Introduction: This relationship is important to the EU because Russia is the EU’s largest neighbor, the EU’s fifth biggest trading partner (and the EU is Russia's largest trading partner) and a major (re-)emerging economy (one of the BRICS), an important market for European exports, a major military power, and one of the world’s two biggest nuclear powers, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and so a major player in international relations, and for Europe a vital supplier of energy (e.g. the opening of Nord Stream pipeline in 2011). Russia is the main EU supplier of crude oil, natural gas and solid fossil fuels. Russia was the origin of about 40% of EU imports of gas and 27% of EU imports of oil. Due to the large value these imports, EU’s trade deficit with Russia (€ 57 billion in 2019) is only second to EU’s trade deficit with China. The stability of the EU's energy supply may be threatened if a high proportion of imports are concentrated among relatively few external partners.

http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/russia/

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the decline and collapse of Communism, the reunification of Germany and the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991, there was, in the early 1990s, real hope and expectation that Russia would, with some unavoidable difficulties due to the transition, gradually turn into a Western-style democracy, allowing the EU to develop the same kind of relationship with Russia that it has with the US, Canada, Australia or Japan.

This did not happen and there was a period of economic chaos, corruption and decline which led first to the emergence of a small number of extremely rich ‘oligarchs’ and a general impoverishment of the mass of the population, and then to a return to an authoritarian model under Putin and Medvedev. Relations today are dominated by 2 factors which are in contradiction. The EU in particular, and the West in general, needs a close relationship with Russia as a partner both politically (e.g. on security questions) and economically.

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35939/european-union-and-russian-federation_en

At the same time Russia is not perceived as a real democracy based on respect for human and civil rights, so this partnership is one of convenience rather than of conviction (in clear contrast to the EU's relations with Canada, Japan, Brazil and South Africa, for example). There is a fundamental element of trust missing, which is what characterizes relations among EU members, and between them and many other democratic states or states committed to implementing democratic development. With the conflict in Georgia, the current conflict in Ukraine and Russia’s growing assertiveness in international relations (e.g. Syria, cyberattacks) new questions have been raised about the prospects for good future relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation.

The main factors:

1) Trade – In Soviet times there was little trade between The Communist bloc and Western Europe until the 1970s and trade remained limited until the late 1990s. Today there is very significant trade between the two. Russia is Europe’s main gas supplier and an important oil supplier and a market for European luxury goods, capital equipment, technology, transport equipment, chemicals, medicines and agricultural products, and this has created real economic interdependence, only partly weakened by sanctions. There are some, however, concerns about whether Russia might try to use energy supplies as a weapon to put short-term pressure on the EU regarding political questions, as it did regarding economic questions with its non-EU neighbor, Ukraine, in 2009, with follow-on effects also on EU members. As a result, the EU is involved in various projects to build new pipelines and gain access to resources outside Russia’s control and thus to diversify suppliers. At the same time, it is committed to developing new, greener energy sources and since the Fukushima Daiichi disaster in Japan several EU countries (notably Germany) have been trying to phase out or cut back on their dependence on energy production from nuclear power. This may, at least in the short term, make it difficult to reduce the EU’s dependence on Russia. Some critics argue that, as a result, the EU was surprisingly quiet about violations of civil and human rights within Russia (certainly in terms of action but often also in terms of words) until quite recently, and until the events in Ukraine, the EU clearly gave priority to economic security. On the other hand, some experts argue that building a strong and reliable relationship with Russia will act as a demonstration of Europe’s good will towards Russia and encourage Russia to reform and overcome its democratic deficit. The rapid development and exploitation of US and Canadian shale oil and gas resources (as well as potential European resources, e.g. in Poland and Arctic reserves) could one day provide an alternative to Russian energy supplies and a welcome diversification of suppliers but this remains only a long-term and ecologically highly dubious prospect (since we are committed to a green transition).

Volatile crude oil prices are key to Russia’s economy and they fell in 2019 to about $57 a barrel (in 2018 they were $75/b). At their lowest they were $26.55 in January 2016 and at their highest in June 2014, they were $100.26. With the Covid-19 pandemic oil prices were hit again and in December 2020 were at $47 a barrel.

https://www.thebalance.com/oil-price-forecast-3306219

They then rose sharply in the third quarter of 2021 to $67 in October 2021 as lock-downs were lifted and economic activity surged, but are now threatened again by the latest wave of the pandemic.

https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/oil-market-developments-rising-prices-amid-broader-surge-energy-prices

https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-december-2021

https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/oil-prices-edge-higher-investor-worries-omicron-spread-remain-2021-12-21/

Trade between the EU and Russia fell significantly in 2014 with the introduction of sanctions in response to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine.

http://www.euractiv.com/sections/european-business-summit-2014/eu-russia-trade-drops-sharply-bilateral-relations-sour-302144

EU-Russia trade dropped by 44% between 2012 and 2016 from €339 billion in 2012 to €191 billion in 2016. EU- Russia trade rose in 2017 but in December 2017 was still down on trade in December 2013.

https://www.rt.com/business/413537-eu-russia-trade-rise-sanctions/

There was a further improvement in trade in 2018 but in February 2019 EU exports to Russia still remained about 20% (EUR 30 billion) below the pre-sanctions level of 2013. Again, with Covid-19 EU exports to Russia declined.

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20200519-2

https://wiiw.ac.at/eu-russia-sanctions-exchange-has-had-important-economic-and-political-consequences-n-365.html

Nevertheless, in 2020 Russia was the EU's fifth largest trade partner, representing 4.8% of the EU’s total trade in goods with the world in 2020. The EU was Russia's biggest trade partner, accounting for 37.3% of the country’s total trade in goods with the world in 2020. 36.5% of Russia’s imports came from the EU and 37.9% of its exports went to the EU. Russia was the origin of 26% of the EU’s oil imports and 40% of the EU’s gas imports*. Energy price volatility directly affects the volume of bilateral trade.

https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/russia/

For more data see:

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Russia-EU_%E2%80%93_international_trade_in_goods_statistics

https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports-to-european-union

and EU concerns and divisions about energy security

https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/europes-energy-security-problem-leaves-it-in-the-cold/

https://ec.europa.eu/energy/topics/energy-security_en

https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/geopolitics-gas-european-union-25103

Russia too is trying to diversify by finding new customers. and has expanded its trade with China in response to EU sanctions.

https://wiiw.ac.at/trade-reorientation-in-russia-will-china-replace-the-eu--n-327.html

In 2014 and 2017 it signed deals with China to supply crude oil and build a new pipeline to supply gas.

https://www.agrimoney.com/news/russia-upgraded-to-top-rank-in-world-wheat-exports-in-2017-18-36734

http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/yuzhno-sakhalinsk/china-russia-pipeline-deal-to-shape-global-lng-27663702 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-25/russian-oil-seen-heading-east-not-west-in-crimea-spat.html

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-08/china-s-cefc-buys-stake-in-rosneft-from-glencore-and-qatar

It also obtained funding from China

http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/06/news/economy/russia-china-investment-deal-sanctions/index.html

and signed deals with Iran in 2014 and 2017

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-russia-nuclearpower/iran-russia-start-construction-of-new-iranian-nuclear-plant-idUSKCN11G0EB

http://www.euractiv.com/sections/european-business-summit-2014/eu-russia-trade-drops-sharply-bilateral-relations-sour-302144

and with Turkey to sell missiles in 2017

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41237812

2) In the last twenty years many former Soviet satellite states have joined NATO and the EU, at least partly (perhaps mainly) as a guarantee of their continuing independence from Russia. This has been seen by Russia as an aggressive act and an attempt to reduce Russia’s sphere of influence. Early on, Russia made clear its opposition to Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia joining NATO or the EU. Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008, in support of the break-away republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, is a good example of the dangers raised by the question of further NATO/EU expansion to the East. Further real progress towards EU and NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia seems unlikely at present given Russia’s opposition and the situation in the separatist regions seems to be frozen.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_enlargement_of_the_European_Union

https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/georgia_en

https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/ukraine_en

https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/24/russia-and-europe-stuck-on-autopilot-pub-82773

Above all, it was the evolution of events in Ukraine which really threw into question all certainties about relations with the Russian Federation. A decision in November 2013 by Ukraine's President Viktor Yanukovych to pull out of an association deal with the European Union and opt for closer ties with Russia sparked huge street protests and then police violence that eventually led to his downfall and flight in February 2014. In March Russia reacted by annexing the largely Russian-speaking Ukrainian region of Crimea after the Crimean parliament held a referendum and declared independence from Ukraine. At the same time unrest began growing in eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russian sentiment is strong. The US and NATO denounced the Russian move as illegal and aggressively expansionist. Russia responded by repeatedly asserting that it saw NATO and the EU’s expansion to the East over the last 20 years as far more aggressive and a violation of a verbal promise made in 1990 that in exchange for Russian agreement to German reunification NATO agreed not to expand towards the East.

https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nato-s-eastward-expansion-did-the-west-break-its-promise-to-moscow-a-663315-2.html

A Brief Summary of Events in Ukraine - Relations between the West and Moscow worsened dramatically as the risk of civil conflict grew and the status of Crimea remained unresolved. In March 2014 the EU and US imposed travel bans and asset freezes on several officials from Russia and Ukraine over the Crimea referendum. A ban on financial transactions was introduced the following month.

(Time line of EU sanctions: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_restrictive_measures_in_response_to_crisis_in_ukraine_en_0.pdf )

Washington put military cooperation with Russia on hold and ended negotiations on the NATO missile defense program. Then in April NATO suspended all cooperation with Russia, and in June the G7 met without Russia (G8). A UN General Assembly resolution described the Crimea referendum as illegal but Russia blocked a similar resolution on the Security Council (some countries such as Cuba, Afghanistan, Syria, Venezuela, Bolivia recognized the validity of the referendum in Ukraine). Meanwhile Russia, Ukraine, the US and the EU held talks in Geneva on steps to "de-escalate" the crisis in eastern Ukraine, but were later unable to halt the violence between pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian government forces.

Protests in Donetsk and Luhansk escalated into an armed separatist insurgency. In May pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk declared independence after referendums which were not recognized by Kiev or the West. In the same month elections were held in Ukraine and in June Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President-elect Petro Poroshenko called for a quick end to the bloodshed in eastern Ukraine. On June 16^th Russia cut off all gas supplies to Ukraine, with Gazprom saying Ukraine had failed to settle its debts. On 27^th June the EU signed an association agreement with Ukraine, along with Georgia and Moldova, in what President Petro Poroshenko described as the most important day in the country's history since independence in 1991. On July 1^st Poroshenko ended a tentative ceasefire and launched military operations against pro-Russia rebels, saying "we will attack and liberate our land."

On July 17^th Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot down in eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 people on board. On the 23^rd US intelligence officials said they believed the plane was shot down by pro-Russian separatists "by mistake." On 29August NATO released satellite images appearing to show Russian soldiers, artillery and armored vehicles engaged in military operations in eastern Ukraine. On 5 September 2014 Ukraine's government and separatist leaders signed a ceasefire deal, the Minsk Protocol, after talks in Belarus, raising hopes of an end to the nearly five-month conflict in eastern Ukraine. It included provisions for a release of prisoners, withdrawal of forces and the establishment of a buffer zone and the decentralization of power from Kiev to the eastern region. The cease-fire seemed fragile and in danger of collapse. However, on 16 Sept. Ukraine, as agreed, voted to give the east of the country limited self-rule as part of proposals aimed at ending the separatist fighting.
The United Nations' refugee agency, UNHCR, said that the number of people displaced in Ukraine by the fighting, particularly around Donetsk and Luhansk, as of 1 September 2014, was 260,000. A UN report published on 29 August 29, said 2,220 people died and about 6,000 were injured in the Ukrainian crisis between mid-April and August 17 2014.

As the conflict continued a new round of sanctions was imposed, by the US, the EU, and others like Canada, Japan Australia, Switzerland during the summer and autumn of 2014 to deter Russia from supporting the insurrectionist movement in the Donbass area. These sanctions involve banking and financial facilities and transactions, trade restrictions on military and technological exports (particularly to the Russian energy sector) and investment in and exports to the Crimea. The US also banned the export to Russia of technology with potential military applications, suspended cooperation on civilian nuclear energy projects and cut off NASA’s contacts with its Russian counterparts.

Russia, meanwhile, made a resolution of the impasse over NATO’s missile defense system a precondition to further strategic arms control talks (although later in 2019 President Putin indicated that he would welcome a resumption of arms talks). It moved forward with plans for a Eurasian Economic Union and a stronger Collective Security Treaty Organization with partners such as Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Some Russian commentators have even argued that its authoritarian model is a viable alternative to Western liberal democracy and one which will gain support in the Caucasus and Central Asia, where some Western ideas are seen as going against tradition and religion. In August 2014 Russia responded to Western sanctions with counter-measures, its own sanctions on the import of agricultural products from the US, the EU and the other countries which imposed sanctions on Russia.

The Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014 was an agreement aimed at ensuring a ceasefire in the Donbass region but it ultimately failed. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_Protocol

The economic sanctions weakened the Russian economy and intensified the challenges that Russia was already facing after the dramatic fall in global oil prices in 2014, a decline in the value of the ruble (usually dependent on the price of oil) and the flight of international capital.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-08/china-s-cefc-buys-stake-in-rosneft-from-glencore-and-qatar

Data confirms Russia entered a recession, with negative GDP growth of -3.7% in 2015 and -0.4% in 2016 but returned to moderate growth in 2017-18, which then weakened in 2019.

https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp-growth-annual

So the sanctions had the economic effect intended (although the fall in oil prices was more important for Russia's economy). However, they did not force Russia into a change of policy in Ukraine. The US imposed new sanctions on Russia in August 2017 (partly in response to Russian interference in US elections). And the sanctions have been regularly renewed by the US and EU. In June2020 the EU renewed sanctions on Russia till January 2021 and Russia responded by extending its own food import embargo on Western countries until the end of 2021.

US also sanctions on Russia remain in place.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/06/29/russia-council-renews-economic-sanctions-over-ukrainian-crisis-for-six-more-months/

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/infographics/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine/#

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/11/21/russia-extends-western-food-imports-embargo-to-end-2021-a72112

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45415.pdf

However, President Biden may intend to impose harsher sanctions

https://globalriskinsights.com/2020/11/the-future-of-us-russia-relations-post-2020/

The EU has, however, expressed concern about further costs to its trade with Russia.

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/why-europe-opposes-the-uss-new-russia-sanctions/535722/

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-17-2302_en.htm

The Trump administration imposed more sanctions on Russia under a chemical and biological warfare law following the poisoning of a former Russian agent and his daughter in the UK

https://edition.cnn.com/2018/08/08/politics/us-state-department-russia-sanctions/index.html

The Gentiloni government said it wanted to continue to work closely with Russia and had doubts about the long-term viability of anti-Russian sanctions.

http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/806012/Russia-European-Union-EU-Italy-Gentiloni-Putin

the first Conte government wanted to lift the sanctions

https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/italy-breaks-ranks-with-g7-and-eu-allies-to-strengthen-ties-with-strategic-partner-russia.html

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-russia-sanctions/italy-resisting-eu-push-to-impose-sanctions-over-cyberattacks-idUSKCN1MM2CP

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603847/EXPO_STU(2017)603847_EN.pdf

In 2017 sanctions on Russia cost the economy of the European Union $3.2 billion a month, while the Russian economy lost $55 billion because of the sanctions over three years, according to a report (September 2017) of the UN Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive measures.

http://russiafeed.com/much-anti-russian-sanctions-cost-eu-economy-per-month/

https://www.rt.com/business/403938-italy-russia-eu-sanctions/

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603847/EXPO_STU(2017)603847_EN.pdf

and here is a 2019 summary of the effects of the sanctions

https://wiiw.ac.at/eu-russia-sanctions-exchange-has-had-important-economic-and-political-consequences-n-365.html

Many European states and leaders, including the Italian government, might like to change policy on the sanctions but this is politically difficult given Russia's continued occupation of Crimea and the tensions about cyber-attacks.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-summit-russia-ukraine-idUSKCN1TL1I4

At the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014, the military alliance approved plans for a new "spearhead" force (a rapid deployment force of 4,000 soldiers able go into action in 48 hours) as a response to growing concern about the Ukraine crisis and the advance of Islamic State militants in the Middle East. Despite calls from eastern European members (Poland and the Baltic states), NATO did not at that time approve the proposal to create new permanent bases in these member states. Germany in particular wished to avoid further antagonizing Russia by such an action. President Obama, however, assured them of NATO and US commitment to their protection.
In February 2015, as a result of the failure of the original Minsk Protocol, a new agreement was reached, Minsk II, which involved an immediate ceasefire on Feb. 15^th, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the restoration of social and economic links. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/minsk-conundrum-western-policy-and-russias-war-eastern-ukraine-0/minsk-2-agreement

Experts argue that Minsk II is not clear, and is open to diverging interpretations by the two sides. The lifting of the sanctions would depend on the full implementation of the Minsk II agreement as interpreted by the West. The conflict continued at a low level and total casualties stood at 4,291 deaths (4,150 identified and 141 unidentified) in June 2019. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Ukrainian_crisis

NATO agreed to deploy multi-lateral forces to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland at its 2016 Warsaw summit and this took the form of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence strategy in those counties.

https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_50090.htm

https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_136388.htm?selectedLocale=en

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_09/20180903_180905-MAP-eFP-eng.pdf

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement entered into force on 1 September 2017 and Ukraine is

determined to join NATO. On the 10th of March 2018, NATO added Ukraine to the list of countries aspiring to NATO membership (others including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the Macedonia) but any definitive moves towards the accession of the Ukraine to the EU and NATO still seem unlikely, given the situation there today and the West's desire not to further antagonize Russia. NATO says it is determined to maintain and repair the dialogue with Russia while continuing to support Ukraine's independence. However, NATO continues to take a hard line on Russia aggression.

Extract from a speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, 12 November 2019

He said that currently 'we continue to combine meaningful dialogue with credible deterrence and defence. including when it comes to dealing with Russia. We see a more assertive Russia illegally annexing Crimea. and destabilizing Ukraine, meddling in our political processes and investing in modern military equipment, including in new intermediate-range missiles which led to the demise of the INF treaty.

In these difficult times, we must avoid miscalculations and misunderstandings. And we need to rebuild trust where possible. We aspire for a more constructive relationship with Russia. All of this is why we keep our diplomatic channels to Moscow open. But our diplomatic efforts can only be effective if we engage Russia from a position of credible deterrence and credible defence.

In recent years, we have implemented the largest reinforcement of our collective defence since the end of the Cold War. We have strengthened our military posture from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. And increased the readiness of our forces. For the first time in our history, we have combat-ready troops in the eastern part of our Alliance. And American forces are there too.

We are also responding in a defensive and measured way to Russia’s violation of the INF treaty. And to the presence of new Russian missiles in Europe. Missiles that are mobile, easy to hide and able to reach major European cities with little warning time.

We will not mirror what Russia is doing. We have no intention to deploy new ground-based nuclear missiles in Europe. But we will consider our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Our air and missile defences. And our conventional capabilities. Because ultimately, it is our military strength that provides the conditions for our diplomatic achievements.'

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_170714.htm?selectedLocale=en

The election of a new President in Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, in May 2019 and an exchange of prisoners in September 2019 seemed to offer some grounds for hope of an improvement in relations (see above).

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-49986007

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/07/long-awaited-russia-ukraine-prisoner-exchange-begins

However, in October 2019 the situation in Ukraine remained substantially frozen, like that in Georgia (2008) and the Moldova/Transnistria situation which dates back to 1990-1992.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russo-ukrainian-war-zelenskyy-unable-to-find-path-to-peace-with-putin/

https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/conflict-in-ukraine

Moreover, as we have seen, the rapid evolution of the situation in Ukraine intensified calls for the EU to move more rapidly towards a diversification of energy suppliers and sources to escape over-dependence on Russia. It also led to a reassessment of the whole relationship with Russia and the terms of political cooperation between Russia and the West (the EU, the US and NATO), and a debate about what kind of measures should be taken in dealing with Russia and how effective or desirable the current sanctions are. After all, although Russia is criticized for its actions in Ukraine and for its support of the Assad regime in Syria, it remains a fundamental ally in the fight against terrorism and for the moment an essential trading partner.

Nevertheless, in June 2021 the EU renewed its Crimea and Sevastopol trade sanctions on Russia in response to the illegal annexation of those areas until June 2022 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/21/russia-s-illegal-annexation-of-crimea-and-sevastopol-council-renews-sanctions-for-a-further-year/

In July 2021, it renewed its more general trade sanctions on Russia till 31 January 2022

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/07/12/russia-eu-prolongs-economic-sanctions-over-the-destabilisation-of-ukraine-by-six-months/

and in September 2021 the EU also renewed its targeted sanctions on individuals and entities held responsible for undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine till March 2022.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/

Lifting the sanctions continues to depend on Russia respecting the Minsk agreements

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/press/press-releases/2021/02/11/joint-press-statement-following-the-7th-association-council-meeting-between-the-eu-and-ukraine/

Russian cyberattacks on the US and some European states has strengthened the position of those wanting to pursue a harder line with Russia.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/18/cyber-attack-brutal-reminder-russia-problem-facing-joe-biden

3) EU members need to show more unity in dealing with Russia through EU institutions. In the past EU members tended to negotiate bilateral agreements with Russia and this could allow Russia to exploit divisions between EU members. The Italian government is sometimes accused of adopting this approach.

4) Russia’s domestic political situation is characterized by a lack of freedom of the press and a concentration of media power, economic power and political power in the hands of the government, or friends of the government (opponents call this ‘cronyism and corruption’), attacks on and the repression of opposition leaders and strong critics of the government (e.g. Aleksei A. Navalny, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexei_Navalny

Garry Kasparov, Pussy Riot), restrictions on freedom of expression and the right to demonstrate (freedom of assembly and association), opposition to the activities of NGOs in Russia involved in human rights issues, accusations of state-sponsored murder regarding the death or disappearance of some critics, (e.g. investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya), accusations from many sources of massive human rights violations and atrocities during and after the military campaigns in Chechnya, the repression of or discrimination against other ethnic or social groups (e.g. immigrants and gays) by the police, secret services, military or paramilitary supporters and allies of the government. The government, first under Putin, then under Medvedev, and now under Putin again seems authoritarian and nationalist and determined to maintain control over society. In fact, after his re-election Putin moved to undo some of Medvedev’s more liberal legislation and the 2020 constitutional reforms in Russia mean that Putin has been granted the right to run again for two more terms. Those in positions of power are often from the FSB secret service (many like Putin originally from the KGB) or from among those who have made money and given their support to the government. Rich opponents have been charged with corruption and imprisoned, silenced or driven abroad. However, the government so far seems genuinely to have been popular and although its control of the media raises some doubts about how far elections in Russia can be considered free and fair, it seems likely that the government still has widespread support (including, despite some demonstrations against intervention in Ukraine, general support for the intervention in Crimea) and popular legitimacy. This may be due to the fear of terrorism or of a return to the economic chaos of the early 1990s and also to a resurgence of national pride after the embarrassment of a weak and economically helpless Russia in the early 1990s. Russia has a stable government but the uneven distribution of wealth makes Russia much less stable socially. It still lacks the large, independent-minded middle class on which a functioning democracy is often said to rest. The protests and demonstrations in 2014 on social and economic questions and the anti-corruption protests and unrest in 2017 as well as current support for Navalny suggest, however, that the middle class is growing and starting to find its voice, although the government remains firmly in control. According to public opinion surveys conducted by NGO Levada Center, Putin's approval rating was 65% in December 2021.

https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/

The handling of the Covid-19 pandemic and tensions with the West regarding Ukraine may have led to an increase in discontent.

https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/putin-s-approval-rating-slips-amid-covid-surge-ukraine-tensions-1.1690228

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/11/he-is-failing-putins-approval-slides-as-covid-19-grips-russia

https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/6/17/putins-rating-is-collapsing-as-anger-grows-in-russia

Official Russian sources have continued to discredit opponents and criticism from abroad.

https://theconversation.com/russias-state-broadcaster-rt-going-all-out-to-boost-legitimacy-of-rigged-duma-election-167682

However, in local municipal elections in September 2020 President Putin’s United Russia party won only a narrow victory in what are generally recognized as ‘managed’ elections.

http://theconversation.com/moscows-municipal-elections-illustrate-the-growing-political-crisis-in-russia-123262

So at the end of 2021, Putin’s popular legitimacy may now be weakening although the regime itself shows no signs of weakening. Its aggressive foreign stance may be a way to distract domestic opinion from domestic issues.

https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/9/22/election-fraud-allegations-will-erode-putins-legitimacy

https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/12/inside-out-what-changing-russian-domestic-politics-mean-for-nato/index.html

5) The Russian economy

https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/12/16/russias-economy-loses-momentum-amid-covid-19-resurgence-says-new-world-bank-report

https://www.businesstoday.in/markets/commodities/russia-annual-oil-production-tumbles-for-first-time-in-12-years/story/426767.html

Russia’s economy is too narrowly based on the export of energy resources and other raw materials. As mentioned above, the Russian economy in 2015 contracted (-3.7% GDP growth, -0.4% in 2016) largely as a result of the fall in oil prices, from well over $100 a barrel between 2011 and 2013 to around $60 a barrel in June 2015, to a low of $27 in January 2016, to $45 in September 2016 and $55 in November 2017, $74 in 2018, $57 in 2019, $47 in 2020 and $67 in 2021.

http://www.macrotrends.net/2516/wti-crude-oil-prices-10-year-daily-chart

Successful diversification would strengthen the economy and spread the wealth. This would help stabilize the country socially. Many experts argue that given Russia’s interest in buying shares in western European energy companies it must now open its economy much more to EU investment in its own energy companies and loosen government control. However, any move in this direction is now blocked by the Ukraine conflict and resulting sanctions, and Russia is turning to China as a new export market for its oil and to Iran for the export of its nuclear expertise. There is also a need for a better business environment in Russia, less bureaucracy and red-tape etc.., to attract investment. Organized crime is still powerful. In August 2012 Russia finally joined the WTO and this should have led to a real liberalization of the economy, increased foreign investment and significant economic expansion. All of this is now threatened by the Ukraine sanctions and counter-sanctions, and by the business environment (corruption and doubts about security of ownership, legal transparency etc...) which remains poor.
Moreover, in ‘The Dying Bear’ in 2011 (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136511/nicholas-eberstadt/the-dying-bear) Nicholas Eberstadt argued that Russia is facing a demographic disaster with a population that fell from 148.8 million in 1993 to 141.9 million in 2010, an aging population, a falling rate of family formation, more deaths than births each year and an average life expectancy of 67 years (lower than in 1961). The low life expectancy is the result of high rates of alcoholism, fatal accidents and violence (violence at the level of some post-conflict African countries), a decline in the quality of the health service and a decline in education levels. Thus Eberstadt predicted a decline in the quality and quantity of human resources available to the Russian economy in the future. All this could undermine Russia’s economic prospects as one of the BRICS. The state is currently trying to raise the birth rate by rewarding families financially for having more children but it is not clear how successful this policy is. Russia also benefits from the growing presence of millions of immigrants from ex-Soviet republics, who provide cheap labor but are not well-integrated into Russian society and are often resented, and from remittances worth billions of dollars from Russians working abroad. However, there is also a general internal migration from East to West that may soon leave the Asian areas of Russia critically underpopulated. Eberstadt also argues that Russia is an economy based on the export of raw materials and that, although this can strengthen a developed economy like Norway or Canada, without a strong industrial-technological base the Russian economy remains weak. In fact, without such a developed economic base Russia’s export earnings are less than those of Belgium. According to Eberstadt all the factors listed above will tend to weaken the Russian Federation economically, politically and, in the end, also militarily. Russia’s future position and role within the international community may thus be threatened with decline and Russia may become a more difficult partner to work with due to domestic tensions. Following the 2014 annexation of Crimea, over 98% of Crimea residents acquired Russian citizenship. Russia's population thus expanded by 2,294,110 people. However, in 2018, the total fertility rate across Russia was estimated to be 1.6 children born per woman, which is below the replacement rate of 2.1, and is one of the world's lowest fertility rates. Russia had had a population of 146.2 million as of early 2021.

http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/russia-population/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Russia

6) Terrorism – Russia has been faced with separatism and Islamic fundamentalism in some of its federated republics (Chechnya and Dagestan are republics in the Russian Federation) and independent allied republics (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are in the Commonwealth of Independent States) in the Caucasus. The war in Chechnya was only the most obvious example. The Russian response has been fairly drastic in some places, milder in others, but it is not clear if Russia has won the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign in the area. This was both a reason for Russia to support NATO logistically in the early years of the its intervention in Afghanistan, but also a reason for Russia to avoid bad publicity with its Muslim citizens by getting too heavily involved (also because the Soviet Union, of course, fought and lost a war there in the 1970s, so it evokes bad memories). However, Russia and the West cooperated closely on major security issues, through the exchange of information and intelligence between secret services on terrorist threats and illegal trafficking. This also means that in order to have Russian cooperation against al Qaeda the West said little in criticism of Russia’s handling of the Chechen question. For the current situation see:

https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/russias-quest-security-north-caucasus-syria-link-24318

One forum for cooperation was the NATO-Russia Council, but in April 2014, following Russia’s illegal military intervention in Ukraine and its violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Alliance suspended all practical cooperation between NATO and Russia including that which took place in the framework of the NRC. However, the Alliance agreed to keep channels of communication open in the NRC and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at the Ambassadorial level and above, to allow the exchange of views, first and foremost on the crisis in Ukraine. Three meetings of the NATO-Russia Council took place in 2016, three in 2017, two in 2018, and two in 2019. NATO remains open to a periodic, focused and meaningful political dialogue with Russia on the basis of reciprocity, as agreed at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016. The NATO-Russia Council has an important role to play as a forum for dialogue and information exchange, to reduce misunderstandings and increase predictability. NATO proposed to hold another meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in February 2020. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50091.htm

7) Syria – On Syria, initially, a clear division emerged on the UN Security Council in 2011-12 between Russia, and to a lesser extent China, which were against sanctions and international intervention and argued their case in terms of the UN principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of an independent state, and the West which viewed the Assad regime as delegitimized by its involvement in massacres and massive human rights abuses. The West attempted to support what it thought were ‘moderate’ opponents of the regime with money and arms and called for Assad to step down. Russia’s support for Assad may have been, in part, because they were confident their ally could defeat the rebels and, in part, a response to what had happened in Libya where the West convinced Russia to allow the UNSC to authorize an intervention to protect civilians. The Russians argued that NATO had exceeded its mandate by helping the rebels to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. With the rise of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, Russia at first argued that US interventions in the Middle East since 2003 had only led to the strengthening of radical Islamist forces and was thus a misguided policy.

However, despite all of the above, in September 2015 Russia itself began to intervene in the Syrian civil war directly with air strikes. Russia supported the Assad regime and claimed it is acting legally (at the invitation of the 'legitimate' Syrian government) against Islamic State but seems to have mainly targeted the opposition rebels and Kurdish fighters. Russia invited the US to form a grand alliance with it against IS (referring to their WWII alliance) but the Obama administration, despite launching its own air strikes and supporting those of its allies, did not want to accept the long-term survival of the Assad regime or Russia’s targeting of Assad’s other opponents. However, the stakes were very high and the situation was in constant evolution. With the terrorist attack on Paris on November 13^th 2015 Russia, the EU and the US began moving towards greater cooperation in their efforts to contain and defeat IS (Da’esh). On 21^st November 2015 the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously in favour of a French-sponsored resolution ‘calling on ‘Member States that have the capacity to do so to take all necessary measures, in compliance with international law, in particular with the United Nations Charter, as well as international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, on the territory under the control of IS(IL) also known as Da’esh, in Syria and Iraq, to redouble and coordinate their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by IS(IL)’ This was interpreted by many politicians and commentators as fully authorizing military intervention in Syria, although this is not strictly true. By October 2017 ISIS had been largely defeated at least for the moment. The humanitarian cost of the civil war has been enormous.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/21/isis-caliphate-islamic-state-raqqa-iraq-islamist

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/28041/the-syrian-civil-war-might-be-ending-but-the-crisis-will-live-on

https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria

After President Trump decided to withdraw US troops from northern Syria and Turkey invaded the area saying this was necessary to secure its border from cross-border Kurdish attacks or infiltration, Russia accepted the Turkish move but expressed concern that it would lead to the escape of ISIS prisoners in Kurdish hands. These pose a threat not only to EU countries but to Russia too.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/11/putin-turkish-invasion-of-syria-could-release-hundreds-of-isis-fighters

In January 2021, ten years after the start of the Arab Spring, Syria remains a human rights disaster with a ruined economy.

https://www.mei.edu/publications/2021-will-be-defining-year-syria

As of December 2021, there seems to be an effective stalemate

https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/12/1108462

8)* in the 1990s and 2000s Russia and the US negotiated and implemented significant cuts in their nuclear arsenals and this is in theory an ongoing process. However, there is growing friction over the question of Russia’s modernization of its weapons systems and NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2020.1728985

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8206.htm

including its Ballistic Missile Defence

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49635.htm

This is still an ongoing process. In November 2010 at the NATO summit in Lisbon, to which Russia was invited (NATO Russia Council), Russia seemed originally to be in favor of the plan if the cooperation offered by NATO meant Russia’s real integration into a system of shared defense against third parties (e.g. Iran). Russia was not willing to accept a system based in Eastern European NATO member states from which it would only receive information and intelligence as a courtesy. The implication from the Russian point of view is that it could still be used against Russia. However, NATO later rejected the idea of Russia’s participation in the control arrangements for the Missile Defense System and Russia threatened to deploy missiles on its Western borders if NATO went ahead with its plans. The impasse here led Russia to break off negotiations for further nuclear arms reductions. In July 2016 NATO took command of the US-built missile shield.

https://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/11/politics/nato-missile-defense-romania-poland/index.html

Talks between Russia and the US on further nuclear arms reductions resumed in September 2017 but experts were not optimistic about the chances of making real progress.

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-09/news/disputes-cloud-us-russian-arms-talks

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-shield-idUSKCN0ZO1Q1

The US withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002 (which banned the development of a missile defence system) and both sides now seem to be willing to risk a new nuclear arms race.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZOxhsrQH7Yw

On Aug. 2, 2019, the United States formally withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty claiming that Russia had repeatedly violated it. The deal banned ground-launched medium-range missiles, with a range of between 500 and 5,500km (310-3,400 miles. e.g. Moscow to Paris).

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty

In summer 2019 there were a series of reports saying that NATO had called upon Russia to destroy a new land-based missile

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-usa-missiles/nato-calls-on-russia-to-destroy-new-missile-warns-of-response-idUSKCN1TQ14E

that Putin had offered a moratorium on missile deployment in Europe

https://www.rferl.org/a/report-putin-sends-nato-proposal-for-moratorium-on-missile-deployment-to-europe/30182957.html

that NATO had rejected this offer. Both sides claim they are still open to dialogue on arms control and reduction.

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-09/news/us-modifies-arms-control-aims-russia

https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2020-08/us-russian-nuclear-arms-control-watch

https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nuclear-arsenal/2020/05/24/time-running-out-on-the-last-us-russia-nuclear-arms-treaty/

Without agreement on an extension the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New Start) would have expired on 5 February 2021. Agreement to extend it was finally reached

https://www.dw.com/en/us-russia-agree-to-extend-new-start-nuclear-arms-treaty/a-56354318

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-05/focus/back-brink-next-steps-biden-putin

https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/22/biden-putin-russia-arms-control-new-start/

https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-12/news-briefs/russia-us-adhere-new-start-limits

but the treaty needs to be expanded to include new technologies

https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/25/extending-new-start-should-be-just-beginning-pub-83699

9) The creation of the BRICS group gave Russia a new forum in which to exercise its influence. While this group will continue to be of growing importance economically (see notes on the BRICS and the New Development Bank) its political value is still unclear. Will authoritarian states like Russia and China share common positions with democracies like India, Brazil and South Africa? This may be possible in a negative sense, e.g. restraining US and Western interventionism, bur when it comes to democratic values and human rights violations, it is difficult to imagine these countries will be in full agreement. However, the growing strength of the relationship between Russia and China was demonstrated by the signing of a $400 billion oil supply deal in May 2014 and the start on construction of a new oil pipeline on September 1^st 2014 (the pipeline was opened in December 2019). Further deals followed in 2016.

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-27503017

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rosneft-chemchina-idUSKCN0ZB0AV

https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/12/06/is-there-strength-behind-russia-and-chinas-new-power-of-siberia-pipeline/?sh=4520018f1faf

Russia, Brazil and South Africa all faced economic difficulties in 2015 and 2016 and weak or erratic growth since then. Meanwhile China and India maintained high growth rates till the onset on Covid-19. This will also limit the group's influence.

https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/brics-divided-we-stand/

https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/why-the-brics-grouping-is-here-to-stay/

https://www.statista.com/statistics/741729/gross-domestic-product-gdp-growth-rate-in-the-bric-countries/

https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/covid-19-magnifies-brics-divergence-as-china-solidifies-lead-61053247

Cooperation between BRICS countries to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic has so far been limited.

https://theprint.in/opinion/brics-with-a-capital-c-how-covid-robbed-members-of-economic-advantage/671471/

10) Russia and how international events, like the World Athletics Championships in Moscow in August 2013 and the Winter Olympics in 2014, affected its foreign policy stance and image at the international level.

http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/politics-sports-mega-events-russia-kazan-sochi-and-beyond However, the World Anti-Doping Agency’s report on Russia’s state-sponsored support for Russian athletes using drugs to enhance their performance did enormous damage to the country’s sporting image and led to a ban on Russia being banned from international athletics events for 4 years. This has been reduced to 2 years but means Russia will miss the next Olympic Games.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/over-1-000-russian-athletes-involved-in-doping-says-wada-1481285107

https://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/50710598

https://www.npr.org/2020/12/17/947504052/russia-suspended-from-next-2-olympic-games-over-anti-doping-violations?t=1608731068527

11) Institutional relations between the NATO and the Russian Federation and the situation after the sanctions with the suspension of some areas of cooperation. The NATO-Russia council was created in 2002 as a consultative mechanism. NATO suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia after the Ukraine crisis broke out in April 2014. However, the NATO-Russia Council, which brings together all 29 NATO Allies and Russia, met in Brussels on 5 July 2019 to discuss Ukraine, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and transparency and risk reduction. This was the second meeting of the NATO-Russia Council this year. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who chaired the meeting, said: “Our discussion was frank but necessary. The allies and Russia hold fundamentally different views but we are committed to continuing our dialogue.”

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_167682.htm

Institutional relations between the EU and the Russian Federation and the situation after the sanctions with the suspension of some areas of cooperation.

https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/russia/docs/russia_brochure07_en.pdf

https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/cooperation/international/russian-federation/

https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_restrictive_measures_in_response_to_crisis_in_ukraine_en_0.pdf

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35939/european-union-and-russian-federation_en

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia%E2%80%93European_Union_relations

http://www.russianmission.eu/en/brief-overview-relations

Conclusion: Russia appears to want to reassert its power and play a more decisive role on the world stage and in eastern Europe. The EU and the West should perhaps welcome or at least try to accommodate its first ambition and try to work with Russia wherever possible, while trying to reach a reasonable compromise as regards its second ambition. However, achieving this seems increasingly unlikely.

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35939/european-union-and-russian-federation_en

If the EU and Russia do not have the kind of friendly relations that the EU has with countries like the US, Brazil, Australia and Japan this is because Russia is not perceived as a fully democratic state. Events in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine since 2014 have undermined this relationship and suggest that there has been a return to a more adversarial relationship. According to some experts there is even the danger of a second Cold War, though this seems an exaggerated reaction. Further progress on US-Russia nuclear arms reductions, cooperation between NATO and Russia and real agreement on the future of Ukraine and other states bordering on Russia seem unlikely for the moment. Indeed, NATO seems destined to return, at least in part, to its Cold War task of guaranteeing the independence of its European members. Many diplomats on both sides see their main task as that of ‘damage control’ and trying to reduce tensions and repair relations. The likely involvement of Russia in attempts to manipulate voting in the 2016 US presidential election and the recent revelations about Russian cyber-attacks on the US and Western European states have further undermined relations.

Nonetheless, compared with relations with the old Soviet Union and Soviet bloc, enormous progress has been made politically and economically in the last 30 years. Russia is clearly no longer a state that Europe regards simply as an enemy. Europe will maintain close ties with the US through NATO as an ultimate guarantee of its freedom from Russian pressure, but needs at the same time to boost its own autonomous defence capability and to intensify its dialogue with Russia. This may mean quiet diplomacy to encourage Russia to implement democratic reforms with a campaign of renewed goodwill to win the confidence of the Russian government and people. Both sides need the relationship to return to stability and cooperation. This will mean reaching some kind of practical compromise on the Ukrainian question and the economic sanctions. The Minsk II agreement of February 2015 was a clear attempt to take a first step towards reaching such a settlement by stabilizing the situation.

What exactly the election of Joe Biden will mean for long-term cooperation between the US and Russia is yet to be seen. Hopefully, it will bring greater stability and predictability.

Some Background notes:

Ukraine

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18010123

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/03/timeline-ukraine-political-crisis-201431143722854652.html

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-a-timeline-of-the-conflict-from-the-euromaidan-protests-to-mh17-and-civil-war-in-the-east-9706999.html

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_Protocol

http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/05/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/index.html

http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/02/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/

http://en.ria.ru/world/20140829/192463965/UN-Observer-Report-Acknowledges-Horrifying-Number-of-Dead-in.html

http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20140904/NEWS08/309040030/Eastern-European-hopes-permanent-NATO-bases-stymied-by-Russia

http://www.voanews.com/content/eastern-ukraine-ceasefire/2440781.html

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/16/ukraine-votes-more-power-separatist-east

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_Protocol

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_II older material on EU-US sanctions on Russia and their effect

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28400218

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/22-russia-sanctions/

http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Ukrainian_crisis#Sanctions_by_Russia

http://rbth.co.uk/opinion/2015/06/16/thaw_in_eu-russia_relations_inevitable_but_dont_hold_your_breath_46951.html

Russia’s economy

http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/publication/rer

https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/russia

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jul/05/there-is-little-reason-to-be-cheerful-about-russias-growth-prospects

http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/russian-federation-economic-forecast-summary.htm

http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/brief/monthly-economic-developments

http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/04/chinas-troubles-make-russias-putin-into-a-loser.html

http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/august-2015-really-black-russia

Ukraine’s economy

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-war-on-ukraine-economy-by-anders-aslund-2015-07

Trade picture

§ Russia is the EU's fifth largest trade partner, representing 4.8% of the EU’s total trade in goods with the world in 2020.

§ The EU is Russia's biggest trade partner, accounting for 37.3% of the country’s total trade in goods with the world in 2020. 36.5% of Russia’s imports came from the EU and 37.9% of its exports went to the EU.

§ Russia is the Union's largest energy resources supplier. Russia is the origin of 26% of the EU’s oil imports and 40% of the EU’s gas imports*. Energy price volatility directly affects the volume of bilateral trade.

§ Total trade in goods between the EU and Russia in 2020 amounted to €174.3 billion. The EU’s imports were worth €95.3 billion and were dominated by fuel and mining products – especially petroleum (€67.3 billion, 70.6%), agriculture and raw materials (€4.3 billion, 4.5%), chemicals (€4.1 billion, 4.3%) and iron and steel (€4.0 billion, 4.1%). The EU’s exports totalled €79.0 billion. They were led by machinery and transport equipment (€35.0 billion, 44.1%), chemicals (€16.7 billion, 21.1%), and manufactured goods (€7.6 billion, 9.6%) as well as agriculture and raw materials (€6.9 billion, 8.7%).

§ Two-way trade in services between the EU and Russia in 2020 amounted to €27.7 billion, with EU imports of services from Russia representing €8.9 billion and exports of services to Russia accounting for €18.8 billion.

§ The EU is the largest investor in Russia. In 2019, the EU’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in Russia amounted to €311.4 billion, Russia’s FDI stock in the EU was estimated at €136 billion.

* Data from 1st semester of 2020

https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/russia/

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was supposed to be upgraded through the negotiation of a New EU-Russia Agreement, providing a comprehensive framework for bilateral relations. The negotiations, but also some of the activities in the existing agreement, were suspended after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Ukraine in 2014.

Still, the EU remains a key trading partner for Russia. Imports from Russia to the EU increased by 16.7% in period from 2017 to 2018 and were driven by the growth in imports of energy products from Russia that account for about 70% of imports from Russia to EU. In the first half of 2019 the EU-Russia trade to a large extent remained at the same level, compared to the first half of 2018. The same was true for EU exports to Russia.

The EU is by far the largest investor in Russia. According to the Central Bank of Russia, the total stock of foreign direct investment in Russia originating from the EU approached €235.2 billion in 2018. Nevertheless, the share of investments originating from the EU in the total FDI stock in Russia has been decreasing: e.g. from 73% in 2014 to 64.7% in 2018. Overall inflow of direct investments in Russia from abroad fell to USD 8.8 billion in 2018 – a three-fold decline as compared with figures from 2017, while outflow of investments from Russia in the same period constituted 31.9 billion dollars (36.8 billion dollars in 2017).

These last 3 paragraphs are an excerpt from the document at the link below, which is still a good guide to the trade and sanctions situation immediately before the Covid-19 pandemic (Feb 2020), and worth reading in full, although the figures are for 2018.

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35939/european-union-and-russian-federation_en

For the effects of the pandemic, see:

http://eu-russia-expertnetwork.eu/en/news/euren-covid2

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/603511/EXPO_STU(2020)603511_EN.pdf

The EU and the Wagner Group 2021

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/12/13/eu-imposes-restrictive-measures-against-the-wagner-group/

Russia, Navalny and the EU 2021

https://www.dw.com/en/russian-opposition-leader-alexei-navalny-sentenced-to-prison/a-56412686

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55876033

https://www.euronews.com/2021/02/02/detained-kremlin-critic-navalny-faces-court-and-may-be-jailed-for-years

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/01/25/world/politics-diplomacy-world/putin-russia-navalny-protests/

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/03/02/global-human-rights-sanctions-regime-eu-sanctions-four-people-responsible-for-serious-human-rights-violations-in-russia/

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/it/press-room/20211129IPR18314/sakharov-prize-2021-interviews-with-alexei-navalny-s-representatives

Status of World Nuclear Forces 2020*
Country	Deployed Strategic	Deployed Nonstrategic	Reserve/ Nondeployed	Military Stockpile^a	Total Inventory^b
Russia	1,572^c	0^d	2,740^e	4,312	6,372^f
United States	1,600^g	150^h	2,050ⁱ	3,800^j	5,800^k
France	280^l	n.a.	10^l	290	290
China	0^m	?	320	320	320^m
United Kingdom	120ⁿ	n.a.	75	195	195ⁿ
Israel	0	n.a.	90	90	90^o
Pakistan	0	n.a.	160	160	160^p
India	0	n.a.	150	150	150^q
North Korea	0	n.a.	35	35	³⁵^r
Total:^s	~3,720	~150	~5,630	~9,320	~13,410

English for Diplomacy

venerdì 4 febbraio 2022

What are the main factors that will influence the evolution of relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation?

The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement entered into force on 1 September 2017 and Ukraine is

including its Ballistic Missile Defence

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