Introduction
It is often argued that when there is in conflict it is better for the two sides to sit down and negotiate in order to seek a reasonable compromise, instead of simply continuing the conflict with all the economic and human costs that this may involve. At the same time a good argument can be made for saying that there may be some states or groups (terrorists, for example) with which it is basically wrong or dangerous to negotiate. Thus the question of if and when to negotiate with a perceived ‘enemy’ has been and will remain for the foreseeable future a key issue for diplomacy.
After 9/11 the Bush administration decided to wage a ‘war on terror’ against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It also named North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Syria as’ rogue states’ arguing that these states supported terrorism and were not therefore reliable members of the international community. It was generally unwilling to negotiate with groups or states that it considered enemies. It claimed that it would use US power if necessary to ‘export democracy’ through regime change. This led to military intervention first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq.
However, at the same time the US seemed to make a deal with Libya – no intervention in Libya in exchange for no further support for terrorism. And later it opened a partial though temporary dialogue with Syria, warning Syria of retribution if Syria tried to destabilize post-Saddam Iraq.
It is often argued that when there is in conflict it is better for the two sides to sit down and negotiate in order to seek a reasonable compromise, instead of simply continuing the conflict with all the economic and human costs that this may involve. At the same time a good argument can be made for saying that there may be some states or groups (terrorists, for example) with which it is basically wrong or dangerous to negotiate. Thus the question of if and when to negotiate with a perceived ‘enemy’ has been and will remain for the foreseeable future a key issue for diplomacy.
After 9/11 the Bush administration decided to wage a ‘war on terror’ against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It also named North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Syria as’ rogue states’ arguing that these states supported terrorism and were not therefore reliable members of the international community. It was generally unwilling to negotiate with groups or states that it considered enemies. It claimed that it would use US power if necessary to ‘export democracy’ through regime change. This led to military intervention first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq.
However, at the same time the US seemed to make a deal with Libya – no intervention in Libya in exchange for no further support for terrorism. And later it opened a partial though temporary dialogue with Syria, warning Syria of retribution if Syria tried to destabilize post-Saddam Iraq.
With
the arrival of the Obama administration the US government said it was
open to dialogue with old enemies if the conditions were right.
However, faced with the Arab spring, growing protests across the Arab
world and the fall of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, the Obama
administration decided to back this popular movement for change. This
meant breaking with Gaddafi
when
he repressed public protests and supporting military intervention ‘to
protect civilians’ and eventually regime change. The US and its
allies also believe that the Assad regime in Syria should step down
or be forced to step down after bloodily repressing public protest.
While many Arab and Muslim countries agree, the international
community is divided on the question of continuing negotiations with
the regime. The UNSC was also divided on the question of more
forceful action, with Russia and China against. All members supported
UN attempts to negotiate a truce as a precondition for negotiations
between the government and the rebels, but Western and Arab countries
imposed sanctions on the Syrian regime to try to discourage it from
further acts of violence and in the hope of bringing it down. The
Syrian regime agreed to dismantle its chemical arsenal under UN
supervision. With the rise of IS Russia and China now actively
support the Syrian regime and Russia has called for an alliance with
the US and its NATO allies. The US refuses to accept Assad as someone
it is prepared to do a deal with. Meanwhile, after months of
negotiations in July 2015 Iran agreed to a deal on its nuclear
program with the P5+1
(the permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council–the
United
States,
the United
Kingdom,
Russia,
France,
and China
plus Germany)
plus the European
Union,
in exchange for the lifting of sanctions.
Given
all the ongoing arguments and negotiations with (and sanctions
imposed on, lifted or threatened against) North Korea, Syria, Iran,
Russia and until recently Myanmar, identifying
if and when it is a good idea for an actor to negotiate with a state
or organization it considers an enemy is still a vital question for
both individual democratic states and the international community as
a whole.
Here are some of the factors that may influence the decision whether to negotiate or not, and some examples to think about, although you will no doubt be able to find for yourself more and better examples from current affairs and from history:
Here are some of the factors that may influence the decision whether to negotiate or not, and some examples to think about, although you will no doubt be able to find for yourself more and better examples from current affairs and from history:
1) Is
there some kind of believable/ feasible /viable/reasonable compromise
that could be reached?
Cuba
– since the rapprochement in December 2014 it seems so, but there
is still a long way to
gohttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/18/us-cuba-relations-one-year-later-progress-report
Al Qaeda and Islamic State –there seems no basis for a negotiation
Colombia and the FARC – a deal has been negotiated. Will it hold and be implemented successfully? http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/26/colombia-farc-peace-santos
http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/americas/2015/12/farc-rebels-days-colombian-jungle-151210205526133.html
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35357170
Al Qaeda and Islamic State –there seems no basis for a negotiation
Colombia and the FARC – a deal has been negotiated. Will it hold and be implemented successfully? http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/26/colombia-farc-peace-santos
http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/americas/2015/12/farc-rebels-days-colombian-jungle-151210205526133.html
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35357170
2) Can
a temporary truce and release of prisoners be arranged to give a
positive start to negotiations? Can negotiations begin with a
moderate political interlocutor who can also act as a proxy for or
channel to a more radical group that we are not yet ready to
negotiate with directly – Sinn Fein for the IRA in negotiating the
1998 Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland / Fatah for Hamas in
negotiations for a settlement with Israel? This is a way to start
things in the hope of broadening participation if progress is made
3) Does
the adversary have some legitimate grievances even though we don not
like their methods? – Hamas / Russia in the Ukraine?
4) Do
they have a leadership with whom to negotiate? Will their followers
accept the settlement the leadership negotiates? Yasser
Arafat’s
problem at Oslo.
5) Do
they have widespread local support? Is not negotiating with them a
dead end?
Brigate Rosse – no/ Hamas –it
seems so in Gaza / the Taliban –in some areas, is it gaining
support?
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/heres-the-most-disturbing-thing-about-the-taliban-takeover-of-kunduz/
6) Do
they have international support – Cuba in the past, and Assad
today, North Korea today?
7) Time
and timing – is this the right moment to negotiate? Is the
population in the area tired of the struggle? Is the enemy now ready
to negotiate? Attitudes in Northern Ireland, Ireland and Britain in
the 1990s / in France during the Algerian crisis. Has the struggle
changed? ETA is no longer fighting Franco but democratic Spain /Cuba
is no longer a Cold War threat, a centre from which Communism can
spread to the Americas. Or is the situation the same? Has there been
too much blood? Is there still too much hatred and distrust? Israel
and the Palestinians? In elections and surveys both the Palestinians
and Israelis say they want peace but both sides seem intransigent and
very unwilling to make any concessions.
8) Does
the group have two wings, radical and moderate? Can the moderates be
persuaded to start negotiations and abandon and isolate the
extremists – the Taliban?
9) Are
there outside sponsors for negotiations? – the UN, US, EU and
Russia and the moderate Arab states for negotiations between Israel
and the Palestinians
10)
Are these sponsors willing to offer money and other aid as an
incentive to negotiate? The UN, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states if
the Palestinians reached a settlement with Israel
11)
Realpolitik – how desperate are we? Afghanistan? How much do we
need an agreement? Can we win without one? Does the present situation
cost too much in terms of lives or money, or damage us in other ways?
Should the Iraqi government include Sunni leaders who were ex-Baath
party members, Shiites who are ex-insurgents or Kurdish separatists?
Should the US accept a dialogue with Assad? Should the Afghan
government do a deal with some of the Taliban? Will the EU and NATO
be forced to accept Russia’s annexation of Crimea?
12)
Realpolitik – can we buy them out? North Korea and US-South Korean
aid to North Korea in the past in exchange for promises to halt its
nuclear program
13)
Realpolitik – Are there domestic reasons for negotiating or not
negotiating? North Vietnam and the Viet Cong (National Liberation
Front) and changing US public opinion on the Vietnam war / Russia’s
refusal to negotiate with Chechen rebel separatists because of the
fear that separatist hopes will spread from Chechnya to other
Caucasian republics (and same for radical Islamist groups in the
area) /Turkey’s fears regarding the Kurds both in Syria and in
Turkey itself and the consequences for its territorial integrity
14)
Realpolitik – Is it better to use another approach? An embargo, an
invasion, political isolation, pressure from an intermediary – for
the latter, the US has often asked China to put pressure on its ally,
North Korea
15)
How weak are our allies? How much do they need peace to survive? The
government of Pakistan and negotiations with moderate Taliban?/ the
government of Iraq and possible negotiations with Sunni ex-Saddam
Hussein supporters and ex- al Qaeda supporters and other
non-government groups?
16)
How expensive for us is what they want (in economic or non-economic
terms)? What would happen if Islamist radicals were successful and
threatened to take control of the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia / Iran
and nuclear power / are the stakes too high to back down and
negotiate? September 1939
17)
How final will the treaty be? Israel wants a lasting settlement that
guarantees security and means no more attacks and no more claims at a
later date. It doesn’t want a treaty with 60% of the Palestinians
on most but not all of the issues
18)
Is the situation a kind of civil war? A fight to the death between
irreconcilable enemies? The Algerian government and Islamist rebels
in the past? / Syria today?
19)
Are there any really effective negotiators who can help? In Northern
Ireland, Senator Mitchell and Mo Mowlam
20)
Costs - Is competition too expensive? The Soviet Union and the US,
SALT I and II and the oil crisis / the US and the Russian Federation
and START and New START?
21)
Impasse – the need for coexistence / Israel and the Palestinians?/
the US and Soviet Union (Nixon and Kissinger) / the US and
China (Nixon and Kissinger)
22)
New opportunities, especially commercial ones – the US and Soviet
Union (Nixon and Kissinger) / the US and China (Nixon and
Kissinger)
Conclusion
There may be space for negotiations with some groups or countries which are currently considered adversaries, but it requires a case by case approach, realism so as not to waste time where progress is not really likely or the counterpart is unreliable, but also real commitment once negotiations are opened (there were accusations of diplomatic inactivity in many areas during the Bush administration). Obama’s willingness to listen and offer dialogue has been a first step and a necessary condition as regards both Cuba and Iran, but the sincerity of the interlocutor in the eyes of skeptics remains doubtful. So progress needs to be monitored in terms of actions in line with the settlement reached or simply in line with the conditions set for opening negotiations. Finally, the possibility of meaningful negotiations depends only in part on the decision and determination of political leaders. It is largely conditioned by public perception of the idea particularly in a democratic country. ETA renounced armed activity in 2011but the Spanish government refuses any dialogue with it, Would negotiations with ETA be acceptable to the Spanish public today? Are they no longer necessary? The same question about popular support for dialogue is perhaps the key to any real hope for serious negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians.http://pon.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/images/posts/N0402Af2.pdf
Below, from page 2 onwards ‘Without Conditions’, but the other articles too:http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Prudent_Use_Full_Book.pdf
There may be space for negotiations with some groups or countries which are currently considered adversaries, but it requires a case by case approach, realism so as not to waste time where progress is not really likely or the counterpart is unreliable, but also real commitment once negotiations are opened (there were accusations of diplomatic inactivity in many areas during the Bush administration). Obama’s willingness to listen and offer dialogue has been a first step and a necessary condition as regards both Cuba and Iran, but the sincerity of the interlocutor in the eyes of skeptics remains doubtful. So progress needs to be monitored in terms of actions in line with the settlement reached or simply in line with the conditions set for opening negotiations. Finally, the possibility of meaningful negotiations depends only in part on the decision and determination of political leaders. It is largely conditioned by public perception of the idea particularly in a democratic country. ETA renounced armed activity in 2011but the Spanish government refuses any dialogue with it, Would negotiations with ETA be acceptable to the Spanish public today? Are they no longer necessary? The same question about popular support for dialogue is perhaps the key to any real hope for serious negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians.http://pon.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/images/posts/N0402Af2.pdf
Below, from page 2 onwards ‘Without Conditions’, but the other articles too:http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Prudent_Use_Full_Book.pdf
