What are the main factors to be weighed by the international community in deciding whether to undertake intervention for humanitarian purposes?
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a8e5b072.pdf
Delivering Humanitarian Aid
http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/deliver-humanitarian-aid/ This covers a lot of UN
emergency and longer-term interventions, where natural disasters have occurred
or food resources are insufficient. These programs are usually authorized and welcomed
by the local government if it is unable to respond on its own, and are not
controversial, except in terms of effectiveness (speed, organization, costs
etc.).
https://www.unocha.org/our-work/coordination/un-disaster-assessment-and-coordination-undac
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK11792/
https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/disaster_preparedness_en
Where a
government is simply reluctant to authorize a foreign presence on its territory,
this may present a serious challenge for the international community if that
government is unable to deal with the situation, even when we are simply
talking about relief in the event of a natural disaster.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/27/regime-blocked-aid-to-burma-cyclone-victims
https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/05/03/lessons-cyclone-nargis
And how should the international community
respond if a government is unwilling to respond to a humanitarian crisis on its
territory perhaps because there is a civil conflict going on?
https://www.unocha.org/story/un-impartial-syria-it-elsewhere
https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-2020-humanitarian-response-plan-december-2020#:~:text=The%202020%20Humanitarian%20Response%20Plan,undertaken%20across%20and%20within%20sectors.
https://hum-insight.info/plan/1044
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/syria_2021_humanitarian_needs_overview.pdf
https://hum-insight.info/plan/1088
Yemen:
https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/yemen/
https://www.unocha.org/yemen/about-ocha-yemen
https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/yemen-crisis
https://www.unicef.org/appeals/yemen
And what should the international community do if that government itself is held to be the cause of, and responsible for, the crisis?
Responsibility to Protect
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect
https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/unga-r2p-debate-2021/
https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml
https://unric.org/en/unric-library-backgrounder-r2p/
https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/
https://archive.unric.org/en/responsibility-to-protect/26981-r2p-a-short-history
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect (read carefully)
in
particular: The Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect
Pillar I: The protection responsibilities of the
state. This stresses that states have the primary responsibility to protect
their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity.
Pillar II: International assistance and
capacity-building. This addresses the international community's commitment to
help states build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and to help those under
stress before crises and conflicts break out.
Pillar III: Timely and decisive response. This focuses
on the responsibility of international community to act in a timely and
decisive way to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity when a state manifestly fails to protect its
population.
Note that:
The ICISS (International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty) argued that any form of military
intervention is "an exceptional and extraordinary measure", and, as
such, to be justified it must meet certain criteria, including:
· Just cause: There must be "serious and
irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to
occur".
· Right intention: The main intention of the military
action must be to prevent human suffering.
· Last resort: Every other measure besides military
invention has to have already been taken into account. (This does not mean that
every measurement has to have been applied and been shown to fail, but that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that only military action would work in
that situation.)
· Proportional means: The military means must not exceed
what is necessary "to secure the defined human protection objective".
· Reasonable prospects: The chance of success must be
reasonably high, and it must be unlikely that the consequences of the military
intervention would be worse than the consequences without the intervention.
·
Right
authority: The military action has to have been authorized by the Security
Council.
Various experts have highlighted some of the problems
that military intervention for humanitarian purposes may involve:
The mixed-motives problem - The legitimacy of R2P rests upon its altruistic
aim. However, states will often be wary to engage in humanitarian intervention
unless the intervention is partly rooted in self-interest. The appearance that
the intervention is not strictly altruistic consequently leads some to question
its legitimacy.
· The counterfactual problem - When R2P is successful,
there will not be any clear-cut evidence of its success: a mass atrocity that did
not occur but would have occurred without intervention. Defenders of R2P consequently
have to rely on counterfactual arguments.
· The conspicuous harm problem - While the benefits of
the intervention will not be clearly visible, the destructiveness and costs of
the intervention will be visible. This makes it more difficult for proponents
of the intervention to defend the intervention. The destruction caused by the
intervention also makes some question the legitimacy of the intervention due to
the stated purpose of preventing harm.
· The end-state problem - Humanitarian intervention is
prone to expand the mission beyond simply averting mass atrocities. When
successful at averting mass atrocities, the intervenors will often be forced to
take upon themselves more expansive mandates to ensure that threatened
populations will be safe after the intervenors leave.
·
The
inconsistency problem - Due to the aforementioned problems, in addition to the
belief that a particular military action is likely to cause more harm than
good, states may fail to act in situations where mass atrocities loom. The
failure to intervene in any and all situations where there is a risk of mass
atrocities lead to charges of inconsistency.
See also praise and criticism of R2P
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect#Praise
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect#Criticism
and very critical: https://fpif.org/the_crisis_of_humanitarian_intervention/
So in any
discussion about using military force as part of an attempt at humanitarian
intervention in order to prevent genocide and human rights abuses, there are a
series of issues to be examined. First, there is the question of legitimacy. Is
what is happening sufficient cause to infringe a state's sovereignty under
Pillar III? Is there a clear mandate from the UN Security Council? (In Yemen
and Syria there is no mandate for military intervention.) If there is not,
should countries act without it if there is widespread support in the UN
General Assembly? Then there is the bigger question of effectiveness. Do such
missions usually achieve their basic goal of bringing peace and stability and ending
the violence, or do they lead to more violence? Is the mission welcomed by the
local people involved? (Compare for example: Somalia UNOSOM I and II 1992-5,
Afghanistan ISAF 2001-present, and military intervention in Libya in 2011)
Moreover, would the funds used for such a mission be better spent elsewhere as
direct aid on a more concrete problem? (e.g. on providing food, water, medicine
and shelter to an area not requiring a military presence). There is another
important consideration that is often raised. Many experts argue that since the
foundation of the UN humanitarian, intervention has always been 'politicized'.
What exactly the international community should do in response to the situation
in Syria, for example, cannot be debated 'neutrally', simply as a humanitarian
crisis. Each member state on the UNSC and in the UNGA will inevitably bring to
the discussion its own economic and strategic interests, and its own cultural
or ideological perspective. In international relations this is the normal context
in which a diplomatic discussion of a question like that of Syria or Libya
takes place. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/03/libya-escalating-drama-case-liberal-intervention
In order to
respond to a question like:
What are the main factors to be weighed when the
international community is considering military intervention in response to a
humanitarian crisis?
You will probably need to look at these sources again and think about the points raised (concerning
the idea that for the international community there is a responsibility to
protect civilians from massive human rights abuses by their own government which
may override the principle of state sovereignty) in relation to past
and present humanitarian crises and intervention or non-intervention by the
international community:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/reflection-responsibility-protect-2020
https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/01/revised-agreement-on-african-union-mission-in-somalia/
You should also
consider whether national public opinion is manipulated by a government or the
media to support a proposed intervention or whether it drives media reporting
and government action or inaction by calling for intervention of responding
with indifference to an event.
https://www.cato.org/white-paper/public-opinion-war-terror
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137364401_12
https://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/avoiding-avoidable-tragedy-public-opinion-and-r2p/
You should also look at an article in Foreign Affairs,
July/August 2014, by Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan called: Drop Your weapons.
This argues
against armed resistance and for civil resistance on a statistical basis,
claiming that the latter is more likely to produce positive change. It is then
argued that this means there is a greater responsibility for the international
community to ‘assist’ (civil protest and civil resistance against a
dictatorship) rather than to embrace the responsibility to protect principle.
For a wider discussion of this and related issues,
see:
The True Costs of Humanitarian
Intervention by Benjamin A. Valentino
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-10-17/true-costs-humanitarian-intervention
Humanitarian Intervention
Comes of Age by
Jon Western and Joshua S. Goldstein
And Justice for All by Gary Haugen and Victor Boutros
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-05-01/and-justice-all
summary
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-haugen/and-justice-for-all-enfor_b_583217.html
Humanitarian Intervention: Iraq, Afghanistan,
Kosovo, Rwanda by Timothy Stacey
http://www.telospress.com/humanitarian-interventioniraq-afghanistan-kosovo-rwanda/
From Libya to Syria: The Rise and Fall of Humanitarian
Intervention by
Füsun Türkmen
https://www.academia.edu/24049222/From_Libya_to_Syria_The_Rise_and_Fall_of_Humanitarian_Intervention
The Crisis of Peacekeeping, Why the UN Can’t End
Wars, by Séverine Autesserre
file:///C:/Users/HP/Downloads/FA%20UN%20Peacekeeping.pdf
More on Libya
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/libya-the-responsibility-_b_841168
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/revisiting-the-humanitari_b_9445270
http://www.jamespattison.org/uploads/1/2/5/1/12518815/libya.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_military_intervention_in_Libya
https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/libya/
https://newrepublic.com/article/121085/libya-no-model-humanitarian-intervention
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/libya-intervention-daalder_n_6809756
Syria
https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/
https://www.reddit.com/r/MapPorn/comments/rybrf6/syria_in_2022_strategic_map_2600_2149/
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-law-idUSKCN12O2S3
http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/11/syria-and-the-crisis-of-humanitarian-intervention/
https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/vanity-bombing
https://www.lawfareblog.com/uk-legal-position-humanitarian-intervention-syria
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/1108462
Central African Republic (CAR)
https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/central-african-republic/
https://ecr2p.leeds.ac.uk/the-central-african-republic-and-the-responsibility-to-protect/
https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/central-african-republic/
http://www.auschwitzinstitute.org/blog/r2p-response-to-crisis-in-car-too-little-too-late/
https://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2017/02/24/central-african-republic-what%E2%80%99s-gone-wrong
South Sudan
https://unmiss.unmissions.org/
Somalia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Operation_in_Somalia_I https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Operation_in_Somalia_II http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a178.pdf http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/readings/lessons.html
current mission:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/somalia/report-somalia/
https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/01/revised-agreement-on-african-union-mission-in-somalia/
Rwanda https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Role_of_the_international_community_in_the_Rwandan_Genocide https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/02/rwanda-20-years-genocide-fork-road
What lessons does the outcome of the military intervention in
Afghanistan provide for the US, NATO, the UN and the international community in
general?
https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/south-asia/afghanistan/report-afghanistan/
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231633.shtml
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231633.shtml
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/17/nato-blames-afghan-government-for-taliban-takeover.html
For me the
fundamental condition remains this one:
· Reasonable prospects: The chance of success
must be reasonably high, and it must be unlikely that the consequences of the
military intervention would be worse than the consequences without the
intervention.
So the R2P doctrine does not, in itself, authorize reckless
military interventions
https://opencanada.org/r2p-is-not-a-license-for-military-recklessness/
the basic question remains – will an intervention be effective? https://theglobalobservatory.org/2022/01/revised-agreement-on-african-union-mission-in-somalia/
Would we want to send large-scale UN forces into Syria
or Yemen even if this were authorized? Are we sure there are reasonably high
prospects of success or might we make things even worse? Of course, watching the
suffering going on and doing nothing is also tremendously frustrating. The UN
in Yemen is trying to get both sides to stick to a ceasefire but the prospects
for fostering real respect for human rights seem poor.
https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1110312
https://osesgy.unmissions.org/
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/11/1050711
https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14352.doc.htm
https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14470.doc.htm
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/03/1087462
But is this really the best we can do? Is it enough? I
don't know. Perhaps it is.
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/64721/node/64721_ko
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