US nominal GDP was $Q4 2021
China’s nominal GDP was $Q4 2021
https://www.imf.org/en/search#q=China%20nominal%20GDP&sort=relevancy
The
IMF estimates US GDP growth for 2022 at 3.7%, for
2021 at 5.7% (after a fall of -3.4% in 2020 and an increase of 2.3% in 2019)
and for China at 4.4% for 2022, at 8.1% in 2021 (after a rise of 2.3% in 2020
and 6.1% in 2019).
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/WEOWORLD/USA
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/WEOWORLD/CHN
Historically, the U.S. public debt as
a share of gross domestic product (GDP) has increased
during wars and recessions and subsequently declined. The ratio of debt to GDP
may decrease as a result of a government surplus or via growth of GDP and
inflation. For example, debt held by the public as a share of GDP peaked just
after World War II (113% of GDP in 1945) but then fell over the following 35
years. In recent decades, aging demographics and rising healthcare costs have led to concern
about the long-term sustainability of the federal government's fiscal policies. The aggregate, gross
amount that Treasury can borrow is limited by the United States debt ceiling but this was raised in
December 2021 to meet the costs of the Covid-19 pandemic.
In February 2022, the public debt of
the United States was around 30.29 trillion U.S. dollars, around 2.39
trillion more than a year earlier, when it was around 27.9 trillion U.S.
dollars.
This is an estimated 130.65% of forecast GDP in 2022
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the federal government spent trillions in virus aid and economic relief. The
government estimated that the budget deficit for fiscal year 2020 increased to
$3.1 trillion or 15% GDP, more than triple that of 2019 and the largest as
a percentage of GDP since 1945.
The first year that President Biden budgeted is fiscal
2022, which runs from October 1, 2021 to September 30, 2022. CBO forecast in
July 2021 that the budget deficit in fiscal year 2022 will be $1.2 trillion, or
4.7% GDP. This is a significant reduction to the budget deficits of $3.1
trillion (15.0% GDP) in FY2020 and $2.8 trillion (12.4% GDP) in FY2021, the
last two fiscal years budgeted by President Trump. Those two record annual
budget deficits were unusually high, primarily due to response measures to the COVID-19 pandemic in the
United States.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_federal_budget
Who holds the US public debt? Most of the debt is held by the public and
US federal agencies (see charts).
Foreign holders of United States treasury debt – according to the Federal Reserve and U.S. Department of the Treasury, foreign countries held a total of 7.55 trillion U.S. dollars (24.9%) in U.S. treasury securities as of September 2021. Of the total 7.55 trillion held by foreign countries, Japan held 1.30 trillion (4.3%) and China held 1.06 trillion (3.5%).
https://www.statista.com/statistics/246420/major-foreign-holders-of-us-treasury-debt/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_United_States
As already indicated Gross Federal Debt to GDP ratio
was forecast at 130.65% in the first quarter
of 2021 (as of March), a reduction of about 1.97% compared with 2020 (when it
was 133.28% of GDP) but still considerably more than the Debt of 113% of GDP in 1945 at the
end of WWII.
In the longer-term, the United States Gross
Federal Debt to GDP is projected to trend to over 133.46% in 2026.
So given its huge public debt, some commentators argue that the US
has now begun an inevitable decline as the dominant economic power, a decline
that may soon erode not only its economic position but also impact its military
dominance. However, according to other experts the relative decline of US power
is at least partially exaggerated and can better be seen as an opportunity for
Washington to redefine its strategic commitments, renegotiate alliances with
its partners and free up resources to relaunch its economy.
The Covid-19 pandemic and war in
Ukraine obviously continue to make all forecasts dubious, so the relatively optimistic
predictions for the global economy in 2022-3 will depend greatly on the
effectiveness and rapid distribution of vaccines and on containing the effects
of the war. Clearly, however, China has weathered the storm in economic terms
more successfully so far than its competitors. It could overtake the US as the
world’s largest economy in nominal terms by 2030
https://www.voanews.com/a/chinas-economy-could-overtake-us-economy-by-2030/6380892.html
In GDP PPP terms the Chinese economy is already bigger
than the US economy (estimated at $30.18 trillion against $25.35 in 2022)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)
The credit rating for the US ranges from AAA to AA+ with
a stable outlook.
https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/rating
The debate between pessimists and more sanguine observers
has intensified. The former predict a serious and rapid decline in US influence
and the growth of a much more multipolar world strongly influenced by China,
while the latter are confident that for the foreseeable future the US will be
able to maintain its leadership role in international relations. Moreover, they
argue that if we consider the West as a whole, rather than the US alone,
then, despite Europe’s continuing economic difficulties, China cannot really
hope to achieve dominance in terms of economic and military power. In addition,
the world’s principal global institutions are all expressions of the West’s
value system and China seems basically to be in the process of joining this
system, adapting to it and trying to gain more influence within it, rather than
wanting to overturn it or see it collapse as the Soviet Union did.
So, in spite of the economic
crisis in 2008 and the alarming economic challenges of the current pandemic and
the war in Ukraine, forecasts of definitive decline seem premature and the US
remains the principal power at the center of the international stage.
As for military power, the US military budget still represented 39% of total
global military spending, $778 billion in 2021. Global spending was $1.981
trillion. The US still spent more than China, India, Russia, the UK., Saudi
Arabia, Germany, France, and Japan combined
in 2021.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures
Moreover, NATO, the US-led 30-member alliance, accounted for an estimated $1.2 trillion, of a total
of $1.92 trillion (62.5%) for global military spending in 2021
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/this-is-how-much-nato-countries-spend-on-defense/
However, if the military spending of other US allies
(e.g. Japan, Australia, South Korea etc.)
is added, this figure rises and suggests that the US remains, at least
potentially, the dominant military power in international relations. The US has
major military bases in 38 countries (750 including smaller ones in 80
countries) around the world compared with: Russia in 9, France in 14, Britain
in 16, India in 5 and China in 3.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_overseas_military_bases
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_overseas_military_bases#United_States
So the 2021 figures show the US military budget as
roughly 3 times that times of China.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures
Finally, the US was still the world leader for
investment in research in 2021 (although China is not far behind), and in the
list of the top 20 universities worldwide, between 10 and 14 are American,
according to which list you choose to believe. Many others are European and
only one or two Asian.
http://uis.unesco.org/apps/visualisations/research-and-development-spending/
https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2020
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2020/world-ranking#!/page/0/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats
However, over the last decade, the US share of global GDP (PPP) fell to 15.83 %
(2020)
while China´s
share of global GDP PPP increased to 18.33% (however the EU also accounted for
14.98% of global GDP PPP). As already mentioned, in nominal terms the US remains
ahead but at this pace of growth China may overtake US nominal GDP by as early
as 2030. So, although US strength is evident, its relative decline is real.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/253512/share-of-the-eu-in-the-inflation-adjusted-global-gross-domestic-product/
In fact, in 2021, the country´s reliance on imports,
combined with its growing debt and its huge military expenditure since 9⁄11 as
it expanded its military and counter-terrorism operations around the world,
inflated its annual budget deficit which stood at 8.6% of GDP for the 2011
fiscal year. After significant spending cuts it returned to its historical
average relative to the size of the economy (around 3% of GDP) registering 2.4%
in 2015. After that the annual budget deficit began to rise again, 3.1% in
2016, 3.4% in 2017, 3.8% in 2018 and 4.6% in 2019 and 15.0% with the
pandemic in 2020 (twice the rate recorded during the recession in 2009). It has
now returned to 4.7% for 2021-2.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)
On the
other hand, GDP PPP per capita (both
nominal and PPP) clearly indicates
that in 2022 American citizens are still far richer than their Chinese
counterparts (5 times (nominal) and 3.5 (PPP) times richer).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)_per_capita
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita
Per capita income is usually a good indicator of how
much money governments can generate in taxes for government projects at home
and abroad.
Moreover, the Chinese authorities may face some
obstacles as they try to steer their economy away from a model where growth is
based on exports to one where domestic consumption plays a much greater role.
These problems include growing debt within the Chinese economic system,
potential domestic unrest, continuing high levels of savings and fast-growing but
relatively low domestic consumption, an aging population (which will become a
significant factor in the next 20 years), a still relatively weak health care
system and widespread corruption. As China moves to respond to these challenges
its labor costs are likely to begin to rise.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-debt-idUSKCN1UD0KD
https://warontherocks.com/2021/12/could-chinas-massive-public-debt-torpedo-the-global-economy/
However,
according to the World Bank, more than a third of the debt of poor counties is
owed to China
https://hbr.org/2020/02/how-much-money-does-the-world-owe-china
The
reputation of the Chinese model and its soft power has also been damaged by
growing domestic repression
https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china/report-china/
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/china-and-tibet
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/02/09/can-china-turn-the-tides-and-mend-its-reputation/
https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/china-is-making-support-for-democracy-a-crime-in-hong-kong/
https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/carrie-lams-departure-signals-a-further-crackdown-in-hong-kong/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xinjiang_internment_camps
https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/the-underlying-politics-of-poverty-alleviation-in-tibet/
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/global
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protest_and_dissent_in_China
Are we
facing the start of a new Cold War as Russia and China work more closely
together?
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53104730
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/New-cold-wars-emanating-from-Russia-China-put-Asia-on-edge
China holds very large foreign exchange reserves, particularly in dollars, although these have declined over the last year to March 2022. As stated above, in 2021, of the total $7.55 trillion of US public debt held by foreign countries, Japan held 1.30 trillion (4.3%) and China held 1.06 trillion (3.5%).
https://tradingeconomics.com/china/foreign-exchange-reserves
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_foreign-exchange_reserves
The US long accused China of currency manipulation,
keeping the Yuan/Renminbi at a low exchange
rate value in order to boost exports, but it has risen and continues to rise in
value.
https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/analysts-2022-outlook-chinese-yuan-2021-12-02/
The Yuan/Renminbi is
now increasingly popular for global payments
Meanwhile, China is the principal stake-holder in the
BRICS’ New Development Bank and the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
China is also the main trading partner for Africa and an important investor in
Africa (with the EU and to a lesser extent, the US). Trade with Africa fell
dramatically in the first quarter of 2020 but has now rebounded. Will this
strengthen support for China in Africa, not only as an economic investor but
also as a political ally?
https://www.statista.com/chart/26668/main-import-countries-sources-africa/
https://qz.com/africa/2154820/why-is-the-us-fixated-on-chinas-rise-in-africa/
https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/african-opportunities-in-china-africa-relations/
https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/chinas-presence-in-africa-is-at-heart-political/
And with its Belt and Road Initiative China
is set to become a major investor and source of investment capital for many
developing countries, which will increase both its economic and political leverage
with these countries.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative
The US has
imposed a series of sanctions on China, for economic, political and human
rights reasons
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/2021-u-s-sanctions-year-in-review-1657396/
under
President Trump there was a trade war between the US and China. President Biden
has reversed many but not all of those tariffs
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/26/politics/china-tariffs-biden-policy/index.html
High levels of personal savings are thought to represent one of the most striking characteristics of the Chinese economy
http://www.voxchina.org/show-3-125.html
While consumer spending still only amounted to 37.8%
of GDP in Dec 2020, compared with more than 68% in the US
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DPCERE1Q156NBEA
investments stood at a very high level estimated at
about 41.6% of GDP (IMF for 2021). The US stood at 22.3%.
Along with massive investments in industrial
infrastructure (a good indicator of future competitivity) there has also been a
rise in property prices in urban, industrial areas with significant social
consequences.
Moreover, the Chinese government is now having to try to
cope with the rising demand for social services by shifting resources from
other kinds of investments to welfare.
China is rapidly increasing investment in
technology, particularly in IT, and education. US companies operating in China
have registered very high productivity levels while benefiting so far from much
lower labor costs. However, there are now signs that as labor flows from rural
areas begin to slow and demand for skilled workers rises, labor costs in China
are now beginning to rise though they obviously remain below levels in the US
and Europe. This may lead some companies to relocate but it is also a sign of the
strength of the Chinese economy.
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/27/chinese-wages-rise-made-in-china-isnt-so-cheap-anymore.html
What if the US chooses not to lead?
This is a more difficult question to respond to, especially
given the role of isolationism in US history.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_non-interventionism#Between_the_World_Wars
The US seemed to have partially retreated from world
affairs under President Trump. President
Trump's foreign policy stance sounded isolationist at times (the Paris climate
agreement, the Mexican border, comments about NATO partners, withdrawal from
the Iran deal, the ban on Muslim visitors to the US from some Islamic
countries, US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement, the“TPP”, the reintroduction
of tariffs on a wide range of goods, the withdrawal of more troops from Syria
and Afghanistan), but hard line at others (its position on China, supporting
Israel, against terrorism, against Iran, against Maduro in Venezuela,
withdrawal from the Intermediate
Nuclear Forces Treaty). Certainly, Trump’s foreign policy was more
unilateral, much more based on narrowly perceived national interests and
involved much less consultation with US allies. In contrast, President Biden
wants the US to return to cooperation and consultation and its traditional
role, but to just what extent is not clear yet since it faces the constraints
of the domestic pandemic crisis and an expanding national debt.
https://www.cato.org/commentary/biden-foreign-policy-restraint-circumstance-not-design
A re-evaluation and reduction in US strategic
commitments in some areas in order to exercise more influence in others seems
likely. After the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the European continent lost relevance in the eyes of America as the threat
level was reduced. However, events in Ukraine in 2014 and growing tension with
Russia forced a review of this policy and the launching of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence mission.
The Russian
invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, has clearly brought, the US, NATO and the
EU together
https://www.freiheit.org/nato-g7-and-eu-come-together-show-western-unity
The US formally withdrew its last 'combat troops' from
Iraq in December 2011 and from Afghanistan in December 2014. It reduced its
presence in both countries to 2,500 at the end of 2020.
The Biden administration’s withdrawal of the remainder
of its troops from Afghanistan in 2021 led to the collapse of the government
and the return to power of the Taliban
https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/08/15/world/taliban-afghanistan-news
The future
of Obama's pivot to Asia is unclear but there has been a build-up of US naval
forces in the Western Pacific in response to North
Korean threats and perceived Chinese 'expansionism' and Trump talked of a 'free
and open Indo-Pacific ' region with the US not seeking domination but rather a
partnership with strong, independent nations willing to play by the rules, see
the Asia Reassurance
Initiative Act.
Will President Biden pursue a new pivot to Asia?
https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/trumps-post-pivot-strategy/
https://www.csis.org/analysis/asia-reassurance-initiative-act-reassuring-australia
https://www.dw.com/en/can-president-joe-biden-return-the-us-pivot-to-asia/a-56337037
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), colloquially the Quad, is a strategic security dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States that is maintained
by talks between member countries. The diplomatic and military arrangement
was widely viewed as a response to increased Chinese economic and military
power, and the Chinese government responded to the Quadrilateral dialogue by
issuing formal diplomatic protests to its members, calling it the "Asian NATO"
China is aware of the policy being adopted by the US
and clearly sees it as an attempt to undermine its growing influence in the
region. Tensions over developments regarding Taiwan are also indicative of the
frictions which are perhaps inevitable as a rapidly growing regional power
challenges a global power whose resources, while vast, are now limited. If
China continues to grow at current rates but fails to democratize and develop
towards the Western model, then a strengthening of security ties between
China’s neighbors, many of which are democratic states is a likely response to
safeguard independence and shared values. Other smaller, non-democratic
neighbors of China may be drawn towards cooperation with the US simply to
balance the influence of China (e.g. Vietnam).
https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/08/what-does-vietnam-think-about-americas-indo-pacific.html
More importantly, the combined economic
resources (in terms of GDP) and military resources of the West (NATO in its
narrowest sense, perhaps the OECD in its widest sense) as a whole is and will
remain far beyond the capacity of China to challenge. US military spending
alone is three times that of China (2021). Certainly, China’s power and influence
is going to grow both regionally and globally, perhaps in partnership with
Russia at the UN and through the BRICS group. However, there may be an alternative
scenario to confrontation. China is a major stakeholder in the current international
order, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, an important WTO and
IMF member, and, above all, as a state holding large foreign currency reserves and
one which also has growing overseas investments (estimated to have reached $1.23
trillion by 2019).
https://chinapower.csis.org/china-foreign-direct-investment/
So even though China may continue to stand on its sovereignty and use nationalist rhetoric that defies international comment (on issues such as human rights in China, its lack of democracy and the situation in Tibet) as interference in its domestic affairs, it is probable that its stake in the existing global order will continue to grow and that, although it may try at times to make the liberal order rather less liberal, it will, nevertheless, have good reason to adopt a policy of accommodation and cooperation rather than one of confrontation.
In the end perhaps it is the definition of what we mean by the ‘West’ that is
of paramount importance in today’s world. Once that meant Europe and North
America, plus countries like Australia and New Zealand. It would be difficult
today not to include Japan. And then there is the OECD. More importantly, it is
the core liberal democratic values enshrined in the main global institutions
from the UN down which best define the West. These are values which many countries
(Brazil, India, but many more in Latin America and Africa and Southern Asia)
and not only the richer, developed ones but developing ones too, have invested
in, or are investing in, and which increasingly represent the normative
political expectations (how things should be) for ordinary people all over the
world. The wave of democratization in the 1990s and at least part of the political
hopes expressed in the early days of the Arab Spring suggest that the West in
this sense is very much alive and flourishing, with or without US leadership.
And a ‘West’ which is global and multipolar, rather than simply a US-led NATO,
may be a very positive evolution. Strangely, al-Qaeda and Islamic State, in
describing the UN and other international agencies as agents of Western
cultural imperialism may simply be acknowledging the extent to which
once-Western values are now becoming universal.
In the last few years, we have witnessed a rise in
nationalism and authoritarianism
https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/understanding-global-rise-authoritarianism
but this is likely to be a response to and protest against the excesses of globalization, rather than real disillusion with or disaffection from democracy and civil rights. Those who doubt the attraction of the West’s cultural model should perhaps pay more attention to the number of migrants and refugees for most of whom the West remains the preferred destination in terms of their hopes for prosperity, security and freedom.
Note – the West in modern English is not normally used as a synonym for
European colonialism (I think this is mainly because European colonialism –
often based on slavery and doctrines of racial superiority – is now seen as
something clearly in contrast with many basic, modern Western values). It is
mainly used in international relations to refer to those countries evolving towards
liberal democracy and a free (today usually mixed) market economy, from the
late 18th century, through the 19th century and up to
1945. Since the end of the Second World War, it has been used to describe first
NATO and other allies outside NATO (like Australia) and then gradually to
include all those countries which generally embrace Western values.
More background material
US economy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_United_States
China is
responding to the US presence in the Pacific and has expand its economic
cooperation in the Pacific, first by signing the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) in 2020
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_Comprehensive_Economic_Partnership
and now by
applying to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP), Sept 2021
It can thus present itself as a promoter of free trade
agreements. Simultaneously, China is carrying out a diplomatic initiative in
Central Asia with the goal of reestablishing the old “Silk Road”.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Belt_One_Road_Initiative
This initiative has led to wider cooperation with many countries, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, aimed at creating a safe-area for international trade and at ensuring gas and oil supplies to China, which are extremely important to China’s industrial production. This initiative has also led to competition between China and the EU for influence in the region and for gas and oil supplies. However, this competition may actually lead to cooperation between China and the EU in Central Asia, in terms of building new pipelines, which could have both Europe and China as final delivery points.
As China has become
more involved in the international community from an economic point of view, some
political cooperation has followed. In recent years,
Chinese military personnel have taken part in UN missions in Cambodia, the Republic
of the Congo, Liberia, Sudan and Lebanon. In 2015, a combat deployment was sent
to South Sudan, where China has significant oil investments. In
addition, China’s navy has actively participated in the anti-piracy operations in
the Gulf of Aden.
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-gosset/china-us-relations_b_1998484.html
https://chinapower.csis.org/china-un-mission/
Basically, the expansion of China’s
economic interests around the world has led to growing political awareness
among the Chinese leadership of the need to protect those interests and engage
on international issues, especially those closely related to international
security. This has resulted in China playing a more active role within the
international community. This trend culminated with the agreement signed with
Djibouti concerning the creation of China’s first real military base abroad in
order to secure trade between China and Africa. However, in the Middle East
region, China has taken a carefully balanced position in the dispute between
Sunni and Shia Muslims and between their main sponsors, namely Saudi Arabia and
Iran. In fact, the publication of China’s Arab Policy Paper shows that the
China wants to adopt a global approach to the Islamic world without taking
sides. Such a policy will make it possible for China to deal with both Saudi
Arabia and Iran to obtain from both parties an agreement on oil supplies, which
is fundamental for China’s economic growth. It also explains China’s willingness
to act as a mediator between the US and Iran (which resulted in the 5+1 Nuclear
Agreement with Iran and in the lifting of economic sanctions) and in the Syrian
civil war.
Potential areas of disagreement between China and the West
As mentioned above China’s neighbors
are worried about its expansionist ambitions in the East Asian area e.g. the
dispute over the Senkaku Islands, located in the South China Sea and claimed by
both China and Japan.
China is the world’s biggest polluter
in terms of CO2 emissions. And the US its second biggest. Although China took
part in a series of international conferences and welcomed the agreement at the
Climate Conference, CoP21, in Paris in December 2015, and made a joint commitment
with the US in 2021,
many countries remain doubtful about
China’s commitment to making real changes, given that the agreement is not
binding in any practical way.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-contradictions-climate-leadership
China’s domestic human rights record
has worsened in recent years, including the use of the death penalty and
repression of political and religious opposition leaders, critics and
dissidents (Hong Kong) and discrimination against minorities (e.g. Tibetans and
Uyghurs and Christians).
https://qz.com/993601/china-uyghur-terrorism/
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/12/chinas-dangerous-ethnic-policies-in-xinjiang/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senkaku_Islands_dispute
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/p31345
http://fortune.com/2016/01/19/taiwan-tsai-ing-wen-china/
http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/china-and-climate-change-three-things-to-watch-after-paris/
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/china
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/29/china-new-hong-kong-law-roadmap-repression
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/31/tibet-china-repression-xinjiang-sinicization/
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