Introduction
It is usually argued, especially in terms of the Functionalist theory of international relations, that when there is a conflict it is better for the two sides to sit down and negotiate in order to seek a reasonable compromise, instead of simply continuing the conflict with all the economic and human costs that this may involve. At the same time a good argument can be made for saying that there may be some states or groups (terrorists, for example) with which it is basically wrong or dangerous to negotiate. Thus the question of if and when to negotiate with a perceived ‘enemy’ has been and will remain for the foreseeable future a key question in diplomacy.
It is usually argued, especially in terms of the Functionalist theory of international relations, that when there is a conflict it is better for the two sides to sit down and negotiate in order to seek a reasonable compromise, instead of simply continuing the conflict with all the economic and human costs that this may involve. At the same time a good argument can be made for saying that there may be some states or groups (terrorists, for example) with which it is basically wrong or dangerous to negotiate. Thus the question of if and when to negotiate with a perceived ‘enemy’ has been and will remain for the foreseeable future a key question in diplomacy.
After
9/11 the Bush administration decided to wage a ‘war on terror’
against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It also named North Korea, Iraq,
Iran and Syria as’ rogue states’ arguing that these states
supported terrorism and were not therefore reliable members of the
international community. It was generally unwilling to negotiate with
groups or states that it considered enemies. It claimed that it would
use US power if necessary to ‘export democracy’ through regime
change. This led to military intervention first in Afghanistan, then
in Iraq. However, at the same time the US seems to have made a deal
with Libya – no intervention in Libya in exchange for no further
support for terrorism. And later it opened a partial though temporary
dialogue with Syria, warning Syria of retribution if Syria tried to
destabilize post-Saddam Iraq.
With
the arrival of the Obama administration the US government said it was
open to dialogue with old enemies if the conditions were right. Then,
faced with the Arab spring, growing protests across the Arab world
and the fall of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, the Obama
administration decided to back this popular movement for change. This
meant breaking with Gaddafi
when
he repressed public protests and supporting military intervention ‘to
protect civilians’ and eventually regime change. The US and its
allies also believed that the Assad regime in Syria should step down
or be forced to step down after bloodily repressing public protest.
While many Arab and Muslim countries agreed, the international
community was divided on the question of continuing negotiations with
the regime. The UNSC was also divided on the question of more
forceful action, with Russia and China against US intervention
against Assad. All members supported UN attempts to negotiate a truce
as a precondition for negotiations between the government and the
rebels, but Western and Arab countries imposed sanctions on the
Syrian regime to try to discourage it from further acts of violence
and in the hope of bringing it down. The Syrian regime agreed to
dismantle its chemical arsenal under UN supervision. With the rise of
Islamic State Russia (actively backed by China) began intervention
in support of the Syrian regime and Russia even called for an
alliance with the US and its NATO allies. However, the US refused to
accept Assad as someone it was prepared to do a deal with and Russian
intervention has targeted the rebels as well as IS. Peace talks
between the Syrian government and the rebel leadership went on for
several years. Earlier efforts were followed in October
2015 by further
talks
in Vienna involving officials from the U.S., the EU,
Russia,
China and
various regional actors such as Saudi
Arabia,
Egypt,
Turkey and, for the first time Iran.
Peace talks with the rebel leadership continued in Astana,
Kazakhstan in
2017
Russia-backed
Syrian peace talks in Sochi in January
2018 and the 9th
round of the Astana Process
on Syrian peace
have so far failed to produce a settlement. The Trump administration
now intends to withdraw from Syria and accepts the reality of Assad's
hold on power. This effectively means that for the US Assad is now an
acceptable negotiating partner in the fight against radical Islamic
military and terrorist groups.
Meanwhile,
after months of negotiations in July 2015 Iran agreed to a deal on
its nuclear program with the P5+1
(the permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council–the
United
States,
the United
Kingdom,
Russia,
France,
and China
plus Germany)
plus the European
Union,
in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. However, the Trump
administration abandoned the
deal on May 12th
2018 because of Iran's
refusal to agree to new conditions.
In
Afghanistan the Trump administration is trying to open negotiations
with theTaliban.
In
June 2018 there was a summit meeting between President
Trump and North
Korean Supreme Leader Kim
Jong-un
in Singapore.
A further meeting took place in February 2019.
Given
all the ongoing arguments and negotiations with (and sanctions
imposed on, lifted or threatened against) North Korea, Syria, Iran,
Russia and Myanmar, identifying
if and when it is a good idea for an actor to negotiate with a state
or organization it considers an enemy is still a vital question for
both individual democratic states and the international community as
a whole.
Here are some of the factors that may influence the decision whether to negotiate or not, and some examples to think about, although you will no doubt be able to find for yourself more and better examples from current affairs and from history:
Here are some of the factors that may influence the decision whether to negotiate or not, and some examples to think about, although you will no doubt be able to find for yourself more and better examples from current affairs and from history:
1)
Is there some kind of believable/ feasible /viable/reasonable
compromise that could be reached?
Cuba
– after the rapprochement in December 2014 it seemed so, but there
was still a long way to
gohttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/18/us-cuba-relations-one-year-later-progress-report
and the Trump administration imposed new sanctions in November 2017, seeming once more intent on freezing relations between the 2 countries.
and the Trump administration imposed new sanctions in November 2017, seeming once more intent on freezing relations between the 2 countries.
Al
Qaeda and Islamic State –there seems no basis for a
negotiationColombia
and the FARC – a successful deal was negotiated in 2016 and FARC
which took part in the 2018 legislative
and presidential elections with a promise to fight poverty and
corruption but lost in both to conservative opponents.
In
2019 there remained one armed rebel group the ELN. In January 2019,
polls
show that 64% of Colombians wanted President Duque to resume
negotiations with the ELN, but the new government called off talks in
2018, leaving the future of the peace process uncertain.
2)
Can a temporary truce and release of prisoners be arranged to give a
positive start to negotiations? Can negotiations begin with a
moderate political interlocutor who can also act as a proxy for or
channel to a more radical group that we are not yet ready to
negotiate with directly? – Sinn Fein for the IRA in negotiating the
1998 Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland / Fatah for Hamas in
negotiations for a settlement with Israel? This is a way to start
things in the hope of broadening participation if progress is made
3)
Does the adversary have some legitimate grievances even though we do
not like their methods? – Hamas for the Palestinians / Russia in
the Ukraine?
4)
Do they have a leadership with whom to negotiate? Will their
followers accept the settlement the leadership negotiates? This was
part of Yasser
Arafat’s
problem at Oslo.
5)
Do they have widespread local support? (Brigate Rosse – no/ Hamas
–it seems so in Gaza.) And if they do, is not
negotiating
with them a dead end? – the Taliban in some areas, is it gaining
support again
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/heres-the-most-disturbing-thing-about-the-taliban-takeover-of-kunduz/
Is
it possible and desirable to negotiate with 'moderate' Taliban? Or is
this dangerous, a betrayal of princile or simply an illusion?The US
began high level talks with the Taliban in February 2019.
https://asiafoundation.org/2018/02/14/afghan-women-pessimistic-peace-talks-taliban/
6)
Does 'the enemy' have international support – Cuba in the past, and
Assad today, North Korea (from China) today?
7)
Time and timing – is this the right moment to negotiate? Is the
population in the area tired of the struggle? Is the enemy now ready
to negotiate? Attitudes in Northern Ireland, Ireland and Britain in
the 1990s / in France during the Algerian crisis. Has the struggle
changed? ETA is no longer faced with Franco but with democratic
Spain, has given up armed struggle and is now voting on its future
Cuba
is seen by many as no longer a Cold War threat, a centre from which
Communism can spread to the Americas. Or is the situation the same?
The Trump administration believes the Cuban government is still a
brutal regime. Has there been too much blood? Is there still too much
hatred and distrust? Israel and the Palestinians? In elections and
surveys both the Palestinians and Israelis say they want peace but
both sides seem intransigent and very unwilling to make any
concessions.
8)
Does the group have two wings, one radical and one more moderate? Can
the moderates be persuaded to start negotiations and abandon and
isolate the extremists – the Taliban?
9)
Are there outside sponsors for negotiations? – the UN, US, EU and
Russia and the moderate Arab states for negotiations between Israel
and the Palestinians
10)
Are these sponsors willing to offer money and other aid as an
incentive to negotiate? The UN, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states if
the Palestinians and Israelis reached a full and lasting settlement.
11)
Realpolitik – how desperate are we? Afghanistan? How much does each
side need an agreement? Can one side win without one? Does the
present situation cost too much in terms of lives or money, or damage
us in other ways? Should the Iraqi government include Sunni leaders
who were ex-Baath party members, Shiites who are ex-insurgents or
anti-US or more some of the radical Kurdish separatists? Should the
US and NATO accept a dialogue with Assad in Syria? Should the Afghan
government do a deal with some of the Taliban? Will the EU and NATO
be forced to accept Russia’s annexation of Crimea?
12)
Realpolitik – can we buy them out? North Korea and US-South Korean
aid to North Korea in the past in exchange for promises to halt its
nuclear program
13)
Realpolitik – Are there domestic reasons for negotiating or not
negotiating? Negotiations with North Vietnam and the Viet Cong
(National Liberation Front) in the late sixties and early seventies
and changing US public opinion on the Vietnam war / Russia’s
refusal to negotiate with Chechen rebel separatists because of the
fear that separatist hopes would spread from Chechnya to other
Caucasian republics (and the same for radical Islamist groups in the
area) /Turkey’s fears regarding Kurdish aspirations in Syria and
the effect of the creation of a Kudish state on the aspirations of
Kurds in Turkey itself and the consequences for its territorial
integrity
14)
Realpolitik – Is it better to use another approach? An embargo, an
invasion, political isolation, pressure from an intermediary – for
the latter, the US has often called on China to put pressure on its
ally, North Korea to negotiate.
15)
How weak are our allies? How much do they need peace to survive? The
government of Pakistan and negotiations with moderate Taliban?/ the
government of Iraq and possible negotiations with Sunni ex-Saddam
Hussein supporters and ex- al Qaeda supporters and other
non-government groups?
16)
How expensive for us is what they want (in economic or non-economic
terms)? What would happen if Islamist radicals were successful in the
Middle East and threatened to take control of the Gulf states and
Saudi Arabia? / Iran and nuclear weapons? / are the stakes too high
to back down and negotiate? September 1939.
17)
How final will the treaty be? In exchange for recognition of a fully
independent Palestinian state, Israel wants a lasting settlement that
guarantees security and means no more attacks and no more claims at a
later date. It doesn’t want a treaty with 60% of the Palestinians
on most but not all of the issues.
18)
Is the situation a kind of civil war? A fight to the death between
irreconcilable enemies? The Algerian government and Islamist rebels
in the past? / Syria today?
19)
Are there any really effective negotiators who can help? In Northern
Ireland, Senator Mitchell and Mo Mowlam
20)
Costs - Is the competition too expensive? The Soviet Union and the
US, SALT I and II and the oil crisis / the US and the Russian
Federation and START and New START? What now seems like the beginning
of a new arms race?
21)
Impasse – the need for coexistence / Israel and the Palestinians?/
the US and Soviet Union (Nixon and Kissinger) / the US and China
(Nixon and Kissinger)
22)
New opportunities, especially commercial ones – the US and Soviet
Union (Nixon and Kissinger) / the US and China (Nixon and Kissinger)
Conclusion
There may be space for negotiations with some groups or countries which are currently considered adversaries, but it requires a case by case approach, realism so as not to waste time where progress is not really likely or the counterpart is unreliable, but also real commitment once negotiations are opened (there were accusations of diplomatic inactivity in many areas during the Bush administration). Obama’s willingness to listen and offer dialogue was a first step and a necessary condition as regards both Cuba and Iran, but the sincerity of the interlocutor in the eyes of skeptics remains doubtful as is the commitment of the Trump administration. Progress needs to be monitored in terms of actions in line with the settlement reached or simply in line with the conditions set for opening negotiations. Finally, the possibility of meaningful negotiations depends only in part on the decision and determination of political leaders. It is often largely conditioned by public perception of the idea. This is true in an area of conflict but also in a democratic country. ETA renounced armed activity in 2011 but the Spanish government refused any dialogue with it at least partly in response to Spanish public opinion after years of terrorist attacks..
There may be space for negotiations with some groups or countries which are currently considered adversaries, but it requires a case by case approach, realism so as not to waste time where progress is not really likely or the counterpart is unreliable, but also real commitment once negotiations are opened (there were accusations of diplomatic inactivity in many areas during the Bush administration). Obama’s willingness to listen and offer dialogue was a first step and a necessary condition as regards both Cuba and Iran, but the sincerity of the interlocutor in the eyes of skeptics remains doubtful as is the commitment of the Trump administration. Progress needs to be monitored in terms of actions in line with the settlement reached or simply in line with the conditions set for opening negotiations. Finally, the possibility of meaningful negotiations depends only in part on the decision and determination of political leaders. It is often largely conditioned by public perception of the idea. This is true in an area of conflict but also in a democratic country. ETA renounced armed activity in 2011 but the Spanish government refused any dialogue with it at least partly in response to Spanish public opinion after years of terrorist attacks..
In
the case of ETA such dialogue no longer necessary.
However,
the same question about popular support for dialogue is perhaps the
key to any real hope for serious negotiations between the Israelis
and the Palestinians.
Good
background:
http://pon.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/images/posts/N0402Af2.pdf
Below, from page 91 onwards ‘Without Conditions’, but the other articles too:http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Prudent_Use_Full_Book.pdf
