How is the role of NATO evolving? What are the main challenges facing the organization? Outline developments at the European Defence Agency and cooperation with NATO.
Look at the
latest news and decisions to keep up to date. For example:
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/07/14/the-real-military-balance-between-russia-and-nato/
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_210927.htm?selectedLocale=en
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_196144.htm
https://eda.europa.eu/who-we-are/partners
https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-magazine/full-edm-23-(final).pdf
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/
NATO's
New Strategic Concept 2022
https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/
https://www.osorin.it/uploads/model_4/.files/117_item_2.pdf?v=1664283035
then:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/what-next-eu-security-and-defence-0_en
https://www.nato.int/ or https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm NATO-Russia
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_190373.htm Ukraine
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_191254.htm?selectedLocale=en
NATO-Russia
Finland and
Sweden https://www.nato-pa.int/content/finland-sweden-accession
https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/
Strategic Concept
https://www.nato.int/nato2030/
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm operations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_NATO_operations
operations
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-the-us-failure-in-afghanistan-wont-break-nato/
withdrawal from Afghanistan
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/speciale-afghanistan-nato-ritirata-31386
https://www.ispionline.it/en/node/1332
https://ip-quarterly.com/en/can-nato-survive-afghanistan-debacle
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/02/01/nato-an-unexpected-driver-of-climate-action/index.html climate action
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm funding
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/this-is-how-much-nato-countries-spend-on-defense/ defence
spending
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074 the US and
its partners
NATO and the European Defence Agency
https://www.pgpf.org/chart-archive/0053_defense-comparison
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2010/11/25/nato-and-the-european-defence-agency-not-a-zero-sum-game/index.html https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3McmcY-3d9I EU-NATO
Cooperation
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jtrW6ivIuJA
EU-NATO Cooperation
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm
EU-NATO Cooperation
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm
last summit communiqué
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm
Enhanced Forward Presence
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhanced_Forward_Presence
https://lc.nato.int/operations/enhanced-forward-presence-efp
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PX4a6d3qNbU Mattarella visiting
the troops
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YnDNOMbu0bg
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en#11929 EU Missions
US bases and NATO installations in Italy
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/03/us-military-base-expansion-italy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:NATO_installations_in_Italy
NATO Funding – How it works. Read all sections
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm
Lessons from Afghanistan?
https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/lessons-wests-long-war-afghanistan-35961
https://www.limesonline.com/sommari-rivista/lezioni-afghane
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/lessons-libya-how-not-intervene
Recent
background, for example: https://thehill.com/policy/international/524971-nato-secretary-general-warmly-welcomes-biden-as-president-elect
https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2020/11/12/great-optimism-eu-and-nato-brussels-looks-biden
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/27/biden-win-macron-independent-europe/
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-germany-usa-defence-idUKKBN2800QS
https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/biden-e-la-nato-ricucire-gli-strappi-28081
https://formiche.net/2020/11/esteri-nato-europa-stoltenberg/
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html
https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/nato-stato-morte-cerebrale-ambizioni-macron-francia-e-ue-ACDUwQx
https://www.france24.com/en/20191107-macron-claims-nato-is-suffering-brain-death
You should also read the Lisbon
Declaration of November 2010
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease
the Chicago Declaration of May 2012
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease
the Wales summit Declarations of September 2014
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112517.htm The
Warsaw summit Communiqué of July 2016 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Warsaw_summit The
Brussels summit of May 2017 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Brussels_summit The Brussels summit of July 2018 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Brussels_summit London summit December
2019: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm
https://bianet.org/english/world/216686-nato-releases-final-declaration-of-london-summit The Brussels summit of June 2021 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm
The Madrid
summit of June 2022
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_196144.htm
and then https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50651695 Trump
https://thedefensepost.com/2019/12/04/nato-joint-statement-london/ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50653597
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forze_armate_dell%27Unione_europea http://www.adnkronos.com/fatti/esteri/2017/09/03/nato-apre-hub-napoli-per-sud_k0JzpzCvEqdnpu1Dqo271N.html NATO’s Naples’ hub
More on developments regarding the European
Defence Agency and NATO
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/430/Military%20and%20civilian%20missions%20and%20operations EU missions and operations https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_and_civilian_missions_of_the_European_Union
EU missions and operations
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SpS4TIdAQ9k https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DnT-gCypgNo https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaEGS5muCSA
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uj385Rq_66I https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3McmcY-3d9I https://www.eda.europa.eu/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bs8xXf-2PBY https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/security/20190612STO54310/eu-army-myth-what-is-europe-really-doing-to-boost-defence https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/07/16/strengthening-eu-nato-relations/index.html https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/28286/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheet_en https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_a_new_beginning_for_european_defence https://www.eda.europa.eu/ https://www.eda.europa.eu/aboutus/who-we-are/member-states https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_and_civilian_missions_of_the_European_Union
https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_41_EU_military_operations.pdf
https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/permanent-structured-cooperation-(pesco) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_Structured_Cooperation#Participating_armed_forces
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_Structured_Cooperation#Neutral_states
https://ec.europa.eu/ireland/news/key-eu-policy-areas/permanent-structured-cooperation-on-security-and-defence_en
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ZYOUM7GbSA https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/eu-defence-co-operation-is-no-threat-to-irish-neutrality-1.3343293 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=99AkjuMgaB4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebvJ9OzMRjY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dh8EKNZ8O7Y http://defencesummit.eu/ https://warsawinstitute.org/finnish-ministry-national-defence-sceptical-european-army/ http://tahdistolehti.fi/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-new-beginning-increased-cooperation-eu-defence/
https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2018/12/12/gismo-s-geohub-aims-at-full-operational-capability-by-early-2019
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/05/defence-cooperation-council-adopts-conclusions-on-eu-nato-cooperation-endorsing-common-set-of-new-proposals-for-further-joint-work/ and then really as much background as you
have time to read https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/28286/EU-NATO%20cooperation%20-%20Factsheet http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2018)625109 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_nato_factsheet_16-06-2017_0.pdf https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2017/03/27/nato-deputy-secretary-general-rose-gottemoeller-visits-eda https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_138829.htm https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/15449/Mogherini:%20%22EU-Nato%20cooperation%20crucial%20for%20the%20continent%22 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/search/site/european%20defence_en http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/19/eu-nato-cooperation/# https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2017-11/2017%20-%20163%20DSCTC%2017%20E%20rev%201%20fin%20-%20EU%20AND%20NATO%20COOPERATION%20-%20MESTERHAZY%20REPORT.pdf https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_49217.htm
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160630_1607-factsheet-nato-eu-en.pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_operations_of_the_European_Union
http://piracy-studies.org/beyond-rivalry-eu-nato-cooperation-in-counter-piracy-operations/ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/595855/EPRS_BRI(2016)595855_EN.pdf https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36195/most-important-moment-european-defence-decades-mogherini_fr http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/american-withdrawal-presents-opportunity-for-europe-a-1135172.html http://www.adnkronos.com/aki-en/security/2017/11/10/pinotti-backs-more-integrated-european-defence_ctDIgGhps1J3p37WCRwlmL.html http://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/future-eu-defence-european-space-data-and-cyber-agency
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/34226/Permanent%20Structured%20Cooperation%20(PESCO)%20-%20Factsheet https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/defence-security-timeline/# http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1516_en.htm http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/22-euco-security-defence/ http://www.newsweek.com/eu-defense-fund-tackle-russia-military-trump-nato-622648 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40217085
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/07/eu-prepares-a-defense-union-that-could-alleviate-not-aggravate-trumps-concerns-on-nato.html http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari1-2017-keohane-threes-company-france-germany-uk-european-defence-post-brexit
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4385_en.htm and plans for the European Border
and Coast Guard https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/fact-sheets/docs/a_european_border_and_coast_guard_en.pdf http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-5715_en.htm https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Border_and_Coast_Guard_Agency
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Risk_Analysis_for_2019_0.pdf
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/11/08/european-border-and-coast-guard-council-adopts-revised-regulation/
NATO background:
The current NATO Secretary General is Jens
Stoltenberg, former PM of Norway.
Read this information carefully, as necessary background, take notes on what
you think you can use. You won’t need everything.
e.g. North Atlantic Treaty Organization or North Atlantic Alliance – formed
April 1949 – at present 30 members (Montenegro joined in June 2017 and North
Macedonia in March 2020) – HQ Brussels, Belgium (with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE) in
Mons, Belgium, the central command of NATO military forces).
The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, famously
stated the organization's goal was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down"
(Do not quote this at the Concorso!!).
NATO was
created at the start of the Cold War as an alliance among states sharing core
democratic values, and was a way to extend the US commitment to the stability
and defense of Western and Southern Europe (resulting from WWII) indefinitely.
Its principal objective was to deter (hence 'deterrence') a Soviet invasion
or interference in the area. This was based on article 5 of the treaty, under which
members are committed to come to the aid and defense of any member state which is
attacked by a non-member (i.e. Russia). This was achieved by the deployment of
US and allied forces throughout Europe in such a way that the invasion of a
NATO member would automatically involve the forces of the US and other
countries, thus committing them to action. Conventional Russian forces were
always superior to those of the Alliance, so the ultimate deterrence was provided
by US (and later British and French) nuclear weapons. In the event of a conflict
NATO conventional forces were there to gain time for diplomacy before using nuclear
weapons. In response the Soviet Union created the Warsaw Pact with its Eastern
European allies in May 1955 (after West Germany joined NATO). NATO never had to
go to war, and was thus successful in fulfilling its main objective of deterring
Russia.
With the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union
(1989-1992), NATO seemed to have lost its historic reason for existing. The US and
its NATO allies reduced the size of their forces in Europe and since then there
has been an ongoing debate about what, if any, NATO’s role can and should now
be in world affairs. The Lisbon declaration (Nov. 2010) seemed to provide some
clear indications regarding the direction in which NATO was moving. However, it
also raised certain questions and left some unanswered. With the events of 2008
in Georgia and, above all, of 2014 in Ukraine there has been a rise in tensions
with Russia, a decline in cooperation between Russia and NATO and fears that we
are returning, if not to the Cold War, at least to an adversarial relationship
rather than one based on working together. Given this scenario, NATO may now
have to return more to its original purpose of guaranteeing its members’ (particularly
its Eastern European members’) sovereignty and independence. President Trump's
decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-range
Nuclear Forces treaty added to tensions and raised fears of a new nuclear arms
race.
(see also
the dispute since 1992 between Moldova and Russia over Transnistria)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria
There were
also concerns in Europe that President Trump might decide to withdraw the US from
NATO, which would have meant the death of the organization, or simply reduce
the US role within it in a more isolationist approach, leaving its European allies
to face threats on their own. This led the EU to look more to its own defence
but also to welcome Biden’s election.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_from_NATO#United_States_of_America
Main points:
1)
After the end of the Cold War the US reduced its forces in Europe and shifted
a significant proportion of what remained southwards. NATO reduced its heavy
conventional forces and European armies based largely on military service in
favor of smaller, more professional and much more high-tech forces with ‘out of
area’ (outside Europe) capabilities (including logistical support). This process
has continued with more attention paid to cost effectiveness and greater integration
of different national forces and weapons systems. However, these goals are
difficult to achieve.
2)
NATO’s Strategic Concept after 2010 was based on the idea of intervention
in crisis management and security questions beyond NATO’s borders (‘out of
area’ operations beyond Europe, the area NATO was originally created to defend)
and in cooperation with other countries and regional organizations (ISAF in Afghanistan
was NATO-led but included forces from other countries). This idea has gradually
evolved since the early 1990s with NATO’s intervention in the Balkans (in 1993
against Serbia, and in 1999 in Kosovo). After 9/11 NATO invoked article 5 for
the first time and sent the ISAF to Afghanistan in 2001 under a UN mandate (the
first major ‘out of area’ operation) and later also became involved in training
Iraqi forces to take over responsibility for security. Since August 2009 it has
conducted operation Ocean Shield against piracy off the Horn of (North-East)
Africa. It launched an operation to protect Libyan civilians from the Gaddafi
regime in March-October 2011 which led to the fall of the regime, and is now
involved in a security operation (Sea Guardian) in the Mediterranean. As a
result of the 9/11 terrorist attack, and the threat of further terrorist
attacks there is now also intensified cooperation between the security services
and police forces of NATO members, and between them and other countries facing
the same threat. The organization also created a NATO Response Force (NRF) to
make it easier for NATO to provide a rapid response to a crisis before the deployment
of heavier forces.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Response_Force
However,
after the failure of the operation in Afghanistan, the US and its NATO partners
may be less willing to engage in ‘out-of-area’ operations.
See the
New Strategic Concept 2022
https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/
3)
NATO began to see its role less in strictly military terms and more and
more in terms of cooperating with the UN, the EU, other international or
regional organizations, and other countries (whether democratic like Brazil and
Australia or less so, like Russia, or not at all but stable, like China) on a
range of issues considered threats to NATO members’ security, e.g. terrorism, international
crime and trafficking, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear arms, piracy,
cyberattacks, climate change and environmental degradation and crisis management
(intervention to stabilize failed states and prevent escalating local crises).See
the Lisbon Summit Declaration November 2010
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease
and
the Chicago Summit Declaration (May 2012)
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease
but again,
as we have seen, Ukraine has changed the focus back to military defence.
4) In
the years following the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, many former Soviet
satellite states joined NATO and the EU which expanded to the East (German unification
in 1990 This meant NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
in 1999, for the Baltic states, Rumania, Bulgaria and Slovakia in 2004, for
Albania and Croatia in 2009, Montenegro 2017, North Macedonia 2020). The remaining
Balkan states will probably join NATO soon (As
of 2021, NATO officially recognizes only three aspiring members: Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the Balkans,
and Georgia and Ukraine, where any rapid progress seems unlikely
because of Russian opposition).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO
For Eastern
European countries this move was mainly a guarantee of continued independence
from Russia. However, this has been seen by Russia as aggressive and a way to
reduce Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Russia made clear its
opposition to Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia joining NATO or the EU. Georgia has
been promised NATO membership at an unspecified date in the future but Russia’s
intervention in Georgia in 2008, in support of the breakaway republics of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, was the first real sign of the dangers raised by the question
of further NATO/EU expansion to the East. In fact, Russia’s opposition to
Georgia joining NATO seems to have blocked further progress.
However, it
is the evolution of events in Ukraine which have really thrown into question
all certainties about relations with the Russian Federation. Ukraine also expressed
interest in NATO membership in 2008, but later adopted a position of neutrality
in 2010 probably because of Russia’s opposition. A decision in November 2013 by
Ukraine's President Viktor Yanukovych to pull out of an association deal with
the European Union sparked huge street protests that eventually led to his
downfall in February 2014. In March Russia reacted by annexing the Ukrainian
region of Crimea after the Crimean parliament declared independence from Ukraine,
and unrest began growing in eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russian sentiment is
strong. The US and NATO denounced the Russian move as illegal and its support for
the separatist insurgencies in the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions
since 2014 as aggressively expansionist. Following Russia’s support for the separatists
in 2014, the Ukrainian government launched a military counter-offensive against
the insurgents, which resulted in the ongoing War in Donbass. After parliamentary elections
in October 2014, the new Ukraine government made joining NATO a priority.
In December 2014, the Ukrainian parliament renounced Ukraine's non-aligned status that had “proved
to be ineffective in guaranteeing Ukraine's security and protecting the country
from external aggression and pressure”. Russia obviously opposes this.
Russia has continued to argue that it sees NATO and the EU’s expansion to the East
over the last 20 years as far more aggressive than its own response to protect
Russian minorities and that this expansion is a violation of a promise made in
1990 that in exchange for Russian agreement to German reunification NATO agreed
not to expand towards the East. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation
NATO's growing concern and its strategy to respond to Russia's moves can be
seen in
The Wales
Summit Declaration Sept 2014 (paragraphs 16-31)
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm
the Warsaw
Declaration on Transatlantic Security July 2016
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133168.htm
and in detail in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué July 2016
(paragraphs 9-24)
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm
EU response
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/
NATO
response
See
the links at the start of this post for a summary of current tensions with
Russia over Ukraine and NATO’s official stance.
With the situation
in Georgia, the current conflict in Ukraine and the resulting sanctions, as well
as Russia’s growing assertiveness in international relations (e.g. Syria) new
questions have been raised about the prospects for good future relations between
the European Union, NATO and the West
in general and the Russian Federation. With Russian minorities in other
Eastern European and Baltic NATO and EU members (and also in Moldova), NATO
decided in March 2015 to strengthen its Baltic Air Policing
mission and presence in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea area. It has
also conducted joint military exercises with Ukraine but has avoided overt
military involvement in both Ukraine and Georgia, not wanting a direct confrontation
with Russia and the risk of a complete breakdown in relations. Although they
are not NATO members, Ukraine and Georgia began
participating in the NATO Response
Force (NRF), respectively, in 2014 and 2015.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315.html
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315-2.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014%E2%80%9315_Russian_military_intervention_in_Ukraine
(See the notes in ‘The EU and the Russian
Federation’ for an account of the evolution of events in Ukraine in 2014 and the growth in
tension between NATO and the Russian Federation).
At the NATO summit in Wales on 4th and 5th September
2014, the military alliance finalized plans for its new spearhead NATO Response
Force (a rapid deployment force of 4,000
soldiers able go into action in 48 hours) as a response to growing concern about
the Ukraine crisis and the rise of Islamic State militants. Despite calls from
eastern European members (Poland and the Baltic states), NATO did not approve
the proposal to create new permanent bases in these member states. Germany in particular
wished to avoid further antagonizing Russia by such an action. President Obama,
however, assured them of NATO and US commitment to their protection (see below
for the change of policy at the Warsaw Summit) NATO also confirmed the suspension
(April 2014) of its partnership for civilian and military cooperation with
Russia and offered support for Ukraine’s plans to strengthen its military capacity.
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/05/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/index.html
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/02/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/
http://www.voanews.com/content/eastern-ukraine-ceasefire/2440781.html
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/16/ukraine-votes-more-power-separatist-east
President
Putin defended Russia’s annexation of Crimea by saying that Washington and its
European allies were guided by “the rule of the gun” rather than international
law and respect for the principle of state sovereignty. In March 2014
Washington put military cooperation with Russia on hold and ended negotiations
on the NATO missile defense program. It also banned the export to Russia of technology
with potential military applications, suspended cooperation on civilian nuclear
energy projects and cut off NASA’s contacts with its Russian counterparts.
Russia, meanwhile, made a resolution of the impasse over NATO’s missile defense
system a precondition for further strategic arms control talks. It formed the Eurasian
Economic Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan in May in 2014
and Armenia and Kyrgyzstan became full members in 2015. The Eurasian
Economic Union has an integrated single market of 183 million
people and a gross domestic product of over 4
trillion US dollars (PPP). All EAEU member states participate in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, an intergovernmental
mutual defense alliance. Some Russian commentators even argue that its authoritarian
model is a viable alternative to Western liberal democracy and one which will
gain support in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where some Western ideas are
seen as going against tradition and religion.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurasian_Economic_Union
At the 2016
Warsaw summit NATO reversed its position on deploying forces to Russia's
borders. NATO agreed to deploy military forces to the
Baltic states and eastern Poland from January 2017 to deter Russia, a response
to Moscow's 2014 seizure of Crimea from Ukraine. The four battalions totaling between
3,000 and 4,000 troops would be led by Britain in Estonia, the United States in
Poland, Canada in Latvia and Germany in Lithuania. This has been called by
various names, Operation Reassurance, Operation Deterrence and now NATO's
Enhanced Forward Presence. There is also the Enhanced NATO Response Force,
the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and the Multinational Division South – East
in Romania. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhanced_Forward_Presence https://kariuomene.kam.lt/en/e_f_p.html
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_09/20180903_180905-MAP-eFP-eng.pdf
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170316_170316-def-det-map.pdf
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-decisions-factbox-idUSKCN0ZP0MX
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/nato-deploys-troops-poland-russian-border-170413213541667.html
https://euobserver.com/foreign/135681
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad/nato-ee.page
https://www.voanews.com/a/nato-summit-shows-shift-from-reassurance-to-deterrence/3409096.html
further NATO
and EU response to Ukraine
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46425777
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_160789.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156623.htm
http://nato.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-nato/Partnership
https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_25457.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93European_Union_Association_Agreement
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/11/ukraine-association-agreement/
5)
NATO continues to want and need to stabilize and improve relations with
Russia. There has been extensive practical cooperation in many fields in the
recent past. How far is each side willing to make concessions to return to this
cooperation? And how far have the events and growing tensions in Eastern Europe
put all future cooperation at risk?
a) NATO has
developed a ballistic missile defense system in Europe for the protection of NATO
forces and the populations of NATO member states.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm This is supposedly intended to deal
with a threat from a country like Iran, accused of wanting to develop nuclear
weapons, or against terrorists (!), but has been consistently opposed by the
Russians as potentially aimed at them. In Lisbon NATO relaunched the idea,
offering to work with Russia on this project. The immediate Russian response at
the Lisbon summit in November 2010 (NATO Russia Council) was positive providing
that the cooperation offered by NATO meant Russia’s real integration into a system
of shared defense against third parties (e.g. Iran). Russia was not willing to
accept a system based in Eastern European NATO member states from which it would
only receive information and intelligence as a courtesy. The implication from
the Russian point of view is that it could still be used against Russia.
In fact, NATO rejected the idea of Russia’s participation in the control
arrangements for the missile defense system and Russia has deployed missiles to Kaliningrad and other
sections of its borders with NATO.
During its 2012 Chicago Summit NATO
leaders declared that the ballistic missile defense system had reached ‘interim’
capability. For what this means see the link to the Wikipedia notes on the
Chicago summit. It seems to involve installations in the Czech Republic, Poland
and the Black Sea region (Turkey and Romania) as well as submarine-based
missiles. The project is ongoing.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_missile_defence_system
http://www.rt.com/news/246709-nato-missile-shield-iran/
At
its 2016 Warsaw summit NATO took command of the U.S.-built missile shield in
Europe to defend against ballistic missiles from Iran.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-decisions-factbox-idUSKCN0ZP0MX
latest: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm
https://ac.nato.int/page8021748
b)
NATO and the US have frequently reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear
non-proliferation, and continuing large-scale reductions in nuclear armaments
and missile delivery systems initiated with the START I treaty (July 1991) and
continued in START II (Jan 1993) and SORT (May 2002). In fact, further reductions
were agreed in negotiations between the US and Russia that led to the New START
treaty which came into force in February 2011 and replaced the START II and SORT
treaties. Some commentators suggest that it seems slightly contradictory to
launch a project for missile defense (point 5a) while supporting arms
reductions. Others argue that it is simply a question of realism, and that NATO’s
first priority must be its founding purpose, collective security.
Russia for
several years made a resolution of the impasse over NATO’s missile defense
system a precondition to further strategic arms control talks. Shortly before
its expiry in February 2021, the US and Russia agreed to extend the New Start
Treaty for 5 years and engage in new talks on nuclear arms control.
https://www.state.gov/new-start/
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-03/news/us-russia-extend-new-start-five-years
There is
still a danger that with the gradual evolution of nuclear and missile
technology much of the impressive progress made on nuclear arms reductions
could unravel unless negotiations are relaunched soon. At the same time in the
US there are doubts about whether Russia has respected its New START commitments
to arms reductions. This is what led President Trump to announce the US withdrawal
from the 1987
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty, with some commentators saying there
is a danger of a new nuclear arms race. Some experts
argue that with the increased reliance on IT systems in nuclear defence systems,
the catastrophic risks of a computer error or computer-related human error are
leading us towards the nightmare scenario of Dr Strangelove. In
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/trump-us-nuclear-arms-treaty-russiahttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-17511816http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7674962/US-has-more-than-5000-nuclear-warheads.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_with_nuclear_weapons
http://www.mapsofworld.com/world-top-ten/world-top-ten-countries-by-nuclear-warheads-map.html https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-future-of-u-s-russian-arms-control/
http://www.nipp.org/2016/06/21/schneider-mark-russias-growing-strategic-nuclear-forces-and-new-start-treaty-compliance/
Unresolved
Questions for NATO:
1)
The decision-making process. The existing system depends on consensus
and agreement at all levels, without formal voting. There is an unwritten rule
that a country (or countries) which is not in agreement with the other members
on an issue remains silent (e.g. Greece and the NATO intervention in the Balkans)
and simply does not participate in the operation. However, as the organization
grows, like the EU, it will probably need to modify this decision-making
process. Can this be done without damaging NATO’s effectiveness? What seems likely
to happen is that NATO actions may be authorized by all or most members but not
undertaken by all the 30 members. In addition, there may be space for small groups
of NATO allies to undertake operations that have first been discussed with the
other members. In practice this is want happened in Libya, although the US criticized
the lack of participation by the NATO members which had authorized the mission.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm
2)
Relations with Russia – at the start of the 21st century, despite
a clear commitment from both NATO and Russia to warmer relations and closer
cooperation it was not clear what this meant in practice, or if they were
thinking along the same lines. Russia seemed to believe that without formally joining
NATO it should have the right to share in NATO decisions (and block those it did
not like) and also to take part fully in NATO’s military/technological
programs. NATO seemed to think that cooperation simply meant keeping Russia informed
and providing it with any information NATO gets regarding possible threats to
Russia. While Russia is a vital partner from the point of view of global
security and within international decision-making bodies (and in economic terms,
e.g. energy supplies to the EU), most NATO members, particularly those in
Eastern Europe no longer believe Russia really shares NATO’s core democratic
beliefs, and have doubts about how far Russia can be trusted. Events in Georgia
and Ukraine have only strengthened this point of view and cooperation with
Russia seems dead for the moment, in favour of cooperation against Russia. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/10/world/europe/russia-eu-nato.html
However, terrorist
attacks like those in Paris on November 13th 2015 will continue to
require cooperation between Russia and the West in a coordinated effort to
defeat Islamic extremists. So, for the moment, how this relationship will
develop is unclear. This document puts NATO's position very clearly:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm
a)
The proposed NATO missile defense system – this is a good example of the
above. How exactly could Russia ever be persuaded to cooperate with, or simply
accept this project? Since Russia is not being offered access to the technology
and a right to participate fully in any decisions, it is likely to remain hostile
to the project.
b)
NATO membership for Georgia, Ukraine and the Balkan states – NATO
believes these states have the right to join. Russia sees this as an aggressive
expansion by NATO into Russia’s ‘near abroad’ and is against more of its neighbors
joining NATO. It seems ready to actively protect what it sees as Russia’s
interests and ethnic Russian minorities (the war with Georgia and support for
separatists in Ukraine and in 2022 the Russian invasion). This seems to make progress
on expanding NATO and EU membership beyond candidate status for both Georgia and
Ukraine a risky process.
c)
Russia and the US are both aware that further progress on arms
reductions depends not only on agreement on the ballistic missile defense system.
Russia argues that the US must be committed to working with, and not against,
Russia for real progress to be made and progress on an agreement on NATO’s missile
defense system is now a factor if no longer a precondition for nuclear arms reduction
talks. The US withdrawal from the Intermediate-range
Nuclear Forces treaty raised the danger of a new nuclear arms race.
d)
Enhanced Forward Presence is a NATO deployment in Europe aimed at countering
possible Russian expansionism after events in Georgia and Ukraine.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm
https://kariuomene.kam.lt/en/e_f_p.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PX4a6d3qNbU
3)
What happens after NATO’s failure in Afghanistan? Will the US and/or its NATO
partners be willing to engage in future out-of-area operations?
https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-fall-of-the-afghan-government-and-what-it-means-for-europe/
Has the outcome,
and the enormous cost of the operation, damaged NATO’s reputation and confidence
so much that it will be unable or unwilling to undertake other operations
outside Europe? Will this be the end of NATO’s commitment to proactive crisis
management around the world? Or will it mean a return to a much more traditional
defensive role limited to the European area? The NATO operation in Libya, which
initially was seen as a success, led to internal chaos, faction-fighting and the
growing presence of Islamic State and other radical groups in the area. Again,
this may have reduced the willingness of NATO members to take part in similar operations
in the future.
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm
https://www.routledge.com/The-EU-NATO-and-the-Libya-Conflict-Anatomy-of-a-Failure/Marcuzzi/p/book/9780367545512
Is
the EU facing a similar risk in its members’ interventions in Mali and the Sahel?
4)
Finances – Both the US and Europe were hit hard by the 2008 recession
and financial crisis and the recent Covid-19 pandemic. There is reluctance on
both sides of the Atlantic to face the question of paying for NATO forces and
operations. The US contributes between one-fifth and one-quarter of NATO's budget
(22%) and most of its forces, equipment and technology for actual operations
(in Afghanistan, for example). The US accounted for a massive 69% of NATO members’
military spending in 2021 (while representing only 41% of the NATO countries’
combined GDP), and the US wants European members to spend more on their
military. For them this has not been a good time to increase their contributions
to NATO. Most of them made cuts to their military spending after the 2008 recession.
This could damage NATO’s operational effectiveness. The cuts in European military
forces after the 2008 financial crisis may have been so large as to compromise their
ability to launch sustained independent operations, or even to participate
effectively in large-scale combined operations. ‘Smart defense’ is an attempt to combine cuts in spending with
rationalization of resources in order to remain fully effective. It is also
difficult to calculate what the balance should be between the US and Europe because
clearly US military spending also covers US operations and forces which are not
intended for NATO.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074
How
realistic is it to talk about a more democratic basis for decision-making within
the organization, with more of a say for European members, if NATO is essentially
an organization in which the US pays for and does most of the work? NATO used to be formed by large armies based
on military service. After the end of the Cold War there was a move to much
smaller professional armies based on career volunteers and greater investment
in high-tech equipment to give these forces a decisive combat advantage. As was
mentioned above, in a period of austerity the key concept seems to be ‘smart defense’, a more intelligent use of
limited financial resources, more sharing of equipment and back-up support and
integration between NATO forces (e.g. Britain and France signed a defense
cooperation treaty in November 2010 which involves plans to share military assets
and technologies). How realistic all this will be in maintaining NATO as an
effective force remains to be seen.
However, at
the Warsaw summit NATO'S European allies agreed a defence spending increase worth
more than £6 billion. Most members, however, failed in 2017 and 2018 to reach
the target of 2% of GDP for military spending.
With new interest in the European Defence Agency, NATO’s
European members may be more willing to raise defence spending, but in the
aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic they may not be able to do so.
5)
Is NATO, a defensive military alliance with capabilities for dealing with
cyberattacks (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm),
really the right kind of organization to deal with threats like terrorism,
various kinds of illegal trafficking, illegal immigration, piracy, nuclear proliferation,
peace-keeping, -building and -enforcement operations and environmental concerns?
Perhaps it is, and NATO should gradually be re-organized and lose some of its
military character.
6)
Is there a contradiction between a NATO ballistic missile defense system
and the goal of nuclear arms reductions? After all, the missiles used to
eliminate incoming missiles (defense) are often weapons that could also be
rearmed and used as delivery systems (offense).
7)
The operation in Libya holds several lessons and, as a case study, offers an
interesting comparison with the operation in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq and
the situation in Syria, both in terms of similarities and differences. First, it
was, like Afghanistan, an out of area operation (but only slightly) and had a UN
mandate. However, the Russians claim it exceeded its mandate to protect
civilian lives. It was limited to air raids against specific targets, as requested
by the Arab League and Libyan fighters, and did not involve sending land forces
to Libya. The US played an active role only at the start but provided logistics,
supplies and support. Generally, it had support from the local population on
the ground, and it was successful and of short duration. However, it also demonstrated
that it is difficult to build consensus to act within NATO even for an
operation very close to NATO’s borders (Germany was initially strongly opposed).
Secondly, the operation was expensive and complex (but obviously nowhere near as
long and costly as the operation in Afghanistan) and only possible with the political,
military, technological and financial support of the US, despite the attempt to
make it a ‘European’ operation. However, what was seen as the operation's technical
success led to the fall of the Gaddafi regime but, as in Afghanistan, this did
not produce a smooth transition to a functioning democracy but the collapse of
law and order. In the absence of an international mission, Libya remains a
country dominated by armed factions and so far unable to produce a stable and
effective central government with real control over its territory. As a result,
it is a base for terrorism and human-trafficking and is the point of departure for
many refugees trying to enter Europe via Italy. It is hard to see how the new but
fragile unity government will re-establish the rule of law.
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/wrangle-over-interim-libyan-government-intensifies-2022-01-31/
However, at
its Warsaw summit NATO leaders agreed to provide support
for the European Union's military mission off the Libyan coast to crack down on
smugglers.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-decisions-factbox-idUSKCN0ZP0MX
More recently, NATO also reaffirmed its support for
the interim Libyan government, while the EU is planning a miliary mission to
Libya.
https://lana.gov.ly/post.php?lang=en&id=188085
https://euobserver.com/world/152474
All of this
should make us think carefully about what kind of operation NATO is able or not
able to carry out / is willing or unwilling to carry out / should or should not
carry out, and in what circumstances and under what conditions it is likely to
be successful. The EU will need to ask itself the same questions about its own
operations.
8) In contrast to the fairly rapid response to
events in Libya in 2011, there was little desire among NATO members to intervene
in Syria when the civil war began except in terms of sanctions. NATO began to
deploy Patriot missiles to Turkey in 2013 to protect it from any potential
spread of the Syrian conflict.
The US in the summer 2015 and its allies (notably
France and the UK after the terrorist attacks in Paris in Nov. 2015) carried
out air raids against IS in coordination with other Middle East allies but
there are no plans for a NATO operation. However, there is neither the legal
basis for a major NATO ground intervention in Syria, nor real support for the
idea among NATO members. There has been extensive intervention by Russia,
Turkey and Iran but there is no agreed and coordinated plan between these three
and Western countries as they have different objectives. In December 2018 Donald Trump
ordered a withdrawal of American forces from Syria. At the same time the US administration
said that it accepted that President Assad, Russia’s ally, could
stay in power as a part of a long-term solution to the Syrian crisis but called
on the Syrian regime to make fundamental changes in exchange for aid in
reconstruction.
http://www.arabnews.com/node/1422691/middle-east
As the fighting goes on there continue to
be large numbers of refugees arriving from Syria at the EU’s borders as a
result of the civil war and the initial success of Islamic State forces.
Meanwhile, although Islamic State has been largely checked and defeated, 900 US
troops remain in Syria.
https://www.voanews.com/a/europe_can-turkey-be-trusted-nato-partner/6173333.html
9) Events in
Turkey, a key NATO ally, have also raised concern. The attempted military coup
in July 2016 and the Turkish government’s hard line response to it added to
existing questions about the treatment of the Kurdish minority and human rights
in general. Turkey is also a key partner for the EU in dealing with the migrant
crisis. So commentators are now
asking whether Turkey is still and will remain a reliable NATO ally, and if
not, what this may mean for the alliance's strategy in the Middle East and Mediterranean.
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/03/29/does-turkey-still-belong-in-nato
10) In recent
years the potential security threats to the EU have grown. There has been increased
instability in North Africa and the Middle East with the collapse of decades-old
regimes and areas of civil war (Syria) or ineffective government and
faction-fighting (Libya), leading to mass migration towards Europe and the spread
of terrorism to Europe itself. Meanwhile Russia has begun to use its military
power to reassert its influence both in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe.
Its intervention first in Georgia and later in the Ukraine have alarmed the EU
and in particular the EU's Eastern members. The decision of the UK to withdraw
from the EU (Brexit) and, even more, the election of Donald Trump as US President
(a figure whose statements sometimes made him sound potentially isolationist,
at least in relation to Europe) galvanized attempts to finally create an integrated
European Defence structure through the EU Defence Agency
https://www.eda.europa.eu/. This is
not intended or expected to substitute NATO any time soon (given the scale and strength
of the US military and logistical infrastructure) but to function alongside it.
Europe needs to be able to respond effectively and independently to threats in
the event that the US, for whatever reason, is unwilling or reluctant to assist,
or to carry out operations in areas that the US does not consider of strategic
importance but the EU deems to be vital. Things seem to be moving fast and the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence
(PESCO) is now fully operational. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/107267/council-adopts-14-new-pesco-projects-deepen-eu-defence-cooperation_en
To
put things in perspective, however, one should remember that while the EU's Eastern
European members have welcomed this process which reassures them of support from
their EU partners they have also welcomed as crucial the deployment of NATO forces,
including US and Canadian units, to their countries. Similarly, Italy which hosts
both the US Sixth Fleet and a large number of US bases, would surely prefer to
be able to count at least on US naval, air and logistical support in any major
operation in the Mediterranean.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/03/us-military-base-expansion-italy https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/34226/Permanent%20Structured%20Cooperation%20(PESCO)%20-%20Factsheet Many
of the technical aspects of European Defence integration are the same as those
facing NATO (financing, standardization of weapons and equipment, integration of
multilingual military forces) but the fact that the EU has a large, existing
civilian structure may be a considerable advantage.
Conclusion:
Despite point 4 NATO still accounted for more than 60% of global military
spending in 2021:
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/this-is-how-much-nato-countries-spend-on-defense/
https://www.statista.com/chart/14636/defense-expenditures-of-nato-countries/
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures
During the
early phase of the Cold War the Warsaw Pact’s conventional forces significantly
outnumbered NATO forces. A comparison of NATO conventional resources today with
those of the Russian Federation gives NATO a clear advantage because of huge,
accumulated US assets (and the transfer of the Eastern European bloc countries
to NATO), despite increased military spending by Russia in recent years and some
reductions in Europe by the US and the rest of NATO.
So NATO continues to be the world’s largest and most powerful alliance system,
and remains committed to its core values and primary security goals. It is now
playing a much wider, much more proactive role than during the Cold War, and
intends to continue to do so while seeking new partners within the international
community. After the failure in Afghanistan and growing tensions with Russia
only time will show whether NATO can be effective in this role and whether it
will continue to have the material and financial resources, internal cohesion
and international consensus that it will need in order to do so. Events in
Ukraine are forcing NATO to re-examine its priorities. It may be compelled to
return to its original purpose, the guaranteeing of its members’ sovereignty,
freedom and security in a mainly European context.
A counter-argument to explore: There
are also many critics of NATO who feel that since the end of the Cold War the
fact that NATO has taken on a more and more proactive role is a mistake. They
fear that even when acting with UN authorization, this too easily leads to an increasingly
aggressive militaristic response to local and global problems. They argue that
anti-terrorist or humanitarian intervention by military means is a high-risk
strategy in terms of both collateral damage (civilian deaths, displaced persons,
refugees, physical destruction of housing and essential infrastructure, economic
collapse and soaring operational costs) and final objectives (creating a functioning
democratic state or simply bringing an end to the fighting). They would prefer
to see NATO adopt a much more cautious and conservative stance, defensive in
the traditional sense, while cooperating with the UN on normal peace-keeping
operations and in humanitarian assistance.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/20/new-thinking-needed-nato
http://peaceandhealthblog.com/2012/05/21/nato-world-security/
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_75836.htm
for context
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Chicago_Summit
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/events_84074.htm
In ‘NATO’s Next Act – How to Handle Russia and Other Threats’ (Foreign Affairs, July- August 2016)
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-06-13/natos-next-act
Philip M. Breedlove, former NATO Supreme Commander 2013-16,
describes how over the past 3 years NATO has begun shifting its forces from operations
outside Europe (e.g. Afghanistan) to the threats closer to the heart of the
continent – namely Russian aggression and the challenges associated to the ongoing
instability in the Middle East and North Africa (international displacement of
people and transnational terrorism). Breedlove argues that the US and its NATO
allies need to increase, modernize and rationalize their available resources in
Europe given that the sanctions imposed on Russia after its seizure of Crimea have
not deterred Russia which is continuing its Cold War- style provocations against
NATO ships and planes and territorial waters and air space and its
militarization of the Arctic. He suggests that a rapid military action by
Russia against a NATO ally (e.g. Poland or one of the Baltic states), presumably
in support of a Russian minority or ‘vital interest’, might meet little effective
resistance from NATO in the short term and the situation could become a fait accompli.
He points out that US and NATO funding for Europe has
been insufficient to deal with this growing threat from Russia, due to US budget
cuts, the US prioritizing of other global threats, the US Asia-Pacific rebalance,
the recession and the economic difficulties faced by many of America’s European
NATO allies, their continuing commitments in Kosovo and Afghanistan and their
growing commitments in dealing with the refugee crisis due to the Syrian civil
war and instability in Libya. While Poland and the Baltic states see Russia as
a real threat, other NATO allies, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey are more
concerned with the threats coming from the Middle east and North Africa.
In 2014 in response to events in Ukraine, the US announced
the European Reassurance Initiative and NATO agreed the Readiness Action Plan.
These involve:
More combined military exercises
The rotational deployment of US forces in Poland and
the Baltic states, the Black Sea
A greater NATO presence in the Mediterranean
A very rapid response brigade (part of the NATO
Response Force)
The prepositioning of NATO military resources and
equipment in advanced positions to facilitate a rapid response to an aggression
Small headquarters in 6 vulnerable central and eastern
European NATO members
2 new tactical headquarters in Poland and Romania
Breedlove argues that NATO must continue the fight
against Islamic State but play a supporting role, concentrating on institution
building and education rather than intervention. He argues that the US and NATO
must also continue to work with Russia where possible and where necessary, to
deal with Iran, North Korea and the terrorist threat. However, he is against
the lifting of sanctions on Russia and takes a hardline position, claiming that
Russia will only respect NATO if it has the means to respond to any aggressive
initiative undertaken by Russia.
NATO missile shield in Europe updates http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8206.htm https://www.rt.com/news/326398-nato-missile-defense-romania/ https://www.rt.com/news/246709-nato-missile-shield-iran/ http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-shield-idUSKCN0Y30JX http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-13/poland-to-break-ground-on-missile-shield-site-as-russia-fumes https://www.rt.com/news/350281-stoltenberg-nato-buildup-russia/ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_112331.htm
What lessons does the outcome of the military intervention in
Afghanistan provide for the US, NATO, the UN and the international community in
general?
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231633.shtml
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/17/nato-blames-afghan-government-for-taliban-takeover.html
The EU and Libya https://euobserver.com/world/152474
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