Reform of the UN
Security Council
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council
Italy
and reform of the UN Security Council
The
Uniting
for Consensus (UfC) group
The UfC
proposal for UN Security Council Reform
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/italy-and-the-united-nations/uniting-for-consensus-ufc/
The
following text with updates could be the basis for an essay on UNSC reform: https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/2023_pirozzi_grasping-the-nettle.pdf
a
range in the number of seats for each area seems to be left open to be agreed,
see page 9
In March 2024, Ambassador Massari talked about a maximum
of 27 (instead of 25 or 26 in earlier proposals) Security Council members,
so there is obviously still space for flexibility. Questions like the exact
length of the term of the semi-permanent seats (3-5 years?) still need to be
decided, so the current proposal is a draft that would need to be further
negotiated and finalised. See this link:
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/italy-and-the-united-nations/uniting-for-consensus-ufc/
and
more generally for the wider context: https://gatecenter.org/en/the-summit-of-the-future-2024-towards-security-council-reform/
see the Security Council Reform Proposals section
outcome https://www.justsecurity.org/103380/un-future-pact-reform/ See the section onthe UNSC https://www.un.org/en/ga/screform/
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/onu-riforma-impossibile-36410
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100059111.pdf
History of veto power https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/history-of-veto-power-how-unsc-member-states-utilised-it-17877022
UK https://una.org.uk/sites/default/files/Briefing%20-%20Veto%20code%20of%20conduct.pdf
recent news and more background
https://www.osorin.it/uploads/model_4/.files/130_item_2.pdf?v=1675071056
https://decode39.com/5919/italy-plan-un-security-council-reform/
https://www.onuitalia.com/2023/01/12/massari-italia-riforma-onu-per-rafforzare-lo-stato-di-diritto/
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/09/1073792
https://www.quirinale.it/elementi/50730
General
position
https://italyun.esteri.it/en/italy-and-the-united-nations/
https://italyun.esteri.it/it/litalia-e-le-ooii/ufc/
https://italyun.esteri.it/it/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2021/01/unscforall/
The Wider Reform of the UN:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations
Start by reading: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/what-has-the-un-achieved-united-nations
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/sep/23/un-security-council-failing-70-years
What the UN says about its structural
reform plan ‘United to Reform’
https://reform.un.org/news/united-nations-management-reform-why-reform
https://reform.un.org/news/interview-jens-wandel-special-advisor-sg-reform
https://reform.un.org/content/benefits-management
https://reform.un.org/news/system-changing
https://reform.un.org/news/briefings-held-new-delegation-authority-heads-entity
https://reform.un.org/news/change-makers-enabling-accountability-continuous-learning-and-improvement
https://reform.un.org/news/change-maker-business-transformation-and-accountability
https://reform.un.org/news/enhancing-management-strategy-policy-and-compliance-dmspc-spotlight
https://reform.un.org/content/un-development-system-reform-101
https://reform.un.org/content/development-reform
https://reform.un.org/content/management-reform
https://reform.un.org/content/peace-and-security-reform
https://reform.un.org/news/un-secretary-general-ant%C3%B3nio-guterres-un-reform
Why is the UN important in international relations?
https://unric.org/en/un-the-main-challenges-and-key-dates-in-2024/
https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/sb12-ten-challenges-un-2024-2025
1) The UN is the most important and universal
international organization. At present it has 193 members representing almost
the entire world. The most recent members are Montenegro (2006) and South Sudan
(2011). The Vatican City and Palestine are non-member observer states. Kosovo
and Taiwan are not members.
2) It is
the main international organization responsible for promoting and ensuring
peaceful relations between states and respect for human rights. So if the UN
fails, this is of enormous importance to international relations. The is much
debate over UN Security Council decisions, whether these have authorised
interventions, as in Afghanistan, Libya and Mali or failed to do so, as in
Syria. Questions are raised about the kind of decisions made, how they are made
and their effectiveness or ineffectiveness.
3) It is
the main public forum for international debate, and in many ways its
institutions and protocols set the moral standards for how actors within the
international community should act (even when they do not), and how individuals
and minorities should be treated. Over the years the UN has established the
language and terminology in which political questions are debated. This
may result in hypocrisy when, for example, a clearly non-democratic state is
forced to use the language of democracy and human rights, but it is a very
obvious form of hypocrisy which many experts argue exerts long-term pressure on
states to conform to international norms of behaviour. The language of these
norms will form the future political expectations of the citizens of UN member
states, both democratic and non-democratic ones.
4) It is the world’s premier aid organization and provider of emergency, development and educational
programs.
Why is there
a need for reform? What are the main criticisms of the UN?
1) UN
Security Council reform. The permanent members of the UN Security Council
(each with a veto on the Council’s decisions) are simply the major powers that
won the Second World War. This no longer represents the economic and political
realities of today’s world. From the Cold War until the present day, the fact that the UN system has
failed to live up to the lofty expectations of its framers can be attributed in
significant part to the threat and exercise of the veto by individual Permanent
Five (P5) members of the Council. This situation can be attributed to an
unequal—but politically necessary—compromise that took place between the great
power Allied victors of the Second World War and the remainder of the UN
membership. The result was a division of powers between the Security Council
and the General Assembly that has never found a satisfactory equilibrium. In the more
than 70 years of its existence there have been several attempts to reform the
SC, and there is an ongoing debate on the right model to adopt, and the ideas
on which to base a model. Should the UN Security Council
a) offer
permanent membership to states that are major economies today (or major powers
today), or the emerging economies of tomorrow, or the most important UN donor
states, (and should these have a veto or not)?
b) have
more representation for the poor countries it seeks to protect?
c) base
membership on better geographic and cultural representation?
d) base
membership on compliance with and participation in UN activities and
operations?
e) abolish
the veto or at least limit its use?
f) Should
the ‘Uniting for Peace’
GA resolution of 1950 be re-examined as a possible means of mitigating the bad
faith exercise of the veto? It was drafted by a P5 member and revealed the
latent powers of the General Assembly existing within the UN Charter to make
recommendations in the event of a blocked Council, up to and including the use
of force. Or would it go too far in usurping the primary role of the
Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security?
The "Uniting for
Peace" UNGA resolution, states that in any cases where the Security Council, because of a lack of unanimity
among its five permanent members (P5), fails to act as required
to maintain international peace and security, the General Assembly shall consider the matter
immediately and may issue appropriate recommendations to UN members for
collective measures, including the use of armed force when necessary, in order
to maintain or restore international peace and security. It was adopted 3
November 1950, after fourteen days of Assembly discussions, by a vote of 52 to
5, with 2 abstentions. The resolution was designed to provide the UN with
an alternative avenue for action when at least one P5 member is using its veto to obstruct the Security
Council from carrying out its functions mandated by the UN Charter..
While there
is general agreement on the need for reform to make the UNSC more
representative and democratic (though this last word is open to
interpretation), there is little agreement on the correct formula to follow. In
part, this is simply due to the fact that states wish to protect and promote
their own power and interests. However, there are also real questions of
principle. For example, if the UN based voting rights on the Security Council
and in the General Assembly on population (one obvious measure of ‘democratic
representation’ used in the European Parliament)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apportionment_in_the_European_Parliament#:~:text=Under%20the%20Lisbon%20Treaty%2C%20which,of%20the%20EU's%20member%20states.
the Council
would be dominated by China, a clearly non-democratic state and the GA by China
and India.
Moreover,
any reform proposal needs to meet at least three basic conditions. Firstly, any reform of the Security Council requires the
agreement of at least two thirds of the UN member states (see below
#)( two thirds of 193 = 129?) and
preferably should have the support of an overwhelming majority in the General
Assembly. Secondly, it must enjoy the support of the current UNSC permanent
members so as not to be vetoed. Thirdly, though this is not an obligation, it
needs to make the UN more effective, not less so (i.e. not more likely to be constantly blocked and unworkable). Given
these limitations, any radical reform of the UNSC seems unlikely, and even
moderate reform seems to be blocked at the moment since no reform plan has
two-thirds support in the UNGA so far.
For some
information on the evolution of Italy’s position see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniting_for_Consensus
https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniting_for_consensus
“On 20 April
2009, Colombia and Italy, acting as representatives of the UfC group, provided
a new model of reform, which was presented as a concrete attempt to reach a
deal. The document proposed creating a new category of seats, still
non-permanent, but elected for an extended duration (3 to 5 years terms)
without the possibility of immediate re-elections. This new kind of seat would
not be allocated to single national countries but rather to regional groups on
a rotational basis. As far as traditional categories of seats are concerned,
the UfC proposal does not imply any change, but only the introduction of small
and medium size states among groups eligible for regular seats. This proposal
includes even the question of veto,
giving a narrow range of options that goes from abolition to limitation of the
application of the veto only to Chapter VII matters.
During the last round, Italy firmly rejected the G4 proposal as well as the African Union one and even denounced the unfair
behaviour of G4 countries. According to Italy, the G4 is attempting to exclude
the UfC proposal from the floor, “on the basis of a presumed level of
support”.Moreover, Italy believes that it has shown flexibility by putting
forward a new proposal on April 2009, while the G4 remained tied to its 2005
document. Italy's active role in current discussions started in February 2009
before the beginning of intergovernmental negotiations, when Minister of
Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini hosted more than 75 countries to develop
a shared path towards a reform of the Security Council. On May 2011, the members states which participated in the group meeting
held in Rome
rose to 120.”
Stated positions of the permanent members on the Security
Council Reform and other groups
https://www.state.gov/briefings-foreign-press-centers/unga79/reforming-the-un-security-council
https://www.reuters.com/world/us-supports-two-permanent-un-security-council-seats-africa-2024-09-12/
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/kremlin-says-it-supports-reform-of-un-security-council/2994742
Arab Group https://www.bna.bh/en/news?cms=q8FmFJgiscL2fwIzON1%2BDr7u%2FucHbOmRykMV4DgnsAg%3D
2) Wider Reforms. In 2005-2006 then UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan made a series of addresses on the subject of UN reform. In
those speeches he spoke about the need for UNSC reform, but he also devoted much
time and space to recommendations on some of the other questions which had led
to widespread criticism of the UN as an organization. He emphasized that the UN
should act swiftly to deal with these problems in order to respond to
international public opinion and win back support and to avoid seeing its image
permanently damaged. Various commentators have indicated the following topics
as issues to be dealt with and the current UN reform project United to
Reform is clearly intended to address points a-c:
a) Waste – Some critics argue that too much
money is spent on personnel and special benefits for personnel instead of on
projects e.g. UN employees staying in first class hotels when on mission
working in the field in a poor developing country (this is also bad taste and
damages the UN’s image) / the duplication of projects by UN agencies, other
international organizations, NGOs and by single countries under bilateral
agreements. As a result funds are wasted.
b) Inefficiency and confusion – duplication
of projects (see above) and/or overlapping of responsibilities creates
confusion. There is a need for much clearer cooperation and coordination
between aid organizations with a clear overall planning and decision-making
structure. Critics argue that there is also a need for an assessment of the
effectiveness of aid programs by an external body. Often projects are limited
in duration due to funding concerns (most donors will not commit funds for more
than 2 years), and some will only be effective with long-term funding.
c) Organizational Deficiencies – There has
also been a lot of criticism of unnecessary and irresponsible bureaucracy. For example, it is difficult to fire anybody
with a permanent contract at the UN, even when someone is not doing or is not
really capable of doing their job. Recruitment is based in part on each
country’s financial contributions to the UN and, at the highest levels, also on
political considerations, (also nepotism and favours) not purely on a person’s
suitability for a post.
d) Corruption, immunity and criminal activity
– there have been serious cases of corruption by UN officials misappropriating
funds for themselves or their supporters. The problem is that as an
international organization the UN does not fall under a national justice system
and its employees enjoy too much immunity since any system of internal
discipline is subject to political pressure. There have been a series of cases
of rape, child abuse and extortion committed by members of UN peace-keeping
forces while on mission. Aid funds are sometimes stolen and supplies resold by
local authorities or criminal organizations and thus never reach the local
community. In a conflict zone the money may then be used to buy arms. A UN
official is not automatically subject to the legal jurisdiction of the host
country for any of these crimes. Thus, many argue that there is a basic lack of accountability and liability
regarding UN officials and UN peace-keepers.
https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/gal3637.doc.htm
https://www.diplomacy.edu/resource/a-diplomatic-analogy-international-functionaries-and-their-privileges/
http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/bbrown/classes/IntlOrgSp09/PEACEKEEPERABUSEIMMUNITYANDIMPUNITY.pdf
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/un-peacekeepers-who-accountable-their-misdeeds
e) UN peace-keeping operations – These have
had a mixed record of many successes and some failures. At present the UN is
dependent on member states to provide soldiers and equipment to form the
peace-keeping forces for a particular operation. This can lead to potentially
fatal delays in organising and mounting the operation (Rwanda). From this
experience many commentators argue that the UN needs to have its own permanent
peace-keeping forces, which would be paid and trained by the UN and directly
responsible to the UN. This should guarantee the professional behaviour of
these forces and allow the UN to respond quickly to a rapidly developing
situation (Rwanda). Other experts argue that previous operations (e.g. in
Somalia) suggest that the UN should only deploy peace-keeping forces on the
ground when it is confident they will be welcomed by the local population, and
that the UN mission commander in the area should have more autonomy to make
decisions which need to be taken rapidly. It should be noted, however, that
other experts are against what they see as a militarization of the UN.
Look at the
evolution of the debate on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) commitment, endorsed by all member states of the United
Nations at the 2005 World Summit (and endorsed again in 2021 https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/unga-r2p-debate-2021/)
to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,
focusses on some of the problems posed by UN interventions and in the
assessment criteria it sets for the decision to authorise such an operation:
· Just cause: There must
be "serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently
likely to occur".
· Right
intention: The main intention of the military action must be to prevent human
suffering.
· Last
resort: Every other measure besides military invention has to have already been
taken into account. (This does not mean that every measurement has to have been
applied and been shown to fail, but that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that only military action would work in that situation.)
· Proportional
means: The military means must not exceed what is necessary "to secure the
defined human protection objective".
· Reasonable
prospects: The chance of success must be reasonably high, and it must be
unlikely that the consequences of the military intervention would be worse than
the consequences without the intervention.
· Right
authority: The military action has to have been authorized by the Security
Council.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect
This
raises some excellent questions about R2P.
f) Impartiality – the UN is sometimes not
seen as an unbiased international organization working to protect human rights
and peaceful co-existence e.g. local attitudes to the UN intervention in
Somalia in the 1990s. In Afghanistan and in Iraq (in the latter the UN did not
approve the invasion but did later open a UN office in Baghdad which was then attacked)
the UN may be seen as a Western organization imposing Western values by force
(e.g. female education).
g) Power politics at the level of states and
agencies – a poor country’s vote and support for a policy in the General
Assembly and on the UNSC may be bought, given in exchange for financial aid or
political favours. This leverage of rich countries over poor countries distorts
representation within these bodies.
h) The UN Human Rights Council – (which replaced the UN Human Rights
Commission, a body that was much criticised by human rights NGOs and the media)
has and had various members (elected for 3-year terms) such as China (until
2019), the Russian Federation (until 2016), Cuba (2019), Algeria (until 2016)
Egypt (2010), Pakistan (2011), and Saudi Arabia (until 2019), all with, at
best, a dubious human rights record (Syria and Iran have also been candidates).
They are often more likely to be motivated to hinder or block rather than to
support a serious investigation into human rights violations. Moreover, the
Council has often been accused of politically motivated action (or inaction)
rather than real concern for human rights violations (e.g. concentrating on the
Israeli-Palestinian question to the point of excluding a real investigation of
human rights violations against women and minorities in some Muslim countries
and other countries). Critics argue that, in practice, it is only marginally
better than the UN Human Rights Commission. Some argue that it would be better
not to have a UN body of this kind since the UN inevitably represents the
interests of states (and states are the most frequent violators of humn
rights), and that, instead, funds should go to independent human rights NGOs
(those which have a good reputation with both the media and the public). These
are the NGOs that are often targeted by governments that violate human rights
(e.g. Russia and Amnesty International).
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-24922058
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6919268.stm
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/24/amnesty-un-syria
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2156687/UN-human-rights-report-criticised-containing-condemnations-Britain--Iran-Russia-Cuba.html
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/25/russian-officials-raid-amnesty-moscow-headquarters
i) Aid Dependence – Some
experts argue that the UN itself has made some countries in Africa aid
dependent by offering aid without setting clear conditions, or concentrating
sufficiently on giving countries the know-how to become self-sufficient. This
is now changing and aid is now often tied to progress on democratization and
human rights. There are also longer-term programs now aimed at developing the
local economy. Time will tell whether this is an effective strategy.
General
considerations – There has been progress on at least some of the points listed above,
and the UN is now aware of its image problem and the
need to make real reforms. The United to
Reform program was introduced to address some of these challenges. https://reform.un.org/
j) The
UN’s role in the past and today – In terms of the Functionalist theory of
international relations (gradual international integration, collective
governance and the growing material interdependence between states) the role of
the UN is clear (See the UN Charter), but it was also based on two other
conflicting principles. It is in one sense a product of Idealism/Liberalism, an
organization created in response to mass genocide, war crimes and human rights
violations and in order to promote the universal liberal values (some would say
Western values) expressed in the UN Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. This is one of the things that most
ordinary people expect it to be and to do. At the same time it was and is a
guarantor of peace between sovereign states that often see things in terms of
Realism (national interests) and Realpolitik (power politics and pragmatism). It was created to prevent another
World War, to provide a forum for and foster dialogue between two very powerful
states with conflicting interests and ideologies, the USA and the Soviet Union.
(The Council of Europe has similar goals). To do this it had to give these
states (and the other victors of WWII) special powers, the veto, to allow them
to protect their interests.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_veto_power
In fact, it
can be argued that it played this role, maintaining a dialogue between the US
and USSR, extremely well during the Cold War (all Cold War conflicts were local
proxy conflicts, never direct conflicts between the US and the USSR). The UN
was the stage for the Cuban missile crisis but also for its resolution, and the
UN continues to play a crucial role in conflict prevention, peace-keeping and
conflict resolution with varying degrees of success. In Functionalist terms the
UN needs to include all states whatever their political system and values in
order to promote peace, and states often join the UN still prioritising their
own ideology and national interests. This inevitably involves a certain amount
of hypocrisy for some states, given the references to fundamental freedoms and
human rights in the UN Charter (mentioned 7 times, for example see Article 51)
which states must accept in joining, and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and other human rights covenants that states are encouraged to sign and ratify. For
example, in the same year that democratic Italy joined the UN, Franco’s Spain
also joined. Being part of the UN has rarely depended on democracy and human
rights (apartheid South Africa is the exception, on 12
November 1974 the General Assembly suspended South Africa from participating in its
work, due to international opposition to the policy of apartheid.). This
conflict of ideas at the heart of the UN is unavoidable. If the UN was given
powers to enforce its values on its members, some of them, the more powerful
ones one imagines, would probably leave the organization rather than accept a
loss of sovereignty (and in many cases a loss of power by the ruling party or
elite) and investigations into human rights abuses. (We should remember the
fate of the League of Nations # #)In
fact, respect for the sovereignty of each UN member state and non-interference
in a state’s domestic politics is one of the basic principles of the UN and the
current international order (consequently, it does not automatically recognise
a right to secession and this can also be a problem), and this is unlikely to
change in the future, especially as there is no simple mechanism for such a
change. As a result the UN has a mandate to try to prevent (and the
International Criminal Court has a mandate to investigate) human rights abuses
within member states but no real mechanism to do so within powerful states or
states that simply refuse to cooperate. Again the debate about R2P demonstrates
the difficulties involved in launching a UN operation on humanitarian grounds
and about the legal questions and practical dangers involved. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect
The opposition
encountered by the ICC from some African states and the accusations of
discrimination also demonstrate these problems.
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Criminal_Court https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jan/31/african-leaders-plan-mass-withdrawal-from-international-criminal-court
Conclusion: Thus given what we have
said above, one could argue that the real role of the UN and ICC is to create a normative environment regarding peaceful relations
between states, democratic values and human rights in the hope that
states and individuals will gradually reform and conform over time. The UN is
thus responsible for creating and reinforcing the diplomatic language and
behavioural norms for international relations, norms based on peaceful
coexistence and cooperation, collective security, international law and mutual
respect. If we compare the cooperation and dialogue between states today and at
any time before or during the Cold War it would be difficult to deny that the
UN and the international community have made some very real progress. However
in 2024 many commentators argue that there are rising tensions within the
international community, particularly between great powers, and a growing
disregard for the norms established and represented by the UN.
# The reform
of the Security Council requires the agreement of at least two-thirds of UN
member states and no veto from any of the permanent members of the UNSC.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council
# # The predecessor of the UN, the League of Nations failed to prevent a
second global conflict essentially because it no longer included most of the
world’s major powers. The US never joined it. Of the League's 42 founding
members only 23 were members when it was dissolved in 1946. The Soviet Union
became a member on in September 1934, and was expelled on in December 1939
for aggression against Finland.
Germany joined in September 1926 and withdrew in October 1933,
rejecting the idea of collective security and disarmament negotiations. Italy
was a founding member but withdrew in December 1937 in response to the
sanctions which had been imposed on the country for its 1935 invasion of
Abyssinia during which time poison gas was utilized. Another founding member,
Japan, withdrew in March 1933 in response to a report calling for it to
withdraw its forces from Manchuria. At the start of World War II the only major
powers still in the League of Nations were Britain (and the 5 major separate
members of its empire) and France.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/League_of_Nations
https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zbg4t39/revision/9
Thus, the
question is – if the United Nations abolished the veto on the Security Council
and opened the decision-making process to a majority in the General Assembly
(with the power to impose sanctions on any member, large or small), would the
US, China, Russia and other countries (Iran, Saudi Arabia) accept this change
or simply withdraw from the organization?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(international_relations)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realism_(international_relations)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism_in_international_relations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberalism_(international_relations)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realpolitik
Background
to the call for reform
After years of
research, Annan presented a progress report, In Larger Freedom, to the UN General Assembly, on 21
March 2005. Annan recommended Security Council expansion and a host of other UN reforms. On 31 January 2006, Kofi Annan outlined his vision for a
comprehensive and extensive reform of the UN in a policy speech to the United Nations Association UK. The speech,
delivered at Central Hall, Westminster, also marked the 60th Anniversary of
the first meetings of the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council.
On 7 March
2006, he presented to the General Assembly his proposals for a fundamental
overhaul of the United Nations Secretariat. The reform report is entitled:
"Investing in the United Nations, For a
Stronger Organization Worldwide”.
On 30 March
2006, he presented to the General Assembly his analysis and recommendations for
updating the entire work program of the United Nations Secretariat over the
last 60 years. The report is entitled: "Mandating and Delivering:
Analysis and Recommendations to Facilitate the Review of Mandates".
On the UN Human Rights Council
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/CanadSenateHRC022508.pdf
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/the-un-human-rights-council-does-not-deserve-us-support
General reform of the UN
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations
http://www.canadafreepress.com/2006/rosett040406.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kofi_Annan#Farewell_addresses
Reform of the UN Security Council
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council
http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSS-Analyses-72.pdf
http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/ManagingChange-1.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council#United_Kingdom_and_France
*For the evolution of Italy’s position on UN reform:
Statement by
H.E. Ambassador Maurizio Massari
on behalf of the
Uniting for Consensus Group
Annual debate on
agenda item 125 entitled “Question of equitable representation on and increase
in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the
Security Council”
17 November 2022
Mr. President,
On behalf of the
Uniting for Consensus group, I wish to thank you for convening this debate. We
thank you for appointing early on in the process two skillful Co-Chairs of
the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN), Ambassador Tareq Albanai and Michal
Mlynár. You are the custodians of one of the most important processes within
the Organization.
The UfC Group
continues to stand ready to actively and constructively support your action and
work within the next IGN session and looks forward to cooperating with them in
full transparency and willingness to make progress. We believe that in
their new capacity they shall help Member States get closer to the common goal
of a comprehensively reformed Security Council.
The UfC also
takes this occasion to thank the previous IGN Co-Chairs
for the excellent work they have done in the past year.
Mr. President,
The UfC group
feels strongly about the need for progress in the negotiations, especially
after this year’s upheavals in the international system, including the current
crisis in Ukraine.
We will once
again approach the next IGN with a constructive spirit, confident that we can
build up on the positive gains achieved. During the 76th session of work we
have advanced on several issues and it is worthwhile to highlight that the
convergences have increased. For example, on the question of the veto there was
a strong support among MS for voluntarily refraining from the use of veto, or
on the need for the increased representation of developing countries and small-
and medium-sized states, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS),
convergences duly reflected in the “Revised Elements” paper.
In fact, the
Co-Chairs’ “Revised Elements” could be a good base to start our work,
notwithstanding the fact that there are important points on which the
negotiating groups still have principled different views and readings for a
starter, on the democratic principle (which for UfC, together with the
principle of accountability, goes hand in hand with regular elections) or on
the principle of regional representation, which should not be confused with the
individual quest for self-representation in the council.
In UfC’s view, a
satisfactory reform should increase the legitimacy of the Security Council in
the eyes of the general membership. To this end, the broadest possible
consensus is needed.
As already
stated in the past, in our view, a reformed Security Council that fulfills this
aspiration should be more transparent, representative, accountable, democratic
and effective.
·
More transparent means a Council where the decisions are taken not by an
exclusive few who hold an ultimate power, but by all the SC members in a fully
inclusive way and taking into due consideration other voices;
·
More representative means going beyond a simple increase in the number of
SC members; it means giving true consideration to increasing the opportunities
for all Member States to sit periodically on the Council so that all Regions
and all voices are heard, including those of small, insular Countries;
·
More accountable means that every new member of a reformed Security Council
would need to answer to the whole Membership. It also entails a containment of
the number of States with the permanent seats to the current ones, while, at
the same time, restraining the use of the veto;
·
More democratic simply means that every new member of a reformed SC must be
elected;
·
More effective means less avenues for paralysis, and a Council that can act
expeditiously, ultimately making it more legitimate; one that – because it is
transparent, representative, accountable and democratic – enjoys more
credibility in the eyes of all Member States and whose decisions are fully
observed and implemented, thus delivering better on its mandate.
Mr President,
Unlike others,
UfC is not asking anything for our individual members, we are not aspiring to
permanent membership equally for us or for any other State! We want a reform
for all, not for few, a reform of the Security Council that is beneficial for
all Member States and for the UN itself. We are convinced that our idea of
reform, which is the only one that has been adjusted over the years in order to
take into consideration the positions of all negotiating groups, serves the
whole membership. Under UfC proposal, everyone benefits; no one is left behind
or left out; and everyone gains better access to the Council to contribute to a
more peaceful world. Besides, our proposal is the most detailed and pragmatic
on the table, as several Member States from various Regional Groups have
repeatedly acknowledged. It would give all MS, big and small, from all
regional groups, a fair chance to be represented and it wouldn’t discriminate
by introducing new situations of privilege.
The ongoing
crises, the increasing number of conflicts and in particular the war against
Ukraine have put a renewed pressure on the need of a meaningful reform of the
SC, need that we share as UfC. However, new permanent seats and new vetoes
would only serve the purpose to further paralyze it. Let me reiterate that,
here, all Member States are equal, thus an approach to reform that only serves
a few cannot be a solution for the entire membership.
Mr. President,
If a condominium
is falling apart, due to the fact that the members of the condominium board are
fighting amongst themselves, simply adding new members by right to the board is
not going to solve the real problem. Let me reiterate that here all member
states are equal, thus an approach to reform that only serves a few cannot be a
solution for the entire membership.
Mr President,
More in
concrete, we propose, on the one hand, to increase the number of two year-term
elected seats in order to ensure a fairer system of rotation in the Council.
Bear in mind that 60 Member States have never yet served in the Security
Council! On the other, we propose the creation of long-term, non-permanent
elected seats, with the possibility of immediate re-election. This innovation
is meant to accommodate those Member States that legitimately aspire, and have
the means to, make a sustained contribution to the work of the Council.
In our proposal,
the Security Council would consist of twenty-six members: on top of the current
15 seats, there would be nine long-term, non-permanent elected seats
distributed among regional groups as follows: 3 for Africa, 3 for Asia Pacific,
2 for GRULAC and 1 for WEOG. Plus, two additional of the current two-year,
elected seats assigned: one to the Eastern European Group and one, as a
rotating seat, to Small Island and Developing States (SIDS) and Small States.
This rotating seat would not prevent them from running within their regional
group, but would – instead – be an additional way for them have fairer chances
to gain access to the Security Council.
Let me underline
that this reform model would greatly enhance regional representation: Africa
would constitute the largest group in the reformed Council; the Asia-Pacific
region would have the highest percent increase; both Latin America and Eastern
Europe would double their representation. Our proposed distribution would also
allow an increased and more stable representation for cross-regional groupings,
such as the Arab group.
Mr. President,
Looking at the
next IGN, we confirm once again our openness to constructive discussion,
bearing in mind that there are no procedural shortcuts to consensus on
achieving Security Council reform. This is one of the main lessons
learned over the years: the reform process can only succeed if the views and
positions of every Member of the United Nations is taken into account.
In order for it
to be successful, it is crucial that the Co-Chairs set a clear agenda of work,
so that when the IGN begins, the whole focus will be on substantive issues and
not on procedures. That means agreeing in advance on a predefined number of
sessions, on an IGN calendar and on the topics to be discussed at each session.
Our ultimate
goal during next IGN session should be to further reduce the main gaps
separating negotiating groups and build and grow more convergences between MS.
Let us be clear that the ultimate goal is to achieve that convergence.
The UfC group
stands ready to cooperate to this precise end with you Mr. President, with the
new IGN co-Chairs and the whole membership.
Thank you.
Some
criticism of the UN
https://www.crisisgroup.org/sb006-ten-challenges-un-2021-2022
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_the_United_Nations
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/what-has-the-un-achieved-united-nations https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/opinion/sunday/i-love-the-un-but-it-is-failing.html?_r=0 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_the_United_Nations
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/mar/03/cholera-haiti-un-experts-chastise-ban-ki-moon
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1976
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