What lessons does the outcome of the military intervention in Afghanistan provide for the US, NATO, the UN and the international community in general?

https://www.forbes.com/sites/williamhartung/2021/08/18/failure-in-afghanistan-over-40-years-in-the-making/?sh=4c162cb7c437

https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231633.shtml

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/17/nato-blames-afghan-government-for-taliban-takeover.html

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/czech-president-natos-failure-afghanistan-puts-its-legitimacy-question-2021-08-17/

https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/europe-urges-unity-taliban-quiet-failed-mission-79480086

The EU and Libya https://euobserver.com/world/152474

Recent background, for example:

https://thehill.com/policy/international/524971-nato-secretary-general-warmly-welcomes-biden-as-president-elect

https://www.gmfus.org/blog/2020/11/12/great-optimism-eu-and-nato-brussels-looks-biden

https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/27/biden-win-macron-independent-europe/

https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-germany-usa-defence-idUKKBN2800QS

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29220/curb-your-enthusiasm-what-france-expects-from-a-biden-presidency

https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/biden-e-la-nato-ricucire-gli-strappi-28081

https://formiche.net/2020/11/esteri-nato-europa-stoltenberg/

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html

https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/nato-stato-morte-cerebrale-ambizioni-macron-francia-e-ue-ACDUwQx

https://www.france24.com/en/20191107-macron-claims-nato-is-suffering-brain-death

You should also read the Lisbon Declaration of November 2010
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease
the Chicago Declaration of May 2012
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease
the Wales summit Declarations of September 2014
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112517.htm

The Warsaw summit Communiqué of July 2016 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Warsaw_summit

The Brussels summit of May 2017

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Brussels_summit

The Brussels summit of July 2018

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Brussels_summit

London summit December 2019:

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm

https://bianet.org/english/world/216686-nato-releases-final-declaration-of-london-summit The Brussels summit of June 2021

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm

and then

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50651695 Trump https://thedefensepost.com/2019/12/04/nato-joint-statement-london/

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50653597
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forze_armate_dell%27Unione_europea http://www.adnkronos.com/fatti/esteri/2017/09/03/nato-apre-hub-napoli-per-sud_k0JzpzCvEqdnpu1Dqo271N.html NATO’s Naples’ hub

More on developments regarding the European Defence Agency and NATO

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/430/Military%20and%20civilian%20missions%20and%20operations EU missions and operations https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_and_civilian_missions_of_the_European_Union EU missions and operations

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SpS4TIdAQ9k

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DnT-gCypgNo https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaEGS5muCSA

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uj385Rq_66I

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3McmcY-3d9I

https://www.eda.europa.eu/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bs8xXf-2PBY

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/security/20190612STO54310/eu-army-myth-what-is-europe-really-doing-to-boost-defence https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/07/16/strengthening-eu-nato-relations/index.html https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/28286/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheet_en

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_a_new_beginning_for_european_defence https://www.eda.europa.eu/

https://www.eda.europa.eu/aboutus/who-we-are/member-states https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_and_civilian_missions_of_the_European_Union https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_41_EU_military_operations.pdf https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/permanent-structured-cooperation-(pesco) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_Structured_Cooperation#Participating_armed_forces https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_Structured_Cooperation#Neutral_states https://ec.europa.eu/ireland/news/key-eu-policy-areas/permanent-structured-cooperation-on-security-and-defence_en https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ZYOUM7GbSA https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/eu-defence-co-operation-is-no-threat-to-irish-neutrality-1.3343293

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=99AkjuMgaB4

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebvJ9OzMRjY

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dh8EKNZ8O7Y

http://defencesummit.eu/

https://warsawinstitute.org/finnish-ministry-national-defence-sceptical-european-army/ http://tahdistolehti.fi/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-new-beginning-increased-cooperation-eu-defence/

https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2018/12/12/gismo-s-geohub-aims-at-full-operational-capability-by-early-2019

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/12/05/defence-cooperation-council-adopts-conclusions-on-eu-nato-cooperation-endorsing-common-set-of-new-proposals-for-further-joint-work/

and then really as much background as you have time to read https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/28286/EU-NATO%20cooperation%20-%20Factsheet

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2018)625109 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_nato_factsheet_16-06-2017_0.pdf https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2017/03/27/nato-deputy-secretary-general-rose-gottemoeller-visits-eda

https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_138829.htm https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/15449/Mogherini:%20%22EU-Nato%20cooperation%20crucial%20for%20the%20continent%22 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/search/site/european%20defence_en http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/19/eu-nato-cooperation/# https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2017-11/2017%20-%20163%20DSCTC%2017%20E%20rev%201%20fin%20-%20EU%20AND%20NATO%20COOPERATION%20-%20MESTERHAZY%20REPORT.pdf https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_49217.htm https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160630_1607-factsheet-nato-eu-en.pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_operations_of_the_European_Union http://piracy-studies.org/beyond-rivalry-eu-nato-cooperation-in-counter-piracy-operations/ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/595855/EPRS_BRI(2016)595855_EN.pdf https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36195/most-important-moment-european-defence-decades-mogherini_fr

http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/american-withdrawal-presents-opportunity-for-europe-a-1135172.html

http://www.adnkronos.com/aki-en/security/2017/11/10/pinotti-backs-more-integrated-european-defence_ctDIgGhps1J3p37WCRwlmL.html

http://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/future-eu-defence-european-space-data-and-cyber-agency https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/34226/Permanent%20Structured%20Cooperation%20(PESCO)%20-%20Factsheet https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/defence-security-timeline/# http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1516_en.htm http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/22-euco-security-defence/ http://www.newsweek.com/eu-defense-fund-tackle-russia-military-trump-nato-622648 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40217085 http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/07/eu-prepares-a-defense-union-that-could-alleviate-not-aggravate-trumps-concerns-on-nato.html http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari1-2017-keohane-threes-company-france-germany-uk-european-defence-post-brexit

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4385_en.htm

and plans for the European Border and Coast Guard https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/fact-sheets/docs/a_european_border_and_coast_guard_en.pdf

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-5715_en.htm https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Border_and_Coast_Guard_Agency https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Risk_Analysis_for_2019_0.pdf https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/11/08/european-border-and-coast-guard-council-adopts-revised-regulation/

NATO background:

The current NATO Secretary General is Jens Stoltenberg, former PM of Norway.
Read this information carefully, as necessary background, take notes on what you think you can use. You won’t need everything.
e.g. North Atlantic Treaty Organization or North Atlantic Alliance – formed April 1949 – at present 30 members (Montenegro joined in June 2017 and North Macedonia in March 2020) – HQ Brussels, Belgium (with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, the central command of NATO military forces).
The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, famously stated the organization's goal was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down" (Do not quote this at the Concorso!!).

NATO was created at the start of the Cold War as an alliance among states sharing core democratic values, and was a way to extend the US commitment to the stability and defense of Western and Southern Europe (resulting from WWII) indefinitely. Its principal objective was to deter (hence 'deterrence') a Soviet invasion or interference in the area. This was based on article 5 of the treaty, under which members are committed to come to the aid and defense of any member state which is attacked by a non-member (i.e. Russia). This was achieved by the deployment of US and allied forces throughout Europe in such a way that the invasion of a NATO member would automatically involve the forces of the US and other countries, thus committing them to action. Conventional Russian forces were always superior to those of the Alliance, so the ultimate deterrence was provided by US (and later British and French) nuclear weapons. In the event of a conflict NATO conventional forces were there to gain time for diplomacy before using nuclear weapons. In response the Soviet Union created the Warsaw Pact with its Eastern European allies in May 1955 (after West Germany joined NATO). NATO never had to go to war, and was thus successful in fulfilling its main objective of deterring Russia.
With the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (1989-1992), NATO seemed to have lost its historic reason for existing. The US and its NATO allies reduced the size of their forces in Europe and since then there has been an ongoing debate about what, if any, NATO’s role can and should now be in world affairs. The Lisbon declaration (Nov. 2010) seemed to provide some clear indications regarding the direction in which NATO was moving. However, it also raised certain questions and left some unanswered. With the events of 2008 in Georgia and, above all, of 2014 in Ukraine there has been a rise in tensions with Russia, a decline in cooperation between Russia and NATO and fears that we are returning, if not to the Cold War, at least to an adversarial relationship rather than one based on working together. Given this scenario, NATO may now have to return more to its original purpose of guaranteeing its members’ (particularly its Eastern European members’) sovereignty and independence. President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty added to tensions and raised fears of a new nuclear arms race.

https://www.france24.com/en/20190802-usa-russia-withdrawal-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-treaty-mikhail-gorbachev-ronald-rea

(see also the dispute since 1992 between Moldova and Russia over Transnistria)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria

http://opiniojuris.org/2020/03/17/looking-for-a-solution-under-international-law-for-the-moldova-transnistria-conflict/

There were also concerns in Europe that President Trump might decide to withdraw the US from NATO, which would have meant the death of the organization, or simply reduce the US role within it in a more isolationist approach, leaving its European allies to face threats on their own. This has led the EU to look more to its own defence but also to welcome Biden’s election.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_from_NATO#United_States_of_America

Main points:

1) After the end of the Cold War the US reduced its forces in Europe and shifted a significant proportion of what remained southwards. NATO reduced its heavy conventional forces and European armies based largely on military service in favor of smaller, more professional and much more high-tech forces with ‘out of area’ (outside Europe) capabilities (including logistical support). This process has continued with more attention paid to cost effectiveness and greater integration of different national forces and weapons systems. However, these goals are difficult to achieve.

2) NATO’s Strategic Concept since 2010 has been based on the idea of intervention in crisis management and security questions beyond NATO’s borders (‘out of area’ operations beyond Europe, the area NATO was originally created to defend) and in cooperation with other countries and regional organizations (ISAF in Afghanistan was NATO-led but included forces from other countries). This idea has gradually evolved since the early 1990s with NATO’s intervention in the Balkans (in 1993 against Serbia, and in 1999 in Kosovo). After 9/11 NATO invoked article 5 for the first time and sent the ISAF to Afghanistan in 2001 under a UN mandate (the first major ‘out of area’ operation) and later also became involved in training Iraqi forces to take over responsibility for security. Since August 2009 it has conducted operation Ocean Shield against piracy off the Horn of (North-East) Africa. It launched an operation to protect Libyan civilians from the Gaddafi regime in March-October 2011 which led to the fall of the regime, and is now involved in a security operation (Sea Guardian) in the Mediterranean. As a result of the 9/11 terrorist attack, and the threat of further terrorist attacks there is now also intensified cooperation between the security services and police forces of NATO members, and between them and other countries facing the same threat. The organization also created a NATO Response Force (NRF) to make it easier for NATO to provide a rapid response to a crisis before the deployment of heavier forces.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Response_Force

However, after the failure of the operation in Afghanistan, the US and its NATO partners may be less willing to engage in ‘out-of-area’ operations.

3) NATO began to see its role less in strictly military terms and more and more in terms of cooperating with the UN, the EU, other international or regional organizations, and other countries (whether democratic like Brazil and Australia or less so, like Russia, or not at all but stable, like China) on a range of issues considered threats to NATO members’ security, e.g. terrorism, international crime and trafficking, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear arms, piracy, cyberattacks, climate change and environmental degradation and crisis management (intervention to stabilize failed states and prevent escalating local crises).See the Lisbon Summit Declaration November 2010

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease

and the Chicago Summit Declaration (May 2012)

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm?mode=pressrelease

4) In the years following the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, many former Soviet satellite states joined NATO and the EU which expanded to the East (German unification in 1990 This meant NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, for the Baltic states, Rumania, Bulgaria and Slovakia in 2004, for Albania and Croatia in 2009, Montenegro 2017, North Macedonia 2020). The remaining Balkan states will probably join NATO soon (As of 2021, NATO officially recognizes only three aspiring members: Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans, and Georgia and Ukraine, where any rapid progress seems unlikely because of Russian opposition).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO

For Eastern European countries this move was mainly a guarantee of continued independence from Russia. However, this has been seen by Russia as aggressive and a way to reduce Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Russia made clear its opposition to Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia joining NATO or the EU. Georgia has been promised NATO membership at an unspecified date in the future but Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008, in support of the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, was the first real sign of the dangers raised by the question of further NATO/EU expansion to the East. In fact, Russia’s opposition to Georgia joining NATO seems to have blocked further progress.

However, it is the evolution of events in Ukraine which have really thrown into question all certainties about relations with the Russian Federation. Ukraine also expressed interest in NATO membership in 2008, but later adopted a position of neutrality in 2010 probably because of Russia’s opposition. A decision in November 2013 by Ukraine's President Viktor Yanukovych to pull out of an association deal with the European Union sparked huge street protests that eventually led to his downfall in February 2014. In March Russia reacted by annexing the Ukrainian region of Crimea after the Crimean parliament declared independence from Ukraine, and unrest began growing in eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russian sentiment is strong. The US and NATO denounced the Russian move as illegal and its support for the separatist insurgencies in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions since 2014 as aggressively expansionist. Following Russia’s support for the separatists in 2014, the Ukrainian government launched a military counter-offensive against the insurgents, which resulted in the ongoing War in Donbass. After parliamentary elections in October 2014, the new Ukraine government made joining NATO a priority. In December 2014, the Ukrainian parliament renounced Ukraine's non-aligned status that had “proved to be ineffective in guaranteeing Ukraine's security and protecting the country from external aggression and pressure”. Russia obviously opposes this.
Russia has continued to argue that it sees NATO and the EU’s expansion to the East over the last 20 years as far more aggressive than its own response to protect Russian minorities and that this expansion is a violation of a promise made in 1990 that in exchange for Russian agreement to German reunification NATO agreed not to expand towards the East. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643220-russias-aggression-ukraine-part-broader-and-more-dangerous-confrontation
NATO's growing concern and its strategy to respond to Russia's moves can be seen in

The Wales Summit Declaration Sept 2014 (paragraphs 16-31)

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm

the Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security July 2016

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133168.htm

and in detail in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué July 2016 (paragraphs 9-24)

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm

See the links at the start of this post for a summary of current tensions with Russia over Ukraine and NATO’s official stance.

With the situation in Georgia, the current conflict in Ukraine and the resulting sanctions, as well as Russia’s growing assertiveness in international relations (e.g. Syria) new questions have been raised about the prospects for good future relations between the European Union, NATO and the West in general and the Russian Federation. With Russian minorities in other Eastern European and Baltic NATO and EU members (and also in Moldova), NATO decided in March 2015 to strengthen its Baltic Air Policing mission and presence in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea area. It has also conducted joint military exercises with Ukraine but has avoided overt military involvement in both Ukraine and Georgia, not wanting a direct confrontation with Russia and the risk of a complete breakdown in relations. Although they are not NATO members, Ukraine and Georgia began participating in the NATO Response Force (NRF), respectively, in 2014and 2015.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315.html
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315-2.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014%E2%80%9315_Russian_military_intervention_in_Ukraine
(See the notes in ‘The EU and the Russian Federation’ for an account of the evolution of events in Ukraine in 2014 and the growth in tension between NATO and the Russian Federation).
At the NATO summit in Wales on 4^th and 5^th September 2014, the military alliance finalized plans for its new spearhead NATO Response Force (a rapid deployment force of 4,000 soldiers able go into action in 48 hours) as a response to growing concern about the Ukraine crisis and the rise of Islamic State militants. Despite calls from eastern European members (Poland and the Baltic states), NATO did not approve the proposal to create new permanent bases in these member states. Germany in particular wished to avoid further antagonizing Russia by such an action. President Obama, however, assured them of NATO and US commitment to their protection (see below for the change of policy at the Warsaw Summit) NATO also confirmed the suspension (April 2014) of its partnership for civilian and military cooperation with Russia and offered support for Ukraine’s plans to strengthen its military capacity.

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/03/timeline-ukraine-political-crisis-201431143722854652.html

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-a-timeline-of-the-conflict-from-the-euromaidan-protests-to-mh17-and-civil-war-in-the-east-9706999.html

http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/05/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/index.html

http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/02/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/

http://en.ria.ru/world/20140829/192463965/UN-Observer-Report-Acknowledges-Horrifying-Number-of-Dead-in.html

http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20140904/NEWS08/309040030/Eastern-European-hopes-permanent-NATO-bases-stymied-by-Russia

http://www.voanews.com/content/eastern-ukraine-ceasefire/2440781.html

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/16/ukraine-votes-more-power-separatist-east

President Putin defended Russia’s annexation of Crimea by saying that Washington and its European allies were guided by “the rule of the gun” rather than international law and respect for the principle of state sovereignty. In March 2014 Washington put military cooperation with Russia on hold and ended negotiations on the NATO missile defense program. It also banned the export to Russia of technology with potential military applications, suspended cooperation on civilian nuclear energy projects and cut off NASA’s contacts with its Russian counterparts. Russia, meanwhile, made a resolution of the impasse over NATO’s missile defense system a precondition for further strategic arms control talks. It formed the Eurasian Economic Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan in May in 2014 and Armenia and Kyrgyzstan became full members in 2015. The Eurasian Economic Union has an integrated single market of 183 million people and a gross domestic product of over 4 trillion US dollars (PPP). All EAEU member states participate in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, an intergovernmental mutual defense alliance. Some Russian commentators even argue that its authoritarian model is a viable alternative to Western liberal democracy and one which will gain support in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where some Western ideas are seen as going against tradition and religion.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurasian_Economic_Union

At the 2016 Warsaw summit NATO reversed its position on deploying forces to Russia's borders. NATO agreed to deploy military forces to the Baltic states and eastern Poland from January 2017 to deter Russia, a response to Moscow's 2014 seizure of Crimea from Ukraine. The four battalions totaling between 3,000 and 4,000 troops would be led by Britain in Estonia, the United States in Poland, Canada in Latvia and Germany in Lithuania. This has been called by various names, Operation Reassurance, Operation Deterrence and now NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence. There is also the Enhanced NATO Response Force, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and the Multinational Division South – East in Romania.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Enhanced_Forward_Presence https://kariuomene.kam.lt/en/e_f_p.html

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_09/20180903_180905-MAP-eFP-eng.pdf

http://www.en.mndse.ro/about

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170316_170316-def-det-map.pdf

https://www.difesa.it/SMD_/Eventi/Pagine/NRDC_ITA_assume_responsabilita_sulla_compinente_terrestre_NRF_2018.aspx

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-decisions-factbox-idUSKCN0ZP0MX

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/nato-deploys-troops-poland-russian-border-170413213541667.html

https://euobserver.com/foreign/135681

https://www.google.it/search?rlz=1C1GCEA_enGB759GB759&biw=1280&bih=694&tbm=isch&sa=1&ei=-3AqWrT_F4G2Us3mp6AO&q=nato+forces+in+baltic+states++by+country+2017+map&oq=nato+forces+in+baltic+states++by+country+2017+map&gs_l=psy-ab.3...87656.91928.0.93067.11.11.0.0.0.0.95.784.11.11.0....0...1c.1.64.psy-ab..0.0.0....0.Ib1z84rd4X8#imgrc=JknmmPrCDI43nM:

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad/nato-ee.page

https://www.voanews.com/a/nato-summit-shows-shift-from-reassurance-to-deterrence/3409096.html

further NATO and EU response to Ukraine

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46425777

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/q-a-russia-attacks-ukraine-again-how-should-ukraine-nato-and-the-west-respond

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_160789.htm

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156623.htm

http://nato.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-nato/Partnership

https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_25457.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93European_Union_Association_Agreement

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/07/11/ukraine-association-agreement/

5) NATO continues to want and need to stabilize and improve relations with Russia. There has been extensive practical cooperation in many fields in the recent past. How far is each side willing to make concessions to return to this cooperation? And how far have the events and growing tensions in Eastern Europe put all future cooperation at risk?

a) NATO has developed a ballistic missile defense system in Europe for the protection of NATO forces and the populations of NATO member states.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-and-nato-officials-inaugurate-missile-defense-shield-in-romania-1463056944

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm

This is supposedly intended to deal with a threat from a country like Iran, accused of wanting to develop nuclear weapons, or against terrorists (!), but has been consistently opposed by the Russians as potentially aimed at them. In Lisbon NATO relaunched the idea, offering to work with Russia on this project. The immediate Russian response at the Lisbon summit in November 2010 (NATO Russia Council) was positive providing that the cooperation offered by NATO meant Russia’s real integration into a system of shared defense against third parties (e.g. Iran). Russia was not willing to accept a system based in Eastern European NATO member states from which it would only receive information and intelligence as a courtesy. The implication from the Russian point of view is that it could still be used against Russia. In fact, NATO rejected the idea of Russia’s participation in the control arrangements for the missile defense system and Russia has deployed missiles to Kaliningrad and other sections of its borders with NATO.

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-nuclear-missiles-kaliningrad-baltic-sea-poland-lithuania-nato-a8199011.html

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-missiles/russia-deploys-iskander-nuclear-capable-missiles-to-kaliningrad-ria-idUSKBN1FP21Y

During its 2012 Chicago Summit NATO leaders declared that the ballistic missile defense system had reached ‘interim’ capability. For what this means see the link to the Wikipedia notes on the Chicago summit. It seems to involve installations in the Czech Republic, Poland and the Black Sea region (Turkey and Romania) as well as submarine-based missiles. The project is ongoing.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_missile_defence_system
http://www.rt.com/news/246709-nato-missile-shield-iran/

At its 2016 Warsaw summit NATO took command of the U.S.-built missile shield in Europe to defend against ballistic missiles from Iran.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-decisions-factbox-idUSKCN0ZP0MX

latest: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm

https://ac.nato.int/page8021748

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-shield-timeline/after-long-wait-u-s-to-unveil-european-missile-shield-idUSKCN0Y217P

b) NATO and the US have frequently reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, and continuing large-scale reductions in nuclear armaments and missile delivery systems initiated with the START I treaty (July 1991) and continued in START II (Jan 1993) and SORT (May 2002). In fact, further reductions were agreed in negotiations between the US and Russia that led to the New START treaty which came into force in February 2011 and replaced the START II and SORT treaties. Some commentators suggest that it seems slightly contradictory to launch a project for missile defense (point 5a) while supporting arms reductions. Others argue that it is simply a question of realism, and that NATO’s first priority must be its founding purpose, collective security.

Russia for several years made a resolution of the impasse over NATO’s missile defense system a precondition to further strategic arms control talks. Shortly before its expiry in February 2021, the US and Russia agreed to extend the New Start Treaty for 5 years and engage in new talks on nuclear arms control.

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-03/news/us-russia-extend-new-start-five-years

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11694#:~:text=Presidents%20Biden%20and%20Putin%20agreed,in%20the%20past%2C%20and%20both

There is still a danger that with the gradual evolution of nuclear and missile technology much of the impressive progress made on nuclear arms reductions could unravel unless negotiations are relaunched soon. At the same time in the US there are doubts about whether Russia has respected its New START commitments to arms reductions. This is what led President Trump to announce the US withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty, with some commentators saying there is a danger of a new nuclear arms race. Some experts argue that with the increased reliance on IT systems in nuclear defence systems, the catastrophic risks of a computer error or computer-related human error are leading us towards the nightmare scenario of Dr Strangelove. In

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/trump-us-nuclear-arms-treaty-russia http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-17511816http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7674962/US-has-more-than-5000-nuclear-warheads.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_with_nuclear_weapons http://www.mapsofworld.com/world-top-ten/world-top-ten-countries-by-nuclear-warheads-map.html

https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-future-of-u-s-russian-arms-control/ http://www.nipp.org/2016/06/21/schneider-mark-russias-growing-strategic-nuclear-forces-and-new-start-treaty-compliance/

Unresolved Questions for NATO:

1) The decision-making process. The existing system depends on consensus and agreement at all levels, without formal voting. There is an unwritten rule that a country (or countries) which is not in agreement with the other members on an issue remains silent (e.g. Greece and the NATO intervention in the Balkans) and simply does not participate in the operation. However, as the organization grows, like the EU, it will probably need to modify this decision-making process. Can this be done without damaging NATO’s effectiveness? What seems likely to happen is that NATO actions may be authorized by all or most members but not undertaken by all the 30 members. In addition, there may be space for small groups of NATO allies to undertake operations that have first been discussed with the other members. In practice this is want happened in Libya, although the US criticized the lack of participation by the NATO members which had authorized the mission.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm

2) Relations with Russia – at the start of the 21^st century, despite a clear commitment from both NATO and Russia to warmer relations and closer cooperation it was not clear what this meant in practice, or if they were thinking along the same lines. Russia seemed to believe that without formally joining NATO it should have the right to share in NATO decisions (and block those it did not like) and also to take part fully in NATO’s military/technological programs. NATO seemed to think that cooperation simply meant keeping Russia informed and providing it with any information NATO gets regarding possible threats to Russia. While Russia is a vital partner from the point of view of global security and within international decision-making bodies (and in economic terms, e.g. energy supplies to the EU), most NATO members, particularly those in Eastern Europe no longer believe Russia really shares NATO’s core democratic beliefs, and have doubts about how far Russia can be trusted. Events in Georgia and Ukraine have only strengthened this point of view. However, terrorist attacks like those in Paris on November 13^th 2015 will continue to require cooperation between Russia and the West in a coordinated effort to defeat Islamic extremists. So, for the moment, how this relationship will develop is unclear. This document puts NATO's position very clearly:

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/115204.htm

a) The proposed NATO missile defense system – this is a good example of the above. How exactly could Russia be persuaded to cooperate with, or simply accept this project? Since Russia is not being offered access to the technology and a right to participate fully in any decisions, it is likely to remain hostile to the project.

b) NATO membership for Georgia, Ukraine and the Balkan states – NATO believes these states have the right to join. Russia sees this as an aggressive expansion by NATO into Russia’s ‘near abroad’ and is against more of its neighbors joining NATO. It seems ready to actively protect what it sees as Russia’s interests and ethnic Russian minorities (the war with Georgia and support for separatists in Ukraine). This seems to have frozen progress on expanding NATO membership to both Georgia and Ukraine and cooperation between NATO and Russia for the moment.

c) Russia and the US are both aware that further progress on arms reductions depends not only on agreement on the ballistic missile defense system. Russia argues that the US must be committed to working with, and not against, Russia for real progress to be made and progress on an agreement on NATO’s missile defense system is now a factor if no longer a precondition for nuclear arms reduction talks. The US withdrawal from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty raised the danger of a new nuclear arms race.

d) Enhanced Forward Presence is a NATO deployment in Europe aimed at countering possible Russian expansionism after events in Georgia and Ukraine.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm

https://shape.nato.int/efp

https://kariuomene.kam.lt/en/e_f_p.html

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PX4a6d3qNbU

3) What happens after NATO’s failure in Afghanistan? Will the US and/or its NATO partners be willing to engage in future out-of-area operations?

https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-fall-of-the-afghan-government-and-what-it-means-for-europe/

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/aug/21/after-afghanistan-the-pax-americana-is-over-as-is-nato-about-time-too

Has the outcome, and the enormous cost of the operation, damaged NATO’s reputation and confidence so much that it will be unable or unwilling to undertake other operations outside Europe? Will this be the end of NATO’s commitment to proactive crisis management around the world? Or will it mean a return to a much more traditional defensive role limited to the European area? The NATO operation in Libya, which initially was seen as a success, led to internal chaos, faction-fighting and the growing presence of Islamic State and other radical groups in the area. Again, this may have reduced the willingness of NATO members to take part in similar operations in the future.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm https://www.routledge.com/The-EU-NATO-and-the-Libya-Conflict-Anatomy-of-a-Failure/Marcuzzi/p/book/9780367545512

https://fundforpeace.org/2021/11/02/libya-state-fragility-10-years-after-intervention/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=libya-state-fragility-10-years-after-intervention

Is the EU facing a similar risk in its members’ interventions in Mali and the Sahel?

https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2021/sahel-europes-forever-war#:~:text=The%20Sahel%20conflict%20is%20a,fighting%20broke%20out%20in%202012.

4) Finances – Both the US and Europe were hit hard by the 2008 recession and financial crisis and the recent Covid-19 pandemic. There is reluctance on both sides of the Atlantic to face the question of paying for NATO forces and operations. The US contributes between one-fifth and one-quarter of NATO's budget (22%) and most of its forces, equipment and technology for actual operations (in Afghanistan, for example). The US accounted for a massive 69% of NATO members’ military spending in 2021 (while representing only 41% of the NATO countries’ combined GDP), and the US wants European members to spend more on their military. For them this has not been a good time to increase their contributions to NATO. Most of them made cuts to their military spending after the 2008 recession. This could damage NATO’s operational effectiveness. The cuts in European military forces after the 2008 financial crisis may have been so large as to compromise their ability to launch sustained independent operations, or even to participate effectively in large-scale combined operations. ‘Smart defense’ is an attempt to combine cuts in spending with rationalization of resources in order to remain fully effective. It is also difficult to calculate what the balance should be between the US and Europe because clearly US military spending also covers US operations and forces which are not intended for NATO.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074

How realistic is it to talk about a more democratic basis for decision-making within the organization, with more of a say for European members, if NATO is essentially an organization in which the US pays for and does most of the work? NATO used to be formed by large armies based on military service. After the end of the Cold War there was a move to much smaller professional armies based on career volunteers and greater investment in high-tech equipment to give these forces a decisive combat advantage. As was mentioned above, in a period of austerity the key concept seems to be ‘smart defense’, a more intelligent use of limited financial resources, more sharing of equipment and back-up support and integration between NATO forces (e.g. Britain and France signed a defense cooperation treaty in November 2010 which involves plans to share military assets and technologies). How realistic all this will be in maintaining NATO as an effective force remains to be seen.

However, at the Warsaw summit NATO'S European allies agreed a defence spending increase worth more than £6 billion. Most members, however, failed in 2017 and 2018 to reach the target of 2% of GDP for military spending.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/11641852/Poland-increases-military-spending-in-response-to-Russias-belligerence.html

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-spending/european-allies-boost-defense-spending-most-still-miss-natos-u-s-backed-goal-idUSKCN1GR1UL

https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/07/10/defense-expenditure-of-nato-members-visualized-infographic/#7c66eed414cf

With new interest in the European Defence Agency, NATO’s European members may be more willing to raise defence spending, but in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic they may not be able to do so.

5) Is NATO, a defensive military alliance with capabilities for dealing with cyberattacks (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm), really the right kind of organization to deal with threats like terrorism, various kinds of illegal trafficking, illegal immigration, piracy, nuclear proliferation, peace-keeping, -building and -enforcement operations and environmental concerns? Perhaps it is, and NATO should gradually be re-organized and lose some of its military character.

6) Is there a contradiction between a NATO ballistic missile defense system and the goal of nuclear arms reductions? After all, the missiles used to eliminate incoming missiles (defense) are often weapons that could also be rearmed and used as delivery systems (offense).

7) The operation in Libya holds several lessons and, as a case study, offers an interesting comparison with the operation in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq and the situation in Syria, both in terms of similarities and differences. First, it was, like Afghanistan, an out of area operation (but only slightly) and had a UN mandate. However, the Russians claim it exceeded its mandate to protect civilian lives. It was limited to air raids against specific targets, as requested by the Arab League and Libyan fighters, and did not involve sending land forces to Libya. The US played an active role only at the start but provided logistics, supplies and support. Generally, it had support from the local population on the ground, and it was successful and of short duration. However, it also demonstrated that it is difficult to build consensus to act within NATO even for an operation very close to NATO’s borders (Germany was initially strongly opposed). Secondly, the operation was expensive and complex (but obviously nowhere near as long and costly as the operation in Afghanistan) and only possible with the political, military, technological and financial support of the US, despite the attempt to make it a ‘European’ operation. However, what was seen as the operation's technical success led to the fall of the Gaddafi regime but, as in Afghanistan, this did not produce a smooth transition to a functioning democracy but the collapse of law and order. In the absence of an international mission, Libya remains a country dominated by armed factions and so far unable to produce a stable and effective central government with real control over its territory. As a result, it is a base for terrorism and human-trafficking and is the point of departure for many refugees trying to enter Europe via Italy. It is hard to see how the new but fragile unity government will re-establish the rule of law.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-12-08/how-election-will-test-war-torn-libya-s-fragile-unity-quicktake

https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/wrangle-over-interim-libyan-government-intensifies-2022-01-31/

However, at its Warsaw summit NATO leaders agreed to provide support for the European Union's military mission off the Libyan coast to crack down on smugglers.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-decisions-factbox-idUSKCN0ZP0MX

More recently, NATO also reaffirmed its support for the interim Libyan government, while the EU is planning a miliary mission to Libya.

https://lana.gov.ly/post.php?lang=en&id=188085

https://euobserver.com/world/152474

All of this should make us think carefully about what kind of operation NATO is able or not able to carry out / is willing or unwilling to carry out / should or should not carry out, and in what circumstances and under what conditions it is likely to be successful. The EU will need to ask itself the same questions about its own operations.

8) In contrast to the fairly rapid response to events in Libya in 2011, there was little desire among NATO members to intervene in Syria when the civil war began except in terms of sanctions. NATO began to deploy Patriot missiles to Turkey in 2013 to protect it from any potential spread of the Syrian conflict.

The US in the summer 2015 and its allies (notably France and the UK after the terrorist attacks in Paris in Nov. 2015) carried out air raids against IS in coordination with other Middle East allies but there are no plans for a NATO operation. However, there is neither the legal basis for a major NATO ground intervention in Syria, nor real support for the idea among NATO members. There has been extensive intervention by Russia, Turkey and Iran but there is no agreed and coordinated plan between these three and Western countries as they have different objectives. In December 2018 Donald Trump ordered a withdrawal of American forces from Syria. At the same time the US administration said that it accepted that President Assad, Russia’s ally, could stay in power as a part of a long-term solution to the Syrian crisis but called on the Syrian regime to make fundamental changes in exchange for aid in reconstruction.

http://www.arabnews.com/node/1422691/middle-east

As the fighting goes on there continue to be large numbers of refugees arriving from Syria at the EU’s borders as a result of the civil war and the initial success of Islamic State forces. Meanwhile, although Islamic State has been largely checked and defeated, 900 US troops remain in Syria.

https://www.voanews.com/a/europe_can-turkey-be-trusted-nato-partner/6173333.html

9) Events in Turkey, a key NATO ally, have also raised concern. The attempted military coup in July 2016 and the Turkish government’s hard line response to it added to existing questions about the treatment of the Kurdish minority and human rights in general. Turkey is also a key partner for the EU in dealing with the migrant crisis. So commentators are now asking whether Turkey is still and will remain a reliable NATO ally, and if not, what this may mean for the alliance's strategy in the Middle East and Mediterranean.

http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/03/29/does-turkey-still-belong-in-nato

10) In recent years the potential security threats to the EU have grown. There has been increased instability in North Africa and the Middle East with the collapse of decades-old regimes and areas of civil war (Syria) or ineffective government and faction-fighting (Libya), leading to mass migration towards Europe and the spread of terrorism to Europe itself. Meanwhile Russia has begun to use its military power to reassert its influence both in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe. Its intervention first in Georgia and later in the Ukraine have alarmed the EU and in particular the EU's Eastern members. The decision of the UK to withdraw from the EU (Brexit) and, even more, the election of Donald Trump as US President (a figure whose statements sometimes made him sound potentially isolationist, at least in relation to Europe) galvanized attempts to finally create an integrated European Defence structure through the EU Defence Agency https://www.eda.europa.eu/. This is not intended or expected to substitute NATO any time soon (given the scale and strength of the US military and logistical infrastructure) but to function alongside it. Europe needs to be able to respond effectively and independently to threats in the event that the US, for whatever reason, is unwilling or reluctant to assist, or to carry out operations in areas that the US does not consider of strategic importance but the EU deems to be vital. Things seem to be moving fast and the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence (PESCO) is now fully operational. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/107267/council-adopts-14-new-pesco-projects-deepen-eu-defence-cooperation_en

To put things in perspective, however, one should remember that while the EU's Eastern European members have welcomed this process which reassures them of support from their EU partners they have also welcomed as crucial the deployment of NATO forces, including US and Canadian units, to their countries. Similarly, Italy which hosts both the US Sixth Fleet and a large number of US bases, would surely prefer to be able to count at least on US naval, air and logistical support in any major operation in the Mediterranean.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/03/us-military-base-expansion-italy https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/34226/Permanent%20Structured%20Cooperation%20(PESCO)%20-%20Factsheet Many of the technical aspects of European Defence integration are the same as those facing NATO (financing, standardization of weapons and equipment, integration of multilingual military forces) but the fact that the EU has a large, existing civilian structure may be a considerable advantage.

Conclusion:
Despite point 4 NATO still accounted for more than 60% of global military spending in 2021:

https://www.visualcapitalist.com/this-is-how-much-nato-countries-spend-on-defense/

https://www.statista.com/chart/14636/defense-expenditures-of-nato-countries/

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074

https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/us-pressure-brings-about-rise-in-nato-defence-spending-despite-pandemic/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures

https://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countries-with-the-highest-military-spending/#:~:text=Global%20military%20spending,trillion%20U.S.%20dollars%20in%202019.

During the early phase of the Cold War the Warsaw Pact’s conventional forces significantly outnumbered NATO forces. A comparison of NATO conventional resources today with those of the Russian Federation gives NATO a clear advantage because of huge, accumulated US assets (and the transfer of the Eastern European bloc countries to NATO), despite increased military spending by Russia in recent years and some reductions in Europe by the US and the rest of NATO.
So NATO continues to be the world’s largest and most powerful alliance system, and remains committed to its core values and primary security goals. It is now playing a much wider, much more proactive role than during the Cold War, and intends to continue to do so while seeking new partners within the international community. After the failure in Afghanistan and growing tensions with Russia only time will show whether NATO can be effective in this role and whether it will continue to have the material and financial resources, internal cohesion and international consensus that it will need in order to do so. Events in Ukraine are forcing NATO to re-examine its priorities. It may be compelled to return to its original purpose, the guaranteeing of its members’ sovereignty, freedom and security in a mainly European context.

A counter-argument to explore: There are also many critics of NATO who feel that since the end of the Cold War the fact that NATO has taken on a more and more proactive role is a mistake. They fear that even when acting with UN authorization, this too easily leads to an increasingly aggressive militaristic response to local and global problems. They argue that anti-terrorist or humanitarian intervention by military means is a high-risk strategy in terms of both collateral damage (civilian deaths, displaced persons, refugees, physical destruction of housing and essential infrastructure, economic collapse and soaring operational costs) and final objectives (creating a functioning democratic state or simply bringing an end to the fighting). They would prefer to see NATO adopt a much more cautious and conservative stance, defensive in the traditional sense, while cooperating with the UN on normal peace-keeping operations and in humanitarian assistance.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/20/new-thinking-needed-nato
http://peaceandhealthblog.com/2012/05/21/nato-world-security/

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_75836.htm
for context
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Chicago_Summit

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/events_84074.htm

In ‘NATO’s Next Act – How to Handle Russia and Other Threats’ (Foreign Affairs, July- August 2016)

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2016-06-13/natos-next-act

Philip M. Breedlove, former NATO Supreme Commander 2013-16, describes how over the past 3 years NATO has begun shifting its forces from operations outside Europe (e.g. Afghanistan) to the threats closer to the heart of the continent – namely Russian aggression and the challenges associated to the ongoing instability in the Middle East and North Africa (international displacement of people and transnational terrorism). Breedlove argues that the US and its NATO allies need to increase, modernize and rationalize their available resources in Europe given that the sanctions imposed on Russia after its seizure of Crimea have not deterred Russia which is continuing its Cold War- style provocations against NATO ships and planes and territorial waters and air space and its militarization of the Arctic. He suggests that a rapid military action by Russia against a NATO ally (e.g. Poland or one of the Baltic states), presumably in support of a Russian minority or ‘vital interest’, might meet little effective resistance from NATO in the short term and the situation could become a fait accompli.

He points out that US and NATO funding for Europe has been insufficient to deal with this growing threat from Russia, due to US budget cuts, the US prioritizing of other global threats, the US Asia-Pacific rebalance, the recession and the economic difficulties faced by many of America’s European NATO allies, their continuing commitments in Kosovo and Afghanistan and their growing commitments in dealing with the refugee crisis due to the Syrian civil war and instability in Libya. While Poland and the Baltic states see Russia as a real threat, other NATO allies, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey are more concerned with the threats coming from the Middle east and North Africa.

In 2014 in response to events in Ukraine, the US announced the European Reassurance Initiative and NATO agreed the Readiness Action Plan. These involve:

More combined military exercises

The rotational deployment of US forces in Poland and the Baltic states, the Black Sea

A greater NATO presence in the Mediterranean

A very rapid response brigade (part of the NATO Response Force)

The prepositioning of NATO military resources and equipment in advanced positions to facilitate a rapid response to an aggression

Small headquarters in 6 vulnerable central and eastern European NATO members

2 new tactical headquarters in Poland and Romania

Breedlove argues that NATO must continue the fight against Islamic State but play a supporting role, concentrating on institution building and education rather than intervention. He argues that the US and NATO must also continue to work with Russia where possible and where necessary, to deal with Iran, North Korea and the terrorist threat. However, he is against the lifting of sanctions on Russia and takes a hardline position, claiming that Russia will only respect NATO if it has the means to respond to any aggressive initiative undertaken by Russia.

NATO missile shield in Europe updates

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8206.htm

https://www.rt.com/news/326398-nato-missile-defense-romania/

https://www.rt.com/news/246709-nato-missile-shield-iran/ http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-shield-idUSKCN0Y30JX http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-13/poland-to-break-ground-on-missile-shield-site-as-russia-fumes

https://www.rt.com/news/350281-stoltenberg-nato-buildup-russia/ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/photos_112331.htm