giovedì 18 giugno 2020

Israel and the Palestinians

Page1 to halfway through page 7 are really just to give you an idea of how things have evolved to the current situation. From the middle of page 7, I am trying to focus on the first part of the title -
'What are the main questions that need to be resolved in the search for a lasting peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians?' How you respond to the second part - Is the two-state solution now effectively dead? is up to you but bear in mind the position of successive Italian governments and the EU. So the main part of my notes are pages 7-9.
What are the main questions that need to be resolved in the search for a lasting peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians? Is the two-state solution now effectively dead?

 See 'Negoziati senza fine' under 'articles' the dropbox 
Chronology of recent events:
2017- to January 2020
On December 6, 2017, US President Donald Trump announced US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel[1] and ordered the planning of the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_recognition_of_Jerusalem_as_capital_of_Israel
On 28th January 2020, President Trump announced his peace plan for Israel and the Palestinians
2018, 70th anniversary of Israel’s founding on May 14th 1948; mourning by Palestinians who regard the same event as their “catastrophe” and observe May 15 as“Nakba Day”; and the transfer of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv on May 14 by the administration of President Donald Trump. https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-04/israel-palestine-gaza-violence-is-about-to-get-worse
In December 2018 Brazil’s new President, Jair Bolsonaro, said he will follow the lead of the U.S. and move the country’s embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.
 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-30/bolsonaro-to-move-brazil-s-embassy-to-jerusalem-netanyahu-says
The United States recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel through a presidential proclamation signed by U.S. President Donald Trump on March 25, 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_recognition_of_the_Golan_Heights_as_part_of_Israel
The 'Annexation of the Jordan Valley' is the proposed application of Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley. The idea has been advocated by some Israeli politicians since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank began in 1967, most recently with the 2019 Netanyahu plan. https://theintercept.com/2019/09/11/netanyahu-hints-trump-peace-plan-will-allow-israel-annex-key-west-bank-territory/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_the_Jordan_Valley https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposed_Israeli_annexation_of_the_West_Bank
Excellent essay in English and Italian:
Earlier background - to have some idea of events over the last decade
President Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian leader, speaking at the UN General Assembly, formally requested full membership for his as yet undefined country on 23rd September 2011. However, the Security Council vote was called off when it became clear that the US would use its veto to block this request. Palestine is recognised by about 130 members of the General Assembly and UNESCO admitted Palestine as a member in October 2011. The Palestinian move at the UN encouraged the international community to try to re-launch direct Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. Some experts saw the prisoner swap (October 18th 2011)  between Israel and Hamas as a positive move in this direction, but talks failed to resume during the summer of 2012 despite international efforts. On September 27th 2012 President Abbas asked the UN to grant Palestine ‘non-member observer state’ (which will allow Palestine to join more UN agencies) and warned that time was running out on a 2-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if Israel continues with its settlement policy. In November of that year the UN voted overwhelmingly in favor.
On July 30th 2013 US Secretary of State John Kerry announced that Israel and the Palestinians had started direct negotiations and made a commitment to serious dialogue over the next 9 months, with talks aimed at reaching a lasting settlement and resolution of all the outstanding questions by 29th April 2014. Little real progress seems to have been made during negotiations despite the release of 3 batches of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. Various proposals for land exchange seem to have been made and discussed, but on many of the key issues neither side made significant concessions. For example, on 6 November, Israeli negotiators said there will not be a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders and that the Separation Wall will be a boundary. Israel also made no commitment to accepting the right of return for all Palestinian refugees and the Palestinians repeated their refusal to recognize Israel as a specifically Jewish state. Abbas dismissed this demand, pointing out that the Palestinians had already agreed to recognition of the State of Israel, both in 1988 and in the 1993 Oslo Accords. He added that neither Jordan nor Egypt, with whom Israel had made peace treaties, had been asked to recognize Israel's Jewish character. He said the Palestinians would never accept Israel as a 'religious state' since, it would damage the rights of Israel's Palestinian minority and “to accept it now as a Jewish state would compromise the claims of millions of Palestinian refugees (to return) whose families fled the fighting that followed Israel's creation in 1948 and were not allowed to return."
The Israeli government made the release of a fourth batch of prisoners conditional on an extension of the negotiation deadline beyond April but went ahead with approval of plans to build further homes in the settlements on the West Bank. It was reported that Abbas then set 3 conditions for extending peace talks beyond the April 29 deadline; that the borders of a future Palestinian state be dealt with during the first three months of the extended talks, a complete freeze on all settlement construction, and the release without deportation of the fourth batch of Palestinian prisoners, including Israeli-Arabs. On 23 April 2014, the rival Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah agreed to form a unity government and hold new elections. Netanyahu said Abbas would have to choose between peace with Israel and peace with Hamas while Palestinian officials said it was an internal matter and peace would be reinforced by uniting the Palestinian people. Israel then suspended peace talks, saying it "will not negotiate with a Palestinian government backed by Hamas, a terrorist organization that calls for Israel's destruction".
On 12 June 2014, three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped in Gush Etzion, in the West Bank, as they were hitchhiking to their homes. The Israel Defense Forces initiated Operation Brother's Keeper in search of the three teenagers. As part of the operation, in the following 11 days Israel arrested around 350 Palestinians, including nearly all of Hamas' West Bank leaders. Five Palestinian militants were killed during the military operation. On 30 June, search teams found the bodies of the three missing teenagers in a field north-west of Hebron. They had apparently been killed shortly after their abduction. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed a tough response to the killings. On August 20, 2014, a Hamas official, Salah al-Aruri, said that the organization's armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was behind the kidnapping and murder. Hamas leader Khaled Mashal said that some Hamas members had kidnapped and murdered the Israeli teenagers but stated that they were not acting on orders from the Hamas leadership, which he said, were "not aware of this action taken by this group of Hamas members in advance".
On 8 July 2014, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched ‘Operation Protective Edge’ against the Hamas-governed Gaza Strip. Seven weeks of Israeli air strikes and Palestinian rocket attacks, in addition to shelling and fighting in the ground invasion and cross-border tunnel attacks, left more than 2,100 people dead, most of them Palestinians.
The stated aim of the Israeli operation was to stop rocket fire from Gaza into Israel, which non-Hamas factions had begun following the Israeli crackdown on Hamas in the West Bank (sparked by the kidnapping and murder of 3 Israeli teenagers by Hamas members, see above)), and which Hamas itself began, following an Israeli airstrike on 6 July which killed seven Hamas militants in Khan Yunis. On 17 July, the operation was expanded to a ground invasion with the stated aim of destroying Gaza's tunnel system.
By 26 August, the IDF reported that Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other militant groups had fired 4,500 rockets and mortars from Gaza into Israel, while the IDF attacked 5,263 targets in Gaza; at least 34 known tunnels were destroyed and two-thirds of Hamas's 10,000-rocket arsenal was used up or destroyed. Several ceasefires (including one on 5 August, during which all Israeli soldiers were withdrawn from the Gaza Strip) fell apart or expired. On 26 August, an open-ended ceasefire was announced. It seems to be holding. As some Gazans began returning to their homes and rebuilding, the international community was faced with a situation in which the current prospects for the two-state solution seem very slim. On 25th September Hamas and Fatah signed a new agreement to share power in governing Gaza, but this is not the first agreement of this kind and the problem is reaching practical compromises in implementing this pact.
Between 2,000 and 2,143 Gazans were killed (including 495–578 children) and between 10,895 and 11,100 were wounded, while 66 IDF soldiers, 5 Israeli civilians and 1 Thai civilian were killed and 450 IDF soldiers and 80 Israeli civilians were wounded. The Gaza Health Ministry, the UN and human rights groups say 70–75% of the Palestinian casualties were civilians; Israel states 50% were civilians. On 5 August 2014 the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(OCHA) stated that 520,000 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip (approximately 30% of its population) may have been displaced, of whom 485,000 needed emergency food assistance and 273,000 were taking shelter in 90 UN-run schools. 17,200 Gazan homes were totally destroyed or severely damaged, and 37,650 homes have suffered damage but are still inhabitable. In Israel, an estimated 5,000to 8,000 citizens fled their homes due to the threat of rocket and mortar attacks.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Israel%E2%80%93Gaza_conflict
According to Walla!, from January 2015 until April 26, 172 attacks against the Jerusalem Border Police and SWAT teams were recorded. 148 Molotov cocktails and 15 explosive devices were thrown at Border Police, 1 shooting incident, 4 stabbing attempts or attacks and 4 "car rampage"attacks (attempted or actualized) were launched. Many policemen were injured in these clashes.
According to OCHA, from January 1 to 22 April 2015, at least 8,139 trees and saplings planted by Palestinians were uprooted or vandalized by Israeli settlers. Israeli search and arrest operations in the Palestinian territories, which averaged 75 per week earlier, rose to 86 per week in the first five months of 2015. According to the same source, averaging statistics from January through to June, 2 Israelis were injured and, excluding settler assaults, 40 Palestinians were injured by Israeli forces, per week. In the Hebron governorate alone from January to June, 550 Palestinians, among them 105 teenagers, were arrested, and 225 sentenced to administrative detention without trial.However, the UN and US seemed ready to try again.http://www.timesofisrael.com/kerry-hopeful-israeli-palestinian-talks-can-be-relaunched/
How much are the prospects for negotiation affected by other developments in the area? IS is now present in the Sinai desert fighting Egypt’s forces. IS aims to overthrow the Egyptian secular government, destroy Israel, and, although supported by some (ex-?) members of Hamas, also intends to destroy Hamas itself. Given the collapse of Syria and Lebanon’s preoccupation with the civil war in Syria and the wave of refugees, does this turmoil represent a growing radicalization of the Arab world and a threat to Israel’s existence, or an opportunity for Israel to create informal alliances with secular governments and parties in the area that now see Israel as the lesser threat? IS negotiating a settlement with the Palestinians now less or more urgent?http://www.timesofisrael.com/un-chief-tries-to-breathe-fresh-life-into-peace-talks/http://www.timesofisrael.com/kerry-hopeful-israeli-palestinian-talks-can-be-relaunched/http://www.timesofisrael.com/pa-officials-reject-netanyahus-call-for-renewal-of-peace-talks/http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-says-willing-to-meet-abbas-for-peace-talks-right-now/
See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013%E2%80%9314_Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_peace_talks http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Fatah%E2%80%93Hamas_Gaza_Agreement http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kidnapping_and_murder_of_Mohammed_Abu_Khdeir http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Israel%E2%80%93Gaza_conflict http://online.wsj.com/articles/cease-fire-between-israel-and-hamas-holds-1409140924
also:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/11/united-nations-delays-palestinian-statehood-vote http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/unesco-votes-to-admit-palestine-over-us-objections/2011/10/31/gIQAMleYZM_story.html http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19746994 http://www.cnbc.com/id/49198865
For the current level of international recognition of Palestine see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_the_State_of_Palestine http://www.timesofisrael.com/ban-ki-moon-urges-arab-states-to-push-for-renewed-israeli-palestinian-negotiations/ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42551&Cr=palestin&Cr1#.UFYMFa502mA
Italia - Con il Ministro Avidgor Lieberman, che ha invitato Gentiloni ad una prossima visita in Israele, è stata confermata la solidità dei rapporti bilaterali e l’interesse reciproco a svilupparli ulteriormente. Il Ministro Gentiloni ha auspicato che possa essere presto ripreso il negoziato per il processo di pace in Medio Oriente e ha riaffermato la tradizionale posizione dell’Italia che auspica nuovi passi verso l’unica soluzione possibile che è quella dei due Stati. http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2014/11/20141103_telminpolisralb.html 3/11/2014
Mar. 16, 2015 - Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu Says No to Two-State Solution on Eve of Election
"Under pressure on the eve of a surprisingly close election, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel on Monday repeated his appeal to right-wing voters, declaring that if he was returned to office he would never establish a Palestinian state... The statement reversed Mr. Netanyahu’s endorsement of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a 2009 speech at Bar Ilan University, and fulfilled many world leaders’ suspicions that he was never really serious about peace negotiations."
New York Times "Netanyahu Says No to Statehood for Palestinians," nytimes.com, Mar. 16, 2015
However, in a Mar. 19 interview with NBC News Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent Andrea Mitchell, Netanyahu claimed that his pre-election statement was not a reversal of policy, but rather a statement about what is realistically possible in the current situation. In the interview, Netanyahu said, "I don't want a one-state solution. I want a sustainable, peaceful two-state solution. But for that, circumstances have to change."
May 13, 2015 - The Vatican Recognizes State of Palestine in New Treaty "The Vatican officially recognized the state of Palestine in a new treaty finalized Wednesday, immediately sparking Israeli ire and accusations that the move hurt peace prospects.
Associated Press (AP)"Vatican Recognizes State of Palestine in New Treaty," ap.org, May 13, 2015
Oct. 19, 2015 - Since the beginning of the month, at least nine Israelis have been killed, along with 41 Palestinians, 20 of whom Israeli authorities have identified as attackers. The remaining 21 Palestinians died in clashes with Israeli troops… The violence has been dominated by Palestinian teenagers stabbing Israelis in so-called ‘lone wolf’ attacks and without the political and organizational support that existed during the first and second intifadas." ABC News, "What's behind Escalating Violence in Israel," abcnews.go.com, Oct. 19, 2015
October 2017 The Palestinians form a unity government.
Israel will not negotiate with a Palestinian unity government if Hamas is involved.
On 7 December 2017 Donald Trump defied overwhelming global opposition by recognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, but insisted that the highly controversial move would not derail his own administration’s bid to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Two days later at the UN ambassadors from Britain, France, Italy, Japan, China and more warned that Trump’s announcement that the United States recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s capital is misguided or a threat to peace. Some called it reckless. Other envoys blasted the U.S. shift as a violation of past U.N. Security Council resolutions or possibly of international law.
UN position on Israel and the Palestinians – the two-state solution remains the only acceptable basis for a settlement
So why is a peace settlement to the conflict so important to the international community?
1) The perceived threat that this conflict poses to the stability of the Middle East and to oil supplies
2) The way it affects the West’s image in the Arab world (and in the broader Muslim world)
3) As a measure of the effectiveness of the UN in resolving international disputes (a basic part of its mandate) and responding to a humanitarian crisis

Possible preconditions or sticking points for the launch of serious negotiations (this should be updated in line with current developments) 1) Mutual recognition of both people’s right to an independent state (the international community and the Quartet’s two-state solution). Moreover, Israel wants recognition specifically as a Jewish state (homeland).
(Some commentators argue that the two-state solution is making no progress and think the Palestinians should give up claims to an independent state, ask for unification of the occupied territories with Israel and for full Israeli citizenship for all Palestinians, thus threatening the Jewish popular majority within Israel. The argument goes that Israel would feel so threatened by such a prospect that it would be forced to make concessions on a two-state solution. See ‘The Death and Life of the Two-State Solution by Grant Rumley and Amir Tibon in Foreign Affairs July/August 2015. However, whether this is a realistic prospect is unclear. Certainly it is not the position of the international community or the Palestinian movement at the moment).
2) A truce and then a lasting cease-fire, a cessation of terrorist attacks and acts of violence to provide time and the right atmosphere to negotiate.
3) A further good-will  release of prisoners (this happened with the exchange in 2011 of an Israeli soldier captured by Hamas for about 1000 Palestinian prisoners. More prisoners were released during the 2013-14 negotiations.
4) A freeze on Israeli settlement building (accepted by the US but no longer by the Israeli government) and a halt to the intimidation and increasing violence by Israeli settlers. These remain perhaps the Palestinians’ main preconditions for real talks
5) A reduction in Israeli road blocks and military outposts on the West bank
6) Israel refuses to negotiate with a 'unified' Palestinian government which includes Hamas because Hamas refuses to recognise Israel's right to exist. Israel also now wants recognition as a specifically Jewish state.
7) There seems to be no space for negotiation on Jerusalem (December 2017)
Other elements in a potential negotiation
1) Perhaps the model should be the 1998 Northern Ireland Peace Agreement. This would mean starting with the moderates, for the Palestinians, the President and government of the PA (Al Fatah, which recognises Israel), in the hope of making progress and so involving more hard-line groups (Hamas, which does not recognise Israel) later. However, Fatah and Hamas are now cooperating again and to deal with one and not the other might be difficult. It is also difficult to see the current government of Israel as ‘moderate’ compared with the Yitzhak Rabin government of the 1990s which negotiated the Oslo Accords.
2) The need for widespread popular support and consensus building before, during and after talks.
3) Pressure and support from the international community, the Quartet, and Arab countries, to start and make real progress with negotiations
4) Should negotiation include other Arab states and other issues (e.g. Jordan and Lebanon as hosts to many Palestinian refugees, Syria because of the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights or is this now a dead issue)?
5) External factors – how did and do the Arab Spring, the protests and demands for greater freedom and the overthrow of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the civil war in Syria and unrest in Lebanon affect the chances of a peace deal? Will the emergence of conservative Moslem governments in Tunisia and Egypt make a settlement more or less likely? Could the civil war in Syria lead to a general conflict in the area involving Israel? What will be the effect of the defeat of Islamic State in Syria, and Iraq and now of its presence in the Sinai desert? Will this mean a dispersal of radical Islamist groups into neighbouring states)Will Israel launch a pre-emptive strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities? Is anti-American feeling in the Arab world (for example, the killing of the US ambassador to Libya in Benghazi in September 2012) now so strong that the US can no longer act as a mediator?
Israel continues to see the Iran Nuclear Deal Framework of April 2015 (between the Islamic Republic of Iran and a group of world powers: the P5+1, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany, plus the European Union) as a mistake, a threat to the long-term balance of power in the Middle East and a threat to its own existence. It welcomed the US withdrawal from the agreement but is alarmed at the EU's position.
The main questions to be resolved
1) Borders: two states, Israel, and a Palestinian state on the West Bank (the problem of the status of the Gaza Strip and Hamas which controls it) Negotiations might begin with the UN Green Line of 1949 and be based on progress made in previous negotiations (e.g. Oslo). This will also require decisions on existing settlements and what would be done with the settlers (for statistics on the rapidly rising number of settlers see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_settlement ) (estimated figures, 350,000 in East Jerusalem and 400,000) on the West Bank and (2)
2) the status of Jerusalem, which is claimed by both as their capital and has Holy sites belonging to Judaism, Islam and Christianity. One example of the nature of the ongoing dispute over settlements and future borders (and the way these issues are intertwined with other aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) is the Israeli government’s plans to build homes for 3,000 settlers in the area known as E1, part of the internationally-recognised Palestinian inhabited territories. The Israeli decision to go ahead with these plans seems to be a response to the UN giving Palestine enhanced observer status and has been met with widespread Palestinian protests. A settlement in the area would cut off Arab East Jerusalem from the West Bank.
3) The political independence and real economic viability of a Palestinian state – water resources, the Israeli Defence barrier and the damage it did to the Palestinian economy, the port of Gaza, removal of (some, most, all and when?) Israeli road blocks and military outposts on the West Bank, aid from the IC, the UN, (the EU?) and rich Arab states.  This question has direct implications for (4)
4) Future security in the area. This is the crucial issue for Israel, which sees a danger in dismantling its defence barrier and then facing new terrorist attacks. Israel wants a peace settlement which is accepted by all the Palestinians (and its Arab neighbours) not with 75% of the Palestinians. Would a compromise also involve the temporary maintenance of some Israeli road blocks and military outposts within the newly created Palestinian state for a certain number of years as a guarantee of security as the Israelis demand?
5)The ‘right of return’ for descendants of the Palestinian refugees of the 1948 and 1967 wars (now estimated at about 4 million people: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_right_of_return ). And where would they return to?
a) Since 1948 many live  in refugee camps in neighbouring countries ( e.g. 1.9 million as refugees in Jordan, although if one includes Jordanians citizens of Palestinian descent this figure rises to 2.7 million, almost half the population of the country)
b) Many refugees claim the right to return to places which are now in Israel, not just on the West Bank
c) Alternatives – settlement on the West bank in the new Palestinian state? Or some form of economic compensation? Could some Palestinians be allowed to return to Israel and become Israeli citizens if they have documentary proof of land ownership in the past?
Conclusion
1) Today may be a difficult moment compared to 20-25 years ago (the Oslo Accords, 1993, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords and the Taba summit of 2001 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taba_Summit )
with a conservative Israeli government today, a fragile and still not fully united Palestinian leadership, and a radicalization of positions and aspirations on both sides. Realistically, it is hard to be very optimistic. In fact, some experts argue that the Palestinians and the Arab world in general continue to regard Israel as a ‘colonial’ outpost (presumably of the West), a foreign imposition, and thus at a fundamental level they reject Israel’s right to exist, or its right to exist as a specifically Jewish state, and therefore question the basis of the two-state solution. The Israelis see the foundation of Israel as their ‘return’ to their homeland after 1800 years, and the creation of a necessary safe-haven for Jews after the pogroms of the 19th century and the Holocaust of WWII. They often regard the Palestinians as simply Arabs (who can therefore become citizens of any Arab state) rather than a specific Arab people with legitimate aspirations to their own independent homeland.
2) In any case, there is a clear need for popular support for the peace process. Political leaders can lead, but a successful peace process would require genuine and growing consensus and support among both populations. Without that basis little progress can be made, and it is not clear that there is a genuine desire for peace at the popular level on either side at the moment, not if ‘genuine desire’ means accepting the price of compromise and making real concessions. In surveys a majority on both sides says it favours peace, but each thinks it is the other side that must make concessions, not their own.
3) Link back to the start by explaining the most recent moves by the international community, and the latest news regarding negotiations or prospects for negotiations.
Some useful sources:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_Palestinian_territories#Population
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_refugee#Refugee_statistics
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Israel
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jews
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_exodus_from_Arab_and_Muslim_countries
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_conflict
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_conflict
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_conflict
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_process_in_the_Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_conflict
http://www.jta.org/news/article/2012/09/16/3106996/palestinian-economic-protests-point-to-uncertain-future-for-pa-israel
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/gilad-shalit-prisoner-swap-israel-prepares-for-the-captive-soldiers-release/2011/10/17/gIQAZ2lFsL_story.html
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/07/05/palestinian-statehood-showdown-at-un/
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/gilad-shalit-prisoner-swap-israel-prepares-for-the-captive-soldiers-release/2011/10/17/gIQAZ2lFsL_story.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_negotiations_between_Israel_and_the_Palestinians_(2010-2011)
Israel declared its independence in May 1948 and was recognized by the USA and Soviet Union in the same month (by Britain and France in January 1949, Italy in February 1949, and Germany in September 1952). It was admitted to the UN in May 1949 under UNSC resolution 273.The Holocaust certainly played a crucial role in determining the attitude of the West and Soviet Union, and the UN’s recognition of Israel. Despite growing sympathy for the Palestinians and sharp criticism of Israeli actions and intransigence over the last 2 decades the EU continues to stand by Israel’s fundamental right to exist in security and to be an accepted member of the international community and the UN, and it supports the Road Map, sponsored by the quartet, which means direct negotiations leading to a 2-state solution. It is not clear if the Oslo Accord(s) would provide a starting point for negotiations or if the 2 sides would prefer to start from scratch [ ripartire da zero].)
public opinion:

Israel's nuclear deterrence
Negotiations
Demographics for the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict

Israel

In Israel in January 2019 the total population is 8,972,000. This is a more than 10-fold increase

compared to when Israel was founded in 1948. Of the Israeli population:

the Jewish population makes up 6,668,000 (74.3%);

1,878,000 (20.9%) are Arabs;

and, those identified as "others" (non-Arab Christians, Baha'i, etc) make up 4.8% of the population

(426,000 people). In addition to these numbers, there are approximately 170,000 people living in

Israel who are neither citizens nor permanent residents.

In May 2014, the Israeli Housing Minister Uri Ariel, who himself lives in the West Bank settlement

of Kfar Adumim, put the settler population at up to 750,000: 400,000 in the West Bank and up to

350,000 in East Jerusalem. The overall population grew by 2% in 2018.

The population of Israel is forecast to reach 10 million by 2024 or sooner.

Israel welcomed approximately 40,000 new immigrants in 2018 with most immigrants arriving in

Israel from France, the Ukraine, Russia, and the United States .

Of Israeli Jews, 44.3% self-identify as secular, 11% simply as religious, and 9% as ultra-Orthodox.

Those of European and American ancestry make up about 2.2 million (36%) of the Jewish

population while Africans fill out another 14.5% and Asians are 11.2%.

Out of the 14.5 million Jewish people in the world, 46% reside in Israel.

In the US in 2016 there were 5,700,000 Jews

In France 460,000

In Canada 388,000

In the UK 290,568

In Russia 179,000

In Argentina 180,700

In Australia 113,500

In Germany 117,000

In Brazil 94,000

In Italy 27,400

However figures for the global and country by country ‘Enlarged Jewish Population’ (a looser

definition based on ancestry and members of Jewish households are much higher.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_population_by_country

see also: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/jewpop.html

The Palestinians
Total population worldwide est. 13 million in January 2019
Palestinian territories
total 4,816,503 in 2016 (probably 5,134,230 in January 2019 http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/palestine-population/)
West Bank 2,935,368 (there are 19 UNRWA refugee camps with 228,560 Palestinian refugees, and 774,167 registered refugees in total)
Gaza 1,881,135 (there are 8 UNRWA refugee camps with 560,964 Palestinian refugees, and 1,276,929 registered refugees in total)
Israel 1,878,000
Global total figure for Palestinians descended from refugees 4,950,000
refugees in Jordan – an estimate including Jordanian citizens of Palestinian descent
2,140,000–3,240,000 (2009)
refugees in Syria, 560,000 (2016) but where are they now? Perhaps 200,000 still in Syria and 100,000 in Europe
refugees n Lebanon 458,369 (2016)
in Chile 500,000 (2009)
in Saudi Arabia 400,000 (2016)
in Qatar 295,000 (2016)
in Iraq 57,000 (2009)
in the US 255,000 (2008)

Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt


Is it reasonable for Israel to insist on being a Jewish state?

Let’s start with another country:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/09/201192614417586774.html
and now Israel, the Palestinians and the wider Muslim world:


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