Then: http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/deliver-humanitarian-aid/ This covers a lot of UN emergency and longer-term interventions, where natural disasters have occurred or food resources are insufficient. These programs are usually authorized and welcomed by the local government if it is unable to respond on its own, and are not controversial (the same is true foe development and education programs), except in terms of effectiveness (speed, organization, costs, duration etc.). See the work of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA):

https://www.unocha.org/our-work/coordination

https://gho.unocha.org/

and the work of the UN Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF)

https://cerf.un.org/

https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/120403_OOM-CERF_eng.pdf

and

https://www.unocha.org/latest/news-and-stories

https://www.unocha.org/our-work/coordination/un-disaster-assessment-and-coordination-undac

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK11792/

https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/disaster_preparedness_en

Where a government is reluctant to authorize a foreign presence on its territory, this may present a serious challenge for the international community if that government is unable to deal with the situation itself, even when we are simply talking about relief in the event of a natural disaster.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/27/regime-blocked-aid-to-burma-cyclone-victims

https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/03/lessons-cyclone-nargis

Peace-keeping and peace-building missions, like emergency aid, development and educational programs, usually present the UN with no difficulty in terms of authorizing the mission as they are requested by or with the consent of the countries involved. Give a brief examples of some of the most important ones and their level of success or failure

https://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/en/news/New-data-show-the-effectiveness-of-UN-peacekeeping-missions/6454 (According to Professor Lise Howard of Georgetown University, in Washington D.C., since the end of the Cold War two thirds of the time, peacekeepers have been successful at implementing their mandates and departing. The presence of peacekeepers also usually coincides with successful and long-lasting peace agreements.)

https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_Nations_peacekeeping_missions

and ongoing missions.

But how should the international community respond if a government is unwilling to respond to a humanitarian crisis on its territory perhaps because there is a civil conflict going on? As the Syrian government starts to normalize its relations with neighbouring countries that till recently condemned its conduct and human rights violations in the civil war, the flow of humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees in those countries has continued. The UN and many member states have also responded to the recent earthquake by providing aid directly to Syria. The US and EU have, at least temporarily, eased their sanctions on the Assad regime to do this.

https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/middle-east-and-northern-africa/syria_en

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/syrian-regime-arab-ties-gradually-normalizing-after-over-a-decade-of-ruptures/2871609#

https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/situations/syria-situation

https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15239.doc.htm

https://fts.unocha.org/countries/218/summary/2023

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/10/us-syria-sanctions-exemption-earthquake-relief

recent past

Syria

https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14779.doc.htm

https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/un-aid-northern-syria-which-neutral-absolutely-essential-and-delivered

https://www.unocha.org/syria

hhttps://hum-insight.info/plan/1044

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/syria_2021_humanitarian_needs_overview.pdf

https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/statement-security-council-briefing-humanitarian-situation-syria-27

Yemen:

https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/middle-east-and-northern-africa/yemen_en#:~:text=In%202023%2C%20the%20EU%20allocated,487%20million%20in%20development%20assistance.

https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/09/14/deadly-consequences/obstruction-aid-yemen-during-covid-19

armed intervention

https://iep.utm.edu/hum-mili/#:~:text=Humanitarian%20intervention%20is%20a%20use,actions%20or%20failures%20to%20act.

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en

What should the international community do if that government itself is held to be the cause of, and responsible for, the humanitarian crisis or if it is a failed or fragile state unable to guarantee the rule of law and prevent atrocities?

In international law, the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states includes the prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (Article 2.4 of the Charter). The principle of non-intervention also signifies that a State should not otherwise intervene in a dictatorial way in the internal affairs of other states.

https://pesd.princeton.edu/node/551#:~:text=In%20international%20law%2C%20the%20principle,Article%202.4%20of%20the%20Charter).

Responsibility to Protect

Some background

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Commission_on_Intervention_and_State_Sovereignty

The purpose of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)

was to arrive at an answer to the question posed by Kofi Annan: "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?"

https://www.globalr2p.org/

https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/summary-of-the-2021-un-general-assembly-plenary-meeting-on-the-responsibility-to-protect/

https://www.peridirittiumani.com/2019/07/04/%EF%BB%BFla-dottrina-della-responsabilita-di-proteggere-tra-diritto-e-politica/

https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/eventi/2020/09/del-re-all-onu-sforzo-instancabile-italia-a-protezione-civili_0/

https://press.un.org/en/2021/ga12323.doc.htm

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/20/council-conclusions-on-eu-priorities-in-un-human-rights-fora-2023/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect

https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/unga-r2p-debate-2021/

https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/un-general-assembly-adopts-new-resolution-on-the-responsibility-to-protect/

https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/#:~:text=The%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect%20%E2%80%93%20known,cleansing%20and%20crimes%20against%20humanity.

https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml

https://unric.org/en/unric-library-backgrounder-r2p/

https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/

https://archive.unric.org/en/responsibility-to-protect/26981-r2p-a-short-history

https://archive.unric.org/en/responsibility-to-protect/26982-responsibility-to-protect-two-case-studies-with-alex-vines-

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect (read carefully)

in particular: The Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect

Pillar I: The protection responsibilities of the state. This stresses that states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

Pillar II: International assistance and capacity-building. This addresses the international community's commitment to help states build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and to help those under stress before crises and conflicts break out.

Pillar III: Timely and decisive response. This focuses on the responsibility of international community to act in a timely and decisive way to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity when a state manifestly fails to protect its population.

Note that:

The ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) argued that any form of military intervention is "an exceptional and extraordinary measure", and, as such, to be justified it must meet certain criteria, including:

· Just cause: There must be "serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur".

· Right intention: The main intention of the military action must be to prevent human suffering.

· Last resort: Every other measure besides military invention has to have already been taken into account. (This does not mean that every measurement has to have been applied and been shown to fail, but that there are reasonable grounds to believe that only military action would work in that situation.)

· Proportional means: The military means must not exceed what is necessary "to secure the defined human protection objective".

· Reasonable prospects: The chance of success must be reasonably high, and it must be unlikely that the consequences of the military intervention would be worse than the consequences without the intervention.

· Right authority: The military action has to have been authorized by the Security Council.

Various experts have highlighted some of the problems that military intervention for humanitarian purposes may involve:

The mixed-motives problem - The legitimacy of R2P rests upon its altruistic aim. However, states will often be wary to engage in humanitarian intervention unless the intervention is partly rooted in self-interest. The appearance that the intervention is not strictly altruistic consequently leads some to question its legitimacy.

· The counterfactual problem - When R2P is successful, there will not be any clear-cut evidence of its success: a mass atrocity that did not occur but would have occurred without intervention. Defenders of R2P consequently have to rely on counterfactual arguments.

· The conspicuous harm problem - While the benefits of the intervention will not be clearly visible, the destructiveness and costs of the intervention will be visible. This makes it more difficult for proponents of the intervention to defend the intervention. The destruction caused by the intervention also makes some question the legitimacy of the intervention due to the stated purpose of preventing harm.

· The end-state problem - Humanitarian intervention is prone to expand the mission beyond simply averting mass atrocities. When successful at averting mass atrocities, the intervenors will often be forced to take upon themselves more expansive mandates to ensure that threatened populations will be safe after the intervenors leave.

· The inconsistency problem - Due to the aforementioned problems, in addition to the belief that a particular military action is likely to cause more harm than good, states may fail to act in situations where mass atrocities loom. The failure to intervene in any and all situations where there is a risk of mass atrocities lead to charges of inconsistency.

See also some praise and criticism of R2P

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect#Praise

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect#Criticism

and very critical: https://fpif.org/the_crisis_of_humanitarian_intervention/

So in any discussion about using military force as part of an attempt at humanitarian intervention in order to prevent genocide and human rights abuses, there are a series of issues to be examined. First, there is the question of legitimacy. Is what is happening sufficient cause to infringe a state's sovereignty under Pillar III? Is there a clear mandate from the UN Security Council? (In Yemen and Syria there is no mandate for military intervention.) If there is not, should countries act without it if there is widespread support in the UN General Assembly? Then there is the bigger question of effectiveness. Do such missions usually achieve their basic goal of bringing peace and stability and ending the violence, or do they lead to more violence? Is the mission welcomed by the local people involved? (Compare for example: Somalia UNOSOM I and II 1992-5, Afghanistan ISAF 2001-present, and military intervention in Libya in 2011) Moreover, would the funds used for such a mission be better spent elsewhere as direct aid on a more concrete problem? (e.g. on providing food, water, medicine and shelter to an area not requiring a military presence). There is another important consideration that is often raised. Many experts argue that since the foundation of the UN, humanitarian intervention has always been 'politicized'. What exactly the international community should do in response to the situation in Syria, for example, cannot be debated 'neutrally', simply as a humanitarian crisis. Each member state on the UNSC and in the UNGA will inevitably bring to the discussion its own economic and strategic interests, and its own cultural or ideological perspective. In international relations this is the normal context in which a diplomatic discussion of a question like that of Syria or Libya takes place. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/03/libya-escalating-drama-case-liberal-intervention

In order to respond to a question like:

What are the main factors to be weighed when the international community is considering military intervention in response to a humanitarian crisis?

you will probably need to look at these sources again and think about the points raised (concerning the idea that for the international community there is a responsibility to protect civilians from massive human rights abuses by their own government which may override the principle of state sovereignty) in relation to past and present humanitarian crises and intervention or non-intervention by the international community:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect

https://www.globalr2p.org/

https://reliefweb.int/report/world/reflection-responsibility-protect-2020

https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-responsibility-to-protect-the-people-of-myanmar/

https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/01/revised-agreement-on-african-union-mission-in-somalia/

You should also consider whether national public opinion is manipulated by a government or the media to support a proposed intervention or whether it drives media reporting and government action or inaction by calling for intervention or responding with indifference to an event.

https://www.cato.org/white-paper/public-opinion-war-terror

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137364401_12

https://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/avoiding-avoidable-tragedy-public-opinion-and-r2p/

You should also look at an article in Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014, by Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan called: Drop Your weapons.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2014-06-16/drop-your-weapons in the SIOI library

This argues against armed resistance and for civil resistance on a statistical basis, claiming that the latter is more likely to produce positive change. It is then argued that this means there is a greater responsibility for the international community to ‘assist’ (civil protest and civil resistance against a dictatorship) rather than to embrace the responsibility to protect principle.

For a wider discussion of this and related issues, see:

The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention by Benjamin A. Valentino

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-10-17/true-costs-humanitarian-intervention

Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age by Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein

humanitarian-intervention-comes-age

And Justice for All by Gary Haugen and Victor Boutros

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-05-01/and-justice-all

summary https://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-haugen/and-justice-for-all-enfor_b_583217.html

Humanitarian Intervention: Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Rwanda by Timothy Stacey

http://www.telospress.com/humanitarian-interventioniraq-afghanistan-kosovo-rwanda/

From Libya to Syria: The Rise and Fall of Humanitarian Intervention by Füsun Türkmen

https://www.academia.edu/24049222/From_Libya_to_Syria_The_Rise_and_Fall_of_Humanitarian_Intervention

The Crisis of Peacekeeping, Why the UN Can’t End Wars by Séverine Autesserre

file:///C:/Users/Pc/Downloads/FA%20UN%20Peacekeeping%20(2).pdf

The Sahel

The deployment of the Group of Five Sahel joint force (Force conjointe du G5 Sahel - FC-G5S) and the French Operation Barkhane against terrorist insurgents with the consent and cooperation of host governments.

https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12881.doc.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barkhane

https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/operation-barkhane-success-failure-mixed-bag#:~:text=On%20November%209%2C%202022%2C%20the,to%20the%20Malian%20Armed%20Forces.

and the EU-led Takuba Task Force

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Takuba_Task_Force

https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eus-takuba-anti-terror-force-quits-junta-controlled-mali/

More on Libya

https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/libya/

https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libyan-lessons-bring-back-responsibility-rebuild

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/libya-the-responsibility-_b_841168

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/revisiting-the-humanitari_b_9445270

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/10/libya-unlawful-lethal-force-and-mass-arrests-in-unprecedented-migrant-crackdown/

http://www.jamespattison.org/uploads/1/2/5/1/12518815/libya.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_military_intervention_in_Libya

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/libya/

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/01/libya-eu-conditions-remain-hellish-as-eu-marks-5-years-of-cooperation-agreements/

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/04/12/everyone-says-the-libya-intervention-was-a-failure-theyre-wrong/

https://newrepublic.com/article/121085/libya-no-model-humanitarian-intervention

https://www.huffpost.com/entry/libya-intervention-daalder_n_6809756

https://journal-neo.org/2015/10/17/nato-s-humanitarian-intervention-in-libya-exacerbated-humanitarian-suffering/

More on Syria

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/

https://www.reddit.com/r/MapPorn/comments/rybrf6/syria_in_2022_strategic_map_2600_2149/

https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/14/syria-war-un-security-council-responsibility-to-protect-r2p-humanitarian-intervention-assad-russia-human-rights-civilians/#:~:text=The%20principal%20norm%20that%20has,being%20committed%20against%20civilian%20populations.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-law-idUSKCN12O2S3

http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/11/syria-and-the-crisis-of-humanitarian-intervention/

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/vanity-bombing

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/10/syria-washington-obama-iraq-middle-east-intervention-assad-isis/505202/

https://www.lawfareblog.com/uk-legal-position-humanitarian-intervention-syria

https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/1108462

Central African Republic (CAR)

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/central-african-republic/

https://ecr2p.leeds.ac.uk/the-central-african-republic-and-the-responsibility-to-protect/

https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/central-african-republic/

http://www.auschwitzinstitute.org/blog/r2p-response-to-crisis-in-car-too-little-too-late/

https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/02/24/central-african-republic-what%E2%80%99s-gone-wrong

https://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwihvbjM3vPSAhXGUBQKHfY3D4wQFggoMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gpplatform.ch%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2FPP%252012%2520-%2520What%2520went%2520wrong%2520in%2520the%2520Central%2520African%2520Republic%2520-%2520Mar%25202015.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHmHZBQDE5yS4QLpNRLQT12aJruaQ

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/02/18/how-the-international-community-failed-the-central-african-republic/?utm_term=.08f891c56e29

South Sudan

https://unmiss.unmissions.org/

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/south-sudan/report-south-sudan/

https://www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/Events/2022/The-UN-in-South-Sudan-2022-Risks-and-opportunities-in-an-uncertain-peace-process

https://www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/Assessing-the-Effectiveness-of-the-United-Nations-Mission-to-South-Sudan-UNMISS

Somalia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Operation_in_Somalia_I https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Operation_in_Somalia_II http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a178.pdf http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/readings/lessons.html

current mission and humanitarian situation

https://unsom.unmissions.org/

https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1180

https://reliefweb.int/country/som

Rwanda https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Role_of_the_international_community_in_the_Rwandan_Genocide https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/02/rwanda-20-years-genocide-fork-road

What lessons does the outcome of the military intervention in Afghanistan provide for the US, NATO, the UN and the international community in general?

https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/lessons-wests-long-war-afghanistan-35961

https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/afghanistan/report-afghanistan/

https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231633.shtml

https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2021/08/18/failure-in-afghanistan-over-40-years-in-the-making/?sh=4c162cb7c437

https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231633.shtml

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/17/nato-blames-afghan-government-for-taliban-takeover.html

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/czech-president-natos-failure-afghanistan-puts-its-legitimacy-question-2021-08-17/

https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/europe-urges-unity-taliban-quiet-failed-mission-79480086

For many commentators the fundamental condition remains this one:

Reasonable prospects: The chance of success must be reasonably high, and it must be unlikely that the consequences of the military intervention would be worse than the consequences without the intervention.

So the R2P doctrine does not, in itself, authorize reckless military interventions since the ‘reasonable prospects’ condition is extremely difficult to meet BEFORE an intervention. It involves predicting whether or not the intervention will be supported by the local people.

https://opencanada.org/r2p-is-not-a-license-for-military-recklessness/

the basic question remains – will an intervention be effective?

https://www.justsecurity.org/92822/before-leaving-somalia-african-union-should-provide-compensation-for-civilian-harm/

Would the international community, and the individual nations that compose it be willing and prepared to send large-scale UN forces into Syria or Yemen even if this were authorized? Are we sure there are reasonably high prospects of success or might we make things even worse? Are we willing to risk our soldiers’ lives for this? Of course, watching the suffering going on and doing nothing is also tremendously frustrating. The UN in Yemen is trying to get both sides to stick to a ceasefire but the prospects for fostering real respect for human rights seem poor.

https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1110312

https://osesgy.unmissions.org/

https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/11/1050711

https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14352.doc.htm

https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14470.doc.htm

https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1087462

But is this really the best the international community can do in such situations? Is it enough? These are not easy questions to answer.

https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/64721/node/64721_ko

https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/eventi/2020/09/del-re-all-onu-sforzo-instancabile-italia-a-protezione-civili_0/

Current siutation 2024

Yemen

Saudi Arabia and Iran, the supporters of the two sides in Yemen, say they are now promoting peace and reconciliation. Will their efforts be successful and end the human rights violations?

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/21/saudi-iran-deal-view-from-yemen

https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/10/1155721

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/yemen

Libya

https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/libya-crisis-response-plan-2024

https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/libya-crisis-response-plan-2024#:~:text=As%20of%20May%202024%2C%20over,the%20start%20of%20the%20conflict.

https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/country-brief-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus-2024-libya

Syria

https://www.unocha.org/syrian-arab-republic

Gaza

https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-situation-update-233-gaza-strip-enarhe#:~:text=As%20of%20July%202024%2C%20the,ongoing%20projects%2C%20totalling%20%2477.5%20million.

Sahel