How is the role
of NATO evolving? What are the main challenges facing the organization? Outline
developments at the European Defence Agency and cooperation with NATO.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/759601/EPRS_BRI(2024)759601_EN.pdf
https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html
https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/files/checklist_en.pdf
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/index.htm
Look at the latest news and decisions to keep up to date. For example:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/index.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_222986.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_220118.htm
https://bestdiplomats.org/nato-vs-russia-military-comparison/
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm
https://eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue15/cover-story/pesco-more-than-just-projects
NATO's
New Strategic Concept 2022
https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/
https://www.osorin.it/uploads/model_4/.files/117_item_2.pdf?v=1664283035
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61397478
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/what-next-eu-security-and-defence-0_en
https://www.nato.int/ or https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm NATO-Russia
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_191254.htm?selectedLocale=en
NATO-Russia
https://www.nato.int/nato2030/
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm operations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_NATO_operations
operations
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-the-us-failure-in-afghanistan-wont-break-nato/
withdrawal from Afghanistan
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/speciale-afghanistan-nato-ritirata-31386
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/02/01/nato-an-unexpected-driver-of-climate-action/index.html climate
action
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm funding
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/02/12/nato-countries-defense-spending-gdp-trump/
defence spending
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074 the US and
its partners
NATO and the
European Defence Agency
https://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0053_defense-comparison
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3McmcY-3d9I EU-NATO Cooperation
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jtrW6ivIuJA
EU-NATO
Cooperation
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm
EU-NATO Cooperation
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/military-spending-by-country
world military spending by country
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm
summit communiqué
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm
Enhanced Forward Presence
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhanced_Forward_Presence
https://lc.nato.int/operations/enhanced-forward-presence-efp
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PX4a6d3qNbU Mattarella visiting
the troops
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YnDNOMbu0bg
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en#11929 EU Missions
US
bases and NATO installations in Italy
https://militarybases.com/overseas/italy/
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/03/us-military-base-expansion-italy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:NATO_installations_in_Italy
NATO
Funding – How it works. Read all sections
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm
Lessons
from Afghanistan?
https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/lessons-wests-long-war-afghanistan-35961
and Libya? https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/lessons-libya-how-not-intervene
Some Background
https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2020/11/12/great-optimism-eu-and-nato-brussels-looks-biden
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/27/biden-win-macron-independent-europe/
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-germany-usa-defence-idUKKBN2800QS
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/biden-e-la-nato-ricucire-gli-strappi-28081
https://formiche.net/2020/11/esteri-nato-europa-stoltenberg/
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html
https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/nato-stato-morte-cerebrale-ambizioni-macron-francia-e-ue-ACDUwQx
https://www.france24.com/en/20191107-macron-claims-nato-is-suffering-brain-death
You should also read the Lisbon Declaration of November 2010
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease
the Chicago Declaration of May 2012
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease
the Wales summit Declarations of September 2014
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112517.htm
The Warsaw summit Communiqué of July 2016 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Warsaw_summit
The Brussels summit of May 2017 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Brussels_summit
The Brussels summit of July 2018 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Brussels_summit
London summit December 2019: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm
https://bianet.org/english/world/216686-nato-releases-final-declaration-of-london-summit
The Brussels summit of June 2021 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm
The Madrid summit of June 2022
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_196144.htm
and then
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50651695 Trump https://thedefensepost.com/2019/12/04/nato-joint-statement-london/ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50653597
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forze_armate_dell%27Unione_europea
http://www.adnkronos.com/fatti/esteri/2017/09/03/nato-apre-hub-napoli-per-sud_k0JzpzCvEqdnpu1Dqo271N.html NATO’s Naples’ hub
More on developments
regarding the European Defence Agency and NATO
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/430/Military%20and%20civilian%20missions%20and%20operations EU missions and operations https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_and_civilian_missions_of_the_European_Union EU missions and operations
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SpS4TIdAQ9k https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DnT-gCypgNo
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaEGS5muCSA
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uj385Rq_66I
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3McmcY-3d9I
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bs8xXf-2PBY https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/security/20190612STO54310/eu-army-myth-what-is-europe-really-doing-to-boost-defence https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/07/16/strengthening-eu-nato-relations/index.html https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/28286/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheet_en https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_a_new_beginning_for_european_defence https://www.eda.europa.eu/ https://www.eda.europa.eu/aboutus/who-we-are/member-states https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_and_civilian_missions_of_the_European_Union https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_41_EU_military_operations.pdf https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/permanent-structured-cooperation-(pesco) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_Structured_Cooperation#Participating_armed_forces https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_Structured_Cooperation#Neutral_states https://ec.europa.eu/ireland/news/key-eu-policy-areas/permanent-structured-cooperation-on-security-and-defence_en https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ZYOUM7GbSA https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/eu-defence-co-operation-is-no-threat-to-irish-neutrality-1.3343293 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=99AkjuMgaB4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebvJ9OzMRjY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dh8EKNZ8O7Y http://defencesummit.eu/ https://warsawinstitute.org/finnish-ministry-national-defence-sceptical-european-army/ http://tahdistolehti.fi/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-new-beginning-increased-cooperation-eu-defence/
https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2018/12/12/gismo-s-geohub-aims-at-full-operational-capability-by-early-2019 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/05/defence-cooperation-council-adopts-conclusions-on-eu-nato-cooperation-endorsing-common-set-of-new-proposals-for-further-joint-work/
and then really as much as you have time to read https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/28286/EU-NATO%20cooperation%20-%20Factsheet
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2018)625109 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_nato_factsheet_16-06-2017_0.pdf https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2017/03/27/nato-deputy-secretary-general-rose-gottemoeller-visits-eda https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_138829.htm https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/15449/Mogherini:%20%22EU-Nato%20cooperation%20crucial%20for%20the%20continent%22 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/search/site/european%20defence_en http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/19/eu-nato-cooperation/# https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2017-11/2017%20-%20163%20DSCTC%2017%20E%20rev%201%20fin%20-%20EU%20AND%20NATO%20COOPERATION%20-%20MESTERHAZY%20REPORT.pdf https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_49217.htm https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160630_1607-factsheet-nato-eu-en.pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_operations_of_the_European_Union http://piracy-studies.org/beyond-rivalry-eu-nato-cooperation-in-counter-piracy-operations/ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/595855/EPRS_BRI(2016)595855_EN.pdf https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36195/most-important-moment-european-defence-decades-mogherini_fr
http://www.adnkronos.com/aki-en/security/2017/11/10/pinotti-backs-more-integrated-european-defence_ctDIgGhps1J3p37WCRwlmL.html http://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/future-eu-defence-european-space-data-and-cyber-agency https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/34226/Permanent%20Structured%20Cooperation%20(PESCO)%20-%20Factsheet https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/defence-security-timeline/# http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1516_en.htm http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/22-euco-security-defence/ http://www.newsweek.com/eu-defense-fund-tackle-russia-military-trump-nato-622648 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40217085 http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/07/eu-prepares-a-defense-union-that-could-alleviate-not-aggravate-trumps-concerns-on-nato.html http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari1-2017-keohane-threes-company-france-germany-uk-european-defence-post-brexit
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4385_en.htm
and plans for the European Border and Coast Guard https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/fact-sheets/docs/a_european_border_and_coast_guard_en.pdf
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-5715_en.htm https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Border_and_Coast_Guard_Agency
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Risk_Analysis_for_2019_0.pdf
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/11/08/european-border-and-coast-guard-council-adopts-revised-regulation/
NATOnotes and history:
The current NATO
Secretary General is Jens Stoltenberg, former PM of Norway.
Read this information carefully, as necessary background, take notes on what
you think you can use. You won’t need everything.
e.g. North Atlantic Treaty Organization or North Atlantic Alliance – formed
April 1949 – at present 30 members (Montenegro joined in June 2017 and North Macedonia in
March 2020) – HQ Brussels, Belgium (with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE) in
Mons, Belgium, the central command of NATO military forces).
The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, famously
stated the organization's goal was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down"
(Do not quote this at the Concorso!!).
NATO was created at the start of the Cold War as an alliance among
states sharing core democratic values, and was a way to extend the US
commitment to the stability and defense of Western and Southern Europe (resulting
from WWII) indefinitely. Its principal objective was to deter (hence 'deterrence')
a Soviet invasion or interference in the area. This was based on article 5 of
the treaty, under which members are committed to come to the aid and defense of
any member state which is attacked by a non-member (i.e. Russia). This was
achieved by the deployment of US and allied forces throughout Europe in such a
way that the invasion of a NATO member would automatically involve the forces
of the US and other countries, thus committing them to action. Conventional
Russian forces were always superior to those of the Alliance, so the ultimate
deterrence was provided by US (and later British and French) nuclear weapons.
In the event of a conflict NATO conventional forces were there to gain time for
diplomacy before using nuclear weapons. In response the Soviet Union created
the Warsaw Pact with its Eastern European allies in May 1955 (after West
Germany joined NATO). NATO never had to go to war, and was thus successful in fulfilling
its main objective of deterring Russia.
With the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union
(1989-1992), NATO seemed to have lost its historic reason for existing. The US
and its NATO allies reduced the size of their forces in Europe and then there was
an intense debate about what, if any, NATO’s role could and should now be in
world affairs. The Lisbon declaration (Nov. 2010) seemed to provide some clear
indications regarding the direction in which NATO was moving. However, it also
raised certain questions and left some unanswered. With the events of 2008 in
Georgia and, above all, of 2014 in Ukraine there was a rise in tensions with
Russia, a decline in cooperation between Russia and NATO and fears that we were
returning, if not to the Cold War, at least to an adversarial relationship
rather than one based on working together. Given this scenario, NATO now seems
to have returned to its original purpose of guaranteeing its members’
(particularly its Eastern European members’) sovereignty and independence.
President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-range
Nuclear Forces treaty added to tensions and raised fears of a new nuclear arms
race.
(see also the dispute since 1992 between Moldova and Russia over Transnistria)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria
There were also concerns in Europe that President Trump might decide to
withdraw the US from NATO, which would have meant the death of the
organization, or simply reduce the US role within it in a more isolationist
approach, leaving its European allies to face threats on their own. This led
the EU to look more to its own defence but also to welcome Biden’s election.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_from_NATO#United_States_of_America
Main points:
1) After the end of the Cold War the US
reduced its forces in Europe and shifted a significant proportion of what
remained southwards. NATO reduced its heavy conventional forces and European
armies based largely on military service in favor of smaller, more professional
and much more high-tech (smart) forces with ‘out of area’ (outside Europe)
capabilities (including logistical support). This process has continued with
more attention paid to cost effectiveness and greater integration of different
national forces and weapons systems. However, these goals are difficult to
achieve.
2) NATO’s Strategic Concept after 2010 was
based on the idea of intervention in crisis management and security questions
beyond NATO’s borders (‘out of area’ operations beyond Europe, the area NATO
was originally created to defend) and in cooperation with other countries and
regional organizations (ISAF in Afghanistan was NATO-led but included forces
from other countries). This idea had gradually evolved since the early 1990s
with NATO’s intervention in the Balkans (in 1993 against Serbia, and in 1999 in
Kosovo). After 9/11 NATO invoked article 5 for the first time and sent the ISAF
to Afghanistan in 2001 under a UN mandate (the first major ‘out of area’
operation) and later also became involved in training Iraqi forces to take over
responsibility for security. Since August 2009 it has conducted operation Ocean
Shield against piracy off the Horn of (North-East) Africa. It launched an
operation to protect Libyan civilians from the Gaddafi regime in March-October
2011 which led to the fall of the regime, and is now involved in a security
operation (Sea Guardian) in the Mediterranean. As a result of the 9/11
terrorist attack, and the threat of further terrorist attacks there is now also
intensified cooperation between the security services and police forces of NATO
members, and between them and other countries facing the same threat. The
organization also created a NATO Response Force (NRF) to make it easier for
NATO to provide a rapid response to a crisis before the deployment of heavier
forces.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Response_Force
However, after the failure
of the operation in Afghanistan, the US and its NATO partners may be less
willing to engage in ‘out-of-area’ operations.
See the New Strategic
Concept 2022
https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/
3) NATO began to see its role less in
strictly military terms and more and more in terms of cooperating with the UN,
the EU, other international or regional organizations, and other countries
(whether democratic like Brazil, Japan and Australia or less democratic, or not
at all but stable, like China) on a range of issues considered threats to NATO
members’ security, e.g. terrorism, international crime and trafficking,
prevention of the proliferation of nuclear arms, piracy, cyberattacks, climate
change and environmental degradation and crisis management (intervention to
stabilize failed states and prevent escalating local crises).See the Lisbon
Summit Declaration November 2010
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease
and the Chicago Summit Declaration (May
2012)
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease
but again, as we have seen,
Ukraine has changed the focus back to military defence.
4) In the years following the disintegration of
the Soviet bloc, many former Soviet satellite states joined NATO and the EU
which expanded to the East (German unification in 1990 This meant NATO
membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, for the Baltic
states, Rumania, Bulgaria and Slovakia in 2004, for Albania and Croatia in
2009, Montenegro 2017, North Macedonia 2020). The remaining Balkan states will
probably join NATO soon (As of 2021, NATO officially recognizes only four
aspiring members: Bosnia and Herzegovina in the
Balkans,
Georgia and Ukraine (where any rapid progress still seems unlikely because
of Russian opposition) and Sweden,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO
For Eastern European countries this move was mainly a guarantee of
continued independence from Russia. However, this has been seen by Russia as
aggressive and a way to reduce Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Russia
made clear its opposition to Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia joining NATO or the
EU. Georgia has been promised NATO membership at an unspecified date in the
future but Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008, in support of the
breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, was the first real sign of
the dangers raised by the question of further NATO/EU expansion to the East. In
fact, Russia’s opposition to Georgia joining NATO seems to have blocked further
progress.
However, it is the evolution of events in Ukraine which have really
thrown into question all certainties about relations with the Russian
Federation. Ukraine also expressed interest in NATO membership in 2008, but
later adopted a position of neutrality in 2010 probably because of Russia’s
opposition. A decision in November 2013 by Ukraine's President Viktor
Yanukovych to pull out of an association deal with the European Union sparked
huge street protests that eventually led to his downfall in February 2014. In
March Russia reacted by annexing the Ukrainian region of Crimea after the
Crimean parliament declared independence from Ukraine, and unrest began growing
in eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russian sentiment is strong. The US and NATO
denounced the Russian move as illegal and its support for the separatist
insurgencies in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions since 2014 as aggressively
expansionist. Following Russia’s support for the separatists in 2014, the
Ukrainian government launched a military counter-offensive against the
insurgents, which resulted in the ongoing War in Donbass. After parliamentary elections
in October 2014, the new Ukraine government made joining NATO a
priority. In December 2014, the Ukrainian parliament renounced Ukraine's non-aligned status that had
“proved to be ineffective in guaranteeing Ukraine's security and protecting the
country from external aggression and pressure”. Russia obviously opposes this.
Russia has continued to argue that it sees NATO and the EU’s expansion to the
East over the last 20 years as far more aggressive than its own response to
protect Russian minorities and that this expansion is a violation of a promise
made in 1990 that in exchange for Russian agreement to German reunification
NATO agreed not to expand towards the East. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation
NATO's growing concern and its evolving strategy to respond to Russia's moves
can be seen in
The Wales Summit Declaration Sept 2014 (paragraphs 16-31)
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm
the Warsaw Declaration on
Transatlantic Security July 2016
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133168.htm
and in detail in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué July
2016 (paragraphs 9-24)
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm
EU response
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/
NATO response
See the links at the start
of this post for a summary of current tensions with Russia over Ukraine and
NATO’s official stance.
With the situation in Georgia, the conflict in Ukraine and the resulting
sanctions, as well as Russia’s growing assertiveness in international relations
(e.g. Syria) new questions were raised about the poor prospects for rebuilding
good future relations between the European
Union, NATO and the West in general and the Russian Federation. With
Russian minorities in other Eastern European and Baltic NATO and EU members
(and also in Moldova), NATO decided in March 2015 to strengthen its Baltic Air Policing mission and
presence in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea area. It has also conducted joint
military exercises with Ukraine but has avoided overt military involvement in
both Ukraine and Georgia, not wanting a direct confrontation with Russia and
the risk of a complete breakdown in relations. Although they are not NATO
members, Ukraine and Georgia began participating in the NATO Response Force (NRF),
respectively, in 2014 and 2015.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315.html
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315-2.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014%E2%80%9315_Russian_military_intervention_in_Ukraine
At the NATO summit in Wales on 4th and 5th September
2014, the military alliance finalized plans for its new spearhead NATO Response
Force (a rapid deployment force of 4,000
soldiers able go into action in 48 hours) as a response to growing concern
about the Ukraine crisis and the rise of Islamic State militants. Despite calls
from eastern European members (Poland and the Baltic states), NATO did not
approve the proposal to create new permanent bases in these member states.
Germany in particular wished to avoid further antagonizing Russia by such an
action. President Obama, however, assured them of NATO and US commitment to
their protection (see below for the change of policy at the Warsaw Summit) NATO
also confirmed the suspension (April 2014) of its partnership for civilian and
military cooperation with Russia and offered support for Ukraine’s plans to
strengthen its military capacity.
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/05/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/index.html
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/02/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/
http://www.voanews.com/content/eastern-ukraine-ceasefire/2440781.html
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/16/ukraine-votes-more-power-separatist-east
President Putin defended Russia’s annexation of Crimea by saying that
Washington and its European allies were guided by “the rule of the gun” rather
than international law and respect for the principle of state sovereignty. In
March 2014 Washington put military cooperation with Russia on hold and ended
negotiations on the NATO missile defense program. It also banned the export to
Russia of technology with potential military applications, suspended
cooperation on civilian nuclear energy projects and cut off NASA’s contacts
with its Russian counterparts. Russia, meanwhile, made a resolution of the
impasse over NATO’s missile defense system a precondition for further strategic
arms control talks. It formed the Eurasian Economic Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan in May in
2014 and Armenia and Kyrgyzstan became full members in 2015. The Eurasian
Economic Union has an integrated single
market of 183 million people and a gross
domestic product of over 4 trillion US dollars
(PPP). All EAEU member states participate in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, an
intergovernmental mutual defense alliance. Some Russian commentators even argue
that its authoritarian model is a viable alternative to Western liberal
democracy and one which will gain support in the Caucasus and Central Asia,
where some Western ideas are seen as going against tradition and religion.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurasian_Economic_Union
At the 2016 Warsaw summit NATO reversed its position on deploying forces
to Russia's borders. NATO agreed to deploy military
forces to the Baltic states and eastern Poland from January 2017 to deter
Russia, a response to Moscow's 2014 seizure of Crimea from Ukraine. The four
battalions totaling between 3,000 and 4,000 troops would be led by Britain in
Estonia, the United States in Poland, Canada in Latvia and Germany in
Lithuania. This has been called by various names, Operation Reassurance,
Operation Deterrence and now NATO's Enhanced
Forward Presence. There is also the
Enhanced NATO Response Force, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and the Multinational Division South – East
in Romania. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhanced_Forward_Presence https://kariuomene.kam.lt/en/e_f_p.html
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_09/20180903_180905-MAP-eFP-eng.pdf
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170316_170316-def-det-map.pdf
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-decisions-factbox-idUSKCN0ZP0MX
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/nato-deploys-troops-poland-russian-border-170413213541667.html
https://euobserver.com/foreign/135681
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad/nato-ee.page
https://www.voanews.com/a/nato-summit-shows-shift-from-reassurance-to-deterrence/3409096.html
further NATO and EU response to Ukraine
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46425777
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_160789.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156623.htm
http://nato.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-nato/Partnership
https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_25457.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93European_Union_Association_Agreement
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/11/ukraine-association-agreement/
5) NATO and the EU continue to
want and need to stabilize and improve relations with Russia. There was extensive
practical cooperation in many fields prior to 2022. How far is each side
willing to make concessions to return to this cooperation? And how far have the
events and growing tensions in Eastern Europe put all future cooperation at
risk?
a) NATO has developed a ballistic missile defense system in Europe
for the protection of NATO forces and the populations of NATO member states.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm
This is supposedly intended to deal with a threat from a country like
Iran, accused of wanting to develop nuclear weapons, or against terrorists (!),
but has been consistently opposed by the Russians as potentially aimed at them.
In Lisbon NATO relaunched the idea, offering to work with Russia on this
project. The immediate Russian response at the Lisbon summit in November 2010
(NATO Russia Council) was positive providing that the cooperation offered by
NATO meant Russia’s real integration into a system of shared defense against
third parties (e.g. Iran). Russia was not willing to accept a system based in
Eastern European NATO member states from which it would only receive
information and intelligence as a courtesy. The implication from the Russian
point of view is that it could still be used against Russia. In fact,
NATO rejected the idea of Russia’s participation in the control arrangements
for the missile defense system and Russia has deployed missiles to Kaliningrad and other sections of its borders with
NATO.
During its 2012
Chicago Summit NATO leaders declared that the
ballistic missile defense system had reached ‘interim’ capability. For what
this means see the link to the Wikipedia notes on the Chicago summit. It seems
to involve installations in the Czech Republic, Poland and the Black Sea region
(Turkey and Romania) as well as submarine-based missiles. The project is
ongoing.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_missile_defence_system
http://www.rt.com/news/246709-nato-missile-shield-iran/
At
its 2016 Warsaw summit NATO took command of the U.S.-built missile shield in
Europe to defend against ballistic missiles from Iran.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-decisions-factbox-idUSKCN0ZP0MX
latest: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm
https://ac.nato.int/page8021748
b) NATO and the US have frequently reaffirmed their commitment to
nuclear non-proliferation, and continuing large-scale reductions in nuclear
armaments and missile delivery systems initiated with the START I treaty (July
1991) and continued in START II (Jan 1993) and SORT (May 2002). In fact,
further reductions were agreed in negotiations between the US and Russia that
led to the New START treaty which came into force in February 2011 and replaced
the START II and SORT treaties. Some commentators suggest that it seems
slightly contradictory to launch a project for missile defense (point 5a) while
supporting arms reductions. Others argue that it is simply a question of
realism, and that NATO’s first priority must be its founding purpose,
collective security.
Russia for several years made a resolution of the impasse over NATO’s
missile defense system a precondition to further strategic arms control talks.
Shortly before its expiry in February 2021, the US and Russia agreed to extend
the New Start Treaty for 5 years and engage in new talks on nuclear arms
control.
https://www.state.gov/new-start/
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-03/news/us-russia-extend-new-start-five-years
There is still a danger that with the gradual evolution of nuclear and
missile technology much of the impressive progress made on nuclear arms
reductions could unravel unless negotiations are relaunched soon. At the same
time in the US there are doubts about whether Russia has respected its New START
commitments to arms reductions. This is what led President Trump to announce
the US withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty, with
some commentators saying there is a danger of a new nuclear arms race. Some experts argue that with the increased reliance on IT
systems in nuclear defence systems, the catastrophic risks of a computer error
or computer-related human error are leading us towards the nightmare scenario
of Dr Strangelove. In November 2023 Moscow revoked its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) after also confirming its withdrawal (June 2023) from
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which was intended to turn
the page on the Cold War. The US and NATo then sospende their obligations under
the latter Treaty.
https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2023-11/nuclear-disarmament-monitor
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/trump-us-nuclear-arms-treaty-russiahttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-17511816http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7674962/US-has-more-than-5000-nuclear-warheads.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_with_nuclear_weapons http://www.mapsofworld.com/world-top-ten/world-top-ten-countries-by-nuclear-warheads-map.html
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-future-of-u-s-russian-arms-control/ http://www.nipp.org/2016/06/21/schneider-mark-russias-growing-strategic-nuclear-forces-and-new-start-treaty-compliance/
Unresolved Questions for NATO:
1) The
decision-making process. The existing system depends on consensus and agreement
at all levels, without formal voting. There is an unwritten rule that a country
(or countries) which is not in agreement with the other members on an issue
remains silent (e.g. Greece and the NATO intervention in the Balkans) and
simply does not participate in the operation. However, as the organization
grows, like the EU, it will probably need to modify this decision-making
process. Can this be done without damaging NATO’s effectiveness? What seems
likely to happen is that NATO actions may be authorized by all or most members
but not undertaken by all the 30 members. In addition, there may be space for
small groups of NATO allies to undertake operations that have first been
discussed with the other members. In practice this is want happened in Libya,
although the US criticized the lack of participation by the NATO members which
had authorized the mission.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm
2) Relations with Russia – at the start of
the 21st century, despite a clear commitment from both NATO and
Russia to warmer relations and closer cooperation it was not clear what this
meant in practice, or if they were thinking along the same lines. Russia seemed
to believe that without formally joining NATO it should have the right to share
in NATO decisions (and block those it did not like) and also to take part fully
in NATO’s military/technological programs. NATO seemed to think that
cooperation simply meant keeping Russia informed and providing it with any
information NATO gets regarding possible threats to Russia. While Russia is a
vital partner from the point of view of global security and within
international decision-making bodies (and in economic terms), most NATO
members, particularly those in Eastern Europe no longer believe Russia really
shares NATO’s core democratic beliefs, and have doubts about how far Russia can
be trusted. Events in Ukraine have only strengthened this point of view and
cooperation with Russia seems dead for the moment, in favour of cooperation
against Russia. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/10/world/europe/russia-eu-nato.html
However, terrorist attacks like those in Paris on November 13th
2015 will continue to require some cooperation between Russia and the West in a
coordinated effort to defeat Islamic extremists. So, for the moment, how this
relationship will develop is unclear. This document puts NATO's position very
clearly:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm
a) The proposed NATO missile defense
system – this is a good example of the above. How exactly could Russia ever be
persuaded to cooperate with, or simply accept this project? Since Russia is not
being offered access to the technology and a right to participate fully in any
decisions, it is likely to remain hostile to the project.
b) NATO membership for Georgia, Ukraine
and the Balkan states – NATO believes these states have the right to join.
Russia sees this as an aggressive expansion by NATO into Russia’s ‘near abroad’
and is against more of its neighbors joining NATO. It seems ready to actively
protect what it sees as Russia’s interests and ethnic Russian minorities (the
war with Georgia and support for separatists in Ukraine and in 2022 the Russian
invasion). This seems to make progress on expanding NATO and EU membership
beyond candidate status for both Georgia and Ukraine a risky process.
c) Russia and the US are both aware that
further progress on arms reductions depends not only on agreement on the
ballistic missile defense system. Russia argues that the US must be committed
to working with, and not against, Russia for real progress to be made and
progress on an agreement on NATO’s missile defense system is now a factor if no
longer a precondition for nuclear arms reduction talks. The US withdrawal from
the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty raised
the danger of a new nuclear arms race.
d) Enhanced Forward Presence is a NATO deployment in
Europe aimed at countering possible Russian expansionism in response to events
in Georgia and Ukraine.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm
https://kariuomene.kam.lt/en/e_f_p.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PX4a6d3qNbU
3) What happens after NATO’s failure in
Afghanistan? Will the US and/or its NATO partners be willing to engage in
future out-of-area operations?
https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-fall-of-the-afghan-government-and-what-it-means-for-europe/
Has the outcome, and the enormous cost of the operation, damaged NATO’s
reputation and confidence so much that it will be unable or unwilling to
undertake other operations outside Europe? Will this be the end of NATO’s
commitment to proactive crisis management around the world? Or will it mean a
return to a much more traditional defensive role limited to the European area?
The NATO operation in Libya, which initially was seen as a success, led to
internal chaos, faction-fighting and the growing presence of Islamic State and
other radical groups in the area. Again, this may have reduced the willingness
of NATO members to take part in similar operations in the future.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm
https://www.routledge.com/The-EU-NATO-and-the-Libya-Conflict-Anatomy-of-a-Failure/Marcuzzi/p/book/9780367545512
Is the EU
facing a similar risk in its members’ interventions in Mali, Niger and the
Sahel?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Capacity_Building_Mission_in_Mali
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Capacity_Building_Mission_in_Niger
4) Finances – Both the US and Europe were
hit hard by the 2008 recession and financial crisis and the recent Covid-19
pandemic. There was reluctance on both sides of the Atlantic to face the
question of paying for NATO forces and operations. The US contributes between
one-fifth and one-quarter of NATO's budget (22%) and most of its forces,
equipment and technology for actual operations (in Afghanistan, for example).
The US accounted for a massive 69% of NATO members’ military spending in 2021
(while representing only 41% of the NATO countries’ combined GDP), and the US
wants European members to spend more on their military.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/02/12/nato-countries-defense-spending-gdp-trump/
For many of them this has not
been a good time to increase their contributions to NATO. Most of them made
cuts to their military spending after the 2008 recession. This could damage
NATO’s operational effectiveness. The cuts in European military forces after
the 2008 financial crisis may have been so large as to compromise their ability
to launch sustained independent operations, or even to participate effectively
in large-scale combined operations. ‘Smart
defense’ is an attempt to combine cuts in spending with rationalization of
resources in order to remain fully effective. It is also difficult to calculate
what the balance should be between the US and Europe because clearly US
military spending also covers US operations and forces which are not intended
for NATO.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074
How realistic is it to talk about a more democratic basis for
decision-making within the organization, with more of a say for European
members, if NATO is essentially an organization in which the US pays for and
does most of the work? NATO used to be
formed by large armies based on military service. After the end of the Cold War
there was a move to much smaller professional armies based on career volunteers
and greater investment in high-tech equipment to give these forces a decisive
combat advantage. As was mentioned above, in a period of austerity the key
concept seems to be ‘smart defense’,
a more intelligent use of limited financial resources, more sharing of
equipment and back-up support and integration between NATO forces (e.g. Britain
and France signed a defense cooperation treaty in November 2010 which involves
plans to share military assets and technologies). How realistic all this will
be in maintaining NATO as an effective force remains to be seen.
However, at the Warsaw summit NATO'S European allies agreed a defence
spending increase worth more than £6 billion. Most members, however, failed in
2017 and 2018 to reach the target of 2% of GDP for military spending.
With new interest in the
European Defence Agency, NATO’s European members may be more willing to raise
defence spending, but in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic they may not be
able to do so. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 real and planned defence
spending has risen dramatically.
5) Is NATO, a defensive military alliance
with capabilities for dealing with cyberattacks (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm),
really the right kind of organization to deal with threats like terrorism,
various kinds of illegal trafficking, illegal immigration, piracy, nuclear
proliferation, peace-keeping, -building and -enforcement operations and
environmental concerns? Perhaps it is, and NATO should gradually be
re-organized and lose some of its military character outside the European
theatre.
6) Is there a contradiction between a NATO
ballistic missile defense system and the goal of nuclear arms reductions? After
all, the missiles used to eliminate incoming missiles (defense) are often
weapons that could also be rearmed and used as delivery systems (offense).
7) The operation in Libya holds several
lessons and, as a case study, offers an interesting comparison with the
operation in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq and the situation in Syria, both
in terms of similarities and differences. First, it was, like Afghanistan, an
out-of-area operation (but only slightly) and had a UN mandate. However, the Russians
claim it exceeded its mandate to protect civilian lives. It was limited to air
raids against specific targets, as requested by the Arab League and Libyan
fighters, and did not involve sending land forces to Libya. The US played an
active role only at the start but provided logistics, supplies and support.
Generally, it had support from the local population on the ground, and it was
successful and of short duration. However, it also demonstrated that it is
difficult to build consensus to act within NATO even for an operation very
close to NATO’s borders (Germany was initially strongly opposed). Secondly, the
operation was expensive and complex (but obviously nowhere near as long and
costly as the operation in Afghanistan) and only possible with the political,
military, technological and financial support of the US, despite the attempt to
make it a ‘European’ operation. However, what was seen as the operation's
technical success led to the fall of the Gaddafi regime but, as in Afghanistan,
this did not produce a smooth transition to a functioning democracy but the
collapse of law and order. In the absence of an international mission, Libya
remains a country dominated by armed factions and so far unable to produce a
stable and effective central government with real control over its territory.
As a result, it is a base for terrorism and human-trafficking and is the point
of departure for many refugees trying to enter Europe via Italy. It is hard to
see how the new but fragile unity government will re-establish the rule of law.
https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/can-the-world-help-war-torn-libya-find-peace-in-2024-16525935
Under the EU mission EUNAVFOR MED
IRINI, the EU is ready to re-start training the
so-called Libyan coast guard whenever the Libyan side is ready.
Operation Sea Guardian is NATO’s maritime security
operation in the Mediterranean
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136233.htm
All of this should make us think carefully about what kind of operation
NATO is able or not able to carry out / is willing or unwilling to carry out /
should or should not carry out, and in what circumstances and under what
conditions it is likely to be successful. The EU will need to ask itself the
same questions about its own operations.
8) In contrast to the fairly
rapid response to events in Libya in 2011, there was little desire among NATO
members to intervene in Syria when the civil war began except in terms of
sanctions. NATO began to deploy Patriot missiles to Turkey in 2013 to protect
it from any potential spread of the Syrian conflict. The US in the summer 2015
and its allies (notably France and the UK after the terrorist attacks in Paris
in Nov. 2015) carried out air raids against IS in coordination with other Middle
East allies but there were no plans for a NATO operation. There was neither the
legal basis for a major NATO ground intervention in Syria, nor real support for
the idea among NATO members. There was extensive intervention by Russia, Turkey
and Iran but there is no agreed and coordinated plan between these three and
Western countries as they have different objectives. In December 2018 Donald Trump
ordered a withdrawal of American forces from Syria. At the same time the US
administration said that it accepted that President
Assad, Russia’s ally, could stay in power as a part of a long-term solution to
the Syrian crisis but called on the Syrian regime to make fundamental changes
in exchange for aid in reconstruction.
http://www.arabnews.com/node/1422691/middle-east
There continue to be large numbers of refugees arriving from Syria at
the EU’s borders as a result of the civil war and the initial success of
Islamic State forces.
https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/unhcr-syria-fact-sheet-january-2024
Meanwhile, although Islamic State
has been largely checked and defeated, 900 US troops remain in Syria.
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-troops-in-syria/
9) Events in Turkey, a key NATO ally, have also raised concern. The
attempted military coup in July 2016 and the Turkish government’s hard line
response to it added to existing questions about the treatment of the Kurdish
minority and human rights in general. Turkey is also a key partner for the EU
in dealing with the migrant crisis. So
commentators are now asking whether Turkey is still and will remain a reliable
NATO ally, and if not, what this may mean for the alliance's strategy in the
Middle East and Mediterranean.
10) In recent
years the potential security threats to the EU have grown. There has been
increased instability in North Africa and the Middle East with the collapse of
decades-old regimes and areas of civil war (Syria) or ineffective government
and faction-fighting (Libya), leading to mass migration towards Europe and the
spread of terrorism to Europe itself. Meanwhile Russia has begun to use its
military power to reassert its influence both in the Middle East and in Eastern
Europe. Its intervention first in Georgia and later in the Ukraine have alarmed
the EU and in particular the EU's Eastern members. The decision of the UK to
withdraw from the EU (Brexit) and, even more, the election of Donald Trump as
US President (a figure whose statements sometimes made him sound potentially
isolationist, at least in relation to Europe) galvanized attempts to finally
create an integrated European Defence structure through the EU Defence Agency https://www.eda.europa.eu/. This is
not intended or expected to substitute NATO any time soon (given the scale and
strength of the US military and logistical infrastructure) but to function alongside
it. Europe needs to be able to respond effectively and independently to threats
in the event that the US, for whatever reason, is unwilling or reluctant to
assist, or to carry out operations in areas that the US does not consider of
strategic importance but the EU deems to be vital. Things seem to be moving
fast and the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation on
security and defence (PESCO) is now fully operational. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/107267/council-adopts-14-new-pesco-projects-deepen-eu-defence-cooperation_en
To put things in perspective, however, one should
remember that while the EU's Eastern European members have welcomed this
process which reassures them of support from their EU partners they have also
welcomed as crucial the deployment of NATO forces, including US and Canadian
units, to their countries. Similarly, Italy which hosts both the US Sixth Fleet
and a large number of US bases, would surely prefer to be able to count at
least on US naval, air and logistical support in any major operation in the
Mediterranean.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/03/us-military-base-expansion-italy https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/34226/Permanent%20Structured%20Cooperation%20(PESCO)%20-%20Factsheet Many
of the technical aspects of European Defence integration are the same as those
facing NATO (financing, standardization of weapons and equipment, integration
of multilingual military forces) but the fact that the EU has a large, existing
civilian structure may be a considerable advantage.
Conclusion:
Despite point 4 NATO still accounted for more than 50% of global military
spending in 2024:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/02/13/nato-spending-russia-ukraine-trump/
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/nato-spending-by-country
During the early phase of the Cold War the Warsaw Pact’s conventional
forces significantly outnumbered NATO forces. A comparison of NATO conventional
resources today with those of the Russian Federation gives NATO a clear
advantage because of huge, accumulated US assets (and the transfer of the
Eastern European bloc countries to NATO), despite increased military spending
by Russia in recent years and some reductions in Europe by the US and the rest
of NATO.
So NATO continues to be the world’s largest and most powerful alliance system,
and remains committed to its core values and primary security goals. It is now
playing a much wider, much more proactive role than during the Cold War, and
intends to continue to do so while seeking new partners within the
international community. After the failure in Afghanistan and growing tensions
with Russia only time will show whether NATO can be effective in this role and
whether it will continue to have the material and financial resources, internal
cohesion and international consensus that it will need in order to do so.
Events in Ukraine are forcing NATO to re-examine its priorities and to return
to its original purpose, the guaranteeing of its members’ sovereignty, freedom
and security in a mainly European context.
A counter-argument to explore: There
are also many critics of NATO who feel that since the end of the Cold War the
fact that NATO has taken on a more and more proactive role is a mistake. They
fear that even when acting with UN authorization, this too easily leads to an
increasingly aggressive militaristic response to local and global problems. They
argue that anti-terrorist or humanitarian intervention by military means is a
high-risk strategy in terms of both collateral damage (civilian deaths,
displaced persons, refugees, physical destruction of housing and essential
infrastructure, economic collapse and soaring operational costs) and final
objectives (creating a functioning democratic state or simply bringing an end
to the fighting). They would prefer to see NATO adopt a much more cautious and
conservative stance, defensive in the traditional sense, while cooperating with
the UN on normal peace-keeping operations and in humanitarian assistance.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/20/new-thinking-needed-nato
http://peaceandhealthblog.com/2012/05/21/nato-world-security/
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_75836.htm
for context
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Chicago_Summit
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/events_84074.htm
NATO missile shield in Europe updates http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8206.htm https://www.rt.com/news/326398-nato-missile-defense-romania/ https://www.rt.com/news/246709-nato-missile-shield-iran/ http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-shield-idUSKCN0Y30JX http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-13/poland-to-break-ground-on-missile-shield-site-as-russia-fumes
https://www.rt.com/news/350281-stoltenberg-nato-buildup-russia/ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_112331.htm
What lessons
does the outcome of the military intervention in Afghanistan provide for the
US, NATO, the UN and the international community in general?
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231633.shtml
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/17/nato-blames-afghan-government-for-taliban-takeover.html
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