/sa4wgw6j1
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0lx7j1lrwro
Is there a European alternative to NATO?
https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/defending-europe-without-us-first-estimates-what-needed
2025 – should
the EU have a nuclear deterrent?
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2025/09/11/should-europe-develop-its-own-nuclear-deterrent/
https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-tusk-plan-train-poland-men-military-service-russia/
https://www.ifri.org/en/media-external-article/europe-thinks-unthinkable-nuclear-bomb
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Tw1GPjHvF8
https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/eu-must-step-nuclear-non-proliferation
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_sharing
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/global-nuclear-warhead-stockpiles-1945-2024/
How many Italian military personnel are
there in missions abroad and where are they?
L’Italia vanta infatti all’attivo più
di 40 missioni nel 2024, posizionandosi come primo contributore per le
operazioni dell’Ue, secondo contributore della Nato dopo gli Usa – quindi primo
tra gli europei – e primo tra i contributori occidentali alle missioni delle
Nazioni Unite.
Military personnel: NATO (5.170), ONU (2.764) e UE (742).
See also:
https://www.analisidifesa.it/2024/04/le-missioni-militari-italiane-allestero-nel-2024/
https://www.difesa.it/operazionimilitari/index/26771.html
https://www.geopop.it/quante-e-quali-sono-le-missioni-e-le-basi-militari-italiane-allestero/
Operazioni Militari - L'Italia è impegnata in 39 missioni e operazioni
internazionali, di cui 3 nazionali. Il contingente massimo autorizzato per le missioni
internazionali è di circa 13.800 unità, mentre l'impiego medio all'estero è di
circa 6.800 unità.
NATO
According
to SIPRI, NATO 32 members accounted for 55%
of total global military expenditures in 2024.
https://demilitarize.org.uk/soaring-global-military-spending-is-sidelining-the-sdgs/
In 2023 the then 31 NATO members accounted for $1341 billion in terms of defence
spending, equal to 55 per cent of the world’s military expenditure. https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2024/global-military-spending-surges-amid-war-rising-tensions-and-insecurity
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm
https://www.comitatoatlantico.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/NATOs-Future_fwl.pdf
https://ecfr.eu/publication/defending-europe-with-less-america/
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/759601/EPRS_BRI(2024)759601_EN.pdf
https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html
https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/files/checklist_en.pdf
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/index.htm
NATO
summit 2024
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/226799.htm
Washington summit 2024
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm
https://www.governo.it/it/node/26198
Prime Minister Meloni
https://theweek.com/russo-ukrainian-war/1025988/timeline-russia-ukraine-war
timeline
of war in Ukraine Feb 2022 to the present
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Russo-Ukrainian_war_(2022%E2%80%93present)
Look at the
latest news and decisions to keep up to date. For example:
https://www.aljazeera.com/tag/nato/
NATO and the
EU
https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/partnerships-and-cooperation/relations-with-the-european-union
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-nato-cooperation/
https://consilium-europa.libguides.com/EUNATOcooperation/NATOinfo
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_222986.htm
https://armedforces.eu/compare/country_NATO_vs_Russia
https://armedforces.eu/compare/country_European_Union_EU_vs_Russia
more
background
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm
https://eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue15/cover-story/pesco-more-than-just-projects
NATO's
New Strategic Concept 2022
https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/
https://www.osorin.it/uploads/model_4/.files/117_item_2.pdf?v=1664283035
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61397478
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/what-next-eu-security-and-defence-0_en
https://www.nato.int/ or https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm NATO-Russia
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_191254.htm?selectedLocale=en
NATO warning before the Russian invasion
and earlier https://www.nato.int/nato2030/ NATO
2030
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm operations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_NATO_operations
operations
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-the-us-failure-in-afghanistan-wont-break-nato/
withdrawal from Afghanistan
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/speciale-afghanistan-nato-ritirata-31386
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/02/01/nato-an-unexpected-driver-of-climate-action/index.html climate
action
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm funding
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074
defence spending
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/02/12/nato-countries-defense-spending-gdp-trump/
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074 the US and
its partners
NATO and the European Defence Agency
https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/eda-in-short
https://eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue26
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3McmcY-3d9I EU-NATO
Cooperation Mogherini 9 years ago
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jtrW6ivIuJA
EU-NATO Cooperation Borrell 5 years ago
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dfpqdygGV8
Greenland Kallas
However, ‘the European Union (EU) does not have a permanent military
command structure along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's
(NATO) Allied Command Operations (ACO).’
But https://www.eppgroup.eu/newsroom/europe-must-take-command
https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/802-the-four-challenges-facing-european-defence
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1480
This is perhaps the real point – https://www.visionofhumanity.org/europes-military-awakening-and-the-real-challenge-of-defence-integration/
https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/eu-space-strategy-security-and-defence_en
https://ip-quarterly.com/en/lost-space-europes-role-spatial-defense
world
military spending by country
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/military-spending-by-country
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_highest_military_expenditures
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/sep/14/nato-military-spending-emissions
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/urgently-needed-europeanized-nato-212357
EU military spending compared with Russia
https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2025/06/25/the-hague-summit-declaration
last NATO summit
https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/strengthening-natos-eastern-flank
NATO’s eastern flank
Enhanced Forward Presence
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhanced_Forward_Presence
https://lc.nato.int/operations/enhanced-forward-presence-efp
with map
https://www.max-security.com/resources/global-forecast/nato-future-strategy-2025/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PX4a6d3qNbU Mattarella visiting
the troops
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YnDNOMbu0bg
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ACNW-PMYuMY
Meloni
https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/operations-and-missions/nato-operations-and-missions
NATO Missions
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en#11929 EU Missions
US bases and NATO installations in Italy
https://militarybases.com/overseas/italy/
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/03/us-military-base-expansion-italy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:NATO_installations_in_Italy
https://rappnato.esteri.it/en/litalia-e-la-nato/
the US and Italy
NATO Funding – How it works. Read all
sections
https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/funding-nato
Cybersecurity cooperation
https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/cyber-defence
https://nextgendefense.com/nato-cyber-defense-center/
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-union-and-nato-hold-first-structured-dialogue-cyber-0_en
Lessons from Afghanistan?
https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/lessons-wests-long-war-afghanistan-35961
and Libya? https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/lessons-libya-how-not-intervene
NATO has
developed a ballistic missile defense system in Europe for the protection of NATO forces and the
populations of NATO member states.
https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/ballistic-missile-defence
https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/nato-integrated-air-and-missile-defence
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm
EUBAM
Libya supports the Libyan authorities in developing border management and
security at the country’s land, sea and air borders. As a civilian
crisis management mission with a capacity-building mandate, EUBAM
assists Libyan authorities at the strategic and operational levels. The
work is carried out through advising, training and mentoring
Libyan counterparts in strengthening the border services in accordance
with international standards and best practices, and by advising the
Libyan authorities on the development of a national Integrated
Border Management (IBM) strategy.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eubam-libya_en?s=327
The European
Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Irini (EUNAVFOR
MED IRINI) was launched on 31 March 2020
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Irini
Operation Sea Guardian is NATO’s maritime security
operation in the Mediterranean
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136233.htm
EUNAVFOR ASPIDES is an EU military operation
contributing to the protection of freedom of navigation, to safeguarding
maritime security, especially for merchant and commercial vessels in the Red
Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf under the EU Common Security and Defense
Policy (CSDP).
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eunavfor-aspides_en?s=410381
Operation Atalanta,
formally European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia,
is an ongoing counter-piracy military operation at sea off the Horn
of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean.
All of this should make us think carefully about what
kind of operations NATO and the EU are able or not able to carry out / are
willing or unwilling to carry out / should or should not carry out, and in what
circumstances and under what conditions they are likely to be successful.
See the Dropbox for the full text.