A possible essay plan on Populism and the future

 Is the rise of populism a real threat to the international liberal order and to EU unity?

Introduction: Start with a reference to one or two recent developments relating to the question to show you are up aware of the impact of this trend, e.g. the election and presidency of Donald Trump, Macron and the Yellow Vest movement, the anti-vax movement, Bolsonaro, Brexit, new political groups in Germany, Austria, Spain, (Italy?) etc...

Line of argument: This essay will argue that the threat to the liberal international order and UN unity is not populism itself but the unresolved causes of populism.

Introduction: Give a definition of populism – for, example your own or the one by the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde

https://www.ufficiostampa.provincia.tn.it/Comunicati/Cas-Mudde-Populism-is-a-thin-centered-ideology

who argues that it is not based simply on emotional rhetoric and is not a temporary opportunistic phenomenon or a detailed ideology, but instead has two essential features. First, it divides the political world into the 'people' and the political élite, which, it argues, is corrupt and pursues its own interests rather than those of the people. Second, populists believe that politics should be the expression of the 'general will' of the people (a rather frightening concept if one thinks of the French Revolution!). Evidence that they may be badly-informed is rejected as 'fake news'.

Causes of the rise of populism – in developed economies the failure of the traditional  parties of the centre-right and centre-left to guarantee the prosperity (low unemployment and a moderate rise in living standards) that they had previously guaranteed for the middle and lower classes / for those without a university qualification, there has been the loss of manufacturing jobs in developed economies,  stagnant salaries and growing income inequality / the lack of employment opportunities particularly for the younger generation, even those who are well-qualified / unemployment or underemployment for those in their 30s and 40s (the Yellow Vest movement) / widespread anger with rising immigration (at unprecedented levels into the EU in 2015-2016) seen as competition for jobs, a downward pressure on incomes and a threat to identity / and thus a growing sense of exclusion from politics.

Other concerns in Europe, whether legitimate or not, include:

the idea that the institutional architecture of the EU is in some way undemocratic and requires reform / that EU leaders are too distant from EU voters and fail to respond to them and communicate properly with them / that the currency union has not been a success for all member states / that some members are treated better while others are punished or abandoned (Italy, Spain and Greece and migration).

In developing countries which have seen periods of economic expansion, the anger may be more focused on inequalities of wealth and land ownership, widespread corruption or on the failure of the government to control the cost of living and provide basic services like a public health service (Chile, Brazil, Lebanon, Iraq, Argentina, Iran, the Arab Spring), security and physical safety (Mexico, the drug cartels, crime and violence).

One much more traditional sense of populism remains and that is popular opposition to an undemocratic regime and that is what happened in the Arab Spring(s), in Hong Kong and in Myanmar. In the Arab Spring the desire for political reform was mixed with expectations that greater democracy would bring rapid improvements in terms of lower prices for food and other basics, increasing prosperity and social reform – expectations which a revolution, even when successful, can rarely meet in the short term. Egypt has seen the restoration of authoritarian rule by the army and security forces. Tunisia, long seen as the sole democratic success story of the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings, is now in turmoil with protests against the Tunisian president for expanding his legislative and executive powers and suspending some parts of the constitution and an ongoing crackdown on the protestors.

One interesting question would be the role of ICTS (internet, social media and cell phones) in all this, in forming opinion, fostering the formation of non-Parliamentary movements and in providing a means for a looser, more flexible form of political organization.

Consequences – growing disillusion, scepticism and cynicism regarding the political ruling class and 'political correctness' (seen as favouring minorities and ignoring the majority), anger with the traditional parties, seen as self-interested, corrupt, élitist or simply incompetent and unable to respond to these challenges, and an anger with international bodies, such as the EU or UN, the WTO and IMF (for example, from nationalists but also from the anti-globalization movement) also seen as too expensive, too far from the people and corrupt, or not interested in the problems of ordinary people, or simply irrelevant. This has often led to the rise of 'anti-system' movements, a return to nationalism, a political arena that populists believe is more natural in cultural terms and can be controlled by the people (give examples, Hungary, Poland, Brexit). The new populists, however, often have little experience of government and may make unrealistic promises, raising unrealistic expectations, and this has led to instability in both domestic politics (give an example) and foreign relations e.g.  Trump and NATO allies, Trump and China, moments of tension in relations between Italy and France and a weakening of the existing international institutions as the US seemed to refuse to want to continue to be the guarantor of the system. With Biden’s election, a more stable environment has returned, but the American public remains profoundly divided.

Conclusion – all this is a real threat to international cooperation and the effectiveness of international institutions, given that populist movements tend to prioritize national issues and solutions, at a time when many of our problems are of a global, or at least international nature and can only be successfully dealt with at that level. However, the problem is not populism itself but the underlying causes which seem to be our failure at the national, regional (EU) and global level to manage the economic and social effects of globalization in a way that reassures people about social stability and their prospects and their children's prospects for the future.

Western Europe is characterized by the welfare state and the great challenges to that model are the pressures from a globalized economy. For example, many experts argue that in a globalized economy, private companies in Italy should give jobs to the best-qualified and cheapest, even if they are foreigners based abroad, and move production to countries where labor is cheaper. Is that an acceptable model? If so, how do we adapt our society to it? If not, how do we redesign an effective European alternative that preserves the basics of the welfare state and our commitment to social inclusiveness?

https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/jan/10/we-the-people-the-battle-to-define-populism

How can EU leaders and institutions respond to the call for greater democracy and better communication? How can the UN’s pledge on poverty in the developing world - to leave no one behind – also be applied economically and politically within the EU (a developed economy) in regard to its citizens and members? Or is its future likely to be further fragmentation, the "multi-speed Europe" (or 'a core Europe and a periphery') as with the existing situation with the Euro and the Schengen area?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-speed_Europe#Participation_of_European_countries_in_non_EU-only_integration_initiatives